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ABSTRACT 
 
This work explores the philosophical implications of moral conversion: the fact 
that, at some point in their lives, people may change their deep-seated convictions, 
attitudes and patterns of action regarding moral matters in rather unexpected and 
surprising ways. The fact of moral conversion and the common characteristics of the 
process are established through the analysis of a compilation of stories of moral 
conversion from various sources and settings. This analysis yields the definition of 
conversion as an “existential change” in the person, and six classes of moral conversion 
are identified. Turning to the philosophical implications of moral conversion, the work 
examines its possible bearing, first, on the free choice/determinism debate, proposing  
that a study of moral conversion is of some interest to this discussion because the 
unpredictability of moral conversion challenges determinism, and because during the 
process the subject often undergoes certain experiences that may be revealing of free 
choice. Second, the work examines the implications of moral conversion for the debate 
on internalism and externalism, proposing that the fact of moral conversion supports an 
internalist view of morality, i.e., that the intelligible content of moral norms, as 
understood by the moral agent, is one of the central operative factors in the agent’s 
adopting (and then living by) the new moral standards. 
 
 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This work explores the philosophical implications of the fact that, at some point in 
their lives, people may change their deep-seated convictions about morality in rather 
unexpected and surprising ways; that as a result they may adopt views, attitudes and/or 
patterns of behavior that are generally regarded as morally better than those held previous 
to the change, even if the moral standards involved appear to be in many ways more 
challenging; and that these changes take place when people find that their views, attitudes 
and/or patterns of behavior are in some way unreasonable. The expression moral 
conversion will be used to designate these instances.
The fact of moral conversion itself needs to be established; there is no shortage of 
views, in both the spheres of common sense and philosophical reflection, that reject the 
possibility of human beings changing morally for the better. Some would reject it on the 
grounds of a pessimistic view of human nature, that considers human beings just too 
strongly drawn towards selfish behavior, dishonesty, inauthenticity, the abuse of power, 
and other forms of behavior generally regarded as morally lacking. Others would reject it 
on the grounds of deterministic views that consider the change itself to be impossible, 
either from the belief that moral behavior is, for good or ill, entirely determined by 





person’s moral habits – due to moral education or to the lack of it – settle in, 
“crystallize,” so to speak. 
The fact of moral conversion cannot then be taken for granted; that moral 
conversion actually takes place has to be proved, and this in turn demands a specific 
methodology. The problem is addressed by providing, along with the philosophical 
discussion, a substantial amount of what is called here “narrative evidence”: evidence 
from real-life stories that exemplify and demonstrate the possibility of moral conversion 
in very diverse areas of life (political commitment, criminal rehabilitation, career shifts, 
alcoholic recovery, etc). These are the “narratives of hope” to which the title makes 
reference. They show that change is possible even in very dark corners of human 
experience. 
Among the main goals of this dissertation, however, is that of demonstrating that 
these changes take place due to, as was said, the person becoming aware that his/her 
views, attitudes and/or patterns of behavior are in some way or other unreasonable, and 
that an interior demand for adopting a more reasonable position in this sense is operative 
in moral conversion. This claim involves what is often called an “internalist” position in 
reference to the origin of moral convictions, attitude and behavior. In essence, this view 
entails that a person’s understanding of what is involved in certain moral rules and 
norms, or in the wider criteria that ground such norms, or even in living a moral life in 
general, is operative in a person’s adopting and living by particular moral standards. A 
methodological difficulty for defending this view (or its opposite, for that matter: an 




structures take shape (for the most part at least) early in infancy and childhood, when our 
capacities for introspective examination and for verbally articulating our cognitive 
processes are not fully developed; as a consequence, our access to cognitive processes 
during those stages is significantly limited. During moral conversion, however, the 
person is present to significant changes in these moral structures at an age in which the 
capacities for an introspective examination and articulation may be fully developed. A 
study of moral conversion, therefore, may offer a “privileged” window into the cognitive/ 
volitional processes through which the moral structures of a person come into being. 
Substantiating this internalist claim, however, requires that the narrative evidence 
provide, as much as possible, not only an external description of behavioral changes, or a 
statement of the observable evidence of a person’s moral convictions “before and after” 
the change took place, but as much insight as possible into the person’s thoughts, 
motives, reasons, or more generally, the cognitive and volitional processes involved in 
the change. This requirement imposes the methodological need to focus on a small 
number of narratives that provide sufficiently rich descriptions, rather than attempt an 
extensive survey of a statistically relevant number of events that would serve little 
purpose for this project. (The Appendix groups all the narratives used in one place, some 
summarized by the author, some transcribed verbatim from the source. Some readers 
have expressed that they benefited from reading at a certain point the Appendix as a 
whole, since this gave them a panoramic view of the stories covered, and an idea of their 




The methodology employed, in other words, is in this respect closer to that of the 
historian than to that of the sociologist. Nevertheless, the variety of stories that, from a 
common sense point of view, could be considered as instances of moral conversion, is 
enormous. A framework is required to categorize the narratives and discuss their 
implications in a meaningful way. None of the available definitions of moral conversion, 
however, was either sufficiently inclusive or sufficiently specific to accomplish this. It 
was necessary therefore, as part of the methodology, to develop this framework. 
The first third of this dissertation is devoted to these preliminaries. Chapter 1 
introduces the notion of “conversion,” as it is often considered, almost identified with 
religious conversion, but not enough to preclude its fruitful use in other areas. Chapter 2 
considers some of the few systematic attempts to study religious conversion, from which 
a more specific characterization of the notion of conversion begins to take shape. Chapter 
3 considers how the notion of conversion was developed in the past century by Bernard 
Lonergan, producing as a result a renewed philosophical and theological interest in 
conversion and yielding explicitly the distinction between different types of conversion, 
moral conversion among them. The resulting scholarship produced most of the literature 
available now that deals specifically with moral conversion. 
Chapter 4 presents a dynamic description of religious conversion. Though it does 
not correlate sufficiently with what can be gathered from narratives of moral conversion, 
this description helps visualize conversion as a dynamic process, with various stages of 




Chapter 5 develops a threefold framework for both including and categorizing 
specific instances of moral conversion. It takes into account both a Classical and a 
modern/contemporary notion of morality (the former focused on happiness, the latter on 
the ideas of right/wrong and moral obligation), and the possibility of conversion 
involving changes regarding ideas/convictions, attitude, and a person’s coherence in their 
behavior with regard to their attitude and convictions. Once this framework is set in 
place, however, further questions arise as to the meaning of “moral conversion,” in terms 
of its boundaries and connections with other important changes. Chapter 6 examines in 
further detail the distinction between moral and religious conversion, and Chapter 7 the 
distinction between moral conversion and psychological healing as the goal of 
psychological therapy. 
A more substantial difficulty for a meaningful characterization of moral conversion 
arises from the observation (substantiated by research on the psychology of moral 
development) that human beings do as a norm go during their lives through various 
stages of moral development. Can these changes in the structure of a person’s moral 
thinking be equated with conversion? Chapter 8 addresses this difficulty. In order to do 
so, it examines in more depth the characterization – presented in Chapter 5 – of 
conversion in general as an “existential” change, and contrasts this character with the 
“natural/spontaneous” character of developmental changes. This contrast is found with 
special intensity in the type of conversion characterized as “sharp-turn,” as opposed to 




normal dynamism of moral development. As a result, “sharp-turn” conversion becomes 
the focus of reflection in the chapters that follow. 
Chapter 9 considers the implications of characterizing moral conversion as 
existential in terms of the debate on free will and determinism. Moral conversion is often 
presented in fiction stories as a highly dramatic event, involving intense deliberation and 
strenuous resolve, and thus such stories suggest that moral conversion may be a 
privileged setting for certain experiences that could be “revealing” of free will, such as 
indecision and resolve. A study of real narratives of moral conversion, however, suggests 
that the actual process is commonly less dramatic – it shows, so to speak, a quality more 
akin to reaching a conclusion than to reaching a difficult decision. Chapter 9 indicates 
some possible directions in which moral conversion may be used as evidence in the free 
will/determinism discussion, when considered in these more measured terms. While the 
results are somewhat ambiguous, the discussion of this chapter does highlight the 
importance, for the process of moral conversion, of the role of cognitive operations. This 
process is analyzed in Chapter 10, using as a working framework Bernard Lonergan’s 
analysis of cognitive operations, together with Brian Cronin’s reading of Lonergan’s 
theory of value. The conclusion reached in this chapter is that an examination of 
narratives of moral conversion supports what will be called a joined affective/cognitive 




CONVERSION: THE ETYMOLOGICAL CONTEXT 
 
A first approach to the meaning of “conversion” can be attempted through an 
examination of the uses that the term (and related expressions) have had in previous 
times, and the use the word has in the present. The English word “conversion” derives 
from the Latin “conversus,” past participle of the verb “convertere” (con: toward, with, 
and vertere: to turn, to revolve, to change direction and orientation), which has the basic 
meaning of “to turn round,” “to change direction,” to revolve or to reverse. While the 
spatial connotation of the term was basic in its Latin use, it is worth noting that a 
specifically religious sense of the term accompanied from early times the spatial 
connotation: in Souter's Glossary of Later Latin to 600 A.D., “conversio” is listed as 
meaning both the revolution of the celestial bodies and the turning of the sinful man to 
God.1 The Latin term carries forward the religious meaning of the Hebrew šûb (noun 
sûbâ), and of the Greek verbs στρέφω and έπιστρέφω (noun έπιστροφή) frequently used 
in both the Old and New Testament, which refer literally to the idea of “turning” or 
“returning.”2  
                                                 
1 John E. Smith, “The Concept of Conversion,” in Conversion: Perspectives on Personal and Social 
Transformation, ed. Walter E. Conn (New York: Alba House, 1978), 51-52. 
2 Catholic University of America, New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd ed., 15 vols. (Detroit; Washington, 





Within religious discourse, the meaning of the term is not univocal; it may be more 
accurate to speak of a “set of meanings” or a group of analogical notions. “Conversion” 
can be simply a synonym for “repentance.” It can mean that a person or a group of 
persons joins - with varying degrees of intellectual, affective, and overall personal 
commitment - a certain faith, belief, observance, or perhaps a certain denomination 
within that faith. It can mean the experience of interior assent to the reality of a living 
God, a meaning that is set sometimes in contrast to the external act of joining a Church. 
Depending on the source, varying emphasis is put on the importance of external actions 
as evidence of a “true” conversion. The Christian tradition emphasizes the role of divine 
grace (which the person should receive with an appropriately open heart) over the 
subject’s own efforts.3 Within the monotheistic religions, the need for conversion has 
been consistently emphasized over the centuries, though any of these meanings may have 
been in the foreground during different time periods. 
Beyond religious discourse, the term “conversion” came to be used in a wide 
variety of contexts and disciplines, sometimes becoming a technical term relevant to that 
field, most frequently with the meaning of “transformation,” of “turning something to 
something.” The term can refer, for example, to a mathematical operation in which a 
measure is transposed to a different measuring unit: converting Fahrenheit to Celsius, 
dollars to pounds, ounces to grams. In logic, “conversion” means an exchange in the 
                                                 
3 Condâe Bâenoist Pallen and John J. Wynne, “conversion,” in The New Catholic Dictionary; a Complete 
Work of Reference on Every Subject in the Life, Belief, Tradition, Rites, Symbolism, Devotions, History, 
Biography, Laws, Dioceses, Missions, Centers, Institutions, Organizations, Statistics of the Church and 
Her Part in Promoting Science, Art, Education, Social Welfare, Morals and Civilization (New York,: The 
Universal knowledge foundation, 1929). Also, see Emilie Griffin, Turning : Reflections on the Experience 




position of the subject and predicate terms, while the proposition remains otherwise 
unaltered. A car can be “converted” to a different type of fuel, electronic equipment to a 
different energy source, and so forth. When the term is used in any of these senses, 
however, there is a significant variation from its religious use, in the sense that the 
transformation implied leaves the subject more or less unaltered. When converting from 
one unit to another, the ideal is to arrive at a result that is only nominally different from 
its origin; when “converting” a car or a T.V. set, the idea is that the object will retain its 
function. When used in religious discourse, instead, the term is consistently used to mean 
an about-face, an important change of direction in one’s convictions or in one’s way of 
life, a change that is in some way radical, that goes “to the roots” of personality; a new 
beginning. Not uncommonly, this change is characterized as abrupt, sudden or 
“catastrophic.”4 
When used in everyday language, and in reference to personal attitudes, 
convictions, and relations in general (in other words, excluding references to non-
personal changes, such as those applied to measuring units and electronic artifacts), the 
term has retained a meaning or set of meanings close to the religious. In fact, it is 
remarkable how commonly it is employed with an implicit awareness of its religious 
overtones, which frequently contributes to provide some humor or even sarcasm to the 
meaning by implying some analogy with the importance and depth of commitment 
                                                 
4 John E. Smith mentions that “there seems to be no indication in the etymology at least that the change or 
turning is sudden or catastrophic” (Smith, “The Concept of Conversion,” 52). But the fact that he has to 
mention this explicitly is an indication of how commonly conversion is though of as an abrupt or sudden 
event. The term “catastrophic” is meant to convey the enormity of the change, at least as subjectively 
perceived. Originally it was not meant to imply that conversion is something “bad” or “disastrous” (the 




characteristic of religious convictions. (“He converted me to whole wheat pasta.”) With 
varying degrees of seriousness, the term is thus applied to changes in a person's “way of 
thinking” about topics as varied as art, economics, government, child rearing, 
technological preferences or eating habits. 
Also in conformity with the religious set of meanings of the term, conversion is 
meant to be first and foremost an “internal” transformation of the person. The 
transformation is not expected to be observable directly from without, in the form of 
organic or physical changes; by “conversion” it is not meant that a person changed her 
physical appearance - sprouted new organs or changed the color of her skin. Rather, the 
drama of conversion is played in an internal field of convictions, beliefs, attitudes and 
emotions, directly accessible only to the subject who is undergoing this process, and, if it 
becomes known at all to external observers, it is only through acts of communication of 
the convert.5 This frequently leaves external parties skeptical or confused, since they have 
not been present to the internal strife of the convert. Yet on the other hand there is an 
expectation that, if conversion is true, it will affect the convert’s behavior, demeanor and 
actions: the tree is known by its fruits. This distinction, rough as it may be, between an 
“internal” and an “external realm” is essential to the everyday understanding of 
conversion, as are its assumptions regarding the relationship between both realms: that 
deep changes in personality and convictions will affect a person to the extent that they 
will be externally observable. It is theoretically possible to deny the reality of such a 
                                                 
5 By “accessible” it is not meant a Cartesian-like immediate presence of one’s ideas to one’s consciousness. 





distinction (describing, for example, the “internal” realm in terms of epiphenomena 
causally related to organic or neurological processes); if the distinction is denied, 
however, one is left with what will be called an “externalist” notion of conversion, which 
is not compatible with its everyday understanding.6 
This should suffice for an etymological introduction to the term. Once one begins to 
investigate its subtleties, however, it becomes evident that the term rejects univocity. A 
great number of varying meanings and emphases come to fore. Speaking of religious 
conversion, for example, one may focus on conversion as a sudden event, rather than a 
progressive, slowly developing process, and perhaps in that manner suggest the presence 
of supernatural forces at play during conversion. An emphasis on conversion as a process 
with a high degree of awareness will be consistent with the view of “justification” – in 
the religious sense of the term – as essentially connected to the intense experience of a 
personal encounter with God; whereas this view will oppose conversion as tied to the 
background work of timely rituals, the action of sacraments, etc. Again, an insistence on 
the notion of a “conversion of the heart” may oppose a notion of conversion that puts its 
emphasis on an argumentative or cognitive process (sometimes referred to as the 
“conversion of the mind”). And so forth. Thus an important part of this work will be to 
arrive at a notion of “conversion” (not just “religious,” but “conversion” in general) that 
somehow encompasses these variations and oppositions. There are difficulties involved 
                                                 
6 An example of this differing notion will be seen in the next section, when I discuss James Leuba’s 




in employing a term that has such wide ranges of meaning, but these difficulties are 
counterbalanced by the depth that its rich tradition brings to this term; and by the fact that 
the notion has been studied to some degree by philosophy and by disciplines related to 




EARLY STUDIES ON CONVERSION 
 
 
Studies on conversion have been generally sparse. They received a boost, however, 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, from a relatively new field of studies: that of 
psychology of religion. The two milestone studies that opened the door for an application 
of the methods of psychology to the subject-matter of conversion were published almost 
in the same year, at the very end of the nineteenth century. Despite their great limitations 
in terms of their empirical base (the range and number of subjects is rather limited) these 
studies – one by E.D. Starbuck,7 the other by James Leuba8 – are consistently mentioned 
in later studies; partly because they – especially Starbuck’s – play a significant part in 
William James’ analysis of conversion in The Varieties of Religious Experience. This 
chapter will consider the contributions of James Leuba, E. D. Starbuck, and William 
James.
                                                 
7 Edwin Diller Starbuck, "A Study of Conversion," The American Journal of Psychology 8, no. 2 (1897). 
8 James H Leuba, "A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena," The American Journal of 




1. James Leuba: “A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena” 
Leuba and Starbuck present some similarities in style, but they vary greatly in their 
empirical  method and in the sophistication of their analysis. James Leuba’s “A Study in 
the Psychology of Religious Phenomena” focuses on personal interviews and stories. The 
collection of stories of conversion he uses (that he offers in an appendix to his article) 
involves in its majority – with one or two exceptions –narratives of alcoholics who at a 
certain point in their life (marked by some concomitant religious experience, frequently 
connected to their attendance to a “revivalist” meeting) cease drinking, and from them 
onwards are able to keep a sober life.9 
Leuba’s metaphysical assumptions, however, dominate his interpretation of the 
phenomena from the very beginning: the reader wanting to find an unbiased attempt at 
elucidating the common patterns found in instances of conversion will probably be 
disappointed. His article reads as a shrewd attempt to articulate a pan-deterministic 
interpretation of conversion. Leuba puts together the following elements: (a) An 
understanding of conversion as essentially a psychological event in which will/effort 
takes no part; this interpretation is buttressed by the emphasis in “self-surrender” 
common to reports of conversion phenomena. (b) His reading of a Protestant doctrine of 
justification according to which no good deeds need to be done in order to achieve 
justification, nor can good deeds in fact be performed by human beings (unless by divine 
intervention); as a consequence no “deeds,” or actual transformation in one’s behavior 
                                                 




seems to be required to be “justified” (“saved,” in a religious sense), but only the 
experience (in this context, an event of great psychological intensity) of conversion. (c) 
An Illuminist critique of religious faith as involving specific intellectual content 
(“dogma”), replacing this notion of faith with one of emotional support to beliefs; in 
virtue of this emotional support, the individual will simply give assent to whatever 
doctrine or cognitive content is proposed. (d) Scientific theories of his day that equate 
"will" or “effort” with “the return sensations of muscle contractions.”10 His conclusion – 
which may strike the reader as a somewhat original twist – is that the truth of pan-
determinism has been present in the doctrines of the Christian churches long before 
scientists proclaimed it; it is only because of a scholarly obscuring of these doctrines that 
pan-determinism is opposed.11 With regard to conversion in particular, the preeminent 
role given in the narratives to the subject’s “surrender” shows repeatedly that conversion 
takes place without the will of the subject taking any part on the process, thus 
contributing to demonstrate the truth of pan-determinism.12 
                                                 
10 “The church denial of the ability of man to do good of himself means nothing more than the recognition 
of the inefficaciousness of the will-effort. It is here in agreement with the modern psychologists who see in 
the sense of effort merely the return sensations of muscle contractions.” (Ibid.: 370.) 
11 “However paradoxical it may appear ... modern empirical science cannot claim for itself the discovery of 
the illusory nature of free-will; that honor - if it is one - must be left to the Christian church, unless 
Buddhism should claim it. Long before science had reached determinism, experience had led the church to 
formulate as a fundamental principle of the psychology of the scheme of salvation the utter impotency of 
the will. To the question, what can men do to obtain salvation? The Christian church has but one consistent 
answer: Nothing.” (Ibid.: 364.) 
12 “One of the deepest impressions left by the perusal of the conversions we have seen, is the passivity of 
the subjects. They are lookers-on; they attend as spectators the drama that is being played in their 
consciousness ... But before assuming a quiescent attitude, they pass through a period of self-affirmation, of 
desperate efforts to bring about the desired salvation, - efforts which are muscular tensions. When their 
ineffectiveness is recognized, the failure of the will is acknowledged, and resignation to God's good 




While it makes for an interesting piece of philosophical discussion, Leuba’s 
analysis is too tightly tied up to his metaphysical agenda; as such, it cannot be taken as an 
entirely reliable source. The patterns that he discovers in these stories, however, are 
generally consistent with those we will find in other studies and in more in-depth 
phenomenologies of conversion. Of particular relevance is the emphasis given to the 
moment of “self-surrender,” the experience of “giving up,” an experience that turns up 
quite frequently in stories of conversion (though not as much in stories of moral 
conversion) and that is usually attributed great importance by the narrators themselves, to 
the point that not infrequently the experience of self-surrender is deemed constitutive of 
conversion. This emphasis will also be found in Starbuck and in William James. 
2. E.D. Starbuck: “A Study of Conversion” 
Starbuck’s study, done during the last decade of the nineteenth century, involved a 
detailed questionnaire on different aspects of religious conversion (events leading to it, 
emotions present, permanence of the effects, etc.), sent to those who would answer it in 
good will. After selecting the usable ones he was left with 137 answered questionnaires, 
51 belonging to male respondents, 86 to female ones, which were later tabulated using a 
method of linguistic analysis that was surprisingly sophisticated for its time.  
The spectrum of topics covered opened the ground to a more varied set of 
experiences than those presented in Leuba’s appendix; however, practically all the 
answers received were from participants under the age of 27 for males, and 23 for 




were eventually excluded from the study).13 This limited range of participants (possible 
reasons for the absence of older respondents are not addressed in Starbuck’s article) 
makes his empirical base more restricted than it would be desirable, and his study ends up 
focusing on adolescent conversion; this to such extent that later scholars sometimes refer 
to his position as maintaining that “conversion is a phenomenon of adolescence,” or at 
least as “overidentifying” conversion with adolescence.14 
A further restriction comes from Starbuck’s study focusing on conversion as the 
effect of 19th century “revivals” (the most significant dividing factor in his study seems to 
be whether conversion happened during one of these events or in some other 
circumstances),15 which betrays a very specific, somewhat problematic meaning given to 
the term, if not by Starbuck, at least by many of his respondents: in some of the narratives 
presented in his study, to be “converted” means essentially the act of spontaneously 
“going to the altar” during a revivalist ceremony and giving public witness of this 
experience, to the point that “conversion” and “going to the altar” becomes, for many of 
his respondents, equivalent expressions. (It is significant that no Catholics, for example, 
participated in Starbuck’s survey; rather, the empirical base is clearly composed of 
members of “revivalist” churches that deal with their rather specific understanding of the  
                                                 
13 Starbuck, “A Study of Conversion,” 271. 
14 See Seward Hiltner, “Towards a Theology of Conversion in the Light of Psychology,” in Conversion: 
Perspectives on Personal and Social Transformation (New York: Alba House, 1978), 179; Wayne Oates, 
"Conversion: Sacred and Secular," in Conversion: Perspectives on Personal and Social Transformation, 
ed. Walter E. Conn (New York: Alba House, 1978), 154. 
15 Starbuck compares the ages in which conversion is more frequent with factors related to puberty and 
growth, and concludes that both are closely related, except that revivals ceremonies seem to accelerate the 
process (the curves for such types of conversion precede the normal curves by up to 2 years). (Starbuck, "A 




term “conversion.”) The snippets of witnesses that Starbuck reproduces (the whole 
questionnaires are not reproduced in the study) leave room to wonder whether his 
respondents were really talking about some sort of radical change in their outlook on life, 
or whether they are just using the term “conversion” in the way their community uses it, 
as a code word for “going to the altar” after feeling interiorly the spontaneous motivation 
to do so. Starbuck, unfortunately, does not seem entirely aware of this peculiarity in the 
meaning given to the term by his respondents; at least, he does not explicitly formulate 
any specific warning. (Nor does William James, who follows Starbuck closely, 
emphasize this point enough, if he was aware of it at all; James’ analysis will be 
consequently accompanied by similar caveats).16  
With these limitations in mind, Starbuck’s study has an abundance of merits. He 
examines many aspects of conversion, regarding its apparent motivation, the process that 
leads to it, and even looks at a range of phenomena that present similarities to conversion. 
Starbuck looks at motivating factors, for example, and presents a list of what seem to be 
the most common factors leading to conversion, distinguishing among eight different 
categories: fears; “other self-regarding motives” (approval of others, heaven, virtue as 
something good for oneself); altruistic motives (the wish to please others, the wish to 
exert good influence on others, love for God...); following out a moral ideal (such as 
duty, controlling one’s passions, etc.); remorse and “conviction” (by which is meant a  
                                                 
16 On the other hand, Starbuck does phrase this phenomenon carefully enough to conclude that he is not 
implying this is the only possible form of conversion: he concludes for example that “if the cases which 
constitute this study are representative, it appears that early adolescence is the golden period at which there 




state of anxiety provoked by the “sense of sin”); response to teaching (meaning an 
intellectual response to readings and sermons); example and imitation (ranging from 
mere imitation to sympathy with a great personality).17 
Starbuck notices, unsurprisingly perhaps, that social pressure and imitation seem to 
be very common factors in revival situations; however, he makes the interesting 
observation that this does not necessarily mean that conversions in revivals are due to 
social pressure. The factors “sense of sin” and “fears” are mentioned in these cases less 
frequently than in non-revival cases. Starbuck concludes,  
this is evidence that the charge we so often make against revivals, that they stir up unduly 
lower religious incentives, such as fear, is not altogether just. They do not so much awaken 
these highly emotional states as appeal to those instincts already at work in the 
consciousness, and which would probably show themselves spontaneously a year or two 
later . . . The effect of revivals is to hasten the working of specific motives.18 
 
In other words, it may be unwarranted to conclude that, because of the social 
pressure involved, the “conversion” should be attributed only to this pressure: it may very 
well be that there are other forces at play, that find a proper opportunity to manifest 
themselves when the pressure of the revival situation weakens other types of resistance. 
Also of interest is the fact that in the younger (adolescent) respondents, self-
regarding motives (particularly fears) appear to be predominant, and in older subjects 
their influence gradually decreases, while altruistic and moral ideals grow in number. We 
find already in this observation a germ of what will be later developed in great detail, for 
example, in Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. 
                                                 
17 Ibid.: 278-280. 




It is interesting to note that, while Starbuck is open to integrate into his explanation 
the presence of psychological forces, his emphasis is not on deeply subconscious 
processes of which we might be mostly unaware (in the technical language of his time, 
“automatisms”), but on a more conscious type of phenomena: what he calls the sense of 
sin (or, in the words used by the communities he examines, the “conviction of sin”), a 
feeling of anxiety that may be sometimes magnified to the last degree of dejection, 
humility, confusion and uncertainty.19 This “conviction,” he notices, varies in its 
manifestations according to age. Not surprisingly, given that the respondents are in a 
great majority in their adolescence, the sense of sin is frequently referred to in relation to 
sexual sins and temptations. Of deeper significance, though, is the fact that a “proper” 
sense of sin (dejection, awareness of recurrently “falling short,” etc.) is found more 
frequently in older subjects; in younger subjects, this anxiety seems to be tied instead to 
what Starbuck calls an “upwards-going” sense of imperfection or incompleteness,20 a 
“wanting something and not knowing what,”21 “longing for something out of reach”22 
which gives rise to the aforementioned feelings of anxiety, restlessness, depression, 
helplessness.23 Starbuck describes this state as “a struggle after larger life,”24 largely 
positive, but often accompanied by uncertainty and distress. Comparing both, the feeling 
of incompleteness appears as a more frequent adolescent experience, while the sense of 
sin proper appears in older subjects, usually accompanied by a “wayward” personal 
                                                 
19 Ibid.: 278-288. 
20 Ibid.: 284-288. 
21 Ibid.: 284. 
22 Ibid.: 289. 
23 Ibid.: 284. 




history. These experiences are very frequently present before conversion happens. They 
are not present always, though, and Starbuck notices that there may be also cases in 
which practically no feeling precedes the moment of conversion.25 
Starbuck complements these observations with a tabulation of what he calls the 
“conscious element” in conversion. In his study, what is “conscious” represents “an 
element of purpose, insight and choice as distinguished from mere response to 
environment, reaction to physiological stimuli and blind determination.”26 Indicating that 
this may be the most uncertain part of the discussion, Starbuck mentions as an interesting 
feature “the apparent smallness of the intellectual factor among the conscious motives to 
conversion, and also of the volitional element at the time of the change.”27 (“Conscious 
following” out of teaching was mentioned only in 7% of the samples, and “response to 
moral ideal” in only 20%, while “external forces” were mentioned in 40%.)28 Once this is 
said, the persistent struggle often shown during “conviction,” indicates in Starbuck’s 
opinion “the presence of incipient ideation and volition.”29 To support this, he mentions 
how public confession is often made in spite of adverse surroundings, and the fact that  
                                                 
25 Ibid.: 287. 
26 Ibid. (Emphasis mine.) 
27 Ibid.: 292. 
28 Starbuck distinguished between 5 gradations according to the prominence of the “conscious” element:  
  1. Those in which it was absent or nearly so (largely cases of imitation, adolescent ferment and the like). 
  2. Those in which it is small. 
  3. Those in which both conscious and “automatic” forces are equally balanced. 
  4. Those in which there was an apparent predominance of insight, moving along a clearly marked course. 
  5. Those in which the conscious element seems the determining factor. 
Starbuck notes that age has much to do with the placing in this series, both in males and females. Revival 
cases are mostly set in the first two categories, while non-revival are set among the two last, though this is 
related somehow to the number of females, whose “conversion” is generally earlier; in females the 
“automatic” forces seem to be in predominance, and in males, evenly balanced. (Ibid.: 294.) 




self-surrender generally means that the subject is drawn between two possible courses, 
and must decide between them.30 By assigning thus a significant role to voluntary choice, 
Starbuck clearly sets his account on a different course from Leuba’s. In the end, the 
overall picture seems to be “a flow of unconscious life rising now and then into conscious 
will, which, in turn, sets going new forces which readjust the sum of the old thoughts and 
feelings and actions.”31 
At this point it is possible to see an opposition between Leuba’s account and 
Starbuck’s, that illustrates one of the central points under discussion in this dissertation. 
Leuba’s position, which can be characterized (in terms later to be defined in detail) as 
“externalist,” explains conversion as a process in which the variety of psychological 
forces converge without the person’s cognitive life having any contribution to the 
outcome. Starbuck’s view, which can by contrast be characterized as “internalist,” is that, 
while “a flow of unconscious life” must be acknowledged as a significant factor in the 
process, the process of conversion is also influenced, to a varying extent (small, 
according to the importance given to it by the respondents), by “an element of purpose, 
insight and choice,” or the presence of “ideation and volition.”32 
Starbuck also draws to consideration another theme of central importance to this 
study: a discussion on whether conversion should be regarded as a somewhat accidental 
phenomenon – an anomaly perhaps -, or whether some types of conversion may be 
considered part of the natural development and growth of the human person – thus to be 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.: 294. 




found, and even expected, at certain points during the course of a person’s life. Starbuck 
begins to consider the possibility of inserting conversion into “stages of life” models of 
human development – an insight that predates the theories of a number of twentieth-
century investigators (Erikson, Guardini, Jung), who observed that the span of a normal 
person’s life could be structured into “stages” or “ages,” each with distinctive 
characteristics, views, aims and goals, and that the passage from a stage to the next would 
sometimes be fraught with strife and the possibility of failure. 
Suggesting a move towards a notion of conversion wider than the specifically 
religious one, Starbuck characterizes the phenomenon he is studying as 
not a matter for the churches alone. It is under certain conditions a vital, normal step in 
individual growth . . . It should be recognized as never before that a birth into new life is 
something that belongs to human nature.33 
 
With regard to the specific characteristics of this process, says Starbuck, 
Conversion is primarily an unselfing. The first birth of the individual is into his own little 
world. He becomes conscious and self-conscious. The universe is organized about his own 
personality as a centre. His own will is law. His own individual insight is order . . . A clash 
is apt to come between the self and whole . . . He must learn to submit himself to [the larger 
world] and be guided by a larger life outside his own. With new insight comes new beauty. 
Beauty and worth awaken love . . . The individual learns to transfer himself from a centre 
of self-activity into an organ of revelation of universal being.34 
 
The period of adolescence is naturally the time for the awakening into the larger life. 
Biologically that is the period when the person begins vitally and physiologically to reach 
out and find his life in another. The life of two united in love, each making demands on the 
other, and living for each other, becomes the centre of organized life . . .35 
 
An “unselfing” (or, to borrow a term from Piaget, a “de-centering”) seems to be the 
characteristic move at this stage; the adolescent, who is characterized as strongly self-
                                                 
33 Ibid.: 307 (Emphasis mine.) 





centered, is called to reach out into a “larger world” – a passage to be described, not 
merely or invariably as moving from selfishness to altruism, but as an expansion of the 
young person’s horizons into the larger world of relations and community that he or she 
is invited to join in full. Conversion in this sense “brings the individual into closer 
relation with the objective world: persons, nature and God.”36 
The life is continually prodded by forces from without. Reverses in life, deaths, the 
example of a beautiful personality, ideas from other people, the demands of established 
institutions, and the like, are frequently mentioned as among the things which shake the life 
from its self-content, and lead it into a recognition of a larger world than its own.37 
 
In this manner, Starbuck expands the concept of conversion to include notionally a 
type of change that can be integrated into models of “normal” moral and psychological 
development, “normal” meaning in this context an empirical or descriptive notion. (That 
these may be considered normal occurrences does not subtract from the pathos and the 
strife characteristic of these transformations.) This is helpful, in the sense that it opens up 
the possibility of understanding “conversion” in less narrow terms than the religious – 
particularly than the rather narrow terms in which conversion is understood in the 
Revivalist context that constitutes the background of Starbuck’s investigation. It is less 
helpful in another sense: characterizing conversion as a “normal” occurrence brings up 
enormous difficulties at the time of distinguishing conversion from normal development 
(moral or otherwise), and dilutes the sense of “extraordinariness” that – it is claimed here 
– is characteristic of conversion. The thesis of this work will go on a different direction, 
                                                 
36 Ibid.: 297. 




distinguishing instances of moral conversion from normal moral development, yet 
suggesting the possibility of integrating both.38 
3. William James on conversion 
In his famous work The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), William James 
devotes two chapters to the matter of conversion.39 He does not diverge much from 
Starbuck (though he does expressly criticize Leuba on more than one occasion),40 but he 
places the matter within the larger context of his theory of religious experience. Within 
this context, we can find in James two distinct but related notions of conversion. One is 
as follows:  
To say that a man is ‘converted’ means, in these terms, that religious ideas, previously 
peripheral in his consciousness, now take a central place, and that religious aims form the 
habitual centre of his energy.41 
 
This first notion is close to one of the most usual meanings of religious conversion, 
in which a person’s life becomes substantially illuminated by religious knowledge, and 
his/her goals and aims – previously either diffused or focused on something else - 
become focused on religious goals and aims. 
                                                 
38 See Chapter 8. 
39 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience; a Study in Human Nature: Being the Gifford 
Lectures on Natural Religion Delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902 (New York: Mentor Books, 1958); 
Lecture IX, “Conversion,” and Lecture X, “Conversion Concluded.” 
40 James says of Leuba that he “subordinates the theological aspect of the religious conversion almost 
entirely to its moral aspect.” Leuba, says James, defines the religious sense as “the feeling of unwholeness, 
of moral imperfection, of sin, to use the technical word, accompanied by the yearning after the peace of 
unity.” “The word ‘religion’,” he says, “is getting more and more to signify the conglomerate of desires and 
emotions springing from the sense of sin and its release.” Ibid., 165.  




The second notion of conversion that we find in James responds to his contrast 
between what he calls the “healthy-minded” and the “sick-soul.” In James’ terms, there 
are 
two ways of looking at life which are characteristic respectively of what we called  the 
healthy minded, who needs to be born only once, and of the sick souls, who must be twice-
born in order to be happy. The result is two different conceptions of the universe of our 
experience.  In the religion of the once-born the world is a sort of rectilinear or one-storied 
affair, whose accounts are kept in one denomination . . . and of which a simple algebraic 
sum of pluses and minuses will give the total worth.  Happiness and religious peace consist 
in living on the plus side of the account.  In the religion of the twice-born, on the other 
hand, the world is a double-storied mystery.  Peace cannot be reached by the simple 
addition of pluses and elimination of minuses from life. Natural good is not simply 
insufficient in amount and transient, there lurks a falsity in its very being . . . It keeps us 
from our real good, rather; and renunciation and despair of it are our first step in the 
direction of the truth.  There are two lives, the natural and the spiritual, and we must lose 
the one before we can participate in the other. 
 
In their extreme forms, of pure naturalism and pure salvationism, the two types are 
violently contrasted; though . . . the concrete human being whom we oftenest meet are 
intermediate varieties and mixtures.  Practically, however, you all recognize the difference: 
you understand, for example, the disdain of the Methodist convert for the mere sky-blue 
healthy-minded moralist; and you likewise enter into the aversion of the latter to what 
seems to him the diseased subjectivism of the Methodist, dying to live, as he calls it, and 
making of paradox and the inversion of natural appearances the essence of God's truth.42 
 
In this context, conversion is understood as a process by which “a self hitherto 
divided, and consciously wrong inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously 
right superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities.”43  
Conversion in this sense is salvation for the “sick soul.”44 The two themes, however - the  
                                                 
42 Ibid., 140-141. 
43 Ibid., 157. 
44 On the term “soul,” James specifies: “When I say ‘Soul,’ you need not take me in the ontological sense 
unless you prefer to; for although ontological language is instinctive in such matters, yet Buddhists or 
Humians can perfectly well describe the facts in the phenomenal terms which are their favorites. For them 
the soul is only a succession of fields of consciousness: yet there is found in each field a part, or sub-field, 
which figures as focal and contains the excitement, and from which, as from a centre, the aim seems to be 




distinction between the healthy-minded and the sick-souls, and the role of conversion in 
the context of that distinction – are not satisfactorily integrated. If, for example, we 
consider conversion as the unification of a divided self, it is not clear what role it plays in 
the life of the healthy-minded. I will not attempt to tie these loose ends here, but rather 
examine what new insights regarding conversion can be extracted from James’ analysis 
of the subject. 
An insight of great importance is the distinction that James makes between 
psychological well-being, and the status of the “sick soul” after conversion. What 
conversion brings is not a unification such that the existential anguish or sadness of the 
sick soul disappears. Thus James says of Tolstoy and of Bunyan, 
They had drunk too deeply of the cup of bitterness ever to forget its taste, and their 
redemption is into a universe two stories deep. Each of them realized a good which broke 
the effective edge of his sadness; yet the sadness was preserved as a minor ingredient in the 
heart of the faith by which it was overcome.45 
 
Further in the same lecture, James makes a similar comment on one Mr. Alline, a very 
austere Christian minister: 
We must class him, like Bunyan and Tolstoy, amongst those upon whose soul the iron of 
melancholy left a permanent imprint. His redemption was into another universe than this 
mere natural world, and life remained for him a sad and patient trial.46 
 
James is here putting his finger on the distinction between psychological and 
religious conversion, based in turn on a more general distinction between what may be 
termed psychological or psychic well-being, and other types of well-being (moral, 
religious) corresponding to other dimensions of human goals and aims. In a discussion of 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 155. 




moral conversion there is a similar danger of confusing it with psychological conversion; 
James’ observation alerts us against doing so.47 
James applies his analytical mind to the discovery of many helpful distinctions and 
qualifications regarding the concept of conversion. One such qualification is the 
distinction between gradual and abrupt conversions, which he names lysis and crisis 
respectively.48 This distinction is of tremendous importance, because it arrests a tendency 
to consider as conversions only  highly dramatic events, sudden in their manifestation. 
The distinction allows for a notion of “conversion” inclusive of both types.49 
Further along, James presents a closely related distinction: that between a 
volitional-type and a self-surrender-type of conversion.50 The volitional type (a 
“conscious and voluntary” type of conversion) usually coincides in James’ analysis with 
the “gradual” type of conversion. Unfortunately, he does not elaborate much on the 
relation of the two themes; he merely adds that the volitional type is “usually gradual, and 
consists in the building up, piece by piece, of a new set of moral and spiritual habits.”51 
Implicit in his characterization of this type seems to be a high degree of cognitive  
                                                 
47 Some authors have accused James of identifying psychological with religious conversion (Griffin, 
Turning, 139-141). It is possible that he may confuse them at times, but the texts quoted above show that 
this was not his intended view. 
48 “The older medicine used to speak of two ways, lysis and crisis, one gradual, the other abrupt, in which 
one might recover from a bodily disease. In the spiritual realm there are also two ways, one gradual, the 
other sudden, in which inner unification may occur.” (James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 152-
153). 
49 Partly the reason why people may tend to conceive conversion in terms of the “abrupt” variety is that 
such instances may be considered, by reason of their dramatic quality, “worth telling.” Thus the number of 
available narratives of one type or other will probably not be representative of the actual distribution of 
instances of conversion on one type or another. 
50 James attributes this distinction to Starbuck, and indeed it is present in Starbuck’s study; but it is James 
who names it in this way and calls our attention to it. 




awareness and a high ratio of intention and self-determination among the causal factors. 
The self-surrender type, instead, (which is mostly correlated to the abrupt type of 
conversion) is the topic of a much more detailed analysis by James. It is characterized by 
an intense struggle, both moral and/or intellectual; the person is both struggling towards a 
position that he/she sees as true and/or right, and resisting it. The struggle is finally 
resolved when the person “surrenders,” “gives up,” ceases resisting. William James 
follows closely on Starbuck’s steps, analyzing this experience of self-surrender in terms 
of emotional/subconscious buildup.52  
These two conversion types are, in James, complementary. Speaking of the 
volitional (i.e. gradual) type, James says, 
But there are always critical points here at which the movement forward seems much more 
rapid ... Our education in any practical accomplishment proceeds, apparently by jerks and 
starts, just as the growth of our physical bodies does.”53 
 
And further below, 
. . . the difference between the two types is after all not radical. Even in the most 
voluntarily built-up sort of regeneration there are passages of partial self-surrender 
interposed; and in the great majority of all cases, when the will has done its uttermost 
towards bringing one close to the complete unification aspired after, it seems that the very 
last step must be left to other forces and performed without the help of its activity. In other 
words, self-surrender becomes then indispensable.54 
 
A third useful distinction in James is that between new birth-type and layered 
conversions.55 What James is alluding to (without spelling it out in such terms) is how, in 
                                                 
52 Leuba, as was mentioned above, focuses on this experience in his analysis of conversion, concluding 
from it the fact of pan-determinism. James does not intend to suggest that religious experience (and 
conversion, in particular) can be understood in full as the result of “independent” (i.e. externalist) 
subconscious processes; rather, he regards the psychological dimension as one aspect of many that take part 
in the understanding of religious experience. 
53 Ibid., 169. 
54 Ibid., 170. 




certain instances of conversion, the direction required seems to be towards such a radical 
change that the person fears his/her identity will disappear in the transformation. The 
person needs to be ready to “die and be born again”; not a literal death, of course, but an 
intense, daunting experience of transformation nevertheless. By a layered conversion, in 
contrast, James is alluding to the fact that, in some cases, the transformation just follows 
in the direction of or flows from earlier conversions. Some things must be given up, some 
new habits and perspectives must be adopted, but the process does not entail the “about 
face” with which conversion is usually identified. Rather, it consists in a progression 
through successively higher “horizons”: when the person looks back on earlier 
developments, she realizes they were oriented in the right direction, but incomplete.56 
Finally, James also opens the door to the consideration of a specifically moral 
conversion, but this theme is presented only as a side comment when James describes a 
conversion “to the systematic religion of healthy-mindedness.”57 In the same section, 
James also offers another interpretation of the concept of conversion, what he calls the 
possibility of “counter-conversions,” as in the case he relates of a man that underwent “a 
sudden conversion to avarice.”58 But neither of these themes is developed more fully in 
James’ analysis. 
 
                                                 
56 The image of “horizons” suggests that there is an asymmetric element in conversion. While a higher 
point of view can incorporate the lower ones, the reverse may not be true. The converted person usually 
acknowledges the transformation as a necessary, useful step; but from the point of view of the situation 
previous to conversion, this step may be seen as unnecessary, utterly ignored, feared or even ridiculed. 
57 Specifically, James tells the story of one Mr. Horace Fletcher, who when he found out about “the self-
control attained by the Japanese through their practice of the Buddhist discipline,” applied this possibility 





These paragraphs sum up what was essentially a short era of psychological studies 
on conversion. After William James there is a gap in terms of significant scholarly 
developments on this area. A few decades later, when the discussion on conversion 
resurfaces, it is in most part due to its central importance in the philosophical and 
theological developments of Bernard Lonergan. In this context there is a renewed interest 
in the matter of conversion (a renewed interest that makes many go back to these earlier 
texts in search of material), and for the first time, an explicit, systematic distinction is 
formulated that makes it possible to talk specifically of “moral conversion.” 
                                                                                                                                                 




CONVERSION IN BERNARD LONERGAN: AN OVERVIEW 
 
 
In the second half of the twentieth-century, the philosopher and theologian Bernard 
Lonergan revitalized the interest of Christian thinkers (particularly theologians) on 
conversion when he assigned it a constitutive place, not just in theological and moral 
reflection, but in his epistemology: in Lonergan’s thought, epistemologically sound 
knowledge of any kind has to be grounded in the intellectually converted subject – a 
subject that has personally gone beyond epistemologically problematic positions (such as 
naïve realism or idealism), and achieved the sounder view of a critical realism. 
Furthermore, Lonergan explicitly distinguished between a religious, a moral and an 
intellectual conversion,59 opening the ground to the study of moral conversion not just as 
an anomalous case of religious conversion (as seems to be the situation in James’ sparse 
references to moral conversion), but as a specific type of conversion in its own right. 60 
                                                 
59 Later on, a number of Lonergan scholars incorporated into their own treatment a fourth type, affective or 
psychic conversion. Though each did this on their own and in slightly different manners, the incorporation 
of this type to the list has been generally accepted among Lonerganians. 
60 The key texts for conversion in Lonergan are in Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 2nd. ed. 
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1973; reprint, 1994 in Paperback by University of Toronto Press), 237-
243. A very detailed analysis of the evolution of the notion of conversion in Lonergan can be found in 
Michael L. Rende, Lonergan on Conversion: The Development of a Notion (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1991). Rende traces the appearance of this and related notions in Lonergan thought throughout 




1. Intellectual conversion61 
Much in the way in which the moral standard is for Aristotle the virtuous man, the 
standard for epistemologically sound knowledge is in Lonergan the authentic subject, the 
person that has attained the proper intellectual habits that permit him or her to be 
attentive to the data of the senses, grasp what is relevant in the empirical data with 
reference to the questions at hand, and habitually reflect on his or her judgments to 
corroborate that they are based in sufficient evidence. In Lonergan, however, there is a 
need for intellectual conversion in order for a person to attain these habits. 
The need arises from the pervasive presence of a number of wrongful assumptions 
regarding the nature of knowledge, that obstaculize the development of such proper 
habits. Most common among these obstacles is “the myth that knowing is like looking.”62 
This myth overlooks the distinction between the world of immediacy (the world of the 
infant) and the world mediated by meaning. Attachment to this myth engenders the 
position known as “naïve realism,” whereas an excessive reaction against it engenders 
positions such as empiricism and idealism, which rather than solving the problem of 
knowledge, only succeed only in narrowing its range.63 Overcoming these “counter-
positions” (in order to achieve the Lonerganian epistemological standard of “critical  
                                                                                                                                                 
Lonergan studies on  conversion: the notion is used as an entry point to discuss Lonergan’s philosophy as a 
whole, but the notion of conversion itself is rarely developed enough to satisfy the reader. 
61 For a detailed account of intellectual conversion in Lonergan, see Richard M. Liddy, Transforming Light: 
Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1993). 
62 Lonergan, Method, 238. 
63 “The consequences of the myth are various. The naïve realist knows the world mediated by meaning but 
thinks he knows it by looking. The empiricist restricts objective knowledge to sense experience; for him, 
understanding and conceiving, judging and believing are merely subjective activities. The idealist insists 
that human knowing always includes understanding as well as sense; but he retains the empiricist’s notion 




realism”) entails undergoing a substantial shift in our conceptions with regard to what it 
means to know, reshaping one’s (originally naïve) assumptions and one’s view of the 
world that is thus known. Lonergan calls this shift “intellectual conversion.” 
Intellectual conversion is a radical clarification and, consequently, the elimination of an 
exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity, and human 
knowledge. The myth is that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what is there 
to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there now to be 
looked at. 
 
To be liberated from that blunder, to discover the self-transcendence proper to the human 
process of coming to know, is to break often long-ingrained habits of thought and speech. It 
is to acquire the mastery in one’s own house that is to be had only when one knows 
precisely what one is doing when one is knowing. It is a conversion, a new beginning, a 
fresh start. It opens the way to further clarifications and development.64 
 
However, while Lonergan refers to this meaning in most occasions in which he 
talks of “intellectual conversion” (namely, to overcoming “the myth of knowing as 
looking”), it does not seem to be Lonergan’s intention to restrict the notion of intellectual 
conversion to this specific meaning. The fact that he addresses mostly this position (and 
its related, empiricism and idealism) when using the expression seems to be a 
consequence of the context of his investigation. Consequently, Lonergan scholars have 
often explicitly expanded the notion of intellectual conversion to include instead any 
epistemological shift that turns the subject away from positions that obstruct the 
achievement of a critical realism. Such is the case, for example, of Walter and Joann 
Conn, who talk of “cognitive conversion” as “the discovery of oneself as a knower” – 
another requisite, in their view, of critical realism.65 It would be consistent with 
Lonergan’s intention to give the expression an even wider meaning, in order to include 
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any substantial epistemological shift on the part of the subject that helps the subject 
achieve a more sound epistemological position. 
2. Moral conversion: a shift from satisfaction to value 
Lonergan does not treat moral conversion systematically; after establishing the 
distinction between the three types of conversion already mentioned, he provides only a 
brief sketch of moral conversion. It will be up to Lonerganian scholars to develop the 
meaning of this notion, not without encountering a number of difficulties on the way. 
Perhaps the most notable difficulty is found in trying to explicate Lonergan’s most 
straightforward definition of moral conversion as a change in the criterion of one’s 
decisions and choices from satisfaction to values.66 This notion of moral conversion is 
based on his distinction among three levels of the good – the good of satisfaction/desire, 
the good of order, and value. Explicating the notion of “value” in particular will be the 
cause of many headaches for Lonerganians.67 
The first “level of the good” identified by Lonergan is that of good as the object of 
desire – i.e. of particular desires such as sleeping, eating, acquiring things, etc. This level 
can be characterized by a certain immediacy (the person considers not long-term goals, or 
potential conflicts with their future well-being, but what they desire here and now), and 
by self-centeredness (the person does not, at least in a first moment, consider others’ 
desires that may need reconciling with his/hers). At this level, the criterion for decision-
making is that of satisfaction. 
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The second level of the good is called by Lonergan the good of order: as a result of 
the development of intelligence extending into the realm of action/decision, the person in 
a community discovers the need for reconciling desires with other people's desires and 
needs, and the goods that come from collaboration. These exceed in many ways (in 
quantity, in variety, in the creativity and sophistication involved) whatever goods a single 
person might accomplish on their own. The person also discovers the need for restraining 
one's desires in order to bring to being this good of order. Initially this sounds a lot like 
Hobbes; but in Lonergan this good of order develops a reality of its own. It does not 
consist in an external ordering of other goods; rather, it is experienced in a society’s 
concrete system of laws and customs and organizations. People actively strive for this 
good of order - not for an abstraction, for the  “ideal” of order, but for their concrete 
system of laws and customs, to prevent transgressions and breakdowns, and to make it 
better, more rational, by modifying it or adding to it, without pausing to consider at every 
step of the way whether such order actually benefits my individual desires or not. There is 
a shift in the motivations of the subject from what brings satisfaction (immediate or 
mediate) to what is good for the good of order.68 
                                                 
68 This shift from the good of desire to the good of order is central to Lonergan’s explanation of the 
emergence of morality; but it does not appear prominently when he discusses moral conversion. This could 
be explained within Lonerganian theory by calling attention to the fact that, by being born into a 
community, most people would quite naturally “grow into” this understanding of the good of order, at least 
when the community’s institutions are functioning properly, achieving an appreciation of it. This 
corresponds rather to the category of moral development (as will be explained below) than to that of moral 
conversion. When the community’s institutions (especially those related to education) are working 
properly, it should be expected that only a handful of people would get developmentally stuck at the level 
of the good as desire (in what Lonergan calls “an incomplete development of intelligence”). These are the 
individuals who will use their resourcefulness to find gaps in the system and use them for their own 
satisfaction. See also Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, ed. Frederick E. Crowe 
and Robert M. Doran, 5th ed., Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3 (Toronto: University of 




Nevertheless at this level the grounding criterion may still be that of satisfaction, 
even if it is satisfaction of a different kind, satisfaction in the good of order. Moving to 
the third level of the good, however, to the realm of value, requires from the subject a 
genuine transformation. The criterion for moral decision becomes, not what is 
“satisfying,” but what is “valuable,” “worthwhile.” It must be emphasized that this is a 
criterion different than the criterion of satisfaction, and not just a more complex form of 
the same criterion. (The ability to postpone satisfaction, for example, as a more 
sophisticated form of the criterion of satisfaction, should not be identified with the shift 
from the criterion of satisfaction to the criterion of value.) 
When it comes to discussing the realm of value, however, Lonergan is sparse, 
almost cryptic. Elaborating on Lonergan’s notion of “value” requires tracking down his 
various pronouncements on this matter, and relying to a great extent in what his 
commentators have offered. This latter point is problematic, given that the scholarship 
has not arrived yet to the point at which one may speak of a “standard” understanding of 
the notion of value. Interpretations of the meaning of moral conversion in Lonergan will 
vary accordingly. 
One possible interpretation of the meaning of this notion of value is eudaemonistic. 
According to Rende, when the criterion for decision/action is not something over and 
above that of satisfying one’s desires, this satisfaction turns sour fairly quickly: 
The glamour and attractiveness of particular goods can quickly vanish. The feelings of 
excitement and opportunity at the outset of a marriage, a career, or any new venture can 
sour. One seeks new opportunities, new challenges, and new stimulation. Yet, because they 




unsatisfactoriness is grounded in the real yet unacknowledged frustration of the pure and 
unrestricted desire for freedom.69 
 
Turning this remark into an eudaemonistic reading, the good of value would be 
what makes the person really happy or fulfilled, as opposed to the good of desire, that 
(though it grounds the possibility for other goods) may at times present a certain 
“illusory” character, offering a satisfaction that, in terms of “true happiness,” would be 
empty. Lonergan’s distinction between the good of desire/satisfaction and the realm of 
value may thus be read as a distinction between the fragmentary criterion of satisfying 
one’s desires as they come, and a more comprehensive criterion that regards happiness, 
fulfillment, “the good life” as the goal. Moral conversion would then entail becoming 
able to choose not out of “desire,” as a fragmentary, somewhat accidental event, but from 
a more complete evaluation of what it is to be human, what it is to have specifically 
human tendencies, and what fulfills them. Lonergan’s alternative expression for “value,” 
the “worthwhile,” would in this reading play a role similar to the one that expressions 
such as “the good life” have played in other eudaemonistic philosophies. 
Michael Rende presents an alternative way of understanding Lonergan’s third level 
of the good. According to Rende, the methodological neutrality with which Lonergan 
presents his notion of value – his attempt to avoid mentioning specific criteria, his focus 
on method – is of fundamental importance to the criterion of value itself; this to such an 
extent that attempts to specify the criteria of the “worthwhile” in too much detail entail 
the risk of forfeiting the notion of value itself. In Rende’s reading, the realm of value 
                                                 




consists in “an unrestricted pursuit of the good.”70 This “unrestricted pursuit” continues 
the never-ending further-questioning of the “unrestricted desire to know,” a fundamental 
human drive in Lonergan. According to Rende, specifying a criterion (such as the ones 
provided by current theories of morality) could entail setting a limit to the unrestricted-
ness of intellectual and moral questioning (“this is the criterion; here we stop”), thus 
curtailing the very pursuit that the criterion of value is supposed to pursue. Instead, the 
“transcendental notion of value” is defined by Rende as a “dynamic state of freedom.”  
The transcendental notion of value is not the notion of any particular good, nor the notions 
informing the concrete structures which insure the recurrence of particular goods, that is, 
the good of order. Instead, I would identify the transcendental notion of value with a 
dynamic state of freedom.71 
 
I understand this not to mean that no criteria for the worthwhile should be sought or 
found, but that at the heart of the subject that has arrived at the “third level of the good” 
there is the persistent disposition to continue questioning, to let the “unrestricted desire to 
know” continue its work, never ceasing to revise the criteria so that the “worthwhile” is 
never replaced by “just one” of its possible manifestations. From Rende’s rendition of the 
notion of value follows accordingly a related notion of moral conversion. In Rende’s 
understanding, moral conversion, “the free response of the moral subject to the 
transcendental notion of value,”72 entails a shift from the criterion of satisfaction, to a 
different, unspecified criterion for moral decision; this criterion (or set of criteria) must 
satisfy the subject’s demand for reasonableness (a reasonableness that goes beyond the 
mere satisfaction of incidental desires). Further, the criterion must not become 
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crystallized in such a way that the person no longer seeks ultimate good but unreflective 
fulfillment of a certain specific criterion or moral theory. A genuine moral conversion 
entails open-endedness, but not just an empty open-endedness: rather, this “dynamic state 
of freedom” is characterized by a constant, persistent drive to improvement.73 
Rende’s rendition of the notion of value emphasizes Lonergan’s insistence upon 
open-minded questioning, but it does not help much in specifying the notion itself. Other 
authors have taken the issue of the “third level of the good” in different directions. Walter 
Conn, for example, has stressed decentralization, a shift from egoism to altruism (though 
his own interpretation of moral conversion has more to do with becoming conscious that 
one is a “chooser,” as will be considered in the appropriate place).74 Kenneth Melchin, 
instead, puts emphasis on the methodological openness involved in the third level, a 
position not too far from Rende’s:  
While the commitment to order is attuned to the obligations and requirements of 
maintaining social structures (the second level), the commitment to historical progress is 
attuned to changes in structures, particularly changes that affect human welfare. . . The 
discernment of these values and how they are to be lived is neither clear nor simple. . . but 
the values and obligations on the third level tend to tolerate a certain lack of concreteness 
or precision. Prior to working out concrete strategies for action, moral analysis asks more 
generally about directions of change, vectors for renewal, and possible goals that such 
renewal would seek to realize.75 
 
                                                 
73 “To decide for the transcendental notion of value is to opt for an open and dynamic orientation which 
ever presses us beyond our present moral achievement.” (Ibid., 135.) 
74 When contrasting affective and moral conversion, Walter Conn says: “If moral conversion is the 
recognition of the possibility, and thus the felt challenge, of becoming a living principle of benevolence and 
beneficence, affective conversion is the transformation of personal being which actualizes that possibility, 
which makes effective response to that challenge a reality.” Implied is the notion of moral conversion as 
“becoming a principle of benevolence and beneficence.” (Walter E. Conn, "Passionate Commitment: The 
Dynamics of Affective Conversion," Cross Currents 34 [1984]: 330.) 
75 Kenneth R. Melchin, Living with Other People : An Introduction to Christian Ethics Based on Bernard 




The most thorough study of Lonergan’s notion of value, however, can be found in 
Brian Cronin’s very recent book, Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective.76 Cronin’s work 
bids fair to become the “standard” understanding of Lonergan’s notion of value. 
According to Cronin’s reading, there is an affective orientation to value that is essentially 
distinct from our affective orientation to satisfaction. It is in response to this orientation 
(a “spiritual feeling,” in Cronin’s terminology)77 that we are able to desire, respond 
emotionally and know value – moral values in particular, such as the generous or the 
noble thing to do. This orientation, however – which he calls the “desire for value” - is 
not “thematic”; it does not provide us with a conceptually clear knowledge of value. The 
desire for value must be thematized through cognitive operations: values must become 
“known” and not just “felt.” Cronin’s interpretation of Lonergan – in support of which he 
provides substantial textual evidence - avoids an intuitionist position à la Max Scheler, in 
which values are directly intuited, and the kind of extreme intellectualist position that 
considers the affective sphere as ultimately irrelevant for establishing what is valuable 
and moral. From his reading follows an understanding of moral conversion as shifting 
one’s operating weight towards this drive to value, and away from the (“non-spiritual”) 
drives that focus on satisfaction.78 
The matter of the meaning of “value” in Lonergan is open to discussion, and so is 
therefore the meaning of “moral conversion.” This is less of a difficulty than it may seem 
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at first, however. For one thing, it seems part of Lonergan’s modus operandi to work with 
open-ended notions rather than narrowly defined ones, so that these notions become 
“receptacles”: complementary, mutually enriching developments. The notion of moral 
conversion seems to be of this sort, a receptacle that allows for expansion and 
development in many directions. More importantly, the notion of moral conversion that 
will be presented in this work (in Chapter 5) is only loosely inspired in Lonergan’s 
notion; it is actually more inspired by his distinction than by his explication of the notion, 
and it is not intended as a development of the latter. There are, however, some aspects of 
Lonergan’s thought on conversion that are worth looking at. One is his application of the 
notion to the concepts of “horizontal and vertical freedom.” Another is his discussion of 
religious conversion – a matter that does not affect the question at hand directly, but that 
helps define moral conversion negatively. Finally, it is useful to look at further treatments 
of moral conversion by various Lonerganian thinkers, who have taken the notion and 
developed it in different directions. Their thoughts have helped shape the notion of moral 
conversion presented here, and distinguish it in particular from other forms of conversion 
and development. 
3. Conversion as an exercise in “vertical freedom” 
Conversion in Lonergan involves choice, as an exercise of freedom. This choice, 
however, is of a peculiar kind. To articulate this peculiarity, Lonergan uses a model that 
he borrows from the work of Joseph de Finance. This model involves the distinction 




Joseph de Finance has drawn a distinction between a horizontal and vertical exercise of 
freedom. A horizontal exercise is a decision or choice that occurs within an established 
horizon. A vertical exercise is the set of judgments and decisions by which we move from 
one horizon to another. Now there may be a sequence of such vertical exercises of freedom, 
and in each case the new horizon, though notably deeper and broader and richer, none the 
less is consonant with the old and a development out of its potentialities. But it is also 
possible that the movement into a new horizon involves an about-face; it comes out of the 
old by repudiating characteristic features; it begins a new sequence that can keep revealing 
ever greater depth and breadth and wealth. Such an about-face and new beginning is what 
is meant by a conversion.79 
 
The introduction of the images of horizontality and verticality is accompanied here 
by the introduction of the image/notion of horizon, a very helpful image to describe the 
process of conversion. It has a close similarity with the perhaps more popular analogy of 
“paradigm shifts.” A horizontal exercise of freedom occurs when we move within the 
limits of the paradigm - epistemological, scientific, moral - that we currently inhabit (the 
term “paradigm” may be here safely replaced with “horizon”). Normally there is no great 
stress or struggle involved in this operation. But when the current paradigm begins to 
reveal its deficiencies and limitations – when, starting from its basic premises, it becomes 
impossible to solve new problems and puzzles that have come up, or when practical 
problems accumulate without finding a satisfactory answer - then the subject may migrate 
to a new, hopefully more encompassing horizon or paradigm, revealing a higher 
intelligibility. This is not accomplished without struggle, of course, because the weight of 
established habits of thought and behavior becomes a strong obstacle that the subject 
must overcome. The drive that moves the subject towards the new horizon or paradigm is 
in Lonergan the unrestricted desire to know; if it is working properly and is not weighed 
                                                 




down by bias, it has the capacity to break through the established habits (intellectual, 
moral, practical) of the paradigm the person is inhabiting.80 
In the text cited above, Lonergan contrasts what he calls “a sequence of vertical 
exercises of freedom” that, arriving at “notably deeper and broader and richer” horizons, 
are none the less “consonant with the old and a development out of its potentialities,” 
with what he calls “an about-face,” that “comes out of the old by repudiating 
characteristic features” and “begins a new sequence that can keep revealing ever greater 
depth and breadth and wealth.”81 It should be noted here that it is possible to consider 
both types of process as “conversion,” without straining the everyday use of the term. 
This possibility is reflected in William James’ distinction between a “layered-type” 
conversion (corresponding to the former), and a “new birth-type” conversion 
(corresponding to the latter).82 The present work intends to develop a notion of 
“conversion” inclusive of both types. This distinction, however (articulated as 
“progressive” vs. “sharp-turn” conversion), will be of great relevance when the need 
comes to distinguish between moral conversion and “normal” moral development (in 
chapters 7-8). 
                                                 
80 When it comes to the dimension of action and decision, this drive takes the form of what Lonergan calls 
“and exigence for self-consistency in knowing and doing.” This represents the continuity of the unrestricted 
desire to know when extended into the affairs of practical life. (Lonergan, Insight, 622.) A more detailed 
examination of this idea (and its limitations) is found in Chapter 10. 
81 Lonergan, Method, 237. 




4. Religious conversion, and the relation between the three types of 
conversion 
The notion of religious conversion in Lonergan is theological and – unlike, for 
example, William James’ notion of religious conversion – it would betray the meaning of 
the author to attempt to consider it while disregarding the theological context. A brief 
description of his treatment of religious conversion must be attempted if we are to place 
his notion of moral conversion in context. 
Much as he does with moral conversion, Lonergan does not define religious 
conversion as a shift from a specific stance (e.g. atheism) to a different specific stance, 
but as a radical shift in a person’s metaphysical, epistemological, practical and affective 
relation to the world. If intellectual conversion is driven by the desire to know, and moral 
conversion is characterized by a shift towards value, the key category in religious 
conversion is love. This is not just any kind of love, however, but love understood from a 
theological context, as “other-wordly” love: 
Religious conversion is being grasped by ultimate concern. It is other-wordly falling in 
love. It is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, 
reservations. But it is such a surrender, not as an act, but as a dynamic state that is prior to 
and principle of subsequent acts.83 
 
This transforming, other-wordly love is interpreted differently in the context of 
different religious traditions. Lonergan refers to this overflowing love through the 
Christian concept of grace, as 
God’s love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us. It is the gift of grace, 
and since the days of Augustine, a distinction has been drawn between operative and 
cooperative grace. Operative grace is the replacement of the heart of stone by a heart of 
                                                 




flesh, a replacement beyond the horizon of the heart of stone. Cooperative grace is the 
effectiveness of conversion, the gradual movement towards a full and complete 
transformation of the whole of one's living and feeling, one’s thoughts, words, deeds, and 
omissions.84 
 
There is here a movement (as a free gift) of love from God to the human person, that 
causes a transformation in the person far deeper than what the person could achieve 
through his or her own means. Naturally, this transformation will have repercussions at 
every level of personality - providing the ground for a more efficacious pursuit of both 
intellectual and moral ends.85 In terms of its influence on moral conversion, religious 
conversion (understood as the transformation produced by this overflowing, “other-
wordly love”) predisposes the subject to a much more efficacious moral agency. Good 
habits are acquired and maintained with less effort, bad tendencies are identified and kept 
in check; the subject’s emotions facilitate the process of conversion, since bad habits are 
perceived as unattractive or morally ugly.  
Religious conversion transforms the subject into a subject in love. The subject is not 
automatically cured of all sin and all bias, but the state of love is an habitual actuation of 
one's capacity for self-transcendence. The subject's apprehension  and response to values is 
more secure because he or she is a subject in love. The subject's desire for truth and being is 
more efficacious because it is included within the richer context of the pursuit of all value.86 
 
These effects on the subject’s moral agency, however, are not at the central focus of 
religious conversion: religious conversion has a dimension and finality of its own;  
Holiness abounds in truth and moral goodness, but it has a distinct dimension of its own. It 
is otherworldly fulfillment, joy, peace, bliss. In Christian experience these are the fruits of 
being in love with a mysterious, uncomprehended God.87 
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The interrelations between the three types of conversion, intellectual, moral and 
religious, is described by Lonergan in terms of “sublation.” Intellectual conversion is 
“sublated” by moral conversion; intellectual and moral conversion are both sublated by 
religious conversion;88 a hierarchical order is established between the three types of 
conversion. There is continuity in their purpose: the structure that is higher in the 
hierarchical order (religious conversion) does not destroy or contradict the finality of 
moral or intellectual conversion; but it transforms them to some extent, infusing them 
with higher meaning or purpose. At the same time the higher structure has a relative 
dependence on the lower ones: the actualization of religious conversion may demand, for 
example, that moral conversion take place, previously or jointly with it.  
The exact details regarding how the three types of conversion are connected is a 
matter that Lonergan scholars have pursued to great lengths,89 and that exceeds the 
purpose of this work, since it has to do mostly with theological issues. It is interesting to 
note, however, that some scholars have felt the need to emphasize the unity of the process 
of conversion over the threefold distinction. Michael Rende, for example, cites Fr. Curran 
as arguing (on the basis of the necessity for supernatural grace) that Lonergan’s threefold 
distinction should be dropped, or unified into one general type of “existential 
conversion.” To which Rende answers by emphasizing the methodological character of 
this distinction: 
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In daily living, the primary distinction, I think, is between converted and unconverted. 
Secondarily, we can ask about the degree to which conversion has penetrated into and has 
been integrated with the totality of their living. . . Although the threefold distinction of 
conversion belongs to the context of methodical theology, it is not to be regarded as simply 
irrelevant to the concrete existential order. From the methodical point of view, the concrete 
existential order is not some ultimate court of appeal. It is not the standard or criterion of 
reality. That standard or criterion is still the true judgment.90 
 
Rende does not simply reject Curran’s objection, but rather concedes some weight 
to it, suggesting that the philosophical question about moral conversion gets its full 
weight not isolated from but in dialogue with the dimensions of religious and intellectual 
conversion. Whether he concedes too much weight to it or not, it can be safely stated at 
least that the three types of conversion should not be considered in Lonergan’s thought as 
isolated events, nor as entirely independent from each other, especially when considering 
their occurrence in the concrete person. 
Stating this unity of the three types of conversion in absolute terms, however, would 
seem to be excessive: it is possible to find narratives of moral conversion that do not 
seem to make any reference whatsoever to religious elements, and others that do not 
seem to involve an intellectual conversion. Thus one should be cautious as to how to 
understand this emphasis: it makes fuller sense in the theological context in which the 
distinction between types of conversion has been established, in which the main goal in 
mind is to understand religious conversion in the wider context provided by the other 
types of conversion. 
                                                 




5. The scholarly development of Lonergan's notion of moral conversion91 
Among the scholars that built on Lonergan's thought, a few took it upon themselves 
to further explore and develop the notion of conversion. Among these the most prominent 
are Walter E. Conn, Robert Doran, Bernard Tyrrell and Donald Gelpi. These authors 
expanded the notion to consider a psychological or psychic type of conversion, explored 
in further detail the role of the affective sphere in moral conversion, and speculated about 
the social dimension of conversion. Though there is an initial intention to remain 
consistent with the structures suggested in Lonergan's work, these scholars did not take 
their speculations in a unified direction – rather, each explored according to their own 
interests, developing their own structures and terminology. As a consequence of their 
investigations there followed a brief period during which discussion on conversion 
expanded in many directions. 
In all of these authors, it must be noted, the theological focus is central, and the 
intent when developing the notion of conversion is to better understand religious 
conversion. The downside, for present purposes, of this theological emphasis is that 
reflections on moral conversion are frequently cursory at most; and while the concept of 
moral conversion is complemented by reflection on other types of conversion, Lonergan's 
understanding of moral conversion is not examined as thoroughly as could be desired – 
certainly not to the same extent to which his notion of religious conversion is examined, 
developed and/or challenged. The result is that Lonergan's notion of moral conversion, 
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itself the least developed of the triad in his work, remains vague and substantially 
unchallenged in a sizeable portion of the relevant scholarly literature. 
Walter Conn 
Walter Conn is arguably the scholar who has most actively pursued this course of 
investigation within Lonergan studies.92 Among his achievements most relevant to our 
topic can be counted the expansion from three to four types of conversion – or five if one 
counts “Christian conversion” as distinct from “religious conversion” - and the 
introduction of an extensive discussion regarding the role of symbolic imagination in 
conversion. 
In Conn's view, the characterization that Lonergan makes of religious conversion, 
as “the surrender of absolute autonomy in the acknowledgment of one's radical 
dependence on the power of God,”93 should be understood as describing an extreme type 
of religious conversion, a “special, extraordinary transformation of religious 
consciousness,”94 an extreme that should be aimed at, but that is not found very usually. 
Conn acknowledges however that this characterization of conversion does not reflect the 
common usage of the term, nor is it applicable to common religious experience. To 
bridge this gap, Conn introduces the notion of Christian conversion, which is used to 
                                                 
92Apart from numerous articles, Conn has a book on the subject, and edited a collection of texts from many 
historical periods and disciplines dealing with conversion. See Walter E. Conn, Christian Conversion: A 
Developmental Interpretation of Autonomy and Surrender (New York: Paulist Press, 1986); Walter E. 
Conn, ed., Conversion, Perspectives on Personal and Social Transformation (New York: Alba House, 
1978). 
93 Conn, Christian Conversion, 216-217. 




characterize the first stage of (Christian) religious conversion. In this manner Conn opens 
the way for a more nuanced characterization of religious conversion. 
Affective conversion 
The introduction of the notion of affective conversion, as structurally antecedent to 
cognitive and moral conversion is perhaps the most salient feature of Conn’s analysis. In 
Conn's view, the affective aspect of conversion has been fundamentally ignored by 
Lonergan's tripartite distinction.95 Affectivity, however, should not be seen as an isolated, 
relatively autonomous aspect of personality. The drives that are seen as constitutive of the 
human person – the unrestricted desire to know, the desire of happiness, of self-
transcendence – are at their very core affective. Affective conversion normally grounds 
the possibility of other forms of conversion taking place.96 
Lonergan, in Chapter 6 of Insight,97 distinguishes among many “patterns of 
experience” in which the person may operate – biological, aesthetic, intellectual and 
others. Operating on any of these different patterns is dependent on accentuating, at 
certain times, the relevance given to certain functions of one’s intelligence and on making 
abstraction of the relevance for life of other functions: while the researcher is absorbed in 
his investigation, for example, the practicalities of eating and sleeping may take a second 
                                                 
95 Lonergan's thought, particularly in his work Insight, has been consistently criticized as lacking an 
appropriate treatment of the role of affectivity. This criticism has been acknowledged by Lonergan, who, 
due to his strongly intellectualist inclinations, had to struggle frequently with this deficiency. See Conn, 
Christian Conversion, 316 (note 59). 
96 “In such affective conversion from the possessiveness rooted in obsessive concern for one’s own needs to 
the self-giving of intimate love and generative care of others lies the possibility of actually living the 
morally converted life (critical or uncritical). Instances of moral self-transcendence do occur in persons 
who have not experienced affective conversion, but possessive need is not the best soil for the morally 
converted life. A consistent pattern of sustained moral self-transcendence, a flourishing moral life, requires 
the richer loam of affective conversion.” Ibid., 152-153. 




or third place. But Lonergan considers also an overarching pattern of experience 
(Lonergan characterizes it as “artistic”) that addresses life in all its polymorphic 
relevance; this is called by Lonergan the dramatic pattern of experience.98 Its unifying 
quality seems to be affective rather than intellectual. Conn’s treatment of conversion 
gives full relief to this “dramatic unification” of the different aspects of human life, 
drawn together by human affectivity. For conversion to be more than an abstract 
recognition of certain possibilities, or of possibly fulfilling or good ways of living, there 
must be a transformation of the affectivity through which the whole person is 
transformed. Because now the new way of life is desired, liked, cherished, loved, the 
possibility of such a way of living becomes actualized.99 
The role of imagination 
Another distinctive contribution of Conn regards the role of imagination in 
conversion. This role may be understood by recalling the Aristotelian view of knowledge 
that is active at the core of Lonergan's theory of understanding. According to this view, it 
is in “images” - in concrete examples, in symbols, in narratives, in role-models, in 
parables and metaphors - that we grasp what there is to be understood. For one lacking 
the relevant images, understanding becomes improbable or even impossible. But if the 
role of images for understanding is so important, their importance in the process of 
conversion is also crucial. Thus, argues Conn, conversion implies a change in the images 
that are at the root of our understanding of the world – we tell ourselves different stories, 
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we look at different role-models to trace the life we would like to live. This change is 
both an effect and a causal element in conversion. Operating in “Christian conversion,” 
for example, will be the rising image of Jesus and his Gospel – a theme that will be taken, 
and further developed, by Bernard Tyrrell, below. 
The matter of the role of imagination is closely connected to the importance that 
Conn gives to the role of affectivity. Imagination is not a purely cognitive function for 
Conn. Affectivity has a cognitive dimension, and affectivity and imagination are 
“inextricably linked in a symbolic world that recognizes no divorce.”100 The affective 
substance of symbols, stories, cultural archetypes and such is as essential to the 
constitution of our world as is their cognitive content. As a consequence, the 
transformation of imagination and of affectivity are inextricably linked: the introduction 
of new images and symbols, the focusing of our attention on symbols, myths, archetypes, 
stories, of which we were hitherto unaware, should naturally have the effect of triggering 
a transformation not just of the intellectual but of the affective components of personality. 
Moral conversion as becoming a chooser 
As was mentioned above, Lonergan’s notion of moral conversion is not framed in 
such definite terms that it precludes alternative (though complementary) definitions and 
varying emphases. Conn’s own take on the notion of moral conversion is colored by a 
strong emphasis on conversion as the moment in which the person becomes a self-
determining, self-creating, autonomous agent (and becomes aware of it). By this is meant 
not only that the person becomes capable of making choices in discrete instances, but that 
                                                 




the person becomes aware of being a chooser – and in particular, of being up to them to 
abide by moral norms, criticize them, or disregard them altogether. 
For within this long and gradual process of personal becoming and increasing autonomy the 
subject may reach that crucial point, that existential moment when he discovers that his 
judging and deciding affect himself no less than the objects of his judgments and decision; 
that it is up to himself to decide for himself what he is to make of himself (Lonergan, 
Method, 240). In such a discovery one recognizes oneself as an originator of value who 
creates himself in every deed, decision, and discovery of his life. . .101 
 
This discovery becomes essential for the person to lead an “authentic life” – the 
normative ideal in Lonerganian philosophy, consisting essentially in performing one’s 
cognitive and affective operations without the distortions (bias, myth, neurosis, etc.) that 
typically plague them. Conn adds another twist by distinguishing between uncritical and 
critical moral conversion. The latter (which is closer to the normative ideal) occurs when 
coupled with an intellectual conversion: the person discovers that he/she is a knower, and 
as such is capable of critical thinking; and that this critical ability may be applied to one’s 
moral structures. The agent becomes ever more authentic then because he/she can 
critically recognize and accept the responsibility of discovering and establishing one’s own 
values (in dialogue with one’s community), or one may merely turn uncritically toward and 
accept some given set of values of whatever conventional source.102 
 
Conn is very insistent on the importance of this critical move for the achievement of 
the moral ideal, applying this structure, for example, to the biographical accounts of 
Thérèse of Lisieux103 and Thomas Merton.104 He even goes as far as applying it to his 
reading of Kohlberg’s developmental model, identifying Kohlberg’s “postconventional 
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moral thinking” with a critical stage in moral development. This will be discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
The usefulness of Conn's contributions for an analysis of moral conversion is not 
difficult to recognize. Both his notion of affective conversion and his attention to the role 
of imagination bring to light elements that, if not absent from Lonergan’s thought, require 
for a comprehensive study of conversion a more focused analysis than Lonergan 
provides. Additionally, Conn’s insight, implicit in his works, of the primacy of one mode 
of conversion over the others at any given stage (identified by Dunne as “the description 
of a conversion stage by that dominant type”)  offers a useful approach to the common 
problem of determining types of conversion in the actual situation.105 According to this 
approach, it is possible in an instance of conversion to identify a dominant type of 
conversion; but besides this dominant type, other types of conversion may be operative 
too, though they can be considered subordinate. Thus, when characterizing a conversion, 
for example, as “intellectual,” one can already be on the lookout for affective and moral 
conversion accompanying the intellectual transformation, as it were, on the background. 
This way of looking at conversion helps to avoid the mistake of describing the different 
modes of conversion in too isolationist terms, while avoiding also the extreme opposite 
approach of fusing all types and overlooking their distinctiveness. 
                                                 





Following essentially the same line as Conn, Robert Doran emphasizes the 
importance (the primacy, perhaps) of affective conversion. Doran complements Conn’s 
achievements by introducing a more specific focus on categories that have belonged 
traditionally to the realm of modern psychology – subconscious processes, structures of 
resistance and repression in the psyche, etc.; what is sometimes called “deep” 
psychology. What in Conn was “affective conversion” becomes in Doran’s works psychic 
conversion. Doran also transforms these categories to some extent by attributing to them 
an aesthetic dimension. 
Doran's treatment is an original cross-pollination of traditional psychological 
categories and the Lonerganian emphasis on the cognitive role of imagination. The 
function of the “censor,” for example - that structure of the psyche that, in traditional 
Freudian theory, is in charge of keeping specific sets of memories from arising into 
consciousness – is formulated by Doran in terms of repressing images. Given that one of 
the constitutive elements of psychic conversion is the “transformation of the censor” (this 
idea is present in Lonergan106), psychic conversion then implies that the censor reforms 
its operation, letting hitherto repressed images go uncensored. 
For Doran, however, it is not only images and insights that are inextricably linked 
to each other, but also feelings (thus, for example, incoherence and breakdown at the  
                                                 




level of affectivity can result if the psyche represses images, or if feelings become 
attached to non-corresponding images).107 Some of the originality in Doran resides in 
characterizing this store of accumulated images, which operate to a great extent below 
our conceptual awareness, as aesthetic. The “aesthetic” represents in Doran a confluence 
of the affective and the imaginal. The imaginal (now the “aesthetic”) dimension becomes 
then essential to the development of affectivity. 
Further, feelings play – according to standard Lonerganian doctrine – an important 
part in the apprehension of values.108 As a consequence, the moral dimension of the 
person becomes to a great extent dependent on the stored images that are operative at the 
aesthetic level. In Doran, “the capacity for image formation is critical to affective 
conversion and therefore to all subsequent conversions.”109 
Ethics is radically aesthetics; and the existential subject, concerned with character as his or 
her issue, is the aesthetic subject.110 
 
Even in such an extremely brief account it can be seen that Doran has expanded the 
limits of the field under consideration, in order to include pre-conceptual factors 
operative in conversion at its many levels, factors that are operative in the images active 
in the imaginal ground of our affectivity. 
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Of lesser importance to our project, but clearly in continuity with the former 
thinkers, is Bernard Tyrrell.111 Like Conn and Doran, Tyrrell puts to use Lonergan's 
distinction between intellectual, moral and religious conversion, but also, like Conn and 
Doran, he states the need of adding to this list the consideration of a conversion of the 
affective/psychological dimension. Tyrrell's central work has been the development of a 
faith-based form of psychological therapy which he calls “Christotherapy.” The central 
idea is that, through the presentation of the image of Christ (actually a number of images, 
since Christ is presented under the aspects of savior, brother, healer, friend, beloved, 
lover), and through the mediation and loving support of the therapist, who acts as a 
concrete presentation of the love of God, the healing of the patient's wounded psyche is 
promoted. In particular, the patient finds a way of re-creating his/her self-image after the 
model of the images being presented. As was said above, Tyrrell's project is of 
comparatively less relevance to this dissertation because the central focus is on a form of 
unified psychological/religious conversion, and therefore moral conversion is not central 
to his work. But his work is useful as yet another reminder of the transforming power of 
concrete images, and can serve to further illustrate the points made by Doran. It could 
also serve (though it will not be thus used in this work) as a working example of a 
psychotherapy with a strongly cognitivist or internalist approach. 
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Donald Gelpi112 can also be added to the list of authors that expand both 
thematically and in depth Lonergan's notion of conversion. Like the authors above, he 
also distinguishes an affective type of conversion, and emphasizes the role of images in 
conversion, particularly – like Tyrrell - the primary role of the vision of Jesus in 
conversion, “the aesthetic element which transvalues all previous developments to the 
religious level.”113 Additionally, Gelpi introduces the notion of sociopolitical conversion: 
a “second moment” that “deprivatizes” conversion, when the person takes responsibility 
for influencing the choices of others. This consideration is a result of Gelpi reflecting on 
the ecclesial dimension of religious conversion, the ecclesial community being the setting 
in which the experience of religious conversion takes place. Gelpi, however, seems to 
place the moment of sociopolitical conversion as fifth in a series of steps, one that allows 
the person to move beyond the four previous, “private” modes of conversion (affective/ 
psychological, intellectual, moral, religious).114 Gelpi's addition of a sociopolitical 
moment in conversion is an important contribution, though his reading of the first four 
moments as essentially private (and only the fifth as open to the sociopolitical) may be 
open to criticism. 
 
*  *  * 
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This brief review of the historical efforts to develop the notion of conversion has 
hopefully provided enough background (if not of the specifics, at least of existing 
projects and orientations) to begin in earnest the task of characterizing the notion of 
moral conversion in more precise terms. A phenomenological analysis (in the loose sense 
of the expression) of conversion follows (in Chapter 4); this is focused mostly in existing 
accounts of religious conversion. Chapter 5 will circumscribe the notion in more precise 
terms, by considering what is meant by “moral,” and once this is done, identifying three 




A PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONVERSION 
 
 
Another approach to conversion worth exploring comes from what may be 
considered a sub-genre in Christian religious literature, that of convert biographies and 
autobiographies. These may be found in short form in numerous compilations, or may 
take the form of in-depth, full fledged autobiographical books.115 From such literature it 
is possible to gather common features of the process of religious conversion, at least as it 
happens in the Christian world. These features generally coincide with what has been 
described already: (a) a series of events, some of them apparently random, but all of them
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 of narrative relevance116 (b) lead to a more or less pronounced buildup in tension that 
deeply affects the life of the person involved for a period of time, (c) eventually (often 
through an event characterized as “self-surrender”) resolving into the process of change 
called conversion. 
1. Emilie Griffin’s four-stage model 
Emilie Griffin, in her book Turning: Reflections on the Experience of 
Conversion,117 has taken the trouble of sifting through a sizeable number of these stories 
of Christian conversion. Classic autobiographical accounts such as those of Augustine, 
Thomas Merton, C. S. Lewis and Dom Bede Griffith are considered, but also less-known 
stories (some gathered from her own acquaintances), with the experience of her own 
conversion grounding many of her points. Griffin presents a very useful four-stage 
model, desire, dialectic, struggle and surrender, followed by a post-conversion period 
simply named “afterwards”; which, though focused on Christian religious conversion, 
outlines some categories present in conversion in general. This model will be used as the 
basis for the phenomenology of conversion presented in this section.118 
                                                 
116 By “narrative relevance” it is meant that, even though some events do not appear to be of great 
significance at the time they take place, at the time of the narrative reconstruction of the person’s life story 
the event gains or is recognized a certain importance in how things turned up. The relevance of the event 
may be considered as causal or symbolic; causal, if the event puts further events in motion (the particular 
humiliation produced by being forced out of a train makes Gandhi reflect about the evils of racism, and 
decide about doing something about it) or symbolic, if the event becomes for the subject, presently or 
retrospectively, the expression of a pattern that was already present in the subject’s life (being forced out of 
the train becomes, at the moment or retrospectively, the symbol of a whole state of events that needs to be 
changed). 
117 Emilie Griffin, Turning: Reflections on the Experience of Conversion (Garden City: Doubleday, 1980). 
118 The term “phenomenology” must be understood here in its loose methodological sense, as a study of the 
structures of experience or of consciousness, primarily from a first-person point of view. (Smith, David 
Woodruff, “Phenomenology,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta, ed. Winter 
2005 Edition). The term does not refer to the more specific meaning given to it in the philosophies of 




(1) Desire or Longing 
The first stage, desire or longing, is characterized by a general dissatisfaction, a 
feeling of emptiness that may be present even in lives that might otherwise be considered 
quite fulfilling or accomplished. Characterizing this stage, Griffin rejects the claim 
(which she attributes to Starbuck, though, as was mentioned, this seems to go beyond 
Starbuck’s intention) that conversion is mainly a phenomenon of adolescence. According 
to Griffin, this dissatisfaction is felt with particular acuteness in the lives of mature, 
accomplished people, precisely perhaps because adulthood and its achievements do not 
succeed in putting this longing to rest.119  
Griffin writes from the viewpoint of faith. This desire, longing, hunger (which 
expresses itself differently according to one’s personality) is traced back by her to a 
desire for God embedded in every person.120 This desire for God Griffin identifies as the 
source of her own past dissatisfaction, and she goes on to show that this claim is present 
in each of the various accounts of religious conversion that she examines. 
Tracing the desire back to God, however, is ordinarily done in retrospect, that is, 
after conversion. At the time the person is struggling through the experience, the desire or 
longing is experienced as a need for something or someone, but the something/someone 
cannot yet be called “God.” “In fact,” Griffin says, “this new knowledge [at the time the 
“someone/something” begins to become clearer] is profoundly disturbing, for we are not 
yet able to admit our need for God to ourselves out of a fear that he may not exist, after 
                                                 





all.”121 To feel this longing, in other words, is one thing; identifying it with a desire for 
God is another: it may take a long, arduous time, and it may not happen at all.  
The demands of intellect must be met; the questions must be raised; answers must be 
found. The desire itself must be examined and understood: if it does not have a 
corresponding reality, then clearly it will be diagnosed as an ailment, an affliction caused 
by the frustration of some other need.122 
 
(2) Dialectic, or the argumentative phase 
The “desire” phase may vary greatly in duration, and it is followed by another phase 
that Griffin calls dialectic, or the argumentative phase. The argumentative phase is 
carried out through either an intellectual, “argued” dialectic, in which arguments and 
reasons are weighed pro and con, or by a “lived” dialectic “of discovering [through the 
experiences of life] whether the desire for God can eventually be satisfied by something 
else instead.”123 
How long this dialectic period will extend, and which of these forms it will take 
(“argued,” “lived,” or both) cannot be specified in advance. For some this period may last 
years, while some may almost seem to skip it altogether, resolving its tension quickly and 
without apparent struggle. According to Griffin, however, this argumentative phase can 
carry a person only so far, that is, to a point at which the person apprehends both belief 
and non-belief as reasonable positions. The person then can get locked into a “game of 
intellectual shuttlecock,” which, if it is to be resolved, will be resolved only by an act of 
faith, a leap that cannot be equated with intellectual weighing or calculation, “not without  
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trust, not without a framework of reason and thought, but a risk-taking jump into a realm 
beyond logic and reason.”124 What could be called a “leap of faith” - which may be a very 
“small” leap, just a very hesitant choice at times – is what puts the person, however 
timidly, on the side of belief: 
Solvitur ambulando, said the ancient philosophers; in our case, the answer is solvitur 
credendo. I do not offer this as an explanation for the crossing from Dialectic to Struggle. I 




The third phase, that follows this act of faith, is characterized by (and therefore 
called) struggle. One foot is already on faith, moving it forward; but the other foot is 
ready to step on the brakes. There is a reluctance to fully convert, partly due to a fear of 
change in general (since the new experience is “an unknown”126), partly due to the 
concrete knowledge that a radical change of lifestyle may be required, partly due to a 
feeling of unworthiness. This latter point is what Griffin calls “the appearance of sin,” a 
pressing consciousness of being morally lacking that seems to be characteristic of this 
stage. The subjective experience of this unworthiness can be very powerful, and at times 
may be at odds with the way in which the people around the convert think about him or 
her. Making mention of this unworthiness, says Griffin, often causes a certain 
embarrassment in “outsiders” who have not shared this experience, and can hardly 
understand the context. Nevertheless, says Griffin, 
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there is no way around sin when it comes to Christian conversion. The inevitable result of 
beginning to glimpse the immensity of God’s goodness and power and love is to see at the 
same time our unworthiness; to gain a knowledge (which is sometimes overwhelming) of 
our own flawed nature.127 
 
This experience of sin, however, is not characterized by Griffin as a depressing 
experience, but rather as a profoundly liberating one. This seems counterintuitive in times 
in which “feeling good about oneself” constitutes one of the reigning paradigms of 
psychological well-being. But there is a reason for this, according to Griffin: 
At last, perhaps even for the first time, we have been honest with ourselves about what we 
are; and we have been honest with the one Person before whom there is no deception.128 
 
Another element characteristic of this phase (mentioned with less frequency, which 
indicates that is probably not as common in the conversion experience) is the “feeling of 
being surrounded”, of finding signs, people, books, etc., pointing in the direction of 
conversion all over the place. This phenomenon may be read as having both 
psychological and theological implications: psychological, if it is read as an effect of the 
mind being consistently focused on the struggle, so that the person becomes predisposed 
to find meaning in signs and events around him/her, to find ways in which they are 
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interpretation of Starbuck, may be actually shortened by bringing the person to a definite crisis, as is done 




relevant to the struggle.129 Theologically, this can be read as the intensifying of God’s 
presence – through people, readings, signs, conversations – at the times in which the 
“struggle” approaches its crucial point. 
(4) Surrender 
The fourth phase, called by Griffin surrender, consists in the final, relatively 
complete assent of the convert to whatever is the view, set of convictions, or way of life 
that he/she is converting to. The expression “relatively complete” must be emphasized: 
while the person may perceive his/her conversion as complete and final at the moment, it 
is usually the case that the convert discovers later, and rediscovers again and again, that 
each realization of it is just the beginning of a long road, one more step in a process to be 
later perfected by further realizations of conversion. But until the person has already 
extensive experience (either personally or vicariously) with conversion, or with the 
human resistance to change, the “relativeness” of this step will in most cases be missed – 
until later at least. What happens most often is that the phase of surrender is subjectively 
experienced as being as final and complete as jumping off a cliff.  
Even though the process leading to the phase of surrender may be very long - 
sometimes spanning years, if one counts the struggle of the preceding phases - the 
moment of surrender seems to be circumscribed to a specific point in time. The 
mechanism of this phase is, to say the least, mysterious. In some cases it involves intense 
feelings and emotion, and converts offer vivid narratives and images of the experience – 
Augustine’s is a classic example. In other cases, the moment of surrender is accompanied 
                                                 




by very little emotion. In many cases, converts are able to pinpoint a moment before 
which they did not believe, and after which they did, yet seem unable to say anything else 
about what happened between the before and after. 
Griffin’s description of the moment of surrender is very similar in its details to 
William James’;130 but while James focuses on providing a psychological explanation, 
Griffin’s approach offers an account in terms of an encounter with a reality independent 
from the one experiencing it – God –, who is actively influencing the subject but, while 
doing so, takes in loving consideration the peculiarities of the human psyche, and the 
particularities of the convert’s personal, emotional situation. She speculates, in a sense, 
about God’s modus operandi. According to Griffin, a moment of great interior freedom 
(freedom from coercion, rewards, promises, etc.) precedes the moment of surrender: one 
must be able to encounter reality unencumbered. Pressure or coercion at this moment, she 
says, would only produce discouragement in the subject. Griffin compares the situation to 
the experience of a child who is learning to walk: she must do it by herself! God, Griffin 
says, knows this, and lets our feelings alone at this moment.131 
The final moment of “letting go” seems to be accompanied by the experience of 
complete, total exhaustion: “You do it, God, I can’t go another step on my own.” It would 
seem that surrender does not take place 
until the convert somehow gets beyond wanting, beyond his own efforts and demands, into 
a state where he wants nothing or cannot say with any clarity or confidence just what he 
wants. At this moment when he wants nothing, he is able to will something -- but 
dispassionately: in Milton’s phrase, ‘all passion spent.’”132 
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William James also elaborates on this phenomenon, providing an interesting 
psychological theorem as its background, a “psychology of self-surrender”: 
There are only two ways in which it is possible to get rid of anger, worry, fear, despair, or 
other undesirable affections. One is that an opposite affection would over-poweringly break 
over us, and the other is by getting so exhausted with the struggle that we have to stop, - so 
we drop down, give up, and don’t care any longer. Our emotional brain-centres strike 
work, and we lapse into a temporary apathy . . . So long as the egoistic worry of the sick 
soul guards the door, the expansive confidence of the soul of faith gains no presence. But 
let the former faint away, even but for a moment, and the latter can profit by the 
opportunity, and, having once acquired possession, may retain it.133 
 
The conscious center of resistance, says James, has to “shut down” for a moment – 
his psychological explanation for why conversion is usually preceded by this sort of 
apathy, or by a deep emotional exhaustion. Emphasizing the intervening subconscious 
processes, James says: 
Starbuck seems to put his finger on the root of the matter when he says that to exercise the 
personal will is still to live in the region where the imperfect self is the thing most 
emphasized. Where, on the contrary, the subconscious forces take the lead, it is more 
probably the better self in posse which directs the operation. Instead of being clumsily and 
vaguely aimed at from without, it is then itself the organizing centre. What then must the 
person do? “He must relax,” says Dr. Starbuck,-- “that is, he must fall back on the larger 
Power that makes for righteousness, which has been welling up in his own being, and let it 
finish in its own way the work it has begun ... The act of yielding, in this point of view, is 
giving one’s self over to the new life, making it the centre of a new  personality, and living, 
from within, the truth of it which had before been viewed objectively.”134 
 
Note that, by his own account, it is not James’ intention to out rule the theological 
side of the explanation; rather, his intention is to present the psychological side of the 
matter, which he hopes will be complementary – and thus, enriching overall – to 
considerations regarding other aspects of the matter. This approach can be conceived as  
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complementary with one that conceives God’s action as being respectful of the 
peculiarities of the human psyche, together elucidating different aspects of religious 
conversion without stepping on each others’ toes.135 
Afterwards 
Returning to Griffin’s account, the aftermath of conversion is considered under the 
simple name of afterwards. Under this rubric she considers a number of common 
elements: 
First, there is what could be named a “retrospective recognition” of the forces at 
play. For the convert, God’s influence, often obscure during the whole journey, is now 
recognized with retrospective clarity. In Griffin’s words,  
It is like Roxanne’s final recognition that Cyrano has been her lover for a lifetime, though 
she had known him only in disguises and mediated through the love of others; now she sees 
that it was his love that shaped her life from the beginning, and she says, “It was you, and I 
might have known every time I heard you speak my name.”136  
 
A second element is the feeling of being finally at peace, after the long struggle. 
This may be articulated also in terms of a newfound, deep-seated joy, in addition to 
peacefulness, which Griffin compares with the experience of Ebenezer Scrooge, in 
Dickens’s paradigmatic story of conversion: 
                                                 
135 To James’ credit, he is considerably sober regarding the explanatory reach of his psychological 
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Subject who undergoes the process can explain fully how particular experiences are able to change one’s 
centre of energy so decisively, or why they so often have to bide their hour to do so.” (James, The Varieties 
of Religious Experience, 162.) 




The chuckle with which he (spoke) and the chuckle with which he paid for the turkey ... 
were only exceeded by the chuckle with which he sat down breathless in his chair again, 
and chuckled till he cried. ... And found that everything could yield him pleasure. He never 
dreamed that any walk -- that anything -- could yield him so much happiness.137 
 
But although peacefulness and joy commonly follow the surrender phase, Griffin 
(and James is in agreement) emphatically denies “happiness” as an ordinary consequence 
of conversion, if by “happiness” is meant something like the disappearance of all sources 
of anxiety, sadness or pain. What has been a major source of worries and unrest – perhaps 
the major source – during recent times, the resistance, the struggle, the fears preceding 
surrender, are gone. But this does not mean that other sources of pain or struggle have 
magically disappear, nor has the individual’s basic psychology been completely 
transmuted by conversion. Those whose lives are filled with trials and difficulties may 
draw further courage and resolution from their turning, especially if conversion has 
oriented them towards a meaning of life that is more fulfilling or satisfying; but they are 
not necessarily turned from unhappy to happy persons.138 Similarly, in James’ view the 
“sick soul’s” existential pessimism or melancholia persists after conversion (the person 
does not become “healthy-minded”); but because the person is now living a “two-storied” 
life, the standards of the spiritual dimension makes this melancholia bearable – to some 
extent at least. Thus the previous quote by James on Bunyan and Tolstoy, 
They had drunk too deeply of the cup of bitterness ever to forget its taste, and their 
redemption is into a universe two stories deep. Each of them realized a good which broke 
the effective edge of his sadness; yet the sadness was preserved as a minor ingredient in the 
heart of the faith by which it was overcome.139 
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In addition to this, there are objective repercussions of the person’s conversion in 
their social and relational life. In some cases conversion is received by others with little 
fuss; but in some cases it raises waves that wreak havoc among a person’s relations, 
professional opportunities, etc. This potential for wreckage throws into relief the 
objective cost of conversion, and the extent to which a person may go in pursuit of 
whatever it is that drives them towards it. 
 
Griffin’s descriptive model of religious conversion, though without offering a 
general definition of conversion, helps illustrate what is common to the process of 
conversion, and thus to identify it when it takes place. Griffin identifies a characteristic 
buildup in tension, prompted by the awareness of a deficiency or need (in the desire/ 
longing phase); a resistance to the demands of this deficiency or need; an internal 
argumentation for and against moving in the direction of transformation (“dialectic”); an 
intensification of this resistance of conversion draws nearer (“struggle”); and finally, the 
cessation of this resistance and struggle, resolving in the direction of the demand 
(“surrender”). The “defeat” of surrender is paradoxically experienced as chosen and 
welcomed by the subject, and if at the time the subject often feels “beaten,” this is 
commonly followed by intense feelings of gratitude or joy, retrospectively supporting the 




2. Assessment: Griffin’s model applied to moral conversion 
How universal is the model that Griffin presents? In arguing for its generality, 
Griffin uses as evidence a selection of well-known autobiographies of Christian converts, 
most of which have become classics. Griffin’s is not a work of erudition; it does not 
attempt to cover all corners of the available literature. But she is able to show a clear, 
easy-flowing correspondence between the categories presented in her model and the 
events described in the autobiographies examined. The textual evidence she provides is 
further supported by anecdotal accounts from Griffin’s numerous convert acquaintances, 
and by Griffin’s analysis of her own experience. 
The model seems also to apply quite faithfully to the majority of cases of religious 
conversion found during research for this dissertation. The exception seem to be those 
cases in which religious conversion takes place very gradually and without a great deal of 
dramatic awareness, in which case identifying such stages becomes more difficult. 
Significant variations in the amount of attention paid to the process – and consequently, 
in the degree to which it is experienced as a dramatic struggle – seem to be closely 
related to personality traits.140 
Some differences between moral conversion, and religious conversion as described 
in this framework, can be advanced here. First, accounts of moral conversion seem to be 
more rare I terms of how often they are reported, and this rarity is compounded by the  
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fact that they are seldom characterized explicitly as “moral conversion.” This poses a 
methodological difficulty. Reports of moral conversion usually provide less reflective 
detail than religious conversion accounts. In the mind of those that provide 
autobiographical accounts of religious conversions there is often the explicit awareness of 
an apologetic function for these accounts, and this awareness seems to foster an attention 
to the relevant details, whereas accounts of moral conversion seldom reflect an awareness 
of that kind. 
But besides this methodological difficulty, there seem to be more substantial 
differences between the structure of religious and of moral conversion accounts. The 
desire or longing phase is not universally present in moral conversion, though it does take 
place in specific classes of moral conversion, as will be seen in the following chapter.141 
But when it does, it appears to be less intense and focused – a longing for happiness, 
perhaps, or for “something better.”142 The presence of something like a “dialectic” phase 
is not frequently mentioned in accounts of moral conversion, and descriptions of a period 
of “struggle,” though less rare, are also infrequent. This may be a consequence of the 
briefness of the accounts, or it may be due to more substantial reasons having to do with 
the distinctive nature of moral conversion. In rough terms, religious conversion has the 
form of a search or quest, and there is the drama produced by the existential involvement 
of the whole person in this quest, while moral conversion very often has rather the form 
of an awakening, or a slap on the face. These dissimilarities limit the use of Griffin’s  
                                                 
141 Namely, in “conversion regarding happiness/eudaemonia/meaning.” 




model for this project. Thus, though it helps to identify some general aspects of 
conversion, the model itself will not be applied to an examination of narratives of moral 
conversion. 
The dissimilarities mentioned have to do principally with the structure of narratives 
of moral and religious conversion (reflecting, one would expect, dissimilarities in the 
processes themselves). A discussion of more substantial differences between the notions 
of moral and religious conversion is necessary, particularly because moral conversion 
takes place frequently within a process that might also be characterized as a religious 
conversion. This discussion will take place in Chapter 6. But it is now time to address the 




THE NOTION OF MORAL CONVERSION 
AND THE THREE CLASSES OF MORAL CONVERSION 
 
1. Introduction: Towards a notion of moral conversion 
Towards a general notion of conversion 
The previous chapters have provided sufficient material to establish a general 
notion of conversion. The concept has most frequently been studied within the realms of 
theology and religious studies (or, within the realm of psychology, as a subtopic within 
the larger topic of psychology of religious phenomena), and as a consequence conversion 
is frequently understood to mean religious conversion. The meaning of the term, 
however, is far broader. Intellectual, moral, affective, psychological, aesthetic, social 
types of conversion have been identified by those having these experiences, and by 





This makes the task of formulating a definition of conversion rather difficult: not 
only are the types of conversion mentioned above quite varied, but each seems focused 
on a different, specific dimension in a person's life. 
In a first look, what is common among these types seems to be some form of 
change in the person. This change is of tremendous importance to the person, in the sense 
that the relations of the person to the world, to others, to truth, even to the self are 
fundamentally affected. How the person is affected, and in respect to which aspect of the 
person’s relation to the world, to others, to truth or to self is what identifies the type of 
conversion involved. For example, intellectual conversion could be described as the 
redefining of one’s understanding of notions such as “certainty,” “facts,” “knowledge,” 
etc., in such a way that the person’s cognitive relation to the world is fundamentally 
altered. (It could also be described, from a slightly different perspective, as a fundamental 
alteration in the way in which one conceives oneself as knower.) 
The task at hand is to formulate this fundamental alteration in more precise terms. It 
will be proposed here that the best term to characterize the kind of change that conversion 
constitutes is the term “existential.” This term is difficult to pin down precisely, given 
how it is used in widely different contexts – and sometimes rather loosely - in 
contemporary philosophy. But “existential” captures very adequately in its general 
meaning the essential characters of conversion, so much so that it is not unreasonable to 
define conversion as an existential change. A detailed characterization of conversion as 




Section 5; but it is useful to state here in advance what is meant by characterizing 
conversion in general in this way. 
The term “existential” draws attention, first, to the importance of the change. A 
phrase like “he made an existential decision,” for example, can be legitimately 
understood to mean that the person made a very important decision, in the sense that the 
decision affects that person’s life fundamentally – though not necessarily other people’s 
lives. An event, it has been claimed, must affect a person’s life and relations in significant 
ways to merit the name of “conversion”; otherwise the name is misplaced or used only 
metaphorically. 
Second, the term implies something being real and concrete, as opposed to 
something being “merely academic,” detachedly theoretical, etc. Thus, an event having 
“existential consequences” means that those consequences are expected to really take 
place and to have an impact on other things or persons, and an “existential decision” is 
understood to have real, concrete consequences. 
Third, the term existential has the connotation of something being personal. This 
connotation makes the term useful to indicate the rather obvious fact that conversion is a 
change that happens to persons. But this rather obvious fact has significant implications. 
Conversion as existential change may be thus opposed to structural changes happening to 
institutions, to the restructuring of systems of law, to the training of animals, not to 
mention material changes in physical structures. That the meaning of “existential” is here 
close to that of “personal” may be corroborated by the inadequacy of talking of 




building. “Conversion” applies to persons and persons only – though perhaps the notion 
may be extended to groups of persons, and thus it may make sense in certain situations to 
talk about “social” conversion. 
Fourth, saying that something is existential can be used to indicate or emphasize the 
contingency of the concrete – the fact that things happen that are not planned, plans fail, 
accidents occur, and contingency in general cannot be excluded from human existence by 
any amount of rational planning. This connotation of the term “existential” also applies to 
conversion, insofar as conversions typically have an element of unexpectedness, even of 
working against expectations. 
 Fifth, “existential” has the connotation brought forth by the philosophical 
tradition named precisely “existentialism”: an emphasis on freedom, and specifically of 
freedom as a harsh blessing, a resistance to empirical/quantifying descriptions, and other 
themes that will be discussed in Chapter 8. The existentialists’ discussions of freedom 
provide a suitable platform for examining the issue of whether conversion is an event that 
requires the freedom of the human agent to take place at all. 
 The five connotations of the term are interconnected: in some philosophical 
accounts of freedom, for example, personhood involves freedom; freedom and 
“unexpectedness” may be closely related, and so forth. These matters will be discussed 
later, as indicated. At this point, the intention is only to present the term “existential” as 
suitable for characterizing the kind of change that conversion entails. It should be made 
clear, however, that at this point the term “existential” is presented only as a 




adjective that – despite its frequent unruliness – adequately describes conversion in 
general. Whether conversion can legitimately or not be understood as an “existential 
event” in a more substantial way is an issue that will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8; 
resolving this question is not intrinsically relevant for the exposition that follows here. 
Towards a notion of moral conversion 
This chapter is structured on the basis of two distinctions, that are then cross-
related. These are briefly presented here, in order to make the subsequent exposition 
clearer. The first distinction concerns the different focus given to the question about the 
meaning of morality by classical and by modern/contemporary philosophy. While the 
modern/contemporary investigations on ethical theory have focused strongly on the 
question on right and wrong, there is a classical understanding of the subject-matter of 
ethical theory (common to both Plato, Aristotle, and Christian medieval philosophers) 
that focuses rather on the question for happiness and “the good life” (contemporarily 
phrased also as “the meaning of life” question). In principle, both provide acceptable – if 
incomplete -ways of answering the question about what constitutes a matter of moral 
concern, and consequently, what differentiates moral conversion from other types of 
conversion. Collapsing both meanings, however, can only be attempted at the cost of 
much confusion, or by a very complex conceptual apparatus that may or may not succeed 
in bringing both together in satisfactory ways. I will therefore address these two 
meanings of morality separately. 
The second distinction concerns the meaning of conversion itself. A closer look at 




definition aimed at covering all or nearly all instances of conversion extremely general 
and vague. Thus, rather than attempting to articulate one common but overly general and 
vague definition of moral conversion, the task of circumscribing the notion for present 
purposes will be accomplished by differentiating three general “classes” of conversion: 
conversion regarding content, conversion regarding attitude or degree of commitment, 
and conversion regarding behavioral coherence. Instances of all three classes are 
consistently found in narratives of moral conversion. Each of these processes entails a 
change profound enough and existential enough to merit the name of conversion as was 
indicated, but collapsing the three classes would only lead to a confusing exposition. It 
should be noted in advance, too, that in the narratives of real conversions we can find 
processes belonging to the three classes deeply intertwined, but not in such a way that a 
single, overarching definition of conversion can be readily constructed.143 
 
2. The modern/contemporary notion of morality: the question of right and 
wrong 
Our focus is moral conversion. Once the notion of conversion has been at least 
characterized in general terms, the next step is to clarify the meaning of the adjective 
moral. The question could alternatively be formulated in terms of the meaning of its 
abstract noun morality, or by inquiring about more general expressions such as what 
constitutes a “matter of moral concern.” The intention is to circumscribe the notion in  
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such a way that it includes a reasonably wide variety of experiences that may be called 
“moral conversion”; in other words, we are looking for a notion of “moral” (in the 
expression “moral conversion”) that is inclusive of at least the most generally accepted 
theories of morality. 
The reader who follows contemporary discussions on ethics and moral theory will 
probably be familiar with two approaches to the right/wrong question that occur 
frequently in moral theory, and are used by diverse authors as a useful first step in the 
investigation of the meaning of “moral.” One common approach is to begin such a 
discussion by asking about the meaning of “right” and “wrong,” the polarity most 
frequently associated with moral judgments (i.e. judgments on the moral quality of 
human actions and decisions). Another very common approach to the right/wrong 
question begins with a discussion on the experience of “oughtness,” the peculiarly human 
experience of regarding oneself as duty-bound with respect to certain courses of action. 
Both of these approaches may or may not eventually be collapsed into one, and 
depending on the particular author, may lead to different theories of morality 
(consequentialist, deontological, etc.) The aim here is only to make reference to what are 
the most frequent ways of initiating an investigation regarding the meaning of “moral.”144 
These two approaches to the right/wrong question, asking about “right/wrong” and 
“oughtness,” are intrinsically bound to each other. The question about why a moral agent 
ought to do (or not-do) something may be answered by saying that such a course of  
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action is (morally) right/wrong, while, conversely, “right” and “wrong” (in the moral 
sense) may be defined in terms of what the moral agent, for whatever reasons, 
experiences as something that he or she ought/ought-not to do. Because of the 
interrelatedness of these two approaches, and to simplify matters, I will refer to them as if 
they were a single approach, and I will use in most occasions the simple expression 
“right/wrong.” 
The reader, however, should be aware of the enormous diversity of approaches 
behind this simple expression, and therefore of the enormous complexity of the task of 
describing what is right or wrong.145 What can be identified as common to contemporary 
ethical discussion (despite its many, varied orientations) is this focus on right/wrong; 
whether they attempt to ground their reflections on value-maximizing operations, human 
rights, self-sustaining rational principles, or some other principle is irrelevant to this 
discussion. 
This common element in contemporary discussion provides us with a first meaning 
for moral conversion: a change in the subject (perhaps the expression moral agent would 
be more appropriate) with regard to her/his existential involvement in the task of acting 
rightly or wrongly, of doing what ought to be done. This change may involve both big, 
consequential decisions and the small, perhaps half-thought actions of daily life. 
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Against this background – i.e. morality as the consideration of what is right/wrong - 
three possible classes of moral conversion can be identified. (The same three will be 
further explained in relation to morality as the question for happiness or the meaning of 
life, later in this chapter.) 
A. Moral conversion regarding the content of right and wrong146 
The first class of conversion focuses on what is considered to be right/wrong in 
general. It is possible to imagine someone changing their moral judgments only on 
specific issues; but if this is a change affecting, so to speak, only the final verdict on a 
specific issue, this would hardly be a reason to consider such a change an instance of 
moral conversion. Suppose, for example, that a practice about which one previously had 
no objection came now to be considered by the person to be environmentally unsound, 
and in the light of this new information, the practice came to be considered morally 
dubious. This change would amount at most to a revision of one’s judgments, or to a 
change of opinion: it would not count as an instance of moral conversion. 
But one can also imagine a change in a person’s moral judgment about the said 
practice happening due to a more fundamental shift in the person’s basic criteria for 
judging; in its wake, a revision of moral conclusions and previously accepted rules 
occurs. Such a shift could take place for example when a person adopts a new criterion  
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that was previously not considered relevant to ethical decisions – a person may now 
consider the environmental consequences of one’s acts as a very important criterion for 
decision, when previously there was no consideration of the importance of this factor. Or 
the change could affect not just the criteria, but the way in which the person arrives at a 
moral judgment – the person, for example, might shift from being strictly rule-abiding to 
a more outcomes-focused form of compliance, and weigh actions more in terms of a 
case-by-case examination of the potential consequences of acting one way or another. 
Thus regarding the first class of moral conversion, in order to judge whether there 
has been a moral conversion one must investigate, first, whether there has been a change 
in the “content” of a person’s moral judgments; and in second place, whether such 
change can be attributed to deeper changes affecting a person’s overall structure of moral 
judgment, rather than changes in particular matters when the bases of such judgments 
have remained unchanged. 
Sometimes such a change in the criteria for moral reasoning is accompanied by a 
shift of another sort: this is the move from a life ruled by uncritically accepted moral 
principles and/or rules, to a life in which one's criteria for moral action are habitually 
reflected upon, weighed and critically considered. A moderately reflective person can 
hardly change long-time held principles and rules without wondering about the 
epistemological status of such principles and rules in general – if one could be wrong 
about them, why could it not happen again? This form of moral conversion (a sub-type of 




Walter Conn a “critical moral conversion”: a moral conversion that is coupled (as was 
explained in Chapter 3) with some degree of intellectual conversion. 
 
Narrative evidence for this class of conversion 
In order to go beyond a mere description of categories and show that these 
categories describe something that actually takes place, I will conclude each section  of 
this chapter with a sub-section providing real-life evidence. Much of the evidence 
provided is narrative, drawn from a survey of biographies, interviews, etc. as well as 
psychological and sociological investigations and similar sources. The focus, it should be 
emphasized, is not on finding statistically comprehensive studies, which in fact provide 
very limited information regarding mental and emotional processes, but on locating 
narratives in which care has been taken to articulate such processes (and other concurring 
factors) in reasonable detail. This said, it should be kept in mind that the people who 
gathered or wrote down these stories did not have in mind the categorization of moral 
conversions into classes as it is offered here, and for this reason their narratives often 
might be put into more than one category, depending on where the major emphasis is put 
when they are read. As Aristotle said, 
our discussion will be adequate if it achieves clarity within the limits of the subject matter. 
For precision cannot be expected in the treatment of all subjects alike.147 
 
So at this point the intention is only to provide evidence that these classes of conversion 
actually happen. 
                                                 




An instance of moral conversion regarding content about right/wrong is found in 
Donald Gelpi’s account of his conversion from racism (case #29 in the Appendix). 
Having been born in New Orleans, Louisiana, Gelpi acknowledges having grown up “a 
racial bigot,” his racism focusing on black people. 
I do not remember ever doing anything to hurt black people, but I did grow up believing in 
their essential racial inferiority to myself and to other white people. 
No one challenged my racial bigotry in a systematic way until I went to high school. The 
Jesuits who taught me waged ceaseless war on my racism and on the racism of my white 
classmates. I resisted them for two years, but eventually I conceded that they had the right 
of it. I recognized the immorality of racism and renounced it in my own heart.148 
 
Gelpi’s account is devoid of any drama, but acknowledges quite simply the fact that 
he essentially agreed with racist views – despite not having hurt anyone on account of 
such views – and in a two-year process eventually came to see such views as immoral 
and renounce them. There is clearly a change in the content of what he regards as 
right/wrong – despite his having grown up immersed in such views, and his resistance to 
change being supported by his classmates. But further, Gelpi finds in this instance of 
conversion also a deeper kind of change: 
I look back on that experience as a personal moral conversion. I regard it as an initial moral 
conversion because, for the first time in my life, I took personal responsibility for my 
disagreeing with the conventional morality taught me by my society. By disagreeing, I took 
personal responsibility for my own conscience.149 
 
This transition - in Gelpi’s words, from “conventional to autonomous morality”150 -
exemplifies a shift in criteria for moral judgment, which is accompanied (and supported, 
in a sense) by a cognitive conversion: Gelpi experiences a need for reasoned support for 
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accepted moral practices and views, rather than accepting conformity by others as a kind 
of evidence for them.  
Arun Gandhi – Mohandas Gandhi’s grandson – tells of the parallel turn from racism 
of South African politician Jacques Besson, who professed for a long time an overt, 
active racism (case #28 in the Appendix). According to Gandhi, Besson, stranded in India 
for a few days, was received by Arun himself, and Arun made a conscious decision to be 
polite rather than berate him. In the few days Besson stayed with Arun’s family, the two 
had harsh arguments over and again, changing the subject when the discussion grew too 
heated. But in spite of this, Arun and his family continued in their polite kindness and 
eventually made some headway in lessening the harshness of the exchanges. By the time 
of them parting – a matter of only a few days - Besson and Gandhi embraced in tears; and 
Besson became an anti-racism activist on his return to South Africa.151 
In this story we do not know what went through Besson’s mind, as we do in Gelpi’s 
story. But it is hard to imagine Besson’s activist racism turning to activist anti-racism 
without some accompanying change of significant moral categories within his thinking. 
What had been judged to be profoundly right was now judged to be profoundly wrong. 
So this also seems an instance of moral conversion regarding content of right/wrong. 
Other instances can be succinctly mentioned. Helen Haste reports about a young 
woman, “Sandra,” who, staying for a few days with a French family, was shocked by the 
way meat was cooked in France (case #5 in the Appendix). After returning to England 
and reflecting on the issue, she began to see meat-eating “as a moral issue on which she 
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could exercise some personal responsibility,” and became vegetarian.152 The reasons 
Haste reports for becoming vegetarian are phrased by her in moral terms: she has come to 
see something that she previously considered morally acceptable as at least morally 
dubious. Another example is provided by Robert Bellah in his interview of Wayne Bauer, 
(case #2 in the Appendix).153 Raised in an unreflective acceptance of traditional patriotic 
values, Wayne joined the Marine Corps in the 60’s; but during this time, friends who had 
gone to college began to argue with him about the Vietnam War. This went on for a few 
months, and Bauer finally concluded that his best arguments held no weight. His 
resolution was strong enough, in the practical sense, to lead him to go AWOL, and then 
to lead an underground life for many years. Eventually he surrendered to the military and 
was spared a court martial. This process eventually led to another conversion, that will be 
classified as moral conversion regarding content about happiness and the meaning of life 
(considered below). That is, Wayne became later a political activist and an advocate for 
poor tenants; but the first steps of the process of change in Wayne can be read as a moral 
conversion regarding content about right/wrong: he came to see joining the military – at 
least at that particular place and time – as morally objectionable, and acted accordingly. 
These examples should suffice to indicate the reality of this class of moral 
conversion. 
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B. Moral conversion regarding the degree of commitment with respect to right/ 
wrong 
Another class of moral conversion can be described as a shift from a general lack of 
concern for the morality of one's actions to genuine concern for this. The opposite 
movement can also occur; but as will be shown, the contrary movement is rarely called 
“conversion.” An initial way to characterize this class of moral conversion could be as a 
conversion “from frivolity to seriousness,” or “from amorality to morality.” The rules and 
principles that previously defined right and wrong for a person, and that were in all 
probability learnt in that person’s childhood, may have been up to that point regarded as 
non-binding; perhaps the understanding is that these are rules laid down by society in 
general, but are to be followed only by those obedient enough to abide by them. But 
when this class of moral conversion takes place, these rules and principles, previously 
comprehended in this detached manner, become now existentially pressing for the 
person. No longer are these rules something exclusively “for other people.” Nor are they 
regarded as rules that one “happens to follow,” arbitrarily or for personal reasons, but are 
now followed because they are grasped as binding on all moral persons – i.e. as 
universally binding.154 
On closer analysis, however, the characterization of this class of conversion 
becomes more complex. First, because the inverse process is also conceivable. A person 
who lived by certain rules believing that they should be followed may come to doubt  
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their foundations, or their hold on him/her in terms of right/wrong, and so become more 
distanced and no longer see him/herself under their rule. This process, however, is rarely 
the exact inverse; for while the shift towards a higher degree of commitment usually 
entails a process of “positive” determination on the side of the agent, its opposite usually 
resembles rather a process of decreasing determination, dis-integration, an “entropic” 
process, so to speak. Such a process fits neither the use of the term “conversion” in its 
common, everyday usage – so it is rarely called a conversion – nor the technical use of 
the term as developed in this work. 
Second, quite a bit of variety can be found in the shapes that this class of conversion 
can take, and some ambiguity, even controversy, in their valuation. Simone de Beauvoir 
for example, in The Ethics of Ambiguity,155 has traced a number of moral/existential 
profiles that range from the “Serious Man,” - a dangerous being, in her account, who 
takes the world to be the source of absolute, unconditioned values – to the “Free Man” 
who, aware of the (claimed) absence of such unconditioned values, commits to the 
existentialist ideal of the exercise of his freedom; and in so doing, by accepting the 
freedom of others as something like an absolute, regains a “legitimate” kind of 
seriousness. In her description we find a number of moral profiles – the “sub-men,” the 
Adventurer, the Nihilist, the Passionate Man – characterized in subtle distinctions by the 
ways in which they commit to values, including whether they regard them as absolute 
                                                 





and unconditional or as something else. (De Beauvoir uses in fact the term “conversion” 
to describe the movement to a profile closer to the “Free Man” ideal.)156 
These examples suggest that very lengthy discussions would arise if we tried to 
establish in precise, absolute terms what constitutes “conversion,” and what constitutes 
“counter-conversion,” if the former is understood as a shift towards a “morally better” 
standpoint and the latter as the opposite. The matter must be left undiscussed here, since 
such a discussion may only be resolved by the positing and defending of a full-fledged 
ethical theory explaining the notions of moral progress and decadence; but the suggestion 
is made here that the matter may be usefully approached by examining whether the 
process can be categorized in terms of integration or disintegration. 
 
Narrative evidence for this class of conversion 
 Identifying narrative evidence for this class of conversion poses a peculiar kind of 
challenge, because a change in attitude is usually accompanied (or even caused by) a 
change in the way the person perceives moral issues (i.e. content), not to mention by 
possible difficulties adapting one’s behavioral patterns to the new attitude (the third class 
of moral conversion, considered below), which in turn may affect the attitudinal change 
itself. Thus a conversion will be considered to fit this type not when there is no change 
regarding content, but when, even if significant changes regarding content can be 
identified, there is a perhaps more significant attitudinal change towards morality. In the 
case of Wayne Bauer, for example, already described (case #2), where a relatively similar  
                                                 




intensity in the agent’s commitment to moral values can be identified before and after the 
change, the case must be deemed a conversion regarding content rather than one 
regarding commitment or attitude. As indicated above, the three classes are being 
proposed to shed light on how moral conversion occurs; there is no claim here that the 
classes invariably occur in isolation from one another. 
A well-known episode that may be read as an instance of this type of conversion is 
the story of Mohandas Gandhi being forced out of the train (case #8).157 While traveling 
first class through Natal, South Africa, as representative of his Indian law firm, an official 
told him (because of his “coloured” skin) that he should move to third-class. When he 
refused, the official called a constable that then took him by the hand and forced him out 
of the train, together with his luggage. Gandhi then sat in the waiting room, dark and 
cold, and considered whether to fight for his rights, to continue on his journey without 
responding to the insults, or – ultimately his choice – to dedicate himself “to root out the 
disease and suffer hardships in the process.”158 
The change in him that Gandhi describes in his autobiography can be best described 
as a change in attitude. The injustice and the brutality of racism in general could hardly 
be something unknown to Gandhi at the time – in fact, he had already been involved in a 
similar quarrel regarding the use of turbans in court.159 But, even though the hardship he 
was subjected to in this episode was somewhat superficial, still the humiliation and shock 
seem to have acted as a sort of “triggering event,” making him reevaluate the morality of 
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ignoring the problem in general, and make a commitment; that is, adopt a new attitude, a 
“committed” attitude towards its solution. Gandhi does not report a significant revision of 
his view of the morality of racism itself on his part (i.e. a revision of the content of his 
moral evaluations). Rather, there is a significant change in the moral weight of the 
obligation to combat structural racism: it is now perceived as an imperative (a personal 
imperative, in Gandhi’s case) that one cannot just shrug off or set aside for another time. 
An experience with some similarities to that of Gandhi is that of Helen John (case 
#6) a mother of five that left her family to take part on a permanent anti-nuclear 
demonstration around a base in Greenham, England.160 According to her account, she 
was driving into Builth when it suddenly occurred to her how the beautiful scenery would 
be altered in a nuclear war – an image that left her physically unwell, forcing her to stop 
the car until she could compose herself and drive away. Until then, she had been  
one of those people who knew about nuclear weapons for years, and put it into the backs of 
their minds. . . because we were assured that we had enough nuclear weapons to stop any 
country attacking us. . . And it was on that particular day driving into Builth that I realized 
that this was nonsense.161 
 
As in Gandhi’s case, she had been previously aware of the evils of nuclear war, but 
not with the sense of pressing urgency that, in her view, demanded of her that she took 
action. Here there seems to have been a content shift: the counter-deterrent justification 
for nuclear weapons ceased to be regarded as a sound argument. But the word Helen uses 
is not “mistaken,” or “false”: it is “nonsense,” a word that indicates significant emotional 
content, especially given that it is accompanied by committed, sharply counter-cultural 
                                                 





action. The change in attitude, though likely prompted by a change in content, is what is 
most significant in her story. 
Both Gandhi’s and Helen John’s cases seem to deal with a person’s attitude/ 
commitment with regard to moral issues that are very specific.162 It is possible to find 
also instances of a more general change in attitude towards morality – the cases, for 
example, of people with a criminal career that significantly “reform.” A narrative of this 
kind can be found in the story of CeaseFire activists Antonio Pickett (“Lil’ Tony”) and 
Evans Robinson (“Chip”) (cases #20 and #21).163 Childhood friends, both were raised in 
strict homes “where grace was said at the dinner table and swearing was forbidden.”164 
They, however, “quickly grew enamored of the thrill and payoff of petty crime,” joining 
a gang, eventually getting into drug dealing, and beginning their rotation in and out of 
prison. By 1996, though, Tony found himself facing conviction, and weary of “worrying 
[that] the next person he saw might try to kill him.” While awaiting placement in a state 
prison he let his gang's leadership know he was stepping down. He mentions the prayer 
and support of his mother, a “loving but stern evangelical minister,” as instrumental in his 
“turning his life around.”  
His friend Chip, in the meantime, ran wild, making many enemies, and was only 
slowed down by the tragedy of his cousin dying in a shooting. 
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Tony was released in 2001, but couldn't risk getting pulled back in. His mother 
connected him then with CeaseFire, an initiative to take on high-risk individuals, help 
them find jobs and educational opportunities, and counsel them about the pitfalls of street 
life, and before long Tony became a counsellor for CeaseFire. Chip became one of his 
first clients, taking with his help a factory job; and in 2002 he was also hired by 
CeaseFire. An article in the Chicago Tribune describes them as having significant street 
clout due to their criminal past, which makes them very effective in recruiting teenagers 
out of gangs. They are also described as loving their adrenaline-charged jobs, but also 
carrying the regret from having hurt people in the past, and having influenced others to 
live a life of crime.165 
From the information that can be gathered from this newspaper account, it would 
seem that Pickett and Robinson were not ignorant of the basic norms required in a honest 
living – they would have learned them in their early years. Rather, they consciously 
disregarded them. Their conversion involves thus a new or renewed interest in leading a 
honest life. But while their understanding of what constitutes a honest life has not 
changed, in this case there seems to have been a change in their way of understanding the 
good of living a honest life – e.g. as freedom from the hazards and weariness of a life of 
crime – and this change in their understanding may have been instrumental in their 
attitudinal change. Summing up his experience, for example, Robinson says, “The air 
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smells different. The sun seems brighter. Things aren’t so bleak all the time.”166 His new 
attitude an his new understanding of life seem to go together. This is in fact to be 
expected insofar as a cognitive element is required for conversion, as will be argued later. 
For it is the thesis of this work that an attitudinal change would not take place without 
some shift in one’s understanding of the matters involved. But more on this later in 
Chapter 10. 
Similar examples of moral conversion regarding attitude, also dealing with 
rehabilitation of people with a criminal past, can be found in great numbers in the context 
of “restorative justice” programs. The Restorative Justice program, born in New Zealand 
and now appearing in other countries (including the U.S.), attempts to revise the 
contemporary paradigms of criminal justice (which are based, it is claimed, on 
“retributive justice,” or on punishment as deterrent); and which the advocates of 
restorative justice see as essentially flawed, both in their theoretical basis and in their 
questionable efficacy.167 One of the Restorative Justice program’s main practices is that 
of facilitating encounters between victims and offenders. In an abundant number of cases, 
the encounter has significant transformative effects both in the victim and the offender. 
The victims have the opportunity to see the offender as a human person, to question 
him/her about their motives, challenge their actions in the presence of someone harmed 
by them, and let them know about the specific ways in which the offense affected them.  
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Sometimes the victims also use the opportunity to forgive the offense, and even aid in the 
offender’s reinsertion into society. The offenders, for their part, frequently experience a 
sort of existential shock when they see that their victims have faces, that their actions 
have harmed concrete people. Quite often too they express this shock, and the experience 
seems to aid greatly in important, positive changes in their lives, which the restorative 
justice movement summarizes as their rehabilitation.168 
A paradigmatic example of moral conversion regarding attitude in this context is 
that of Jackie Katounas, reported to have spent 12 years in prison over a 25 year period 
(“clocking up” 138 convictions!), having gone into her first maximum security unit at the 
age of 12 (case #24).169 Her restorative justice experience was in this case of an informal 
kind, when she received “some stolen goods” and discovered that she could identify the 
owner, a person she knew personally. “In all that time,” Katounas reports, “I was never 
aware I was hurting anyone. I never gave consideration or a thought to the victims.”170 In 
this occasion, however, she felt deeply ashamed, and she phoned the victim to explain her 
involvement. After returning the stolen goods to the victim, Jackie ceased “offending” 
altogether. “It was a powerful turning point because I began thinking of other people than 
myself,” Jackie reports.171 The move away from her life of crime was difficult, among 
other things because she needed to learn to communicate with people who were not 
criminals. Some time later she heard of the Restorative Justice program, where she now 
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works actively as a facilitator, even running some new initiatives for the project. As in 
the case of Tony Pickett and Chip Robinson, her previous experience has been useful in 
building a rapport with the prisoners/offenders.172 But the point here is that, with the help 
of some new data (the harm done to the victims, their possible suffering) Jackie changed 
her attitude towards stealing, and regarding how to live her life generally.173 
These examples both provide evidence for and specify in clearer terms what is 
meant by this class of moral conversion, regarding attitude about right/wrong. The 
distinction between classes of conversion, to repeat, is not meant to be understood as 
circumscribing the different classes in clearly separated groups; rather, it is meant to take 
into account the fact that the weight of a concrete moral conversion may fall on one of 
these three aspects, while involving transformations or struggles relevant to the other 
aspects too. The distinction is nevertheless very useful, for without it we would be forced 
to struggle with a phenomenon too varied, too multiform to consider under a single 
structure without being excessively vague. 
Narratives of the opposite process: “counter-conversion” as disintegration 
The opposite process, it has been proposed, is often less a matter of resolution or 
determination (a positive process by which the agent reaches some form of higher 
integration) and more a process of disintegration or dissolution, of losing control over 
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where one’s actions are leading, either because one has lost the capacity to objectively 
evaluate them, or because one has become too entangled in compromises and does not 
see a way out. This is suggested, for example, by the story of Patrick K., a fast-track 
operator who got gradually involved in a scheme with corrupt elements of his state’s 
government. Eventually the scheme was discovered; Patrick managed to escape with his 
family and became an international fugitive; but eventually the stress of this fugitive life 
became too much and he turned himself in (case #11).174 The story is now told by Patrick 
himself, who gives talks as part of community service duty. In his account, rationalization 
was a very important factor in his downfall – he spent a great deal of time devising ways 
to convince his wife and parents that what he was doing was ethical - and so was a 
feeling of invulnerability or arrogance fostered by his success. Interestingly enough, his 
body seemed to be more aware than his conscious mind of the trouble he was getting 
into; according to K., his body responded with constant ulcers and hair loss. In this story, 
the dissolution seems to be gradual, and does not seem marked by a turning towards 
anything. Rather, the story illustrates what Lonergan called “the flight from insight,” a 
half-conscious attempt to avoid looking at the issue or understanding it adequately. For 
these reasons, it seems appropriate to withhold the term “conversion” from this type of 
change. 
The same conclusion is supported by the story of Robert Cooley, a Chicago 
attorney who worked for the mob (the “outfit”) and then later put his life continuously on 
                                                 




the line to bring them to prison (case #19).175 As a young policeman, Cooley performed a 
number of heroic deeds, and refused to take part in a number of small corruption schemes 
he came across; but after becoming a successful criminal attorney, he gradually became 
entangled in the designs of some mob bosses. While a certain amount of unethical 
behavior was common in lawyers living in those times, it was the bosses’ pressure to 
“fix” a case – and Cooley’s reluctant acquiescence with the scheme - that eventually 
sealed his entanglement; after that, the more the bosses trusted him, the more dangerous it 
became for him to quit working for them. According to his account, however, his “core 
values” (crystallized in the image of his father, a honest policeman who had suffered 
from his unwillingness to compromise with the widespread corruption) survived: Cooley 
put his life on the line more than once to save a client or a friend from the mob, or to 
support an honest judge in his resolve to prosecute corrupt elements. These deep-set 
values – pushed down by fear, rationalization and convenience – eventually made their 
way to the surface again.176 
The type of “downfall” we see in Cooley’s descent into the life of the mob seems to 
have been the result of discrete, sometimes half-conscious decisions that progressively 
led him to lose moral control over his life. This kind of story is a favorite topic of 
fictional narratives too, from crime epics such as Mario Puzzo’s The Godfather to 
fantastical allegories such as Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray or Charles Williams’ 
Descent into Hell, to the social criticism of Steinbeck’s The Winter of Our Discontent. It 
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is also the stuff classic tragedies are made of, from Creon in Antigone to Macbeth – a 
progressive loss of control, originated in dubious or bad decisions, that eventually ends in 
corrupting the character’s originally good (even outstanding) moral character. 177 
C. Conversion regarding behavioral coherence in right/wrong178 
It is fairly common – possibly, indeed, a universal point in human moral experience 
– that even people who take morality seriously, or have an ingrained concern for doing 
what is moral, do not always act accordingly. “I cannot even understand my own 
actions,” says St. Paul, “for I do not do what I want, but I do what I hate.”179 These 
occurrences, viewed by the actor as contrary to their best intentions of right behavior can 
sometimes be explained, when they occur occasionally, as accidents – due to fatigue, to 
strong emotions provoked by an external situation (fear, anger, anxiety), to distraction, to 
being in a hurry, etc. That is, even though one may know what is the right action to take, 
it may be hard at times to do it because doing so requires an energy or concentration not 
readily available, or perhaps a certain amount of sacrifice that seems, in the situation, 
more than the agent can muster. Overall, these faults can be and are commonly attributed 
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to “human weakness.” By this expression it is generally meant that we human beings do 
not operate perfectly according to the ideal, and that in the concrete existential situation 
we sometimes operate even further from the ideal than what we consider an acceptable 
standard. Faults of this kind are commonly distinguished, however, from those that have 
become a habit, i.e. patterns of behavior through which we recurrently diverge from the 
standard: bad habits, vices, specific weaknesses, what is sometimes called the “dominant 
defect” by those presenting the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises, etc.180 
 Regarding the occasional faults in one's behavior, it is not unreasonable to believe - 
as traditional virtue theory maintains - that it is possible to become to some extent more 
proficient at getting them under control, as the person develops self-control or a more 
sustained attention to the conditions that make those faults more probable. In the 
language of virtue theory, virtues such as courage, temperance, equanimity, patience 
allow the agent to increase control over the influence of external and emotional factors in 
their decisions. Together with these, intellectual virtues that are accessory to prudence 
improve the agent’s awareness of cognitive factors that are relevant to decisions. This 
process of gradually building up virtues, however, does not seem to fit the notion of 
conversion (though such a process may be required to consolidate the new patterns of 
behavior that are seen as desirable or morally required, after conversion takes place).181 
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But if the process of consolidating good habits is not itself conversion, it may be 
possible to identify, at the beginning of a person's sustained efforts to “grow in virtue,” a 
relatively conscious shift towards a more complete commitment to one's moral standards. 
The process may be described in this manner: the person realizes that his/her 
commitment to his/her own moral standards is weak, because of an apparent lack of 
coherence between the actions and the contents of the moral standards;  there is a a lack 
of reliability, or a proneness to be swayed towards behavior that is deemed unethical or 
imperfect. But faced with this realization, the person then judges this low degree of 
commitment to be unacceptable, and commits in earnest to certain moral standards, and 
accordingly begins acting more coherently. This kind of shift corresponds to the class of 
moral conversion regarding attitude/commitment about right/wrong, which was 
described in the previous section. 
Habitual flaws, however, can coexist also with an earnest commitment to moral 
ideals; even a very moral person may be constantly tortured with anxiety for a recurrent 
flaw of character that appears to be impossible to correct. There is no direct logical 
correlation between a person's commitment to moral ideals and that person's capacity for 
self-control: a person that experiences a strong desire to be more moral may indeed be 
very poor at self-control. A change towards greater coherence between moral standards 
and actual behavior – the third class of moral conversion - has to be, for this reason, 
distinguished from a change in one’s degree of commitment to moral standards (the 
second class of moral conversion). A close relationship between them might be expected 




such standards); but this third class of conversion is distinct enough to need separate 
examination. 
The possibility for this class of conversion is of particular importance for the person 
that has maintained a high level of commitment for a long while, but has not achieved the 
desired degree of behavioral coherence. A person that has recently arrived to a high 
degree of commitment to moral standards (that is, one who has recently undergone a 
moral conversion regarding attitude/commitment) has little experiential reasons to doubt 
that as he/she becomes familiar with a new way of life – the kind of life now demanded 
by moral standards - a greater coherence will spontaneously follow. But if such 
conversion took place a long time ago, or if the person has, as long as he/she can 
remember, adhered to these ideals with the same conviction, then one’s habitual flaws 
may weigh very differently. The person may then be living in a perpetual situation of 
partial resignation or despair, convinced that these flaws are unconquerable, or, 
alternatively, may have become nearly blind to them, finally ignoring them, or perhaps 
living with a certain amount of Sartrean “bad faith.” 
Yet it still may happen that at a certain point in life the person that had given up 
now encounters a source of hope, and so engages with the conviction that it is possible to 
change. Or the person that became used to living with his/her habitual flaws, or is nearly 
blind to them, is suddenly vividly awakened to them. On the wings of renewed strength 
and/or awareness, the person may rise to meet the challenge and conquer these flaws, 
finally beginning to move at a steady, determined pace – sometimes at a very fast pace -




more complete coherence between one's moral standards and one's patterns of behavior. 
The key moment, however, seems to be the original moment in which the person’s 
resolve is made (not just when it is formulated, but when it somehow “clicks” and 
transforms the whole disposition of the person towards his/her habitual flaws). Such is 
the third class of moral conversion.  It is not a change in the contents of what is believed 
to be right/wrong, or on the criteria for such moral judgments, nor of the degree to which 
the person is committed to moral ideals or standards, but of the habitual coherence 
between ideal standards and real practice. 
 
Narrative evidence for this class of conversion 
 Examples of this instance of conversion abound in literature regarding alcoholism 
recovery: cases of alcoholics that have given up hope of ever getting rid of their 
addiction, that in one way or another – sometimes rather unexpectedly – find a source of 
strength, hope or motivation, religious or otherwise, and put themselves in a successful 
path of recovery. Common in these cases is the fact that the subjects do not consider their 
addiction a good thing, but – to varying degrees – a destructive one. Many suffer greatly 
from knowing this; they even feel they have practically excluded themselves from 
humanity. The task of classifying these cases as instances of moral conversion regarding 
coherence, however, requires some qualifying comments. Depending on the cases, it is 
possible to “jump back” and find that the conversion process began as a conversion 
regarding attitude: some of the subjects express not having particularly cared about the 
direction their lives were going; and it is a change in this respect – i.e. a change towards 




their conduct. Once this desire coalesces, overcoming the addiction necessitates a 
struggle towards coherence (between the desire/commitment to stay sober and the 
person’s actual behavior), and there seems to be in stories of this kind a close relation 
between the strength of the desire/commitment and the ability to achieve coherence. But 
because of the nature of addictions, it is not rare to find cases in which the awareness of 
the destructiveness of one’s addiction, and the desire to overcome it, have been stalled by 
the subject’s sense of inability to do so. The subject’s desire in this case turns into an 
abstract kind of desire, i.e. without direct operative consequences, so that its frustration 
adds an additional element of suffering for the subject. When this is the situation, it 
seems justified to classify a subject’s initiating a push to change their behavior (if the 
push is grounded in the same desire that was previously ineffectual) as a moral 
conversion regarding coherence. 
In the collection of cases in Leuba’s study of conversion – a study that, as was 
mentioned, focused almost exclusively on cases of alcoholic recovery – it is possible to 
find examples of the three classes of conversion; and it may be of use to bring up also 
examples of the first and second classes to provide a clarifying contrast. The detailed 
account of Leuba’s “Subject E” (case #12) seems to fit the description of a conversion 
regarding content, in the sense of a new understanding by the subject of the wrongness of 
his habits. "In all this period,” the subject reports,  
I never had a desire to reform on religious grounds, but all my pangs were due to some 
terrible remorse I used to feel after a heavy carousal, the remorse taking the shape of regret 
after my folly in wasting my life in such a way - a man of superior talents and education. I 
was not much alarmed about the future world; I did not believe it to exist, at any rate. 182 
 
                                                 




 Yet one day a friend asked him for an opinion regarding a book, Professor Drummond's 
Natural Law in the Spiritual World. Here the subject met with the biblical phrase “He 
that has the Son has life eternal,” and could not proceed further, all the while feeling there 
was another being in his bedroom. “It was unquestionably shown to me, in one second of 
time, that I had never touched the Eternal, that is, God, and that if I died then, I must 
inevitably be lost. I was undone.” After this experience, he told his family about his 
experience, although only his older sister understood it. He came home drunk once more 
(he had not promised to abstain from drink) but having met his sister on his way back, 
prayed for the first time in twenty years, and had an experience of self-surrender, after 
which, he claims, “from that hour drink has had no terrors for me; I never touch it, never 
want it.”183 
By contrast, the story of John B. Gough, a “famous temperance orator” (case #17) 
seems to fit the description of a conversion regarding attitude.184 “It is practically the 
conversion of an atheist,” Leuba says;  
neither God nor Jesus Christ is mentioned. The sense of his degradation and worthlessness 
does not involve in his mind responsibility for his sin to other; he is absorbed in his own 
self. He battles against himself, poor slave and outlaw, to conquer, if possible, the place he 
has lost in society.185 
 
But when a stranger speaks to him on the street, “kindness, sympathy, the proof that all 
bonds between him and mankind were not cut of, and that men still had confidence in his 
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manhood, lighted up the redeeming flame of Faith.”186 Leuba quotes from Gough's 
Autobiography: 
It was the first touch of kindness which I had known for months; as simple and trifling as 
the circumstances may appear to many, it went right to my heart, and like the wing of the 
angel, troubled the waters in that stagnant pool of affection.187 
 
This spiritual/psychic renewal at the heart of his reform suggests this to be of the 
conversion regarding attitude class. 
But other cases mentioned by Leuba seem to focus more on the subjects losing the 
struggle at the level of behavioral coherence, and thus in these scenarios the conversion 
that takes place is a conversion regarding behavioral coherence. The story of “Subject 
G” (case #15)188 tells about a man who became an alcoholic at the age of twenty-one, 
losing his business and two jobs because of this. The subject reports having signed 
“enough abstinence pledges to cover the wall of the room,” which indicates a relatively 
active desire/attitude towards recovery over the preceding years. But then, finding 
himself without money, without friends and without a home, and practically wishing to 
die, 
a lady showed him sympathy and invited him to a mission. Her kindness made him look 
within. For years no one had ever cared about him; this unwonted kindly interest went to 
his heart.189 
 
Going to this meeting, he was invited to “give himself to the Lord Jesus Christ with the 
assurance that He would save him.” He accepted the offer of a bed and tried to read the 
material given to him; he was too disturbed, but finally experienced peace after asking 
God to take him as he was. 
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The anguish of the night had passed, and he found himself calm and peaceful. That very 
morning he told a companion that he was converted, that he had given his heart to God. 
Terrible were the temptations that day as he passed before the saloon doors; but he was 
kept. They recurred day after day for more than a week. The lady's continued sympathy was 
a great comfort to him.190 
 
Three months after this conversion, at age forty, the subject was not only still “sober,” but 
he opened and begun managing a mission himself. 
“Subject H” (case #16)191 also describes a moral conversion regarding behavioral 
coherence, with a similar leading event: 
While he was seated in Central Park, N.Y., a young man entered into conversation with 
him, and invited him to go in his company to a religious meeting. The kindness of the 
stranger moved him deeply; he did not understand why a well-dressed stranger should care 
for him and be willing to walk with a raggedly clad fellow like himself.192 
 
In a very different context, Robert Cooley’s conversion (case #19)193 also seems to 
fit the conversion regarding coherence class. According to his biography, Cooley seemed 
to be constantly disgusted with the way his life had become entangled, and the fact that 
he was betraying the values modeled by his father – and working for the very people his 
father fought against, some of which might have been involved in the murder of his 
grandfather – did not leave him alone.194 Some of his behaviors in certain areas – 
especially his busy night-life and his gambling habits – had the consequence of fooling 
his mob clients into thinking that he had no principles. Yet in many cases he did go 
dangerously out of his way to warn a potential victim, or to provide some moral support 
to an honest judge wavering in his resolve. At one point, some words his father said in his 
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deathbed made him examine his current life - it is not, therefore, out of the question that 
this instance may fit a conversion regarding attitude class as well. But Cooley lived for a 
relatively long period of time carrying these contradictions within himself. Eventually, 
the turning event of his moral conversion took place almost without his making a 
conscious decision – or perhaps as he tryied to shield his decision from conscious 
thought, given the risks involved: 
When Saturday rolled around, ten days after the Colella trial, I was still in turmoil, just 
boiling inside [from an ongoing quarrel with one of the bosses regarding that case]. That 
morning, for a little fun, I went downtown to play gin with my old lawyer pals at 100 North 
LaSalle. The group included Allan Ackerman, the first attorney I had shared an office with. 
We had our laughs, and it was like the good old days again. I totally forgot my troubles. We 
finished up early in the afternoon, and I wanted to grab some lunch before I went home. My 
favorite deli, the Dill Pickle, was only a few blocks away, so I decided to take a stroll. 
Getting a corned beef sandwich was my only purpose in life. When I turned the corner onto 
Dearborn Avenue, I happened to pass the Federal Building. It seemed to draw me like a 
magnet. Suddenly I thought, “Maybe I should see who's up in the Strike Force office.”195 
 
Arriving there, he communicated to the FBI Strike Force his intention of bringing down 
the First Ward – after which there would be no turning back. Eventually Cooley 
succeeded in bringing many of the mob bosses to prison, even though this implied that he 
would have to go into hiding permanently.196 In Cooley’s case, the apparent accident of 
walking past the Federal Building did not impact his attitude or what was understood 
(content). But it somehow enabled or facilitated a radical shift in behavior so that 
Cooley’s actions thereafter cohered with his attitude against collaborating with the mob 
bosses (and with his conviction that collaborating with the bosses was wrong). 
                                                 
195 Ibid., 181. 
196 The FBI had to investigate carefully the motives that Cooley had to denounce the “Outfit” (as that 
particular organized crime group was known): if it was discovered that debts or any other significant 
motive was behind his intention, that might have invalidated their efforts in court. This fact adds an extra 
level of credibility to his account, particularly when it comes to assessing whether this was actually a 




Thérèse of Lisieux also records in her autobiography a moral conversion that took 
place in her teenage years, which may also be an example of this class of conversion. In 
this case, however, the facts locate the story on the borderline with the conversion 
regarding attitude class. She tells in her book how, at the age of four, with her mother’s 
death, she had lost her liveliness and had fallen into the habit of crying over everything: 
I, who had been so lively, so communicative, was now a shy and quiet little girl, and over-
sensitive. Merely to be looked at made me burst into tears.197 
 
This habit went on even until she was fourteen years old. 
Really, my touchiness in those days was quite unbearable. If I’d given some slight 
annoyance to anyone I was fond of, without in the least meaning to, it was obvious that 
crying about it only made things worse, but could I control myself? No, I wept like the 
Magdalene herself; and as soon as I had begun to cheer up about what I’d done, I started 
crying about having cried over it. Arguments were unavailing; nothing would cure me of 
this unpleasant habit.198 
 
The incident leading to her moral conversion is almost trivial: on the occasion of 
Christmas, Thérèse overheard her tired father saying that that would be the last time she 
would find presents in her slipper. Thérèse tells us that her sister, Celine, realized that 
Thérèse had overheard this, and was bracing herself for the inevitable deluge of tears that 
would follow. Yet something changed inside Thérèse. She swallowed her tears and acted 
as if nothing painful or distressing had happened. 
Celine thought she must be dreaming. But no, it was a sublime reality; baby Thérèse had 
recovered the strength of mind which she'd lost at four and a half and recovered it for good.  
With this night of illumination, the third period of my life begins, the best of all, the richest 
in heavenly graces. In a single instant, our Lord brought about the change which I'd vainly 
tried to achieve these ten years past; I'd tried, and that was enough for him.199 
 
                                                 
197 St. Thérèse of Lisieux, Autobiography of St. Thérèse of Lisieus: The Complete and Authorized Text of 
"L'histoire D'une Ame", trans. Ronald Cox (New York: P.J. Kennedy & Sons, 1958), 57. 
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Thérèse tells that this sudden change in her conduct – and arguably in the disposition 
behind it – was permanent, providing important evidence that significant changes can 
take place in a very short period of time; almost instantly, by Thérèse’s account. 
This change was sweeping; it seems to have taken place also with regard to her 
relations towards other people, and to her general disposition about the meaning of her 
life. 
He [our Lord] did more; he made me “a fisher of men.” I felt a great desire to work for the 
conversion of sinners: a desire which had never before been so vividly present to me; to put 
it quite simply, charity had found its way into my heart, calling on me to forget myself and 
simply do what was wanted of me; and since then I've been as happy as the day is long.200 
 
In this respect, Thérèse’s conversion may thus be read as an instance also of conversion 
not only of how she understood/valued/acted in relation to right/wrong, but also as an 
instance of conversion in regard to happiness, eudaemonia and the meaning of life (i.e. a 
conversion in regard to morality understood in the classical sense); which will be the 
subject of Section 3. 
 
Conclusion to Section Two 
It has been shown that it is possible to identify three subcategories (“classes”) of 
moral conversion, where “moral” is understood in terms of right/wrong. Moral 
conversion in this sense can then refer, first, to a shift in content regarding right/wrong. 
This can occur in a number of ways: as a shift in a person’s understanding of what 
specific actions are morally right/wrong (though instances in which changes of this kind  
                                                 




are sweeping enough to be called “conversion” are infrequent); as a deeper shift in a 
person’s criteria for judging about right and wrong; and, if accompanied by an 
intellectual conversion, as what Conn calls a “critical moral conversion,” in which a 
person’s understanding of themselves as moral agents is also changed. Moral conversion 
can refer, in second place, to a change in the moral agent's attitude or degree of 
commitment to doing what is (understood to be) morally right/wrong. In third place, 
moral conversion can occur as a change in a person’s patterns of behavior, so that the 
person’s  actions become consistent or coherent with their judgments about right/wrong 
in a stable way. 
As was mentioned, these three classes are not mutually exclusive. Thus, for 
example, an attitudinal change and a move towards behavioral coherence often occur not 
only in the same person, but sometimes almost simultaneously with each other. But these 
blending areas do not evidence a flaw in the threefold framework for classifying moral 
conversions; they indicate rather that the process of moral conversion is very dynamic, 
and in concrete, real-life cases the three classes are often interwoven in complex ways. 
Nevertheless the distinction between the three classes of moral conversion is a distinction 
that corresponds to real events, as evidenced in the narrative evidence; and this 





3. The classical notion of morality: the question for happiness, 
eudaemonia or “the meaning of life” 
The three classes mentioned above would be sufficient to circumscribe the notion of 
moral conversion, if choosing or doing what is right/avoiding what is wrong were the 
only relevant elements of moral experience. The focus on right/wrong, however, that has 
been described as characteristic of the modern/contemporary notion of morality, leaves 
out many aspects of moral life that can be considered essential to it. These are aspects 
that were regularly taken into account in what may be called, at least for the purposes of 
contrast, the “classical” notion of morality. This way of looking at morality will lead us 
to an alternative, expanded set of scenarios that are also instances of moral conversion.201 
That the focus on right/wrong is too narrow to be considered exhaustive is argued 
by Servais Pinckaers in The Sources of Christian Ethics.202 Pinckaers denounces in this 
work a shift he detects in modern ethical theory towards obligation as the central 
category of ethics,203 i.e. to what has been characterized in this work as the focus on 
right/wrong. Pinckaers contrasts this focus on right/wrong with the focus on happiness  
                                                 
201 In calling this notion of morality “classical,” I subscribe to Pinckaers’ denomination out of convenience; 
for it may be argued that the expanded notion of “what is a matter of moral concern” is not specific of 
“classical” (i.e. Western, ancient and medieval) philosophy, but using Pinckaers’ denomination greatly 
simplifies the exposition. 
202 Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. Sr. Mary Thomas Noble from the 3rd ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1995). 
203 Pinckaers does not specify what he means by “modern”; but it may be inferred that he refers to a 
tendency that had it roots in some Renaissance thinkers and culminated in the Enlightenment, its 
paradigmatic expression being Kant’s moral treatises. This focus on obligation was carried on, mostly 
unchallenged, into twentieth century ethical theories; for this reason it may better be called 
“modern/contemporary.” In any case, the notion of morality expounded in the previous section in terms of  




which is, according to Pinckaers, the keystone of ancient and medieval moral thought (as 
well as of the moral message of the Scriptures). 
To illustrate this shift, Pinckaers offers a quotation from A. Janssen, who is 
reviewing a work from J. Tonneau. In his review, Janssen states that 
Thomists do not fail to note that their master does not give, at least apparently, such 
importance to the idea of obligation, and that he is singularly laconic on the subject. Father 
Tonneau takes this as his starting point. He wants to know how St. Thomas could, 
inadvertently as it were, deny the primary role of obligation in morality.204 
 
As Pinckaers points out, this quotation is revealing of an assumption that is made by 
both Janssen and Tonneau (and apparently unquestioned) regarding the “primary role of 
obligation” in morality, i.e. a primary focus on right/wrong. This assumption is evident in 
the surprise expressed by Janssen at the fact that a great thinker such as Aquinas has 
“inadvertently” denied such primacy. For Pinckaers, Janssen and Tonneau can be 
considered as illustrative of what is extensively the modern/contemporary approach to 
ethical theory, with its right/wrong focus. 
What Pinckaers argues is that denying a primacy to right/wrong is no oversight on 
the part of Aquinas. Just perusing the structure of the second part of the Summa, says 
Pinckaers, is enough to reveal that happiness, and not obligation, is at the heart of 
morality: Thomas’ treatise opens with five questions on happiness – what it is, what is 
required for its attainment –; and these chapters are no mere preamble, but “the keystone 
of the whole moral edifice; it [the question on happiness] determines its [Aquinas’s 
whole moral theory] ultimate goal and general orientation.”205 True, Thomas does deal 
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(1965):617. Quoted from Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 17 (emphasis mine). 




with laws and their precepts, but we must remember that in Aquinas law is defined as “an 
ordinance of reason for the common good.”206 “For him law is, by its very nature, closer 
to the mind than to the will. In determining the morality of actions, law does not play the 
same role as it does for modern moralists.”207 Pinckaers also provides evidence that this 
focus on happiness is similarly true of Augustine, Aristotle, Plato; true of the ancients in 
general, Christian and Pagan alike.208 
After distinguishing in this way what he calls the classical and modern views of 
morality, Pinckaers mentions some detrimental consequences of the moderns’ exclusive 
focus on obligation. The most important for this dissertation is that some traditional 
topics of ethics, closely linked to the matter of happiness - friendship, love, suffering, the 
meaning of life - are rarely considered, because they do not quite fit into the categories of 
obligation.209 Or alternatively, they are forced in a somewhat Procrustean manner to fit 
into the obligation-based framework. Pinckaers illustrates this latter tendency by offering 
examples from modern and contemporary manuals of moral theology that ask, for 
example, questions such as “how many explicit acts of charity is a Christian obliged to do 
in a lifetime?” or “how often we should pray?”210 Pinckaers sees a similar “forcing” of 
these topics into a right/wrong framework in modern and contemporary philosophical 
moralists as well. 
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In a similar Procrustean way, modern/contemporary moral thought tries to deal with 
some of these themes, says Pinckaers, by distinguishing the “erogatory” from the 
“supererogatory,” i.e. what is strictly morally due from what goes beyond the call of 
moral duty. Formulating this issues in terms of this distinction, however, involves 
addressing the matter from the viewpoint of right/wrong. From that perspective, in fact, a 
substantial part of ancient and medieval moral thinking will seem to be seriously 
defective, appearing to offer little more than a self-centered search for happiness, and 
leaving many important questions about a person’s obligation unanswered, especially 
obligations that demand from the individual a measure of self-sacrifice. Furthermore, the 
very idea of a focus on happiness is misunderstood by attempting to cast it into modern/ 
contemporary terms. Thinking about the search for happiness as a quasi-obligation, for 
example, is a mistake; it should not be cast into such terms as, for example, an imperative 
to make one’s talents grow. The foremost reason for lending ear to what ethics has to say, 
from the classical perspective, is not that ethics can tell us what is right/wrong, but that 
the drive for happiness is the innermost desire of the soul, and as such must be paid 
attention.  
In short, according to Pinckaers, there is a wide range of human experience that is 
relevant to moral life in the classical sense - i.e. as reflection on how to achieve 
“happiness,” eudaemonia, “the good life,” fulfillment, growth – and, one may expect, 
also very important to moral life in general; but that is not considered to be important to 





It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to weigh the adequacy of Pinckaers’ 
historical distinction (i.e. “classical” and “modern”), or to address the adequacy or 
relative importance of these two models of the moral life. But the present analysis of the 
notion of moral conversion must not foreclose in advance the possibility that this other 
aspect of moral life, although arguably not often considered seriously in modern and 
contemporary moral theory, might prove important for a full understanding of the notion 
of moral conversion.211 
Consider for example the many “change of heart” stories that populate the big and 
the small screen: cynical pennycounter becomes warm-hearted boss; workaholic dad 
realizes he has a family and opts for a less frantic lifestyle; fast-paced broker becomes 
small-league trainer; odd couples become lifelong friends; fashion-focused teen leaves 
her exclusive clique and opens up to systematically excluded potential friendships, and so 
forth. These stories have been told so many times that the main challenge the scriptwriter 
faces is to avoid their becoming clichés. They are all about conversion – not religious or 
intellectual, but moral. Yet analyzing them in terms of right/wrong – e.g. “the main 
character finally did what he/she ought to do, fulfilled his/her duty as a parent, friend, 
human being” - would be missing the most important point. Only in a few cases are these 
stories centrally about obligation.212 
                                                 
211 Note that the literature of psychology of moral development displays a similar division, between authors 
whose research is focused on themes such as the development of rule-abeyance, the notions of right and 
wrong, guilt and responsibility, etc. (Piaget, Kohlberg), and authors that focus on questions regarding 
happiness and the “meaning-of-life” (Erikson, Fowler, Frankl, etc.) 
212 Note, however, that it may be possible to cast the characters' options in terms of “right and wrong” (e.g. 
“in quitting his job and moving to a farm in the countryside she did the right thing”), But this only insofar 
as right/wrong is understood in terms wider than “what ought or ought not to be done.” In this observation, 
the expression right/wrong appears to have a wider meaning than “ought” or “obligation,” at least in 




What seems to be the case then is that the concern for happiness or eudaemonia that 
characterizes classical ethical theory is not only alive and present in ordinary people’s 
moral lives, but also constitutes a recurrent theme in many stories of moral conversion. 
This is true to such an extent in fact that the theme of happiness merits its own exposition 
in relation to the three classes of moral conversion, discussed in Section Two in terms of 
morality as right/wrong. This will be done presently; but before this task is addressed, a 
few general remarks are in order. 
The first one is that – adamant claims of critics like Pinckaers aside - an analysis of 
moral conversion from the point of view of happiness or eudaemonia should not be taken 
to replace but rather to complete or complement the considerations of moral conversion 
from the point of view of obligation or right/wrong. Whether both points of view will 
eventually be reunited or reconciled in some manner, or whether one of them could 
eventually be absorbed by the other, is not a question for the present discussion; for both 
focuses are essential to a careful discussion of moral conversion. This means that to the 
three classes of moral conversion discussed in the previous section will now be added 
three classes similar in structure, but focused on happiness or eudaemonia instead. 
The second remark regards the terminology available to designate this kind of 
conversion. As with the expression “right/wrong,” it is necessary to conventionally 
choose an expression that designates this focus. The term “happiness” has been used so 
far, along with the more technical Greek term eudaemonia. The term “happiness,”  
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fact, in its own way, supports the present claim that an adequate account of moral conversion cannot limit 




however, is not in all cases the most adequate. For one thing, it evokes contingency or 
luck, something that “happens” to a person, often due more to external circumstances 
than something prompted or caused by a convert’s new understanding, attitude or 
conduct. More importantly, the term is often used to refer in ordinary speech to a 
superficial satisfaction of desires rather than the deeper sort of fulfillment intended in 
classical and medieval discussion.213 
The Greek term eudaemonia is more specific, and in certain contexts, more 
adequate. The notion, as found for example in Aristotle, refers to a deeper sort of 
fulfillment associated with a structure of concatenated goals aiming in turn at higher 
ends, i.e. ends that are distinctively human (e.g. knowledge, moral conduct, friendship, 
justice, etc.) Aristotle’s initial observations regarding the general meaning of the term, in 
the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, bring together characteristics that people are 
generally looking for when they ask about happiness: true eudaemonia is pleasurable (we 
want the experience of it to continue rather than to end); it is stable (meaning that it is not 
accompanied by inordinate fear or anxiety about the possibility of losing it); and it is self-
sufficient (meaning that when attained, one is not longing for something else). These 
characteristics make eudaemonia a more precise expression than the ordinary uses of 
“happiness.” 
It must be acknowledged, though, that further along Aristotle’s analysis, as 
Aristotle develops in more specific details what he means by eudaemonia, the notion 
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becomes a potential source for disagreement. Eudaemonia according to Aristotle is 
achieved in the activity of the highest part of the soul, in a life in conformity with virtue, 
and in a life not strongly marked by suffering or hardship. If one inquires further what 
this special kind of activity is, Aristotle’s answer is “theoretical knowledge.” This 
characterization, while valuable and challenging, does not enjoy sufficient consensus 
among students of human fulfillment to accept it for granted. However, defending 
Aristotle’s notion of eudaemonia is not one of the goals of this dissertation. For this 
reason, in the course of this work the term will designate only a general notion of 
eudaemonia, i.e. as found in Nicomachean Ethics up to the first half of Chapter 7, book I. 
But neither “happiness” nor eudaemonia are adequate to convey the full meaning of 
a more contemporary, very popular expression; namely, “the meaning of life.” This 
expression – which comes up frequently in narratives of moral conversion – aims at 
identifying something specific as the meaning of life: thus the expression is frequently 
used in the question: “what is the meaning of life?” Possibly this expression points to a 
distinctively contemporary need – the need of choosing one's social role, one’s 
profession, long-term goals, even what “the meaning of it all” is – in an age in which 
choice has become a normative activity of humans, and a characteristic source of 
anxiety.214 
The three expressions thus have their uses. Accordingly – choosing, for present 
purposes, inclusiveness over precision – each of the three expressions will be employed  
                                                 
214 The expression “the meaning of life” is also more open-ended than eudaemonia; it can transcend the 




when its use is appropriate to the context. The reader should thus keep in mind that the 
intention here is to be inclusive, and that alternative expressions are not meant to 
designate clearly distinct categories of moral conversion. 
 
Classes of moral conversion in relation to happiness/eudaemonia/meaning 
When discussing the classes of conversion related to right/wrong, the three classes 
were described as: 
1.A: A change in content regarding (in some cases) what is judged to be morally 
right/wrong, or (more commonly) a change in the criteria by which right/wrong are 
judged. 
1.B: A shift regarding the moral agent's attitude toward or commitment to  the 
morality of his/her actions – or lack thereof. (E.g. from frivolity to seriousness, from 
ignoring the issues to actively engaging them, etc.) 
1.C: A change in behavioral patterns or habits, through which the agent achieves a 
more persistent coherence between his/her actions and his/her moral convictions. 
Applying this framework again,215 the three classes of moral conversion in terms of 
happiness/eudaemonia/meaning can be characterized as: 
2.A: Moral conversion as a change in content, here meaning what the person 
believes that will bring them – or produce in them – eudaemonia or happiness. 
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2.B: Moral conversion as a change in attitude: a move towards more actively (more 
“seriously”) formulating the question, or more actively seeking the answer to the 
question, of what brings meaning or eudaemonia. 
2.C: Moral conversion as a change towards more coherence in one’s behavioral 
patterns, i.e. the agent begins to attempt to conform his/her behavioral patterns to the 
behaviors that seem to be required in order to achieve eudaemonia. 
A. Conversion regarding content about happiness/eudaemonia/meaning 
Take as a starting point a common form of the question about eudaemonia, “what 
would make me truly happy?” or perhaps “what would bring me true happiness?” What 
is commonly sought with this question, even if the word eudaemonia is not commonly 
used these days, is something very much akin to what Aristotle identified in his own 
times with that term (and to which the term eudaemonia will refer to in this dissertation): 
a stable, deeply fulfilling form of happiness. Insofar as the question is taken with a 
certain degree of seriousness, a change in the habitually given answer (or even the 
suspicion that the answer given habitually to this question, perhaps unreflectively, is 
wrong) can precipitate existential life-changes, i.e. moral conversion. 
The most common form of conversion within this class occurs when a person shifts 
from looking for happiness/eudaemonia/meaning in one “category of goals” to looking 
for it in a very different category. Possible “categories of goals” are, of course, 
tremendously varied. Here are for example some categories in which the answer to the 




- in possessions that increase status 
- in possessions for leisure 
- in entertaining, leisurely activities 
- in “hobbies” – leisurely activities that require a certain focus and specialization 
- in external achievements, job- or career-related 
- in external achievements unrelated to one’s career – in  hobbies, sports, creative 
activities 
- in experiencing varied sights and sounds – traveling, attending cultural events 
- in artistic or creative expression 
- in understanding things 
- in acquiring knowledge for its own sake 
- in sharing knowledge 
- in experiencing intense physical pleasure 
- in giving way to, and shaping one’s life around an overriding “passion” (revenge, 
hatred, envy, resentment, an obsessive attachment to someone) 
- in minimizing an overriding, persistent pain or suffering, physical, psychological 
or moral 
- in exciting, adrenaline-ridden activities that involve some danger 
- in solving particular challenges 





- in being respected or looked up by determinate groups of people (because of 
one’s success, dependability, “coolness,” celebrity status...) 
- in exercising power over other people 
- in friendships and relationships “based on virtue” in the Aristotelian sense 
- in experiencing the self-assurance of being loved 
- in being depended upon 
- in spontaneously helping others 
- in helping others in organized ways, alone or as part of a community 
- in serving an ideal, or an idealized institution 
- in promoting a “cause,” deemed important and “bigger than oneself” 
- in “virtue,” understood as internal self-possession 
- in conducting one’s life or affairs according to the expectations of the community 
- in conducting one’s life or affairs according to the regulations or commandments 
of one’s religion 
- in worship, understood as offering oneself partially or totally to the Divine, 
particularly within the practices of a religion 
- in mysticism, understood as close intellectual/affective communing with the 
Divine, that yields out-of-the-ordinary experiences.216 
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Commonly these goals will be found not alone but grouped together – someone 
may regard an activity such as surfing as meaning-giving because of the challenge, the 
excitement, the traveling, and perhaps the partying afterwards.217 
Much as specific changes in judgments of right/wrong are rarely considered to be 
instances of moral conversion, a person seeking happiness or eudaemonia who changed 
his/her preferences from one object to another within the same category would rarely be 
spoken of as undergoing moral conversion. A person, for example, who looking for 
happiness in “material possessions” begins looking for another thing to acquire when the 
latest acquisition failed to provide the desired fulfillment, would not be characterized as 
having undergone a moral conversion. A way to explain this is by saying that such a 
change does not seem to be structurally significant; that is, when a person changes one 
“object of affection” for another belonging to the same category, the structural elements 
supporting such interest or affection – structures of desire, expectations, organization of 
priorities, material resources devoted to its attainment, etc. – seem to remain essentially 
the same. So, although there may be exceptions, the person’s life will remain essentially 
the same in the ways that seem most important from the perspective of eudaemonia.218 In 
fact, moving from one object to another in the same category may very well be an 
important part of a life that is already well-oriented towards eudaemonia: a person with a  
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passion for books will finish one book and go to the next; a musician will learn different  
songs and even try new styles, and so on. But just as these are not reasons to assume that 
such persons are not already finding eudaemonia in their activities, so changes of this sort 
are not generally evidence of moral conversion.219 
Changes from one “category of goals” to another, instead, are more often 
considered instances of moral conversion; but for such changes to be instances of moral 
conversion a second condition must be also taken into account. That which is changed for 
something else must have been something that habitually constituted a “central focus” in 
the life of that person. In other words, it must be in that specific good or category of goals 
that the hopes for eudaemonia are placed.220 A person may in fact have a variety of 
interests that can be dropped and taken up again without any substantial moral 
restructuring of his/her life. It is when the “central focus” shifts – particularly if it shifts 
towards a category very dissimilar to the original one – that one can expect changes deep 
and overhauling enough to merit the name “conversion.” These changes may entail a 
substantial rescheduling of the person’s resources, time commitments, etc.; but of more 
significance to our work is the restructuring of priorities and values that may follow from 
the person changing his/her outlook on what counts as – and therefore, how to attain – 
happiness/eudaemonia/meaning. 
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Narrative evidence for this class of conversion 
Examples of this kind of conversion abound. Some of the narratives considered 
previously in other classes of moral conversion have sufficient elements of this type of 
conversion to be revisited here. Gandhi’s story, for example (case #8): his decision not to 
shrug off the abuses of institutional racism but to actively combat it would lead him into 
an extraordinary kind of life, very different from the regular life of a barrister that he had 
previously envisioned (though he may not have suspected this would happen at the time 
of his decision to commit to fight racism). What is relevant to the present topic is that he 
changed his priorities and life goals quite sharply, as the result of what he saw as a 
personal moral imperative. In a similar fashion, some of the converted alcoholics 
described by Leuba found a meaning-giving function as a result of their conversion 
regarding right/wrong: “Subject G,” who founded and managed a mission, and John B. 
Gough, who became a “temperance orator” (cases #15 and 17). Similarly, Jackie 
Katounas (#24) became a restorative justice activist and facilitator; and “Chip” and “Lil’ 
Tony” (#20 and 21) became CeaseFire workers. This pattern is quite significant; it 
suggests, among other things, a strong link between moral conversion regarding 
right/wrong, and an openness to finding meaning for life in responding to one’s 
community’s needs and ailments. 
This connection does not always need to be present, however. Robert Bellah, for 
example, has documented (with the intention of documenting the pervasiveness of 
individualistic thinking in different social strata in the U.S.) a few instances of moral 




of Brian Palmer (case #1), for example, is used by Bellah to illustrate the categories of 
“utilitarian individualism” and “expressive individualism,”221 showing how Palmer’s 
moral views moved from the former to the latter. In the interview, Palmer recalls “a 
considerable devotion to making money” that was at the root of his “utilitarian 
individualism.” He married at twenty-four, and “shouldering [financially] the adult 
responsibilities of marriage and children became the guiding purpose of his life for the 
next few years.”  
Whether or not Brian felt his life was satisfying, he was deeply committed to succeeding at 
his career and family responsibilities. He held two full-time jobs to support his family, 
accepting apparently without complaint the loss of a youth in which, he himself reports, 
“the vast majority of my time ... was devoted to giving myself pleasure of one sort of 
another.”222 
 
Palmer put extremely long hours at work, averaging 60 to 65 hours a week, not 
questioning his commitment, which just “seemed like the thing to do at the time.” But 
while he provided for his family, he neglected sharing his time with his wife and 
children. He compensated by saying, “I have this nice car, this nice house, joined the 
Country Club. Now you have a place you can go, sit on your butt, drink, go into the pool. 
I'll pay the bills and I'll do my thing at work.”223 Eventually, however, his wife divorced 
him. This came as a surprise, and led Palmer “to reassess his life in fundamental ways 
and to explore the limits of the kind of success he had been pursuing.” In this process of 
reassessment, he reencountered such pleasures as reading and listening to music. The 
children chose to stay with him, which also forced him to shift his sense of himself and 
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his priorities. A “compulsive problem solver” by his own definition, Brian reexamined 
“where the thing broke down” and found that he was  
operating as if a certain value was of the utmost importance to me. Perhaps it was success. 
Perhaps it was fear of failure, but I was extremely success-oriented, to the point where 
everything would be sacrificed for the job, the career, the company. I said bullshit. That 
ain't the way it should be.224 
 
With this new outlook about the content of what should be striven for, Brian 
married a divorcee his age, with four children herself, and discovered by his own account 
“a new sense of himself” and of “what love can be,” “almost a psychologically buoyant 
feeling of being able to be so much more involved and sharing.”225 He also found out that 
he could “get a lot of personal reward from being involved in the lives of my children.”226 
In Bellah’s assessment, “the revolution in Brian's thinking came from a 
reexamination of the true sources of joy and satisfaction in his life.” But he also mentions 
some reasons for skepticism regarding the philosophical grounding of this reassessment: 
Palmer’s new goals seem to Bellah “as arbitrary and unexamined as his earlier pursuit of 
material success,” and both are justified as idiosyncratic preference rather than as 
representing a larger sense of the purpose of life. Devotion to his own self-interest seems 
to be the guiding force all along. Nevertheless, despite Bellah’s criticism – which is 
partly aimed at a perceived deficiency in the conceptual and linguistic tools allowed by a 
culturally omnipresent individualism – it is clear that there has been a significant change 
with respect to what “goals” are regarded as meaning- or happiness-giving – a change 
that can also be perceived in the practical dispositions of Brian Palmer’s life – while the 
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operative question remains: what is an adequate source of joy and satisfaction in life? The 
question, if one follows Bellah’s analysis, is answered alternatively in terms of a 
“utilitarian individualism,” narrowly focused on the individual’s career, acquisitions, 
status, and of an “expressive individualism” that shifts focus to relationships and to less 
materially-based forms of joy and satisfaction. 
An instance of moral conversion that is less dramatic, but perhaps more surprising 
overall, is found in the story of Russ Fee, a lawyer that voluntarily gave up his law 
practice to work as a primary school teacher (case #22).227 After dedicating 27 years to 
the practice of law, Fee felt that this activity was no longer giving him “a sense of 
accomplishment.” 
I had become too brittle, too competitive, too self-absorbed. I was involved in the 
adversarial system and became disillusioned with what I had accomplished as a lawyer. I 
wasn’t achieving what I had intended. I was racing through life instead of strolling.228 
 
With the support of his wife and his three adult children, Fee began winding down 
his practice, and as time became more available, began working as a substitute teacher. 
Though already qualified to teach in high school, he took the necessary courses for 
certification at the elementary level. While doing an assignment that involved observing 
children in public places, three boys approached to ask what he was doing, and when he 
told them he was studying to be a teacher, they “recruited” him, asking him to apply at 
their school. He did, and was hired as full time. His biggest challenge, he claims, is 
“answering questions from parents and others who wonder how I could give up law to 
teach third grade.” He even turned his experiences into a book of poems. 
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Unfortunately, the article does not provide sufficient information regarding Fee's 
previous motivations to judge the depth of the change in his motivations and his sense of 
happiness and meaning. The fact that he was a civil rights attorney suggests that his 
motivations might have been “altruistic” or community-oriented from the beginning; 
therefore, we may be in the presence not so much of a deep change in a person’s moral 
structures, but rather of the discovery of a more appropriate way of channeling his 
original ideals and motivations. Fee himself uses the expression “about-face” once during 
the interview, thus characterizing it as a form of conversion (though the expression 
“career change” is favored by the article). His case is peculiar in that the change was very 
gradual and carefully discerned; and as such it can be presented as evidence that not all 
conversions have to be sudden and dramatic. Fee counsels to others in a similar situation 
to go slowly and see out “what has values that are important to them and try it out. 
Changing careers is not necessarily a panacea for what’s wrong in one’s life. It has to be 
a decision of the heart and mind.”229 The enthusiasm with which he compares his present 
situation with his past career (“I feel better about what happens in a single day in the 
classroom than I ever did during my years in law”) is also suggestive of the renewal that 
often accompanies conversion.  
These are but a few of the kinds of narratives that are available. Moral conversion 
regarding the content of a person’s search for happiness/eudaemonia/meaning of life can 
clearly take immensely varied forms. Career changes usually involve this class of 
conversion, when a rethinking of one’s life’s goals is involved. Religious conversion 






often also involves this class of conversion, both in terms of the life-meaning that a 
religion can give, and in the more specific terms of the vocational calling that often 
accompanies a strong religious experience. A person’s turning from a life of addiction or 
crime may also involve it, perhaps because the newly acquired sense of freedom demands 
of the person an expansive development in the new direction. In these and other cases 
mentioned, what is common is that a significantly different answer to the question about 
happiness/eudaemonia/meaning is given, while the question remains the same. But 
another possibility must be mentioned. 
 
Moral conversion as a shift in the question about happiness/eudaemonia/meaning 
While most instances within this class of moral conversion will fall under the sub-
class of a change in the category of goals in which happiness/eudaemonia/meaning is 
sought, there is the possibility of a perhaps deeper kind of conversion within this class: 
this is a change not in the answer given to the question about eudaemonia, but in the 
question itself. 
At the beginning of this section, for example, the question that was used as a 
starting point was “what would make me truly happy?” This question, it was said, could 
find varying formulations (such as “what would bring me true happiness?”) Whatever 
answer is given to this question, even if it is such a selfless answer as “helping others,” 
would never completely dispel the originally individualistic focus of the question: “what 
would make me truly happy?” But one might consider instead the possibility that the 
question is wrongly formulated, if it is presented in such terms – in a similar way in 




could be argued, for example, that an excessive focus on what makes “me” happy (what 
Bellah calls, in Habits of the Heart, the “therapeutic attitude”)230 will only yield 
dissatisfaction or disappointment. Assuming that is the case, then one would need to face 
the paradox that the only way to find an answer to the question about eudaemonia is by 
abandoning that formulation of the question, and asking something else. 
Furthermore, it is even possible that the question about happiness may be entirely 
pushed out of the way by the existential situation. Thus, in The Lord of the Rings, Frodo 
tells Gandalf, speaking about the oppressive evil that is extending to every corner of the 
world,  
'I wish it need not have happened in my time.' 
'So do I,' said Gandalf, 'and so do all who live to see such times. But that is not for them to 
decide. All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given us.'231 
 
Here, a matter of duty has risen that displaces or takes priority over questions of personal 
happiness. Frodo’s adventure is going to be of a very different kind than his predecessor 
Bilbo’s “adventuring for its own sake.” 
This is actually the strongest reason for incorporating the term “meaning” (of life) 
in the expression that designates this class of moral conversion. As was anticipated in the 
terminological discussion above, there are conceivable ways of addressing the question of 
human goals that are not really considered in the Aristotelian treatment of the matter, and 
for which the Aristotelian treatment becomes insufficient. Every distinctive formulation 
of the question can generate a very distinctive approach. For this reason, the more  
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contemporary expression “the question about the meaning of life” is in some cases 
preferable to formulations in terms of either happiness or eudaemonia; while still 
indicating a teleological theme, the expression is more inclusive and may replace both, 
and even accommodate duty as the meaning-giving focus of a person’s life.232 
Narrative evidence for this sub-class is harder to find than for the previous sub-class 
(i.e. a change in the categories of goals that would answer the question about happiness), 
perhaps indicating that changes in the formulation of the question are more rare than 
changes in the answer, but probably also due to the need for a subtler observer in order to  
identify a change in the question itself. For the purpose of illustrating this sub-class, two 
well-known stories of conversion will be proposed, one of them corresponding to the 
previous sub-class but presented for sake of contrast. Both narratives have a religious 
context, and are generally brought up to illustrate religious conversion; but the elements 
of eudaemonia/meaning are clear enough. 
One of them, presented for the sake of contrast, is the story of the conversion of 
Ignatius of Loyola. A military man and nobleman, Ignatius’ life goals were focused in 
“gaining for himself a great name” through a military career and a life in court.233 He 
fought bravely in many battles, but was wounded during the defense of Pamplona, under 
siege by the French army. Because of his bravery, the French regarded him with  
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admiration and he was brought to his family’s house to recover. As he convalesced, 
Ignatius asked for some “romances” to pass the time, but in his family’s house there were 
no books of that kind; he was given, instead, The Life of the Christ by Rudolf the 
Carthusian and the Flowers of the Saints. The stories of such saints as St. Francis of 
Assisi and St. Dominic filled him with the desire to do the same heroic things they had 
done, and these ideals began to alternate in his imagination with those of more worldly 
glory. Slowly he began paying attention also to the feelings that accompanied his 
daydreaming: 
When he thought of worldly things it gave him great pleasure, but afterward he found 
himself dry and sad. But when he thought of journeying to Jerusalem, and of living only on 
herbs, and practicing austerities, he found pleasure not only while thinking of them, but 
also when he had ceased. 
This difference he did not notice or value, until one day the eyes of his soul were opened 
and he began to inquire the reason of the difference. He learned by experience that one train 
of thought left him sad, the other joyful. This was his first reasoning on spiritual matters.234 
 
The result of this process was that Ignatius eventually replaced his desire for “worldly 
glory” with significantly different life-goals, at first articulated in no more definite ways 
than “to promise with the help of divine grace that what they [the saintly men he wanted 
to imitate] had done he would also do.”235 He became a pilgrim and a beggar, and 
eventually became a priest and the founder of the Society of Jesus.  
What is interesting about Ignatius’ story for our present purposes is that, despite 
significant differences between his life-goals before and after his conversion, there are 
great similarities in the structure or the orientation of the question regarding his life 
goals. He still thinks very much in terms of performing heroic deeds; and it is a 
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significant detail that, if he renounced to the desire of attaining “worldly glory,” the 
motto of the Society of Jesus is precisely Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam. Ignatius’ life-goal is 
still articulated in terms of “gaining glory,” except that now this is intended for God and 
not, as it previously was, for some anonymous “illustrious lady,”236 and that he now 
considers that there is a kind of “glory-gaining activity” much more worthy of his efforts 
than the life of a military man or a courtesan, i.e. the life of a saint. 
As widely known as Ignatius’ conversion story is that of his friend and companion 
Francis Xavier. The younger son of a noble family, he was preparing to take up an 
ecclesiastical career, on the hopes of becoming a canon in the cathedral of Pamplona. To 
this purpose he traveled to Paris to study, and in that city he met Ignatius – sixteen years 
older than him, preparing for the priesthood. Francis’ life-goals at the time could be 
characterized as mundane – enjoying the fun and diversion that Paris offered at the time, 
and professional success in future years. Ignatius, however, with persistent cunning, 
gained the young man’s friendship while repeatedly inciting him to question his own life-
goals, using for this purpose selected phrases from the Scriptures; most famously the 
phrase from St. Matthew, “What does it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world, and 
lose his own soul?”237 Eventually Francis abandoned his former plans and decided 
instead to become a priest and join Ignatius and his friends in what would become the 
Company of Jesus, devoting his extraordinary energy to missionary work in places as  
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remote as Goa and Japan.238 In this narrative, again, there is a significant change in the 
content of life-goals that drive a person; but among the factors that prompt this change 
there is specific mention of a question, one that, if addressed in seriousness, would make 
Francis’ world of desires, plans and goals practically turn up on its head – as in fact it did. 
What this story lacks in historiographic detail, it gains in iconic power. It illustrates 
like few others the effect that a well-placed, new question may have in the restructuring 
of a person’s content in terms of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning. 
 
The presence of the class of moral conversion described in this section, conversion 
regarding content about happiness/eudaemonia/meaning, implies that the person is, with 
some degree of awareness, already involved in some kind of meaning-seeking process. 
The following section will consider a class of moral conversion that can take place when 
a meaning-seeking process is not actively operative: moral conversion as the process 
through which a person is “awakened” to meaning and becomes involved in a meaning-
seeking process. 
B. Conversion regarding attitude towards happiness/eudaemonia/meaning 
The shifts considered in the previous section regarded the content of happiness/ 
eudaemonia/meaning, i.e. what kind of goals or goods are considered by the person as 
worth seeking, to such an extent that a person’s life may be said to be focalized on the 
achievement of such goals. This section will consider instead what changes may take 
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place regarding the attitude with which the effort to achieve happiness/eudaemonia/ 
meaning is (or is not) undertaken. The attitude may range from deep involvement (both in 
the effort to clarify the content of these goals, and to attain them), to utter indifference to 
the problem, and even to denying that there is a question. 
Similarly to what was discussed when considering moral conversion regarding 
attitude about right/wrong (in section 2.B above), there are reasons to argue that there is 
a proper direction in which this conversion should proceed in order to be considered 
such, and not its opposite, i.e. “counter-conversion,” degradation, “fall” or some form of 
moral disintegration (this will be considered below). The direction that is commonly 
regarded as normative declares the ideal to be the person who applies his/her conscious 
faculties explicitly to discerning the content of happiness/eudaemonia/ meaning, in 
general terms perhaps, but mostly as it applies specifically to their own lives. The well-
known phrase attributed to Socrates, “the unexamined life is not worth living,” declares 
this well enough. On the opposite side of the spectrum it is possible to find a variety of 
scenarios. A very common one seems to be that of the person who has always taken for 
granted that certain actions have to be performed and/or certain desires have to be 
satisfied, without ever reflecting on their relation to an overarching, ultimate goal, such as 
happiness, eudaemonia or ultimate meaning. (Lonerganians sometimes use the 
expression “living uncritically” to designate this). In its extreme expression, a person may 
so lack reflective awareness that the difference between the person and a machine resides 
mostly on the person’s potentialities; in such cases, one may be tempted to ask whether 




An important part of the “gadfly” task of philosophers has been in fact to regularly 
denounce when the social environment favors such a situation. Josef Pieper, for example, 
denounced as a contemporary tendency the creation of a “world of labor,” by which he 
meant an existence absolutely oriented towards production, without the possibility of 
escape, since even resting periods are supposed to be for the sake of production.239 The 
individual's presence in the world becomes “bare facticity” (in de Beauvoir’s phrase), 
since from the viewpoint of production the individual may be without difficulty replaced 
by another worker, a cog with another cog.  
A criticism of this unreflective life can also be found in what Simone de Beauvoir 
has characterized as the “sub-men,” those who facing the risk of freedom draw back from 
it.240 Their fundamental characteristic is a tepidity or apathy that derives, in de Beauvoir’s 
view, from a fear to confront the anguish of freedom. The sub-man’s acts are never 
positive, only flights. The poverty of his project makes him discover around him only an 
insignificant and dull world, not different perhaps from the world of animality.  
Lonergan too has addressed this possibility in the figure of the “drifter.”241 In 
Conn’s words, 
In contrast to the open-eyed, deliberate subject, there is the drifter. In Lonergan’s 
description, the drifter has not yet found himself. He has not yet discovered his own deed or 
his own will or his own mind, and so he is content to do, choose, and think what everybody 
else is doing, choosing and thinking. The point is not that drifters are evil. As with 
Kierkegaard’s aesthetes, the problem with drifters is not that they go about deliberately 
doing evil; the problem is more that they do nothing very deliberately. Either they have 
never discovered the meaning of human authenticity in themselves, or, if they have, they 
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have never summoned the courage to opt for it – to choose themselves as free and 
responsible.242 
 
Instances of actual people living an “unexamined life,” of “drifting” without 
reflecting on the content of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning, seem to be rather common. 
If it is true, however, that human beings are at their core directed towards happiness, 
eudaemonia, or meaning, and if such a quality has not been permanently expunged or 
drowned by habit, then the question for “what's the meaning of it all” may yet be 
reawakened in such persons. When this happens – when a person changes his/her attitude 
so that the content of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning becomes a pressing question, and 
its specific achievement is at the center of that person’s efforts and energy, we are in the 
presence of a moral conversion regarding attitude towards happiness/eudaemonia/ 
meaning. 
The modalities in which this shift can take place are very varied. Simone de 
Beauvoir's analysis in Ethics of Ambiguity can be used to illustrate some: she talks about 
the “serious person,” who becomes concerned by meaning in absolute terms, 
subordinating his life and freedom to this meaning.243 There is the “Adventurer,” that 
rejects seriousness and absolute values, but manages to keep alive his taste and delight 
for living; this carefree position, says de Beauvoir, can only be held until the Adventurer 
meets other people, for then he must choose whether to respect their freedom as some 
sort of absolute or become their oppressor (a connection the right/wrong theme is 
suggested by the need to make an option at this point).244 There is the “passionate 
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person,” who sets up some object as an absolute, but only insofar as it is disclosed to 
his/her subjectivity.245 There is finally the “free person,” a sort of existentialist moral 
ideal that regains a form of legitimate seriousness, by committing to the exercise of his/ 
her freedom (and to respecting others' freedom) as a chosen absolute.246 Such a list could 
be expanded, or amended if there is disagreement with de Beauvoir's typology. The point 
for the present purpose is to illustrate that a variety of attitudes towards happiness/ 
eudaemonia/meaning are possible, and not one but many possible attitudes may be 
adopted. Optimistic acceptance, joyful awakening, grateful relief, blind obsession, even 
an anguished struggle to fend off despair, to escape nihilism, these are some possible 
forms into which this class of moral conversion may develop. When a person’s attitude in 
this regard is stable enough to be considered habitual, a shift that establishes a 
significantly different attitude as habitual (e.g. an “adventurer” becoming “serious,” and 
so forth) can be considered as a form of moral conversion belonging to this class. 
More detailed descriptions of some of the modalities this class of conversion may 
adopt can be found by looking at the narrative evidence for this class of conversion. 
 
Narrative evidence for this class of conversion 
 Ira Byock is a doctor who has specialized in palliative medicine, and is active in 
the Hospice movement, which has asked what the goals of medicine should be during the 
last stages of a person’s life when sickness or old age make death an impending reality. 
Byock has written a book on his experiences of hospice care, Dying Well: Peace and 
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Possibilities at the End of Life.247 Some of the “possibilities” Byock mentions in the title 
are in fact useful examples of moral conversion regarding attitude about happiness/ 
eudaemonia/meaning.  
The story of Marie Allen (case #3) is representative.248 Marie is a middle-aged 
woman who has been dealt many bad hands, and learnt to receive them with an acid 
sense of humor. Among the worst was finding out that her sister, Kathy, had an affair 
with her husband, after which Marie divorced him and broke relations with her sister. 
Marie then remarried her ex-husband after fifteen years of separation; but her husband 
died briefly after their second marriage. Shortly after this, Marie learned from her doctor 
that she had colon cancer in its terminal stages and a very short time to live. 
While this revelation could have been an occasion for despair, Marie overcame her 
initial shock quickly and pragmatically and contacted her sister, who had been trying for 
some time to reconcile with her; and the bad news became an opportunity to heal their 
relationship. Kathy and her husband, Roger, received Marie openly in their house and 
cared for her lovingly during her last year, adapting their lives to the schedules and 
material needs of Marie’s palliative treatment. Marie’s relation with Kathy continued to 
be a little stiff for a while, until Marie found out from Kathy that her late husband had 
actually been two-timing both sisters, and this discovery caused the last ties of resentment 
to dissolve in shared laughter. At this time Marie’s estranged daughter Cindy was about 
to get married, and Marie’s goal became to endure as best as she could, with the help of 
the Hospice staff, until Cindy’s wedding. Her daughter also drew closer to Marie then, 
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though she had to overcome a certain degree of denial regarding Marie’s sickness. 
Shortly after a year of being diagnosed, Marie died, without pain, and in the care and 
company of her family. 
A surprising thing about Marie’s story is just how quickly and pragmatically 
Marie’s life changed after her diagnosis. A detail that is very representative of the 
changes that took place was the change in Marie’s tendency to collect and accumulate 
things that she would buy at Target and other places, including a very large collection of 
shoes. Once she learnt of her disease and decided to move to Kathy’s, she gave away all 
her stuff, arguing motives of space, and without giving it much of a second thought. 
Wounds were quickly healed too, as has been mentioned, also with characteristic, matter-
of-fact pragmatism: when, for example, Kathy offered to take care of Marie, a brief 
discussion ensued regarding Marie’s worries of becoming a nuisance (mostly, she 
expressed worries about “smelling”); but once these concerns were put aside, even the 
painful matter of Marie’s late husband became soon water under the bridge. 
A good amount of psychological healing took place also, and some re-evaluation of 
goals. But above all, this narrative seems to fit well the category of a conversion 
regarding attitude towards happiness. There seems to be in Marie, before the diagnosis, a 
general lack of authentic purpose: she lives in resentment, estranged from her loved ones, 
and seems to fill these gaps in her life by treating herself to material trinkets. There does 
not seem to be an examined choice here. By contrast, once she finds out that she has little 
time left, she quickly takes the matter into her hands, gives away those things that are not 




of her last moments a time for healing and cultivating her relations with her loved ones. 
There is a general and rather swift change, first, in her attitude towards happiness in 
general: rather than lingering in her resentment and adding to it negative feelings 
provoked by this last revelation, she puts her energy in cultivating positive, loving 
relations. Second – with some help from the hospice staff – she examined and articulated 
her concrete goals (for example, enduring until her daughter’s wedding), a move that 
implies some degree of examination of what she considered meaningful to her life at that 
stage. In short, Marie converted from an attitude of acid pessimism and lingering 
resentment to life in general, to an attitude of cherishing life, letting go of grudges and 
actively seeking “happiness,” which for her meant dying in peace after having 
reconstructed loving relations with the remaining members of her family. 
Brian Palmer’s story (case #1) has been considered in the previous subsection, and 
categorized as an example of moral conversion regarding content about happiness/ 
eudaemonia/meaning – more specifically, following Bellah, as a shift from “utilitarian 
individualism” to “expressive individualism.”249 But this case is also interesting in terms 
of attitudinal changes. Palmer’s previous “utilitarian individualism” seems to have been 
espoused, to a great degree, unreflectively. Not entirely without examination: Palmer 
seems to have had some clarity as to his day-to-day, short-term goals, and was even able 
to articulate them in a generalization (“I have this nice car, this nice house, joined the 
Country Club. Now you have a place you can go, sit on your butt, drink, go into the pool. 
I'll pay the bills and I'll do my thing at work,” is how he articulates his relation with his 
                                                 




wife and his goals at that time in his life.)250 But he also articulates the reasons for his 
commitment to working many jobs and focusing mainly on making money saying that 
“[it] seemed like the thing to do at the time.”251 In other words, though Palmer seems 
aware of what his goals are, this awareness seems limited, lacking the necessary degree 
of examination to knowingly conclude that such goals may or may not be satisfactory in 
terms of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning. There is something paradoxical perhaps, but 
not uncommon, in the way in which this energetic, goal-driven “problem solver” lived for 
a long period of time devoid of authentic purpose, i.e. a purpose sufficiently examined 
and knowingly embraced. The very energy and focus with which he committed to these 
eventually unsatisfying goals may have kept him away from the reflection needed to 
infuse more authentic purpose in his life. The shock and forlornness that followed his 
divorce provided the setting and the motivation for a conscious examination of his life 
goals. From Palmer’s narrative, however, it would seem that he not only changed his 
goals, but that he also adopted a different attitude towards happiness/eudaemonia/ 
meaning, as something that deserves explicit examination. 
This connection between a shift in content and a shift in attitude is in fact something 
to be expected. Insofar as nothing has been found wrong with the content of one’s 
orientation towards happiness/eudaemonia/meaning, no attention may be drawn to the 
question about the content itself - certainly not with practical urgency. That one is on the 
right path towards happiness will be often taken for granted in this case, much as we take 
for granted the appropriateness of our dietary habits if no health problems arise. But if it 
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is found at least once that one’s orientation towards meaning, or one’s life plans are 
somehow flawed or unsatisfactory, a person will naturally stay on their guard, incorporate 
perhaps the habit of examining whether he/she is on the right track or not. In short, there 
is potentially a causal relation between having to examine (and perhaps change) the 
content of one’s life goals, and becoming more consciously reflective with regard to such 
goals. Thus, it is possible that when classes of conversion overlap (as seems to be the 
case in the narrative of Brian Palmer), the overlapping may be due not to merely 
accidental juxtaposition but to causal connection. 
The variety of potential meaning-giving goals and activities is so large that it can 
extend to examples that might be found almost ludicrous. The story of Julia Galvin’s 
conversion through “bog snorkeling” is a nice example. “Bog snorkeling” is an 
idiosyncratic competition that was conceived late one night in a Welsh pub, and consists 
of competitors completing two consecutive lengths of a 60-yard water-filled trench, cut 
through a peat bog, in the shortest time possible. Competitors must wear snorkels and 
flippers, and complete the course without using conventional swimming strokes. The 
water, of course, is icy, murky, weedy and malevolent; and despite the existence of a an 
annual World Bog Snorkeling Championship, the fact that this “sport” looks rather like a 
dare that got out of hand does not seem lost on the contestants. And yet this unlikely 
competition became a meaning-giving (and practically a life-saving) activity for Julia 
Galvin, an Irish teacher who had become almost paralyzed by severe scoliosis. As told by 
Greg Rubinson, 
A biology teacher from Listowel, Ireland, Julia was in the hospital for a severe form of 
adult-onset scoliosis just seven years ago. She was taking 16 different pain and anti-




never be able to walk again. By chance she picked up a copy of the Guinness Book of 
World Records and therein first read about the bog snorkeling championship. 
“It was my epiphany,” she says. 
Bog snorkeling? An epiphany? 
She assures me she isn’t kidding. “I can honestly say that bog snorkeling and Gordon 
Green [one of the creators of the competition] saved my life,” she says. “My future held 
nothing for me.” 
Bog snorkeling became her reason to go on, even though she had never learned to swim. 
Fighting against incredible pain, Julia took swimming lessons for six weeks and eventually 
was able to swim the length of a pool. Her pain receded. She ditched her medications and 
applied herself to training. Then, at the 1999 World Bog Snorkeling Championship, she 
came in second place in the women’s division. For a woman who just a few months earlier 
couldn’t walk, this was indeed a grand accomplishment. “I do this because I can,” she tells 
me. “There was a time when I couldn’t.”252 
 
One is reminded of Viktor Frankl’s claim that  
there is nothing in the world. . . that would so effectively help one to survive even the worst 
conditions as the knowledge that there is a meaning in one’s life. . .‘He who has a why to 
live for can bear almost any how.’253 
 
 Certainly Julia Galvin’s story could be used as powerful evidence for Frankl’s thesis. 
More to the point at hand, Galvin’s narrative provides further evidence as an instance of 
moral conversions regarding attitude towards happiness/eudaemonia/meaning. The 
article provides too little information to speculate on the details of the mental process that 
led Julia to give bog snorkeling such a meaning-giving place in her life: perhaps it was 
some sort of spontaneously felt attraction, or perhaps a part of her personality was at that 
point desperately looking for a goal (even a half-serious one) that would give her a reason 
to live and train and fight against the spiraling decline of her health. Even if the latter was 
the case, however, at the level of conscious awareness it seems that she was experiencing 
something closer to despair in terms of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning. That she was 
able to initially overcome her despair simply by a chance finding in a book of records is 
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the kind of surprise that one often encounters when researching moral conversion. The 
phrase she uses to describe this finding is “my epiphany,” a word that has for synonyms 
“insight”254 and “illumination,” and that seems to describe in many cases a key moment 
in the process of moral conversion - a practical sort of illumination, a powerfully 
operative insight, powerful enough to bring a person out of a destitute state and into a 
process of recovery and hope. 
These examples will hopefully be sufficient to establish the reality of this class of 
conversion. For the sake of brevity, only a few examples have been explored; more 
examples can be found in the Appendix,255 and the reader may want to reexamine some 
of the cases presented in the previous section (moral conversion regarding content about 
happiness/meaning), which as was proposed, may often involve to some degree an 
element of attitudinal change too. 
 
The question about the possibility of counter-conversions regarding attitude about 
happiness/eudaemonia/meaning 
Before moving on to the next (and last) class of moral conversion, it is worth 
examining the question about whether changes that go in an opposite direction to what 
was just described - i.e. a change in attitude that moves a person away from an interest in 
happiness/eudaemonia/meaning, and from expending energy in attaining them – could be 
considered legitimately as instances of moral conversion. The answer proposed here is 
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negative; but the process of reaching that answer throws additional light on the nature of 
conversion. 
A process opposite to what has just been described and illustrated is conceivable at 
least: it could be characterized as a shift from a life illuminated by meaning to one in 
which any awareness of meaning (or the lack of it) in one's life is extinguished, so that 
one comes to live in “mere facticity.” It is difficult, however, to picture such a process as 
the consequence of an active attempt on the part of the moral agent to become devoid of 
meaning; and yet an active endeavor on the part of the moral agent seems to be one of the 
defining aspects of the notion of conversion explored here. 
The idea of actively seeking an unexamined/uncritical/merely factual life seems 
also to involve an important paradox: only exceptionally active “seekers” would be 
capable of undergoing the moral and psychological effort required to adopt such a self-
annihilating posture; yet it is hard to imagine an individual with such a capacity for 
meaning-seeking (implying also a strong, underlying drive for meaning) being actually 
able to annihilate him/herself in such a way. The Sartre that wrote Nausea (or even the 
later, humorously self-deprecating The Words) is a good example of this paradox: much 
as he toiled to live consistently in acceptance of the reality of a meaningless existence, he 
only succeeded in making such a struggle his life's meaning-giving quest – why else 
write a novel (and an autobiographical essay, and many plays) about it?256 This paradox 
makes it difficult to concede the possibility of a “conversion” that consisted in actively 
seeking “sub-humanity,” or the suspicious bliss of an unexamined life. 
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There is, perhaps, an exception to this rule: the view that considers this whole 
“meaning-seeking” enterprise to be misguided, and that human beings would be 
essentially happier if they reverted to a more “animal” type of existence, with less 
questioning and, in some versions of the argument, giving free rein to our “repressed 
animality.” According to this view, it has been our insistent and aberrant questioning 
what has made human civilization a breeding ground for anxiety and unhappiness. It is 
possible to read some of Nietzsche’s texts in this way - Jacinto Choza, for example, has 
done it with extensive attention to detail in his Conciencia y Afectividad (Consciousness 
and Affectivity).257 Ray Bradbury’s story (from The Martian Chronicles) “And the Moon 
be Still as Bright” illustrates this point too: in the story, by taking hold of a human’s 
consciousness, the last Martian tells the recently arrived astronauts of a happier era:  
The Martians discovered the secret of life among animals. The animal does not question 
life. It lives. Its very reason for living is life; it enjoys and relishes life. .  .258 
 
It is very doubtful that such an ideal could ever be consistently applied by a human 
being; but this view is presented here only as an example of a way in which the endeavor 
to actively abandon the quest for meaning has been rationally articulated – an intellectual 
scenario in which the normative direction of this class of moral conversions would run 
the opposite way, i.e. away from examining, identifying and articulating the content of 
happiness/eudaemonia/meaning. But apart from views of this kind – that seem to be rare 
and that almost in all cases lack concrete application - the shift towards an attitude of  
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indifference, inattention or insensibility to the question of happiness/eudaemonia/ 
meaning often seems to be due rather to obstinacy and/or disintegration. Obstinacy in the 
sense of a refusal to move forward in the search for meaning; disintegration in the sense 
of a dissipation of forces, or a self-destructive abandonment. For an example of such a 
shift away from meaning-seeking, consider for example the person that, as the 
consequence of a great loss, attempts to drown his/her sorrows in drinking, drifting 
further and further away from an active interest in happiness or despairing from the 
possibility of finding meaning. The term “conversion,” however, sounds very 
inappropriate to designate this process. Conversion implies struggle and activity, and this 
kind of abandonment of hope appears to be a refusal to struggle and an option for 
inactivity; in fact, insofar as it has an element of deliberateness, “desertion” might be a 
more appropriate term for this kind of change.259 
There is also the possibility of shifting away from an attitude of actively seeking 
meaning/eudaemonia, merely by drifting into a routine in which meaning is never a 
concern. In fairness, it must be said that such a shift may not be a bad thing in all cases: 
some people may enjoy routine, at least if it is not of a dehumanizing kind, and some 
people, who suffer from actually being too reflective, may benefit from it. But whether 
this move can be considered a positive thing or a negative one, insofar as it involves a 
mindless, unintentional drifting it is not properly described by the term “conversion,” 
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which, again, implies some active endeavor on the part of the moral agent, and not 
merely the absence of directedness of “drifting.” 
For these reasons (though they depend here on a limited set of examples), it does 
not seem appropriate to use the expression “moral conversion” to designate a shift from 
an attitude of active search for happiness/eudaemonia/meaning to one in which the quest 
for a goal such as happiness, eudaemonia, or for ultimate meaning for one’s actions has 
disappeared from one’s active concerns. As such, this type of shift will not be the object 
of direct consideration during the course of this work. 
C. Conversion regarding coherence in the search for eudaemonia 
Finally, there is the possibility of a third class of moral conversion regarding 
happiness/eudaemonia/meaning that corresponds structurally to the third class previously 
described regarding right/wrong. It was noted above, (in Section 2.C), when describing 
moral conversion regarding behavioral coherence about right/wrong, that the fact that a 
person holds certain moral criteria and principles does not guarantee that a person's 
actions will conform to such principles, particularly when they clash with the 
immediateness of short-term satisfaction. Similarly, even though a person may clearly 
appreciate that a certain course of action would be beneficial with respect to his/her quest 
for eudaemonia (implying, as it was said, a stable, satisfying, profound form of 
happiness, possibly in the long term), or more in tune with what is regarded by this 
person as meaning-giving, the person may still choose to follow a different course of 




engage in the course of action that is a prerequisite to what he/she understand as the more 
appropriate to achieve happiness/eudaemonia/meaning.  
Classical sources interpret such failures to act for happiness as the result of an 
internal division with respect to the person’s operative principles. Plato, for example, has 
described this internal division with the vivid image of a many-headed beast, in which all 
heads seek at the same time to be fed by a sometimes strong, sometimes weak human 
head, representative of reason.260 If the human head is strong and shepherds the heads 
according to reason, the person is just and virtuous; if not, the whole person is enslaved 
by the conflicting desires of the many heads or appetites, and the person becomes unjust. 
Aristotle has also given this phenomenon a detailed treatment in book VII of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Here Aristotle talks about “moral strength” and “moral weakness”; 
in the latter there is a disconnection between what the person regards as the rational way 
to act, and that person’s actions. 
A man who is morally strong tends to abide by the results of his calculation, and a morally 
weak man tends to abandon them.261 
 
Aristotle explains moral weakness as sometimes the effect of a disconnection between 
different types of knowledge (i.e., we may know the general rule, and not apply it to the 
concrete situation at hand), and sometimes as the effect of the person’s knowledge being 
rendered ineffective by reason of the person being in the grip of his/her emotions – a 
condition compared to those of being asleep, mad or drunk.262 
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The list of authors that subscribe to this idea of an internal division includes most 
Christian medieval authors, and a number of contemporary authors who have explored 
the issue with the aid of notions from modern psychology. There is some variety in the 
different formulations regarding the principles set in opposition, though often this variety 
seems more the result of variation in emphasis than in the explanatory principles 
themselves. At times cognitive dissociation is emphasized; mechanisms such as bad faith, 
rationalization, denial, or the Aristotelian disconnection between the principles and the 
concrete case are then used to explain the incoherence between actions and knowledge. 
At times it is the role of emotions that obfuscate the person’s judgment that is 
emphasized. At times it is the immediacy of the attraction of pleasure: in Aristotle, for 
example, the “self-indulgent” person would be normally swayed by pleasure, lacking the 
related virtue of self-control.263 Other conflicting operative principles (e.g. will versus 
intellect) may be also invoked. These views can be summed up by saying that, according 
to these authors, there is in the human person the potential for an internal division/ 
disconnection, and that this in turn makes it possible for a person to act in dissonance 
with his/her best judgments regarding happiness or eudaemonia, 
Sporadic acts of “moral weakness” can then be considered a normal or part of 
human life; in such moments, a person may engage in actions that go against what they 
habitually perceive as adequate behavior for the attainment of happiness/eudaemonia/ 
meaning. But it may happen that these inconsistencies that undermine one’s progression 
towards happiness/eudaemonia/meaning become habitual. Furthermore, they may 
become so resistant to change, and recurrent in their occurrences, that overcoming them 
                                                 




in a stable and definitive way comes to be perceived by the person as being beyond their 
capacities and resources. There may be clarity in the person’s mind with regard to the 
content of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning, but there is also the perception that such 
content is essentially unattainable to them, not because of external conditions that make it 
beyond their reach, but because of their own weaknesses or insufficiency. The result is a 
loss of hope, despair, defeat; the person often gives up trying. 
This is the setting for the third class of conversion. Conversion at this point appears 
as an infusion of new strength, new enthusiasm, new operative hope, on the wings of 
which the person is able to overcome effectively the obstacles and contrary habits that 
weighed him/her down, and engage in – and eventually consolidate – patterns of behavior 
that are consistent with what is regarded as the proper direction towards happiness/ 
eudaemonia/meaning.264-265 
 
Narrative evidence for this class of conversion 
Some of Leuba’s cases of converted alcoholics may also be used as evidence of this 
class of conversion. In one such case (“Subject E”, case #12), the subject declares 
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. . . all my pangs were due to some terrible remorse I used to feel after a heavy carousal, the 
remorse taking the shape of regret after my folly in wasting my life in such a way - a man of 
superior talents and education. I was not much alarmed about the future world.266 
 
Of the case of John B. Gough (case #17), already cited, Leuba says, 
The sense of his degradation and worthlessness does not involve in his mind responsibility 
for his sin to other; he is absorbed in his own self. He battles against himself, poor slave 
and outlaw, to conquer, if possible, the place he has lost in society.267 
 
In these two texts the theme of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning appears clearly.  
More recent narratives of a similar same sort can be found in the collection of 
stories that Alcoholics Anonymous publishes in its “Big Book” (as the Alcoholics 
Anonymous informational book has been nicknamed). The book is currently in its fourth 
edition, the first having appeared in 1939; in each new edition some of the earlier stories 
are kept, while new ones are added “to represent the current membership of Alcoholics 
Anonymous more accurately, and thereby to reach more alcoholics.”268 One of its earliest 
narratives is that of “Doctor Bob,” one of A.A. cofounders (the birth of the society is 
dated from “his first day of permanent sobriety,” in June 1935).269 To the day of his 
death, in 1950, he had helped more than 5,000 alcoholics, men and women, giving them 
also medical assistance without charging them. Doctor Bob got into drinking during his 
college years, drinking as much as his money permitted. By the time he took up 
medicine, he was drinking enough to have morning “jitters.” His addiction was already 
compromising his capacity to go to class; he would not dare assist to class if he had those  
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jitters, and in the Sophomore year he almost quit school. He had to convince the faculty 
to let him take his exams (he had turned many examination books empty because he 
could not hold a pencil), then passed them, then got into drinking again, eventually pulled 
himself dry, graduated, and remained sober during a couple years of residency during 
which he was too busy to leave the hospital frequently. After this, however, once he got 
his own practice, he fell into drinking again; he even developed a phobia to running out 
of liquor.270 He had to manage his addiction carefully – he needed to be sober enough in 
the morning to practice medicine, in order to have money for liquor in the evening. He 
also developed tremendous cunning for acquiring and keeping alcohol at home, even 
during the times of prohibition and living with a vigilant wife. 
It is significant that, in Bob’s narrative, drinking itself is never specifically censured 
in terms of right/wrong, whether from a religious or a social point of view. Rather, 
drinking is mentioned as a continuous obstacle to his fulfilling his aspirations, the cause 
of many miserable moments and of living under the constant threat of downfall and 
shame. (Doctor Bob seems to have somewhat gotten used to the constant exertions that 
providing for his addiction demanded, and that took most of his waking life; and 
mentions the greater blunders matter-of-factly.) This focus also places this narrative 
within the happiness/eudaemonia/meaning theme. 
Indeed, it is a focus on happiness – here emphasizing the aspect of “living a free 
life” – that reignites in Doctor Bob a strong desire to recover; a moral conversion 
regarding attitude, according to our classification, but one that does not become 
                                                 




immediately effective, and thus requires a conversion regarding coherence as an 
additional step, in order to reach fulfillment. Says Doctor Bob 
About the time of the beer experiment [a catastrophic attempt to replace stronger drinks 
with beer] I was thrown in with a crowd of people who attracted me because of their 
seeming poise, health and happiness. They spoke with great freedom from embarrassment, 
which I could never do, and they seemed very much at ease on all occasions and appeared 
very healthy. More than these attributes, they seemed to be happy. I was self conscious and 
ill at ease most of the time, my health was at the breaking point, and I was thoroughly 
miserable. I sensed they had something I did not have, from which I might readily profit. I 
learned that it was something of a spiritual nature, which did not appeal to me very much, 
but I thought it could do no harm. I gave the matter much time and study for the next two 
and a half years, but I still got tight [i.e. drunk] every night nevertheless. I read everything I 
could find, and talked to everyone who I thought knew anything about it.271 
 
It was about this time that a woman called Bob’s wife, and recommended that Bob 
talk to a friend of hers. This man – unnamed in the story – managed, after many hours of 
talking, to get Bob to remain sober for a few weeks. After this, however, in the course of 
going to a conference, Bob drunk severely for many days and woke up at a friend’s house 
without remembering much. The unnamed man then took care of Bob again, and the 
following morning Doctor Bob was able to cease drinking permanently. He was able then 
to regain both his health and self-respect, and the respect of his colleagues. Bob asks 
himself the question, what did this man do or say that was different from what others had 
done or said? In his opinion, a key factor seems to be the fact that this man had been an 
alcoholic too, and had had “most of all the drunkard’s experiences known to man, but had 
been cured by the very means I had been trying to employ, that is to say the spiritual 
approach.”272 
                                                 
271 Ibid., 178. 




The current edition of the Alcoholics Anonymous book features a section with 
forty-two selected stories of recovered alcoholics. Many of these have similarities to the 
story of Dr. Bob above. If it is granted that this story is an appropriate example of moral 
conversion regarding coherence about happiness/eudaemonia/meaning, the reality of this 
class of conversion can be established as a fact. The success of the Alcoholics 
Anonymous “12-step method” also suggests that the possibility of this type of conversion 
taking place (despite the difficulties involved) is not extremely remote or rare: a mere 
four years after the first Alcoholics Anonymous began meeting, they counted over 100 
ex-alcoholics who had recovered using their 12-step, collective method; and 100,000 
worldwide in 1950 – that is, eleven years afterwards. Today A.A. claims over 2 million 
members worldwide, at different stages of recovery.273 
For present purposes, i.e. providing evidence for this class of conversion, this small 
selection of narratives should be sufficient. It will be noticed that they have been taken 
from the context of life- and happiness-threatening addictions – specifically, alcohol 
addiction (though many of the stories in the “Big Book” make also reference to 
medication addiction, especially sedatives). It has turned out to be relatively easy to find 
stories appropriate to this class of conversion in the context of addictions (and relatively 
difficult to find proper narratives from other contexts). A possible explanation for this is 
not hard to find: once a person has a definite orientation towards a certain goal (as 
happiness- or meaning-giving), one would expect the person to direct their efforts to such 
goal, unless significant obstacles are met on the way, either external or internal. The 
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presence of external obstacles is not relevant to the theme of conversion. Among the 
strongest internal obstacles, on the other hand, are addictions, which seem to effectively 
divide a person against him/herself, forcing them to expend most of the energy they could 
aim at attaining happiness/eudaemonia in attempting to counterbalance the destructive 
pull of their addiction.274 
The fact that addictions are now considered to be a type of disease with an organic 
component should not be considered a reason to exclude their consideration from the 
realm of moral conversion. On the contrary, the path to healing and recovery as reported 
in these narratives involves, a cognitive appraisal of moral and morally-related issues: an 
appraisal of one’s situation and the ways in which one’s addiction is affecting one’s 
chances for happiness, a realization of how the addiction is harming loved ones, an 
appreciation of the loving support of other human beings, a shifting of one’s sources of 
hope towards the group or a loving God, etc. Furthermore, in many narratives there is 
even the suggestion that medical interventions focused on the organic are ineffective for 
anything more than a temporary recovery.275 These cognitive factors, it is claimed here, 
are possibly involved in the dynamism of the other classes as well. But it is not yet the 
place to argue for these claims, which will be done in Chapter 10. The purpose of this 
subsection has been primarily to demonstrate that there is substantial narrative evidence 
to support the existence of moral conversions of this class. 
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The present chapter has offered a tripartite classification of instances of moral 
conversion, a classification that applies to moral conversion understood both in terms of 
right/wrong and in terms of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning of life. For each class of 
conversion, a number of narratives have been presented, with the double purpose of 
constituting evidence that such a class of conversion actually takes place, and illustrating 
with examples what is meant by each class of conversion. The fact that some narratives 
may be used as examples of more than one class of moral conversion has been noted, and 
has been explained as a consequence of the process of moral conversion having different, 
interrelated aspects (corresponding to each of the classes outlined), that are involved in it. 
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, a general notion of moral conversion 
can now be offered. Moral conversion is a process in which a person changes in 
existential ways related to their understanding of, their attitude towards and/or their 
behavioral habits regarding right/wrong and/or happiness/eudaemonia/meaning of life. 
The term “existential” is here especially important as denoting the importance of 
the change, that it is change involving human persons (though by analogy it may also 
apply to groups), and that it is real, concrete change, involving a great degree of 





Before addressing the philosophical implications of moral conversion (in chapters 
8-10), there remain two tasks: to clarify the notion of moral conversion in comparison 
with (and as distinguished from) the related notions of religious conversion, and the 




THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MORAL  
AND RELIGIOUS CONVERSION 
 
The previous chapter presented a general notion of moral conversion, which was 
arrived at after presenting two complementary views on what is the central matter at stake 
in philosophical discussions of the moral life, and analyzing the different ways in which 
moral life is affected by conversion in relation to these two views. In order to adequately 
delimit the notion of moral conversion, however, there remains the need to differentiate it 
from two forms of conversion that are often connected with it: religious conversion and 
psychological conversion. The present chapter will discuss in further detail the distinction 
between moral conversion and religious conversion, and will consider to what extent the 
distinction between them is relevant to this project.
1. A threefold notion of religious conversion 
Authors who attempt to define religious conversion encounter a difficulty similar to 
that already encountered when attempting to define moral conversion: the notion is not 
univocal. Three meanings, related but distinct, appear repeatedly in the literature on 




Interestingly, this threefold notion of religious conversion coincides with the threefold 
notion of moral conversion described in the previous chapter.276 
1) The first meaning of “conversion” in the religious context sees it as intellectual 
assent to truths that are considered of divine origin.277 The most common name for this 
assent is “faith.” (The term “faith” itself, however, is not univocal: it can be used in 
reference to the other two notions of conversion as well, and for this reason it will not be 
further employed in this chapter). People are said (in this first sense) to convert to a 
certain religion or denomination or set of religious beliefs when they give assent to the 
relevant corpus of truths.278 In addition, a conversion from atheism to some form of belief 
in God (i.e. that there is a God, or some similar truth claim) would also be included under 
this meaning.279 This first category of religious conversion corresponds closely with what 
was characterized in moral conversion as “conversion regarding content.” 
Frequently, truths assented to in this sense are considered to be of divine origin in 
such a way that these truths could not be known by, nor demonstrated by natural reason 
alone (i.e. without the aid of revelation or the like); but this is not always the case: in 
some theological traditions, some religious truths are considered to be also knowable by 
                                                 
276 The threefold distinction in the previous chapter is my own construction, formulated before the research 
for this chapter was done. But it is heartening to find that scholars have identified a parallel pattern in 
regard to religious conversion. 
277 I am using the term “truths” out of respect, since “belief” used in this context seems to be somewhat 
pejorative; but I do not imply that the content here is always “true,” or “demonstrable” in an 
epistemological sense. 
278 Obviously such assent must be given with genuine conviction (even if weak or still doubting); “exterior” 
assent, from the mouth only, would only mean that the person is posing as a convert. 
279 Commonly, autobiographical accounts of conversion serving an apologetic purpose (such as Griffin’s, in 
Chapter 4) focus primarily on this first type of conversion. On the other hand, treatises on spirituality, even 
if structured around an autobiographical account (such as Thérèse of Lisieux’s), more often focus on the 




natural reason, their revelation being provided for human assistance or convenience.280 
This matter presents somewhat of a methodological difficulty peculiar to religious 
conversion: the ruling criterion for characterizing a truth as “religious” will not be the 
nature of the content of the truth itself, but rather its origin, i.e. as revealed by God, 
and/or as assented to by an act of faith in the divinity, or an act of trust in the religious 
authority, etc. Looking at the nature of the content may in many situations – most, 
perhaps – help identify a truth as religious, and consequently, to identify cases of 
conversion regarding content as instances of religious conversion. This may be the case 
when the content refers to themes such as God and the relation of God to human beings. 
But in other cases the content of truths that, according to the criterion of origin, should be 
characterized as religious, may refer to moral themes (e.g. religiously sanctioned moral 
prescriptions), or to metaphysical views (the term “metaphysical” is here used very 
broadly) that have direct moral implications, particularly regarding happiness or ultimate 
meaning. In these cases the matter would overlap with that which has been identified as 
characteristic of moral conversion. 
This possibility raises a methodological issue: should such instances be considered 
also as instances of moral conversion? Could they, consequently, be used as evidence (as  
                                                 
280 In Aquinas’ analysis, for example, some of the revealed truths are actually truths that “natural reason” 
could have recognized, but that are revealed for in order to assist us: “Hence it was necessary for the 
salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine 
revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was 
necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason 
could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many 




will be done in Chapter 10) of an internalist view of morality? This issue will be 
discussed in the following section. 
2) The second sense of religious conversion corresponds fairly closely with what 
was characterized above as moral conversion regarding commitment or attitude. The 
expression that most adequately conveys this kind of religious conversion is “conversion 
of the heart.”281 It is usually presented in contrast to an assent to religious truths that 
remains chiefly in the intellectual but does not inform the person’s affective sphere 
and/or the orientation of their active life. It involves the awakening of commitment to the 
meaning and practical demands of religious truths assented to previously, often for a 
significant amount of time before conversion takes place, but assented to with 
indifference at the affective and/or practical level.282 Alternatively, this form of 
conversion may be formulated without any reference to such contrast (i.e. between the 
“chiefly intellectual” and the affective and/or practical), and may be thus formulated 
simply as a significant change in the person’s affective and volitional relation to the 
Divine. (Quite often this conversion takes place in the form of a submission or surrender 
of the person to God, intended by the person to be full and complete.) 
Within the Judeo-Christian writings this “change of heart” has traditionally 
involved a two-phased turning: there is first a turning away from alienation from God and 
                                                 
281 The image of the “change of heart” is used explicitly in the Old Testament; as for example in Ezekiel 
11:19: “I will take from them their heart of stone, and will give them a heart of flesh.” 
282 Some differences of emphasis will be found between religious thinkers and groups that emphasize the 
importance of the content of faith – in which cases the change in content will be emphasized as being the 
cause for this further transformation. In a different context -, and thinkers or groups that emphasize the 
negative consequences of a “purely abstract” assent to truth that does not otherwise transform the person or 
his/her actions, while giving them an (in their view) false sense of being justified, saved, etc. by the mere 




from sin (a phase ordinarily called “repentance” or metanoia), and secondly there is a 
turning toward God and the related affective and volitional states (a phase sometimes 
called “enlightenment” or epistrophe,283 and sometimes simply “faith”).284 
3) A third sense of religious conversion is that of a transformation of the convert's 
practical life. This corresponds to the third category described above in regard to moral 
conversion, namely conversion regarding coherence. From what has been expounded in 
the previous chapter about conversion regarding behavioral coherence, this category can 
be readily understood. But it should be noted that some controversy may be found in 
some theological contexts as to whether this conversion regarding coherence should not 
rather be interpreted as a signal/sign (or, perhaps, as the touchstone) of a conversion of 
the heart (i.e. the second category of religious conversion), than as a distinct kind of 
religious conversion. In other words, proponents of collapsing the third into the second 
category might say that, if conversion does reach the heart, it is supposed to transform a 
person's life. Therefore, if no discernible changes in the person’s life appear over a period 
                                                 
283 Richard Fragomeni, "Conversion," in The New Dictionary of Catholic Spirituality, ed. Michael Downey 
(Collegeville, Maine: The Liturgical Press, 1993), 231.  
284 The two notions of religious conversion just expounded are found, in less or more detail, in practically 
every dictionary of Christian theology that contains the term “conversion.” See Donald Attwater, ed., A 
Catholic Dictionary, 3rd ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958); Louis Bouyer, Dictionary of 
Theology, trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (New York: Desclee Co., Inc., 1965); Robert C. Broderick, ed., 
The Catholic Encyclopedia - Revised and Updated Edition (New York: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1986); 
Mark Miller, "Conversion," in The Harper Collins Encyclopedia of Catholicism, ed. Richard P. McBrien 
(San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1995); F. J. Moloney, "Conversion, I (in the Bible)," in The New Catholic 
Encyclopedia (Detroit, MI; Washington, D.C.: Thomson/Gale Group; Catholic University of America, 
2003); T. H. L. Parker, "Conversion," in A Dictionary of Christian Theology, ed. Alan Richardson 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969); Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, Theological 
Dictionary, ed. O.P. Ernst, Cornelius, trans. Richard Strackan (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965); S.J. 
Walsh, J.P.M., "Conversion," in The Modern Catholic Encyclopedia, ed. Michael Glazier and Monika 
Hellwig (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1994). About half of these sources make explicit 
reference to the distinction between the phases of repentance and “turning toward,” expressed in these 
sources most often as faith (Bouyer, Dictionary of Theology; Moloney, "Conversion, I (in the Bible)"; 




of time – particularly, if a person persists in habits that are defective by the relevant 
religious standards – this should be considered a sign that there has not been a true 
conversion. On the other hand, it is also possible to find in a different theological context 
the view that the principal point of religious conversion consists in a change in how one 
lives, and that conversions of the previous categories are not too different from mere 
precursors of the “genuine” conversion, i.e. of practical, behavioral habits. For the 
present purposes, however (and keeping in mind that an analog threefold distinction was 
argued for in the previous chapter), it will be clearer to consider this as a category of 
conversion of its own, distinct from assenting to certain truths or from a change in one’s 
feelings, values, volitions, attitude.285 
 
2. A methodological problem: When the religious and moral aspects of a 
conversion are blended 
In all three types of religious conversion, it has been argued, there is a dependence 
of the convert’s change of life on revelation - its content, its ability to move the heart, and 
its ability to motivate practical changes in behavioral patterns - that distinguishes them 
from their corresponding classes of moral conversion. This dependence has been  
                                                 
285 This third sense of religious conversion is not as frequently mentioned in explicit terms in the relevant 
literature as the first two are (see previous note). If this one is explicitly mentioned, the expression 
commonly used is “conversion of life” or similar. (Broderick, ed., The Catholic Encyclopedia - Revised and 
Updated Edition; Miller, "Conversion.") Also note that, in this presentation of three senses of religious 
conversion, I have steered away from Lonergan’s definition of religious conversion, which focuses not on 
faith but on love, which for Lonergan is a change at the center of a person's drives and motivations. Though 
Lonergan's notion, quite original and profound in its own right, deserves further study, it is not so close to 
the common understanding of religious conversion as to be immediately intuitive; tallying it up with the 




identified as the chief criterion for distinguishing religious from moral conversion. On the 
other hand, the criteria provided to identify moral conversion focuses on the nature of its 
content/matter, i.e. as dealing with right/wrong and happiness/eudaemonia/meaning. The 
fact that different sets of criteria are used allows for the possibility of the content of 
religious conversion overlapping with the content of moral conversion. How should the 
relation between the two categories (whether as inclusive, exclusive, complementary, 
overlapping) be articulated? 
As was mentioned, concrete instances of conversion are complex processes in 
which the whole person is involved. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge the 
possibility of overlapping categories, i.e. that in the same narratives one may find both a 
religious and a moral conversion. Most authors that have considered the subject do in fact 
consider this not only to be a possibility, but in fact a normal occurrence, and some have 
explained this as the result of some form of structural relation between the different 
categories of conversion (such as, for example, “sublation”286). 
The fact, however, that some of the narratives presented in the following chapters as 
evidence for an internalist view of morality do contain religious elements – not just in 
terms of content, but in terms of the origin of the assent given to them – does raise a 
methodological issue. In general terms (a more detailed definition will be developed in 
later chapters) an internalist view of morality claims that a person’s understanding of the 
                                                 
286 Thus, in Lonergan: “I would use this notion in Karl Rahner's sense rather than Hegel's to mean that what 
sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new 
basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, 
preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward  to a fuller realization within a 





content of a moral rule or principle, and the related judgment on the reasonability of such 
rule or principle, are operative factors in that person’s assenting to such content, and/or 
adopting a certain, practically oriented attitude towards such content.287 A somewhat 
popular view of religiously motivated assent, however, regards this assent as essentially 
disconnected from the need to somewhat thoroughly understand the content and its 
implications, and to judge accordingly about its reasonableness. In other words, 
according to this view, assent based on religious faith (including assent to matters of 
moral concern) is supposed to replace or even suppress the need for a judgment of 
reasonableness; assent to such content would be given on the basis of “blind faith” or of 
“faith alone,” or even (a bit like Kierkegaard’s description of Abraham as a “man of 
faith”) of faith defying understanding and reasonableness altogether. 
Described in such terms, religiously motivated assent to moral matters seems closer 
to an externalist than to an internalist dynamism: the content becomes irrelevant, and it is 
the mechanism “behind” assent (e.g. the fact that a certain norm has been legitimated by 
a source of authority acknowledged as such by the person) that “produces” assent. But if 
such were the case in all instances of religious conversion, this would make it necessary  
                                                 
287 As will be argued later, to demonstrate the truth of an internalist view of morality it is enough to show 
that internalist processes take place at least once – or a handful of times -, because the claim of internalism 
is not that all processes of moral development, and of moral decision/action take place in the way 
internalism describes them. To demonstrate the truth of externalism, instead, it is necessary that no 
internalist processes take place, because its claim is exclusionary: in logical terms, externalism is a 
universal-negative statement that can be contradicted by a particular affirmative. Thus, the methodology 
involved in demonstrating internalism does not require to take into account “as many narratives of 
conversion as can be found” and produce some form of numerical comparison between those that indicate 
internalist processes and those that do not. Rather, it is enough to provide substantial examples that 
internalist processes do take place, and those narratives that do not provide such evidence do not need to be 
considered. There is no circularity involved, in other words, in selecting only those narratives that provide 




to exclude from consideration any narrative in which religious faith seemed to be an 
operative factor (since what is looked for are narratives that can serve as evidence for an 
internalist process). And given that, at least from what can be gathered from the 
collection of narratives examined during the preparation of this work, a majority of 
narratives do include religious elements and even some form of religious conversion, 
such exclusionary process would leave very little material to work with. 
What is claimed here is that it is not necessary to understand the relation faith-
reason in such terms, i.e. as excluding each other. (In fact it may be that this exclusionary 
view is justified only in a narrow range of instances, though that claim cannot be 
sustained here.) It is possible instead to understand faith and reason as related in 
“friendlier” terms, as is understood for example in the principle that states that fides 
quaerens intellectum, that faith seeks understanding. This is a view that enjoys the 
support of a very rich philosophical and theological tradition. 
Faith and reason in non-exclusionary terms: The example of Aquinas 
An example of this view, that regards faith and reason in non-exclusionary terms, 
can be found in Thomas Aquinas’ treatment of the distinction and relation between 
“natural reason” and “reason aided by Revelation.” This distinction was deemed 
necessary in order to make possible a dialogue with non-Christians (the aim, for example, 
of Aquinas’ Summa Contra Gentiles). It was also considered helpful for apologetic 
reasons: the distinction would help identify what was generally called the preambula 




of the Christian faith. Thus Aquinas discussed explicitly which truths that composed the 
Christian theological doctrinal corpus could be and which could not be reached, at least 
theoretically, without using the Christian revelation as a source of authority, as it had 
historically been used – which among these truths, in other words, could be defended 
philosophically. 
One way of applying the distinction between natural reason and reason aided by 
Revelation consisted in figuring out what truths could be argued for in the hypothetical 
situation of not having had the Christian revelation. Theoretically these truths could also 
be agreed upon by a reasonable person that did not share the Christian faith. Examples of 
this kind of truth would be in Aquinas’ view the moral rules contained in the Ten 
Commandments,288 or the existence of God;289 examples of truths that could not be 
reached without the aid of Revelation were in his view the Trinitarian constitution of 
God290 and, as Aquinas explains in a lengthy, somewhat esoteric discussion, the fact that 
the universe began at a certain point in time and did not exist eternally.291 Note that this 
exercise was not supposed to be one of historically tracing back ideas to their point of 
origin, whether it be religion, myth, or the recorded contribution of a particular thinker. 
What was attempted was to gauge, so to speak, the viability of certain ideas in terms of 
their reasonableness, i.e. of the possibility of arriving at them and defending them 
through philosophical argumentation, without having recourse to Revelation. Given his 
calm confidence in the truth of the Christian faith, Aquinas (and other scholars who 
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289 Summa Theologiae I, q. 2 a. 2. 




pursued the project) had the optimistic expectation that whatever knowledge were gained 
through natural reason would not contradict this faith-based truth, but rather would 
possibly support it, and might even further the understanding of faith-based truth. 
From these reflections, it was possible to establish a distinction between a) “strictly 
religious” truths, i.e. truths that can only be considered or defended as such if supported 
by the authority of revelation; b) “mixed” truths, i.e. that may be defended as “natural” 
truths, but are also argued for from a religious point of view, by “reason aided by 
revelation,” in the Scholastic phrase; and c) “strictly natural” truths, in the case that 
revelation seems to have no opinion on the subject; such might be the case, for example, 
of Catholic doctrine regarding which form of government may be the best for human life. 
(The terminology here, though not the distinction, is my own.)292 But in Aquinas (and not 
just in Aquinas but in the general spirit of medieval theology), even in the case of 
“strictly religious” truths reason still played a part, because a faith that understood its 
object (to some extent at least) was considered more perfect than a faith that gave assent 
without understanding anything about it at all – even if the latter case could be said to 
have something meritorious about it in terms of the virtue of obedience to authority. 
Thus, though acknowledging its limitations, Aquinas tried to give account of the “strictly 
religious” Christian doctrine of the Trinitarian God by referring to an analogy with the 
mental acts as they were understood by Aristotle.293 
                                                                                                                                                 
291 Summa Theologiae I, q. 46 a.2. 
292 The terminology used in this distinction is my own; its basis in Aquinas can be found in Summa 
Theologiae I, q.1 a.1; I-II q. 91, a. 3 and I-II q. 95 a.2. 
293 See for example Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and 





These various reflections call attention to the fact that religiously motivated assent 
is related to understanding and judgments of reasonability in much more complex ways 
than what is claimed by the view that considers all religious assent as per se constituted 
through the rejection of the demands for understanding and reasonability. The possibility 
of a person needing at a certain point in his/her life to assent without understanding – or 
even against what appears for them to be reasonable - is not rejected by Aquinas,294 but 
this kind of assent seems to go essentially against the human natural drive to understand 
and to act reasonably, and as such appears in Aquinas as a temporary, somewhat 
exceptional situation, that demands to be resolved eventually by the person growing 
towards an understanding of the object of the act of faith.295 
 
In short, the fact that narratives of moral conversion often include, as an important 
factor in the development of the conversion process, references to revelation, religious 
faith or religious expressions of some kind or other, should not be taken a priori as a 
reason to consider that in such narratives an internalist dynamism will not be found. (The 
view just presented, for example, using Aquinas’ reflections as illustrative, is 
representative of at least a significant portion of Catholic thought, current and past, on the 
nature of the relation between faith and reason; and in this view, the human need to 
understand, judge and act reasonably – what will be considered, in Chapter 10, as the 
constitutive elements in an internalist dynamism – are operative also during religious 
                                                 





assent.) Thus if, for example, one finds in the narrative of Antonio Pickett, the gangster 
turned CeaseFire worker (case #20), the statement 
Through it all, Tony's mother, Shirley Pickett, a loving but stern evangelical minister, had 
never stopped praying for him, and the faith she always preached finally took hold.296 
 
 one needs not conclude that Tony’s moral conversion was the result exclusively of some 
(externalist-conceived) “blind” assent to religious notions about right/wrong. For one 
thing, this narrative indicates a variety of factors at play, many of which can support an 
internalist reading (e.g. Tony’s growing awareness that this was a miserable sort of life, 
and that it was probably only going to become worse). For another, there is no reason to a 
priori conceive “his [Tony’s] mother’s faith,” and in particular the moral notions related 
to this faith, as a set of notions ungrounded in understanding and reasonability, assented 
to by Tony in a “blind” manner. 
To put the matter differently: assent given by faith does not conform to some 
canons of certainty, particularly to those of empiricism; but this fact does not support the 
conclusion that assent given by faith is therefore unintelligent or unreasonable. This 
conclusion would only be supported if one were willing to grant the truth of empiricism. 
Empiricism, however, has been sufficiently criticized as a view too narrow to properly 
explain human knowledge, and to normatively qualify it accordingly, and thus this claim 
needs not be considered here. 
To conclude this chapter: It is possible to find narratives of conversion in which 
religious and moral conversions appear to be “blended” to such an extent that it becomes 




narratives. This happens when a narrative indicates changes with regard to moral matters, 
but also indicates assent to revelation, or supported by religious faith, as a potentially 
significant factor in the changes. There seem to be, however, no substantial reasons to 
consider this fact a methodological problem, given that it was not claimed at any point 
that categories of conversion have to be considered in exclusive terms. Rather, the 
potential for overlapping was acknowledged early during the course of this dissertation, 
as well as the explanatory convenience, argued by some, of considering conversion 
alternatively as a process that affects the whole person at different levels. 
In second place, and with regard specifically to the proposed use of narratives of 
moral conversion as evidence for an internalist view of morality: the presence of factors 
that would allow a narrative to be characterized as an instance of both religious and moral 
conversion is not in and of itself sufficient reason to assume beforehand that, in the 
process described by that narrative, the elements of understanding/judgment of 
reasonability will not be present because they are precluded somehow by the religious/ 
faith based character of the conversion. Such an assumption can only be based in a very 
narrow – and in some cases, rather shallow – understanding of the nature of religious 
assent, that, in considering essential to religious assent the rejection of understanding and 
reasonability as relevant to that assent, would be disregarding important areas of 
philosophical and theological thought on the matter. 
On the other hand, the possibility that assent be given to moral content in a purely 
externalist manner is always present, even within an internalist view of morality; 
                                                                                                                                                 




therefore, it may be possible to find among narratives of both religious and moral 
conversion particular cases in which assent to moral truths will be given on the basis of 
“blind faith,” and disregarding to a great extent the demands of understanding and 
reasonability. The presence of these cases does not constitute in itself a problem for 
internalist views of morality, nor is there a methodological need to examine such 
narratives for the purposes of this dissertation. 
With these considerations in mind, it is legitimate to incorporate into the project, 
and without misgivings, an analysis of narratives that contain rich moral elements, but 
which have been identified as markedly religious (such as those of Augustine, Merton 
and Thérèse of Lisieux), and also narratives that, while markedly moral, contain explicit 
religious elements too (such as those of the CeaseFire worker Antonio Pickett, Jackie 




THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MORAL CONVERSION  
AND THE GOALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THERAPY 
 
 
1. Three points of contact 
There are three points at which this analysis of moral conversion connects in 
important ways with the field of psychology. The first point of contact concerns the 
discussion, in the final chapter of this dissertation, regarding moral conversion as 
evidence for an internalist view of morality. This connection may be stated in simple 
terms by saying that psychological research is at present a very important source of 
methodically collected empirical data for the philosophical discussion about internalist 
and externalist theories of morality (and other related discussions).
But the connection between philosophy and psychology is more complex than this. 
Some areas of psychological research are so richly permeated by philosophical 
considerations, that what is psychology cannot be fully distinguished from what is 
philosophy; and this symbiotic state of affairs must be taken as it is by those who study in 
these areas. More relevant to this project is the fact that many regions of psychological 




remain deeply influenced by a philosophical/anthropological standpoint that is indebted 
in most part to a positivist/physicalist model in the construction of psychological theories 
and in the interpretation of data. In turn, in a sort of reverse osmosis, this model has 
flooded philosophical method and philosophical theory in those areas that are studied by 
both disciplines. This positivist/physicalist model is to a great extent hostile to internalist 
views of morality. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 10. 
A second point of contact concerns the growing field of psychological research 
known as the psychology of moral development. The varied developmental theories 
formulated within this field aim to describe the regularities displayed by human beings as 
they change their views and attitudes regarding morality. This research clearly has points 
in common with the present efforts to describe moral conversion. Thus, the relation 
between moral development as studied by psychological theories, and the notion of moral 
conversion examined in this work must be addressed. This will be done in Chapter 8.  
A third point of contact concerns the relation between moral conversion and the 
field of psychological therapy. Psychological therapy attempts to accomplish something 
that is similar, at least in a first look, to moral conversion; for its aim is an important, 
hopefully lasting transformation of a person that will affect positively the person’s 
attitudes and behavior. It is therefore important to distinguish or at least establish the 
relation between the topic of this philosophical project – moral conversion - and 




2. The notion of mental health 
 One way of approaching this topic is by looking at the aim of psychological 
therapy. To clarify this, it is most useful to look first at the psychological profession’s 
definition of “mental health.” This is of particular importance because popular notions 
about the aims of psychological therapy are quite often colored conceptually with an 
undifferentiated mixture of notions from both psychology and moral conversion.297 
 A common pattern in psychology’s reference literature defines “mental health” in 
terms of the removal of obstacles, i.e. a negative way of constructing the definition: what 
is looked for is that the person be able to live and interact with others, with a reasonable 
degree of freedom from paralyzing obstacles due to psychic or mental disorders. The 
American Psychological Association Dictionary of Psychology, for example, defines 
“mental health” as 
a state of mind characterized by emotional well-being, good behavioral adjustment, relative 
freedom from anxiety and disabling symptoms, and capacity to establish constructive 
relationships and cope with the ordinary demands and stresses of life.298 
 
In this definition of mental health, even some elements that appear to be positive reveal 
an implicit negative formulation upon closer examination: “freedom from anxiety and  
                                                 
297 Popular narratives about psychological therapy, such as the ones found in movies and television shows, 
often emphasize the moment of the “breakthrough” in which, due to a significant insight of some sort on 
the part of the patient, problems are resolved with a certain finality. While it is not impossible that this may 
happen (some classical examples of the effectiveness of psychoanalysis, for example, are described in such 
terms in the field’s technical literature), it is significant that the notion of “breakthrough” is rarely used in 
psychological texts. A search for the term “breakthrough” in the dictionaries and encyclopedias of 
psychology only yielded one short entry in the APA Dictionary of Psychology, lending no support to the 
popular view that the “breakthrough” is an important moment in therapy. 





disabling symptoms”; “good behavioral adjustment” (“adjustment” meaning here the 
absence of conflict). The definition is in most part constructed by excluding the elements 
that identify a mental disease or mental disorder. “Mental disorder,” in turn, is defined as 
A disorder characterized by psychological symptoms, abnormal behaviors, impaired 
functioning, or any combination of these. Such disorders may cause clinically significant 
distress and impairment in a variety of domains of functioning and may be due to organic, 
social, genetic, chemical or psychological factors.299 
 
In the same source’s definition of “normality,” the negative character of the 
definition is even clearer: 
Although there are no absolutes and there is considerable cultural variation, some flexible 
psychological and behavioral criteria can be suggested: (a) freedom from incapacitating 
internal conflicts; (b) the capacity to think and act in an organized and reasonably effective 
manner; (c) the ability to cope with the ordinary demands and problems of life; (d) freedom 
from extreme emotional distress, such as anxiety, despondency, and persistent upset; and 
(e) the absence of clear-cut symptoms of mental disorder, such as obsessions, phobias, 
confusion and disorientation.300 
 
A review of some of the standard psychological reference literature confirms this as 
the typical approach to the field’s understanding of mental health. The Concise 
Encyclopedia of Psychology, for example, states in fact that there is in systematic 
psychology a striking absence of an explicit theory of healthy personality.301 This is 
explained partly because research on health seems less useful than research on disorders, 
since “people who function constructively and productively do not jeopardize 
civilization”;302 and partly as an effect of the fact that it is easier to identify the  
                                                 
299 Ibid. 
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301 Raymond J. Corsini and Alan J. Auerbach, eds., Concise Encyclopedia of Psychology, 2nd ed., abridged 
ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1998). S.v. “Healthy Personality.” In fact, in some of the 






phenomena of abnormality and bring them under the control of the investigator (and 
possibly the therapist). The result is that “theories of healthy personality are mostly 
derived by implication from theories of disordered personality.”303 Nevertheless, a few 
positive traits are sometimes named; for example: 
Healthy people continuously expand their consciousness of themselves, other people, and 
the world; increase their competence to fulfill basic needs; grow in response to threat; and 
develop realistic and satisfying roles and interpersonal relationships.304 
 
The positive traits that are identified – that is, those that go beyond a “neutral” sort 
of equilibrium, such as “stability,” “adjustment,” or “conformity” - seem to coalesce into 
two general categories; either integration and harmony, or “flourishing” and the 
actualization of one’s potential and capacities.305 Even the latter, though, may be partially 
cast in terms of an absence of paralyzing disorder, as in the A.P.A.’s definition of 
“flourishing”: 
a condition denoting good mental and physical health: the state of being free from illness 
and distress but, more important, of being filled with vitality and functioning well in one’s 
personal and social life.306 
 
The A.P.A.’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) 
also lacks an explicit theory of healthy personality, though this is to be expected given the  




306 VandenBos, ed., A.P.A. Dictionary of Psychology. A slightly different approach can be found in D. W. 
Peters and J. D. Carter, "Healthy Personality," in Baker Encyclopedia of Psychology and Counseling, ed. 
David G. Benner and Peter C. Hill (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 1999). In what could be 
characterized as representative of a Christian approach to psychology (an approach that surfaces with some 
frequency in the area of personality theory), a number of positive factors are mentioned as representative of 
a healthy personality, which sometimes coincide with, sometimes add to those already mentioned. Such 
factors are listed in summary form as “having a realistic view of oneself and others, accepting oneself and 
others, living in the present but being informed by the past and the future, possessing guiding values, and 




Manual’s explicit focus on categorizing and diagnosis of mental disorders. The Manual 
does elaborate a bit on the definition of mental disorder, emphasizing what could be 
called the need for a “contextual” diagnosis: in order to be categorized as a disorder, the 
syndrome or pattern identified must be associated with present distress or disability, or 
with a significant risk of death, pain, disability or loss of freedom;307 in addition, the 
actual or potential distress must not be “merely an expectable and culturally sanctioned 
response to a particular event, for example, the death of a loved one.”308 Finally, it must 
be considered “a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction 
in the individual.”309 The Manual also establishes criteria for clinical significance, 
insisting that there be clinically significant impairment or distress, so that the 
symptomatic presentation by itself is not considered “inherently pathological, and may be 
encountered in individuals for whom a diagnosis of ‘mental disorder’ would be 
inappropriate.”310 
Accordingly, the Manual does not provide any attempt to define mental health or a 
healthy personality. There is, however, operative in the Manual, an implicit notion of 
“health,” as adequate functioning and the absence of clinically significant destructive 
tendencies. This can be gathered from its “Global Assessment of Functioning” (GAF) 
scale, which establishes grading criteria that range from (at the lowest end) persistent 
danger of severely hurting self or others and inability to maintain minimal personal 
                                                 
307 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV, 4th 
ed. (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994), xxi. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Ibid., xxii. 
310 Ibid., 7. To highlight the importance of this criterion, it is usually included specifically in the individual 




hygiene, to serious or moderate impairment in social, occupational or school functioning, 
to (at the highest end) absent or minimal symptoms, good or superior functioning in a 
wide range of activities, social effectiveness, general satisfaction with life, “no more than 
everyday problems of concerns,” or even the fact that “life’s problems never seem to get 
out of hand.”311 
 
3. Therapeutic psychology and moral conversion 
A. The focus on happiness 
This brief survey yields a notion of mental health, as the aim of psychological 
therapy, that can now be compared to what a person arrives at through the process of 
moral conversion. (The operative assumption here, of course, is that the general reference 
literature is truly representative of the way in which psychologists and psychotherapists 
see their own discipline and the function of therapy. In practice their methods and goals 
may vary, and may incorporate elements that might be more appropriately regarded as 
belonging to moral, or possibly intellectual conversion. A more detailed exploration of 
psychology’s and psychotherapy’s understandings in this regard would involve extensive 
study beyond the scope of this dissertation.) 
How does this notion of mental health as the goal of therapy compare with moral 
conversion? The notion of “moral” that focuses on happiness and the meaning of life will 
be discussed first. A general way of formulating the relation between happiness and the 
goals of therapeutic psychology is that psychologists attempt to help the person establish 
                                                 




some of the necessary conditions for happiness. In other words, therapeutic psychology 
normally focuses on means, on developing “mental health” as a chief requisite for 
achieving happiness. In this sense, the therapeutic setting can be considered a privileged 
environment for the occurrence of moral conversion regarding happiness, but the normal 
focus of the therapy itself is on developing the healthy mental dispositions that make 
happiness possible. 
A comparison with Aristotle’s treatment of eudaemonia offers some help in 
understanding the relation between the two spheres. Aristotle defined eudaemonia (his 
term for happiness) as an “activity of the soul,” especially the activity of the “highest 
part” of the soul.312 This activity, according to Aristotle, depends on a number of 
conditions – some degree of health, wealth, friends, leisure time, etc. – but these do not 
constitute happiness: they make possible the type of activities that bring happiness, and in 
their absence, happiness becomes impossible, or at least quite hard to achieve. In a 
similar manner, therapeutic psychology seems to take the view that mental health – or, in 
its alternative formulation, a “healthy personality” – makes it possible for the person to 
identify and engage in whatever it is that may bring happiness. Or in a negative 
formulation, mental health implies the absence of obstacles and hindrances that oppose 
the possibility of identifying and participating in or achieving happiness, such as 
paralyzing anxiety, lack of confidence, or the inability to interact normally with other 
human beings. These are clearly grounds for a potentially close relation between  
                                                 




therapeutic psychological practice and moral conversion regarding happiness.313 
As has been discussed in Chapter 5, moral conversion can be understood in one (or 
more) of three ways concerning the person’s orientation towards happiness: as a shift in 
content, a shift in attitude, or a shift in the person’s coherence between convictions/ 
attitude and actual behavior. In terms of content, the general standard of practice 
(consistent with the characteristics indicated above, when discussing definitions of 
mental health) is for psychologists to keep their distance from explicit statements on 
content with regard to happiness and the meaning of life. Thus, even a psychologist like 
Viktor Frankl, who has given a central place in his therapeutic model to explicit 
reflection on the meaning of life, emphatically states that it is not the place of the 
psychologist to make concrete declarations in this respect, i.e. about content regarding the 
meaning of life. Instead, 
The logotherapist’s role consists in widening and broadening the visual field of the patient 
so that the whole spectrum of potential meaning becomes conscious and visible to him.314 
 
But while psychologists may methodologically restrict themselves from suggesting 
or imposing specific content to the patient, they may deem it necessary to prompt in the 
patient a revision of current content. Some models of therapeutic practice, for example 
(Frankl’s “logotherapy” is one), consider a deficit or a vacuum with regard to existential 
meaning (or some comparable content) as the root or cause of symptoms that express 
themselves in the form of anxiety, neurosis and other conditions that are properly within 
                                                 
313 Aristotle’s specific account of what are the activities of the soul and which are “highest” is often in 
contrast with the typically more open-ended account of therapeutic psychology; but that contrast is less 
informative for present purposes than Aristotle’s focus on ends as contrasted with psychology’s more 
instrumental focus, i.e. on the means needed to attain happiness. 




the realm of psychological therapy. The more a psychological theory incorporates these 
considerations, the more frequently the therapeutic setting will become an environment 
for the revision of notions related to happiness and the meaning of life, and possibly 
therefore an environment for moral conversion. It is clear, however, that not all forms of 
therapeutic psychology have this focus, and having it is not a necessary feature of 
professional therapeutic practice. So the distinction between therapeutic psychology and 
moral conversion remains unchallenged by these examples. 
Similar reflections arise when therapeutic psychology is compared to moral 
conversion regarding happiness/eudaemonia/meaning in terms of attitude or behavioral 
coherence (the second and third classes). Successful therapy may remove obstacles that 
impede normal function (e.g. self-deprecating or self-destructive tendencies, unjustified 
guilt, etc.), and as a consequence, the person may be freed to revise his or her attitude 
regarding the question of happiness and the meaning of life, or may be freed from 
conditions that impede achieving a deeper level of coherence between conviction and 
action. Conversely, situations such as a deficient focus on meaning and happiness or a 
pronounced dichotomy between convictions and behavior (e.g. believing that happiness 
lies on a certain path, but being forced by a life situation to do something different) have 
been identified as significant factors in the development of some mental disorders.315 As 
a consequence, the therapeutic setting would naturally become a privileged space for 
revising attitude or behavioral coherence with regard to happiness and the meaning of  
                                                 





life. This said, however, the emphasis in therapeutic psychology remains on these factors 
as means to happiness and on the removal of obstacles to the achievement of happiness. 
Instead, the focus of moral conversion, the direct object of the process of moral 
conversion, is in attaining eudaemonia or happiness itself. The convert typically does not 
achieve it wholly in one jump, but the initial steps, from the perspective of moral 
conversion, are the first experience of the end, that is, are not experienced as merely 
creating conditions for its achievement. 
B. The focus on right/wrong 
A similar reflection can be advanced regarding the relation between mental health 
as the goal of psychological therapy, and moral conversion in its focus on right/wrong. It 
is generally regarded as good therapeutic practice that the psychologist methodically 
abstain from judgments regarding the content of right/wrong, and in this sense, 
psychological therapy is neither directly concerned with moral practice, nor with moral 
conversion in particular. 
Nevertheless, some connections can be identified between the content of 
convictions regarding right/wrong, a person’s attitude towards moral obligation, and/or 
coherence on the one hand, and the emergence of mental disorders that are the proper 
object of psychological therapy on the other. The problem of guilt, for example, a 
fundamentally moral emotion, has a central place in the history and development of 
modern psychological therapy and science, particularly in psychoanalysis. As a 




towards moral obligation, and specific issues of (in)coherence between convictions and 
behavior will be a matter of concern for the therapist to prompt reflection on, and so are 
bound to arise in the therapeutic environment. Therefore also in this sense, i.e. right/ 
wrong, there is the potentiality in psychological therapy for enhancing the probability of 
moral conversion. 
In no case, however, are the goals of psychological therapy formulated in terms of 
making people “morally better,” in the right/wrong sense. Psychological therapists do not 
attempt to make their patients more honest, responsible, or better at fulfilling their 
obligations on such grounds, i.e. that it is the goal of their profession to make people 
“behave better.” If any such negative dispositions are addressed, it will be on the grounds 
that such dispositions interfere with the development of mental health, create undue 
conflict in the psyche, or generally function as an obstacle to the patient’s happiness. The 
distinction between moral conversion regarding right/wrong and the goals of 
psychological therapy is in this sense even more clear than that between the goals of 
therapy and moral conversion regarding happiness.316 
                                                 
316 The distinction between the goals of psychological therapy and moral conversion regarding right/wrong 
may be made clearer, perhaps, by considering the contrast between therapy and the Christian sacrament of 
confession, as traditionally practiced. In the latter, the penitent addresses explicitly their actions in terms of 
right/wrong, how the recurrence of such actions indicate negative dispositions or habits, and must express, 
as one of the operative requisites, the resolution to amend such habits. Moral conversion in terms of right/ 
wrong is not the main purpose of confession thus conceived – the main purpose is the absolution of the 






To sum up, psychological therapy aimed at mental health and psychological 
research about it are potentially useful to the process of moral conversion (and there is 
also the possibility of benefit in the other direction, though there has been no need to 
stress this point here). For the therapeutic environment can become a privileged space for 
moral reflection that can launch or foster a process of moral conversion. But such 
contingent practical links between therapeutic psychology and moral conversion do not 
indicate their equivalence conceptually, which is the key point for present purposes, nor 
do they indicate that these processes are identical practically either.317 
                                                 
317 Lonergan scholars have studied in particular detail the relation between moral conversion and what they 
call “affective (also ‘psychological’) conversion” (see Chapter 3, above). Though some of these scholars 
have explicitly employed this category for an analysis of the goals and results of psychological therapy, the 
consensus seems to be that the category of affective conversion is not limited exclusively to the 
environment of mental therapy, but rather, that it is a broader category, of useful application for the 




THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MORAL CONVERSION 
AND NORMAL MORAL DEVELOPMENT: 
MORAL CONVERSION AS AN EXISTENTIAL EVENT 
 
1. Introduction 
As was explained in the previous chapter, the process of moral conversion cannot 
be understood properly without placing it within the context of recent discoveries and 
achievements in the field of developmental psychology. A variety of theoretical models 
have been put forward that distinguish different stages of moral development, regarding 
different but overlapping aspects of a person’s moral life. Many of these models have 
been corroborated to some extent by progressively more sophisticated empirical research, 
sufficiently so in fact that it now seems safe to say, as a standing achievement of 
psychological research, that human beings do not remain the same during their whole life 
– not even during their whole adult life - with respect to their structures of moral 
reasoning and moral judgment, their structures of value, and other areas related to moral 




field, even when empirical research has been based on widely different theoretical 
models, keeping in mind that, partly because of the newness of this branch of psychology 
and of psychology in general and partly because of the complex methodology that the 
relevant tests involve, the empirical base has generally been small and not very diverse. 
Nevertheless there has been a considerable consensus across the work of numerous 
researchers.318 
Clearly, the notion of moral conversion as a relatively rare, even extraordinary 
event must be confronted with the discovery that important structural changes in a 
person's moral life, including their moral reasoning, are common, and not only common 
but cross-cultural, as Kohlbergian research suggests,319 and therefore to be expected in a 
person’s normal development. The task then is to articulate and distinguish the concepts 
of moral development and moral conversion. This will be done by looking at the best 
known of these theories, Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, which 
structures moral reasoning into a six-stage progression.  
                                                 
318 While the focus of the first part of this chapter will be on Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, it 
should be noted that a cursory look at alternative theories of moral development - such as those of 
Durkheim, Havighurst, Erikson, William Perry and others – shows substantial agreement that human 
beings progress through different stages of moral life in more or less predictable patterns. The differences 
between these theories can be in most cases attributed to differences in their focus of research rather than to 
disagreement on this basic fact. See, for example, John Martin Rich and Joseph L. DeVitis, Theories of 
Moral Development (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1985). 
319 Ronald E. Galbraith and Thomas M. Jones, Moral Reasoning: A Teaching Handbook for Adapting 
Kohlberg to the Classroom (Minneapolis: Greenhaven Press, 1976), 32; James Rest, "Background: Theory 
and Research," in Moral Development in the Professions, ed. James Rest and Darcia Narváez (New Jersey: 




2. Kohlberg’s stages of moral development 
Kohlberg’s theory is chosen for this comparison with moral conversion because it is 
currently by far the most developed and intensely researched among psychological 
theories of moral development.320 In addition, Kohlberg’s theory is also the theory 
focused on when scholars specifically compare moral development and conversion, as 
will be considered in the proper place. Kohlberg’s theory is not without its critics (most 
famously Carol Gilligan, but also many others),321 challenging both his theoretical 
structure and his empirical methodology; but because of the very lively state of 
Kohlbergian studies a good number of these criticisms have been met or have been 
incorporated into more recent formulations of Kohlberg’s theory. 
Kohlberg’s standard methodology consists in presenting his research subject with a 
number of moral dilemmas, about which the subject has to resolve what ought to be done. 
This is followed by an interview, in which the reasoning behind the subject’s decisions is 
                                                 
320 Practically every author that considers Kohlberg has to present at a certain point an outline of his stage 
theory. Kohlberg himself discusses it in Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the 
Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development," in Cognitive Development 
and Epistemology, ed. T. Mischel (New York: 1971); Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Growth," in 
Values and Moral Development, ed. Thomas C. Hennessy (New York: Paulist Press, 1976). Other useful 
sources are Conn, Christian Conversion, 43; Galbraith and Jones, Moral Reasoning, 32; Thomas Lickona, 
ed., Moral Development and Behavior (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), 197; Rest, "Background: 
Theory and Research," 4-9; Rich and DeVitis, Theories of Moral Development, 87; Thomas E. Wren, 
Caring About Morality : Philosophical Perspectives in Moral Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1991), 141-143. The precise interpretation of the meaning of these stages is often developed and phrased in 
subtly varying ways from author to author, which may be explained as the result of this theory being itself 
at an early stage of development, and also, perhaps, as a natural consequence of the explanatory richness of 
Kohlberg’s articulation of the stages, which allows for his theory to be developed in many directions. 
321 John Gibbs summarizes some of these criticisms in this way: Kohlberg’s stage theory is “ethnocentric 
(Simpson, 1974), ideological (Sullivan, 1977), elitist (Frankel, 1978), restrictively abstract (Aron, 1977a, 
1977b; Gilligan, 1977), and perniciously individualistic (Hogan, 1975; Reid and Yanarella, 1977).” (John 
C. Gibbs, "Kohlberg's Moral Stage Theory: A Piagetian Revision," Human Development, no. 22 [1979]: 
90). Gibbs himself is sympathetic to Kohlberg’s theory, arguing that “although Kohlberg’s theory is in fact 





elicited. The decisions themselves are not the real focus of the analysis, but rather the 
reasoning processes that led to them, as far as they can be elucidated in the interview. The 
subject is also interviewed on various further occasions over time, enabling the 
researchers to periodically track changes in the subject’s moral reasoning. Using this 
method, Kohlberg and his colleagues have formulated a theory of moral reasoning, 
charting and categorizing it into six stages that are grouped by pairs into three “levels” of 
moral reasoning. 
Perhaps more important than the categorization made possible by this research is 
the consistent finding that the stages seem to progress following an invariant sequence; 
that is, stages are not skipped (one does not progress from stage 2 to stage 4 without 
having gone through stage 3), and the progression proceeds in one direction only (a 
subject that reaches a certain stage does not return to numerically lower stages). Cross-
cultural studies have found this sequence repeated consistently up to stage 4 in a variety 
of countries and cultures. However, cross-cultural studies have not been able to establish 
with the same consistency the presence of stages 5 and 6 (the “postconventional” or third 
level of moral reasoning).322 This absence has important implications that are examined 
below. 
                                                 
322 John C. Gibbs, "Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development: A Constructive Critique," Harvard 
Educational Review 47, no. 1 (1977): 50; James Rest, "Morality," in Handbook of Child Psychology, ed. 
John H. Flavell and Ellen M. Markman (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), 583; Rest, "Background: 




Placing Kohlberg’s research in context 
It should be mentioned that it is clearly acknowledged among Kohlbergians that 
Kohlberg’s empirical research only reaches a particular aspect of moral life.323 James 
Rest, for example, has expressed interest in identifying other aspects of moral life that 
may in due time receive similar treatment (that is, that models may be formulated that 
allow for an empirical analysis of those aspects, possibly leading to the formulation of 
developmental stage-structures for that specific aspect of moral life). Thus Rest identifies 
four “psychological components of moral behavior”:324 
Moral sensitivity: the awareness of how our actions affect other people; awareness 
of the moral issues being at stake in a certain situation. 
Moral judgment (also “moral reasoning”): once the situation is assessed, judging 
which line of action is just, or right. 
Moral motivation: as Rest formulates it, this is the problem of how values are 
prioritized – particularly, of how or why those actions regarded as morally required are 
prioritized over those that are not, or why the opposite takes place. 
Moral character: the problem of why, even if moral values are regarded as a 
priority, the person may fail to act accordingly (or consistently act accordingly).325 
                                                 
323 Rest, "Morality," 563-569; Rest, "Background: Theory and Research," 22. 
324 Rest, "Background: Theory and Research," 22-25. 
325 Rest’s classification shows interesting correlations with the three classes of moral conversion identified 
in Chapter 5. The first class, moral conversion regarding content, can be correlated to Rest’s first and 
second components of moral life, moral sensitivity and moral judgment/reasoning: shifts both in criteria for 
reasoning and in awareness to specific moral issues would fall under this class. The second class, 
conversion regarding attitude towards right/wrong and the meaning of life can be correlated to Rest’s third 
component of moral life, moral motivation. This component, though essentially outside the focus of the 
Kohlbergian model, has been approached by Kohlberg, who talks about the problem of akrasia, the gap 




The  second component, that Rest identifies as “moral judgment,” and only this 
component, is the developmental element on which Kohlberg’s research has focused, the 
component of moral life that is assessed by his method. It should be clear that Kohlberg’s 
stage structure is presented here only as a specific example of psychological empirical 
research on moral development, and not as all that there is to know about psychology of 
moral development. Kohlberg’s model is clearly not intended as a comprehensive 
framework. But for present purposes it works as a very accessible illustration of a 
developmental stage-structure, against which to contrast what will be called “an 
existential event,” i.e. moral conversion.  
 
A description of Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning 
Kohlberg identifies six stages that are grouped into three levels of two stages each. 
The three levels are called preconventional, conventional and postconventional. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Commitment," 326); and Kohlbergians, as in McNamee’s famous study that established a correlation 
between stages of moral reasoning and actual response to a person in distress (Sharie McNamee, "Moral 
Behaviour, Moral Development and Motivation," Journal of Moral Education 7, no. 1 [1978]).  
Finally, the third class of moral conversion, conversion regarding coherence between convictions and 
behavior, can be correlated with Rest’s fourth component, moral character. In this area researchers from 
various schools have explored categories such as resistance to distraction, “ego strength,” assertiveness, 
expertise in the task at hand, empathic capacity, etc., attempting to find correlations between the 
development of these factors and an increased incidence of behavior matching moral convictions. The 
limited conclusion that these studies warrant at this point seems to be that an increased degree of behavioral 
coherence may be achieved indirectly by fostering developmentally a diversity of personality factors. See 
P.F. Grim, Lawrence Kohlberg and S. H. White, “Some Relationships between Conscience and Attentional 
Processes,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology no.8 (1968), 239-252; R. L. Krebs, “Some 
Relations Between Moral Judgment, Attention, and Resistance to Temptation.” Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967; D. E. Barret and M. R. Yarrow, “Prosocial Behavior, Social 
Inferential Ability, and Assertiveness in Children,” Child Development, no. 48 (1977), 475-481; Ted 
Huston and Chuck Korte, "The Responsive Bystander: Why He Helps," in Moral Development and 




Level I: The preconventional level of moral reasoning 
At the preconventional level, the person (at this level, usually a child) 
is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets 
these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action 
(punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who 
enunciate the rules and labels.326 
 
Within the preconventional level, two stages can be distinguished: Stage 1 
(“Heteronomous morality,” or “punishment-and-obedience orientation”)327 and Stage 2 
(“Individualism, instrumental purpose and exchange”)328 
At Stage 1, the goodness and badness of an action is principally determined by its 
physical consequences, apart from the meaning or value of these consequences.329 The 
reasons for doing what is right are to avoid physical damage to persons and property, and 
the understanding of “right-ness” is tied to “avoidance of punishment, and the superior 
power of authorities.” The agent’s point of view is characterized as fundamentally 
egocentric: the point of view of others – as centers of their own egocentric demands - is 
seldom considered, and there is even confusion between the interests of others and the 
agent’s, and between the authority’s point of view ant the agent’s own.330 If the agent 
actually has views – undifferentiated as these may be –  about others’ interests, these are  
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generally conceived as operating in terms as narrow as the agent’s. Furthermore, this 
stage seems to be characterized by attention to the concrete or literal aspects of an act 
(“he was caught stealing, so he has to go to jail”) rather than to the intentions of the 
agent331 - a fact that in children may be explainable by the child’s inability to grasp 
different personal perspectives at his/her present cognitive level.332 
At Stage 2 there is a developing awareness that others have their own points of view 
and their particular interests.333 “Right action” at this stage is what instrumentally 
satisfies the agent’s own needs (and occasionally the needs of others)334; moral 
prescriptions or evaluations are justified by appeal to pragmatic needs and instrumental 
intentions (“lying doesn’t get you anywhere, it leads to more lies”; “you will get caught 
anyway”).335 The agent’s immediate interest is primary, although elements of fairness 
and reciprocity can also begin to enter into consideration (marking a development from 
the egocentrism characteristic of Stage 1). Thus “right” is understood as “what is fair”; 
but “what is fair” is understood to a great extent in terms of the agent’s concrete interests. 
However, there is a developing recognition that others have their own interests too, and a 
progressive understanding of “what is fair” as what lets others meet their own interests 
too. 
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Level II: The conventional level of moral reasoning 
Level II (stages 3 and 4) is called the conventional level: at this level the agent 
regards him/herself as part of the community and its social order. 
Maintaining the expectations of the individual’s family, group, or nation is perceived as 
valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude 
is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, 
of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the 
persons or group involved in it.336 
 
Stage 3 is characterized by mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships and 
interpersonal conformity.337 The individual’s perspective has now expanded to attribute a 
high degree of prominence to relationships with others. The key factor seems to be the 
need to be a good person in one’s own eyes and those of others. This includes living up to 
what is expected by people close to one, or generally expected of one’s roles (good 
friend, good son, a person that can be trusted, a “nice” neighbor, i.e. pleasant and helpful, 
etc.) These expectations now frequently take precedence over the individual’s interests 
and instrumental reasons; and moral judgment is therefore extended to good motives and 
good intentions. Rules and authority are now very important because they identify and 
support “stereotypical good behavior.”338 
At Stage 3 the agent’s perspective, though, is still focused on a fairly closed circle, 
the “interpersonal,” i.e. the people that are known through direct personal interaction; it is 
not generalized enough to consider with equal prominence more extended social systems. 
This expanded perspective is achieved in Stage 4 (named, in different places, “social 
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system and conscience,”339 “the law and order orientation,”340 “appeal to societal 
requirements and values”341). At Stage 4 the agent can differentiate between societal 
concerns and the narrower, interpersonal considerations, points of view and motives. The 
agent can now take the point of view of the larger social systems of which individual and 
narrower interpersonal relations are a part. “Right action” consists in fulfilling social 
duties and generally supporting society and its institutions. Laws must be upheld “except 
in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties”342; avoiding the 
breakdown of the institutions and the social system is prominent among the reasons for 
acting one way rather than another. The agent may, for example, restrain his/her own 
interests by considering what would happen at the systemic level “if everyone did the 
same,” but “everyone” here refers to participants in the actual social systems that include 
the agent and his/her more direct interpersonal relationships. 
Level III: The postconventional level of moral reasoning 
Level III is called the “postconventional,” autonomous, or principled level. 
Kohlberg describes it in general terms as follows: 
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity 
and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles 
and apart from the individual’s own identification with these groups.343 
 
Here again, two stages (5 and 6 of moral development) may be distinguished within 
this level. Stage 5 is characterized as the stage of the “social contract,” although Kohlberg 
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attaches utilitarian overtones and considerations of individual rights to it as well. 
Characteristic to this stage is the awareness that other people may hold very diverse 
values and opinions from one’s own, and of the potential conflicts that may ensue as a 
consequence. A central aim of social effort at this stage is to reach consensus through 
procedural rules, with the purpose of integrating conflicting interests. Kohlberg notes that 
the pragmatic efforts to integrate these conflicting interests and points of view are 
frequently expressed in utilitarian terms. But aside from what is “democratically” agreed 
upon, what is “right” is not at this stage a matter of universal values: it is a matter of 
achieving consensus among personal values and moral opinions.344 Kohlberg’s 
characterization of the agent at this stage stresses his/her individuality; his/hers it is the 
perspective “of a rational individual aware of values and rights prior to social attachments 
and contracts.”345 
Stage 6 is characterized as “the universal-ethical-principle orientation.”346 
Kohlberg’s general description is: 
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles 
appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality and consistency. These principles are 
abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete 
moral rules like the Ten Commandments.347 
 
At Stage 6 social arrangements are regarded as deriving from a universal “moral 
point of view”, a perspective that any rational being would theoretically recognize, and, 
more importantly, choose. A (Kantian) element that is sometimes lost in the descriptions  
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of Stage 6 is that these ethical principles, which are moral standards for all rational 
beings, are “self-chosen.” This element is emphasized when commentators consider the 
“post-conventional” aspect of this level of development (as opposed to the 
“conventional” level, in which the agent essentially adopts societal standards with very 
little inclination to criticize them from a more universalized point of view). Particular 
laws and social systems and rules are considered to derive their validity from such 
principles: if a law violated these principles, for example, one should act in accordance 
with the universal principles rather than the law.348 
Though the principles that distinguish this stage are formulated by Kohlberg in 
mainly formal terms, he also attempts to convert these principles to standard moral 
concepts: 
At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human 
rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.349 
 
As it might be expected, there has been significant philosophical debate about 
Kohlberg’s description of moral reasoning at stages 5 and 6, and about Kohlberg’s 
proposal that these are the highest stages of ordinary human moral development. For our 
present purposes, however, this literature will be discussed only insofar as it contributes 
to the topics of this dissertation; other kinds of criticisms (or defenses) of Kohlberg’s 
claims about moral life are outside the scope of this project. However, examining a 
discussion between Gibbs and Conn about which of Kohlberg’s six stages can be really 
considered “stages” in the technical sense of the word (i.e. as established by Piaget) will 
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shed light on whether moral conversion involves a decision that is conscious and, in the 
terms that will be developed here, existentialist.  
3. The “natural” vs. “existential” distinction 
Conn and Gibbs on the Piagetian logic of Kohlberg’s structure 
There are not many direct links in the literature between theories of moral 
development and theories of moral conversion. The best source in this regard is Walter 
Conn, who has produced a number of articles linking various theories of moral 
development to the Lonerganian notion of moral conversion.350 Specifically regarding the 
possible link between Kohlberg’s theories and moral conversion, Conn discusses the 
matter at length in his book Christian Conversion.351 A great portion of this discussion 
involves Conn’s critique of an article by John Gibbs,352 which is in turn critical of 
Kohlberg. Understanding the points of dispute between these two scholars will 
unavoidably take the present discussion along something of a detour; but it will 
eventually shed important light on the issue of how, if at all, moral conversion can be 
distinguished from normal moral development.  
Two fundamental characteristics of Kohlberg’s stage-structure have already been 
indicated. Kohlberg holds that the movement through the stages follows a sequence that 
is invariant (no skipping of stages) and unidirectional (no “falling back” to earlier 
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stages).353 It is regularly noted, however, that significant individual differences have been 
found regarding the rate (i.e. at what age) of the subjects’ movement through the 
stages.354 
Invariability and unidirectionality, however, are only two of five empirical stage 
criteria proposed by Jean Piaget in his original proposals about stage developmental 
theories.355 Is Kohlberg’s structure consistent with Piaget’s original conception of a stage 
structure? The question is considered by John Gibbs’ in his article “Kohlberg’s Stages of 
Moral Development: A Constructive Critique.”356 Gibbs claims that Piaget’s empirical 
stage criteria establish the standards for corroborating the actual presence of 
developmental stages, so that the proper empirical corroboration of Kohlberg’s stage 
theory depends on conformity to Piaget’s criteria for all stages in the theory. But, claims 
Gibbs, this is not the case. 
Gibbs outlines the five empirical criteria proposed by Piaget as follows: 
1. Underlying generality: evidence must be found that a given response 
(characteristic of a certain stage) represents an underlying, more general “thought-
organization”357 That is, responses characteristic of a given stage are not the results of  
localized stimulus-response learning, but expressions of an underlying structure. In 
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practical terms, the relevant tests should be designed to bring to light the presence of such 
a structure, and weed out “learned responses” to specific questions.358 
2. Upward directionality and stability. The Piagetian conception of a “stage” is 
unidirectional. Evidence must be found that movement from a stage to the next has a 
marked tendency to go in one direction only. In practical terms, for example, tests should 
be designed to determine that subjects that were in Stage 2 are later found in Stage 3 or 
higher, and have not reverted indiscriminately to Stage 1. 
Note that, according to this criterion, the implication is that persons in a certain 
stage may be conceived as dynamically inclined or moving towards the following stage. 
This teleologically-oriented conception can be contrasted with (and proposed as 
explanatorily richer than) the “static” conception of a subject that is every now and then 
jolted towards the following stage. As a point of empirical corroboration, subjects in 
Kohlbergian tests are generally found to have characteristics of both lower and higher 
stages.359 Galbraith and Jones, for example, have proposed that development occurs 
because of an attraction to the next higher stage of reasoning: 
                                                 
358 In this description of the five criteria, I follow closely Gibbs’ terminology. In my own comments 
following the description of some if these criteria, I have tried to bring to light the scientific conception 
underlying the criteria proposed by Piaget/Gibbs, which is in turn in close consonance with the scientific 
view of the universe proposed by Lonergan’s theory of emergent probability . That is, the view of science 
implied in the Piaget/Gibbs criteria is defensible within a philosophy of science as developed by Lonergan. 
See Lonergan, Insight, 144; Kenneth R. Melchin, History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability : Ethics, 
Society, and History in the Work of Bernard Lonergan (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987). 
359 The relevant literature is covered by Gibbs, "Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development," 49. See also A. 
Bandura and F. McDonald, "The Influence of Social Reinforcement and the Behavior of Models in Shaping 
Children's Moral Judgments," Journal of abnormal and social psychology, no. 67 (1963); P. A. Cowan and 
others, "Social Learning and Piaget's Cognitive Theory of Moral Development," Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, no. 11 (1969); James Rest, "The Hierarchical Nature of Moral Judgment: A Study of 
Patterns of Comprehension and Preference of Moral Stages," Journal of personality, no. 41 (1973); James 
Rest, E. Turiel, and Lawrence Kohlberg, "Level of Moral Development as a Determinant of Preference and 




An individual has the capacity to comprehend reasoning presented at the next higher stage 
of development. Since the reasoning may appear more logical and comprehensive and, 
therefore, more adequate in the face of a dilemma situation, individuals may be attracted to 
the next stage of reasoning. This does not mean that the higher stage is always adopted or 
even verbalized, but that the listener may begin to incorporate elements of the higher stage 
in future solutions to moral problems.360 
 
3. Rates of stage development increase in an experientially rich environment. With 
respect to stages of moral development, this criterion asks about the presence of a 
“socially rich” environment. Research has indicated, for example, that there is an 
increased tendency to move to higher stages in the presence of conditions such as a 
child’s interaction with adults who place themselves “on the child’s own level, and give 
him a feeling of equality by laying stress on one’s own obligations,”361 or similar 
experiences of increased opportunities for role-taking.362 
Implied in the description of this stage, it should be noted, is Piaget’s conception of 
learning as being primarily the result of interaction with the environment, rather than the 
result of a one-way transmission of knowledge from “outside,” or of an exclusively 
“internal” impulse to change.363 
4. Upward movement should be gradual and consecutive, i.e. without skipping 
stages. The implication, when this is corroborated by the relevant tests, is that the lower 
stages are necessary for the higher stages to emerge; in other words, higher stages build 
upon the lower stages. 
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5. Species-wide existence of stages: “the stages should be commonly in evidence 
among members of the species from birth to maturity.”364 This last criterion, explicit in 
Piaget’s stage theory, is only implicitly present in Kohlberg’s writings, according to 
Gibbs.365 Galbraith and Jones mention that cross-cultural studies made in the United 
States, Taiwan, Mexico366 (involving middle-class urban males), and Turkey367 and 
Yucatan (involving lower class peasants), have to some extent corroborated this aspect.368 
Gibbs369 mentions additional studies with similar results done in Kenya,370 India371 and 
the Bahamas.372 
This empirical criterion, however, raises a particular difficulty with respect to 
Kohlberg’s stages 5 and 6, for attempts to corroborate the species-wide presence of these 
stages have not been successful.373 In fact, at the time Gibbs’ article was written, the 
matter was so problematic that Kohlberg himself had noted, “no real data exists on 
                                                 
364 Ibid.: 47. 
365 Ibid. 
366 Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization.," 
in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. D. A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), 384-
385. 
367 Ibid. 
368 Galbraith and Jones, Moral Reasoning, 32. 
369 Gibbs, "Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development," 50.  
370 C. P. Edwards, "Societal Complexity and Moral Development: A Kenyan Study," Ethos, no. 3 (1975). 
371 B. S. Parikh, “Moral Judgment and Its Relation to Family Environmental Factors in Indian and 
American Urban Upper Middle Class Families” (Boston University, 1975). 
372 C. B. White, "Moral Development in Bahamian School Children: Cross-Cultural Examination of 
Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Reasoning," Developmental psychology, no. 11 (1975). This latter study 
focuses on the first three stages or orientations. 
373 Lawrence Kohlberg, "Continuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development Revisited," in Lifespan 
Developmental Psychology, ed. P. B. Baltes and L. R. Goulet (New York: Academic Press, 1973); 
Lawrence Kohlberg and R. Kramer, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral 




movement to this [the sixth] highest moral stage,”374 and stage 6 was not even scored in 
Kohlberg’s then forthcoming Standard Form Scoring Manual.375 
This lack of evidence for stages 5 and 6, concerning this fifth empirical criterion in 
particular, is what prompts Gibbs to criticize the inclusion of the post-conventional level 
of moral reasoning (i.e. stages 5 and 6) in Kohlberg’s stage-sequence of moral 
development.376 Gibbs proposes to call these by a different term, “orientations,” and to 
use the term “stages” only for developmental categories that clearly fulfill the Piagetian 
empirical criteria. This, Gibbs believes, would help dispel some of the confusion 
produced by considering all of Kohlberg’s categories under the same rubric. 
Gibbs, however, does not limit his criticisms to these methodological issues. 
“Orientations” 5 and 6, he claims, not only do not deserve to be called stages, but actually 
the transition to orientations 5 and 6 (the “principled” orientations, in Gibbs’ 
terminology) obeys a different type of dynamism than the one evidenced in stage-
transitions from stages 1 to 4. What characterizes the transition in orientations 5 and 6 is 
described by Gibbs as an “existential theme,” which he contrasts with a “naturalistic 
theme” in properly called (Piagetian) stage-transitions.377 Gibbs’ criticism has bearing on 
an adequate description of moral conversion, and of the difference between moral 
conversion and “normal” moral development, as will now be explained. 
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Gibbs and the distinction between “natural” and “existential” orientations 
Gibbs explains his concern that Kohlberg unwarrantedly integrated the 
postconventional orientations (5 and 6) into a stage-developmental structure in which 
they do not belong in these terms. While stages 1 to 4 follow a “natural” or 
“spontaneous” dynamism, which is how stage development in the Piagetian sense should 
be understood, categories 5 and 6 cannot be adequately described without including an 
“existential” move on the part of the subject (what Gibbs means by “existential” will be 
discussed shortly). Indeed, for Gibbs, the fact that research subjects in stages 5 and 6 
have so rarely been found can be interpreted as an observable result of this problem. 
Gibbs’ claim merits investigation here because the distinction proposed by Gibbs is 
quite consistent with at least a common sense notion of the distinction between “normal” 
moral development and conversion. Development, corresponding to Gibbs’ “natural” or 
“spontaneous” processes, is considered in common sense reflection to be significantly 
different from conversion precisely because the latter involves something out of the 
ordinary developmental flow of human life. This out of the ordinary characteristic is 
expressed by the term “existential” in Gibbs and in this discussion.378 If the distinction 
Gibbs proposes between “natural” or “spontaneous” changes and “existential” changes 
can be established as meaningful, it can contribute to this project’s effort to distinguish 
conversion from normal moral development. 
To argue his point, Gibbs considers Kohlberg’s stages in terms of the Piagetian  
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criteria described in the previous section. As was mentioned above, orientations 5 and 6 
seem to fail the “species-wide” criterion while, on the other hand, extensive research 
suggests that stages 1 to 4 fulfill them. In order to explain the lack of empirical support 
for the higher stages 5 and 6, Gibbs takes a methodological step back and identifies what 
he considers to be the four basic features of Piaget’s overall developmental-structuralist 
theory.379 These four features are holism, constructivism, interactionism and naturalism. 
According to Gibbs, the “most fundamental” feature of the four is naturalism,380 and the 
other three build upon this naturalistic theme. But it will be clearer to discuss the other 
three first. 
The holistic character of Piaget’s view of world process corresponds to the 
observation that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, and, conversely, that the 
whole cannot be adequately explained merely by an analysis of its component parts.381 
(The first empirical criterion, “underlying generality,” corresponds to this feature). 
The constructivist feature complements Piaget’s holism: holistic structures are 
organized neither arbitrarily, nor by a pre-formed (but static) idea or “gestalt,” but 
oriented in the direction of “a relational objectivity of increasing efficacy.”382 Living 
beings have a characteristic tendency to “extend” themselves beyond mere stability or 
equilibrium. Mental behavior, in Piaget’s view, consists in “the elaboration of new 
structures and new lines of conduct in the course of a constantly constructive 
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development.”383 Similarly, human intelligence “extends, but does not reduce to, organic 
regulatory processes and structures.”384 (The second empirical criterion, “upward 
tendency,” corresponds to this theme.) 
The feature of interactionism can be understood by contrast with the idea of 
learning as a mere transmission of knowledge. Piaget conceives learning instead (and 
analog processes of “extension”) as primarily a result of interaction with the 
environment; it is thus an extension of the constructive tendency in life processes.385 
The perpetual compensations which regulate and control embryonic growth, for example, 
reflect equilibration as much as the perpetual coordinations entailed in the growth of 
understanding, discovering and inventing during childhood.386 
 
Interaction is, for Piaget, the generative origin of the acquisition of all 
knowledge.387 The same may be said of all analog processes, including in the present case 
moral development. (The third empirical criterion, of “facilitated rates of development in 
an experientially rich environment” corresponds to this feature). 
It can be seen how these features of Piaget’s theory, which articulate a 
philosophically rich view of human development, play out in Kohlberg’s stage-structure. 
According to the contructivism canon, the movement from one stage to the next is fueled 
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by an internal drive: the characteristic tendency of living beings to extend themselves 
beyond mere stability or equilibrium. According to the interactionism canon, this 
“extension” is fundamentally accomplished by interaction with the environment – not by 
a passive interaction, not by a simple “being molded” by the environment, but rather by 
active interaction. The organism’s drives actively engage in the achievement of 
equilibrium in relation to an expanded environment, and then to further expansion. 
Underlying this process, the canon of holism establishes that it is the organism as a whole 
– the organism with its multiple structural layers, from the biochemical to the behavioral 
and beyond – that engages in this interaction and develops accordingly. 
Among all these features, however, Gibbs considers the “most fundamental” feature 
to be that of Piaget’s theory to be naturalism; but when he tries to explain this feature 
from which the other three are supposed to flow, he becomes excessively vague. In one 
paragraph – in one breath, one may say - he describes naturalism as “a philosophic 
doctrine emanating from early Greek theology, which identified deities with nature and 
natural processes,” and as being used by Rousseau and other Romantics “as a theory of 
the good.” Then, in the context of Piaget’s theory, he says it emphasizes “a continuity 
between the human species and other forms of life. Normative human behavior has a 
‘deep biological significance.’”388 This is all that the reader gets regarding the specific 
meaning of the feature of naturalism; the point might have been clearer in fact if he had 
just used the word and not attempted to illustrate it at all! 
                                                 




But the particular implication Gibbs is aiming to bring forward by using this word 
eventually becomes clear. “Naturalistic” processes, for Gibbs, are fundamentally 
unconscious, or at least unreflective. Piaget’s naturalistic orientation, says Gibbs, “leads 
to an emphasis upon the implicit or unreflective character of ‘theories-in-action’ which 
direct unconscious behavior.”389 He quotes Piaget: 
In the case of cognitive structures the situation is remarkably comparable: some (but rather 
limited) consciousness of the result and almost entire (or initially entire) unconsciousness 
of the intimate mechanism leading to the result.390 
 
What this boils down to is the repetition of two empirical criteria, and the 
introduction of a new one. Gibbs connects the feature of naturalism to the criteria, 
already stated, of gradual development and species-wide findings, and adds to the list of 
criteria for a valid stage-sequence the criterion that a stage must be “achieved through 
processes which are spontaneous and essentially unconscious.”391 This important 
criterion is added at this point by Gibbs almost surreptitiously to the five originally 
mentioned, and it is understood by Gibbs to derive directly from (or indeed to be almost 
identical with) the feature of naturalism. 
That is, implicit in Gibbs’ previous argument has been the idea that, in properly 
defined and empirically determinable “stages” of development, development is achieved 
by the interaction itself – with the environment, with other people – and without the 
explicit, conscious awareness of the agent. Even if cognitive processes are involved, it is 
the dynamism of the processes themselves that produces the development regardless of 
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(and most commonly, without) the agent’s awareness of the mechanism involved, and of 
the fact that the new skills, vision and attitude it leads to have been the result of this 
mechanism at work.392 
Gibbs and the existentialist theme 
Gibbs’ positing of this “naturalist theme” as central to Piaget’s developmental 
theory is itself a debatable move, and would merit further examination if it were relevant 
to this dissertation. But even if Gibbs’ account of Piaget’s naturalistic emphasis is 
granted, it can be argued that Kohlberg’s project goes in a different direction from the 
narrow Piagetian criteria that Gibbs presents as normative, and therefore, that it is not 
fundamentally affected by Gibbs’ criticism. Thus, according to Walter Conn, it is part of 
Kohlberg’s approach  
to account for principled moral reasoning as a distinctively adult reality by reinterpreting 
the concept of structural stage in a broad enough way to include the existential experiences 
of personal moral questioning, choice, and responsible action – realities excluded from his 
earlier view which denied the existence of a structurally distinctive adult morality.393 
 
According to Conn, it is then inappropriate to judge Kohlberg’s stage-structure in the 
narrow Piagetian terms that Gibbs uses. 
Gibbs, however, does this; and his conclusion is that Kohlberg’s stages 1 to 4 (pre-
conventional and conventional moral thinking) do conform to the naturalistic criteria, 
while “orientations” 5 and 6 (postconventional moral thinking) do not. Orientations 5 and 
6, says Gibbs, should therefore not be considered within a stage-sequence, but as 
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he is denying is that Kohlberg’s stages 1 to 4 are processes of that kind. 




something else. In place of stages, Gibbs says orientations 5 and 6 must be described in 
terms of an “existential theme,” as opposed to the naturalistic theme which for Gibbs is 
the norm for proper “stages” in a Piagetian stage-sequence.394 
Before considering the meaning of this “existential theme,” it should be noted that 
Gibbs has actually made two challengeable moves. First, in accepting orientations 1 to 4 
as “stages,” and excluding orientations 5 and 6, he needs arguments that show that, in 
pre-conventional and conventional moral thinking, the process by which one moves from 
one stage to the next does conform to the criterion he has explained under “naturalism,” 
i.e. processes that are “spontaneous and essentially unconscious.” This interpretation of 
Kohlberg is in fact challenged by Conn. Second, Gibbs supports his claim that 
Kohlberg’s orientations 5 and 6 depend on conscious awareness (and belong thus to the 
“existential theme”) by interpreting Kohlberg’s account of the move to a 
postconventional level of moral thinking (orientations 5 and 6) as the articulation, on the 
part of the subject, of a quasi-formal metaethics. Gibbs writes: 
Kohlberg contends that “notions of natural rights, social contract, and utility are ‘natural 
structures’ emerging in nonphilosophers.” However, persons who introduce this complex of 
notions into their thinking may no longer be nonphilosophers. If the position accepted that 
anyone who constructs a social-contract theory of ethics is in effect a philosopher, then it is 
more reasonable to understand the principled orientations themselves as “constructive 
systematizations” starting from natural intuitions about morality and human nature.395 
                                                 
394 Gibbs, "Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development," 54-55. 
395 Ibid.: 56-57. Gibbs quotes from Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage 
of Moral Judgment," Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 634. Gibbs takes this theory to interesting extents, 
going as far as to suggest that the different “principled orientations” may be better understood as self-
conscious developments (in the meta-ethically reflective individual) of their earlier, implicit forms in the 
properly called “stages” of moral reasoning. Thus the “social-contract ethics” of orientation 5 seems to be a 
philosophical development of the pragmatic, instrumental, egalitarian intuitions present in stage 2, and the 
“ideal role taking” that characterizes (in Gibbs’ view) the meta-ethics of orientation 6 requires the third-
person perspective-taking that is the particular achievement underlying stage 3. The principled 
(postconventional) stages may be understood, according to Gibbs, “as formalizations which are based on 





But this interpretation of Kohlberg’s stage theory, creative as it may be, conflicts at every 
step with the standard interpretation of Kohlberg’s stages, and Gibbs therefore needs to 
offer specific arguments to support this interpretation. 
For present purposes, however, as Conn also says, the goal is not “to arbitrate the 
differences between Kohlberg and Gibbs.”396 The point is to explore a possible way of 
determining if there are significant differences between “normal” moral development and 
moral conversion. Gibbs’ attempt to formulate these differences in terms of a distinction 
between “spontaneous/natural” and “existential” presents initially a potentially good 
starting point. Unfortunately, his notion of the “existential” is developed in much the 
same vague terms of his presentation of the “naturalistic theme” – in this case, quoting a 
couple of lines from Teilhard de Chardin and Erich Fromm, and mentioning Frankl and 
Maslow.397 The gist of these brief quotations is that the gradually waking consciousness 
of human beings is problematic and a cause of anxiety for them, a theme that adds little to 
the present discussion, except insofar as it draws attention to the human possibility, 
however difficult, of critical questioning. 
The idea of the “existential” (implicitly emphasizing the aspect of critical 
questioning) becomes in Gibbs implicitly an opposite to the “naturalism” of the first four 
stages, which are essentially unconscious in the sense that their dynamism takes place 
                                                                                                                                                 
discourse.” Gibbs even suggests the possibility that less adequate ethical theories may have also this origin; 
that, for example, “the historically recurrent doctrine that might makes right,” itself “post-conventional and 
reflective,” may amount “to a formal, universalist philosophy, drawing its intuitive inspiration from the 
fusion of moral with physical superiority evident at natural stage 1.” (Gibbs, "Kohlberg's Stages of Moral 
Development," 56-57.) 
396 Conn, Christian Conversion, 110. 




below the agent’s awareness. Gibbs, however, does not enrich the notion of “existential” 
by dwelling on it further, or discussing any additional connotations, apparently because 
for him its only role is to denominate the metaethical constructions that characterize 
postconventional moral thinking. 
 
Conn’s notion of the “existential” 
But as indicated, Gibbs’ distinction, though obscurely formulated, can lead in a 
useful direction. Walter Conn, in his analysis of moral conversion, considers Gibbs’ 
distinction between natural and existential orientations, criticizing Gibbs’ interpretation 
of Kohlberg’s stages as focusing too narrowly on the Piagetian notion of a stage-
sequence. Conn partially agrees with Gibbs’ emphasis on an increased reflective/critical 
disposition of the agent in the higher stages of moral reasoning. He rejects, however, 
Gibbs’ narrow interpretation of this reflective/critical disposition as involving the 
development of a metaethics. Furthermore, though Conn concedes great importance to 
the reflective/critical disposition, he does not identify the existentialist theme with it. 
Instead, Conn emphasizes the idea of “self-chosen values” as central to the existential 
theme, and to moral conversion itself. 
Unfortunately, like Gibbs, Conn is also not very specific at the moment of defining 
the term “existential”; Conn never makes the meaning of the term explicit enough, and 
the reader is forced to surmise it by examining those sections of his text in which the term 
is employed. The notion is thus too undeveloped to justify an in-depth comparison with 




was proposed (i.e. as making reference to a change as important, personal, real and 
concrete, involving the contingency of the concrete and therefore involving 
unpredictability or unexpectedness, and connected to the theme of freedom). There is 
some implicit correspondence, but Conn’s discussion focuses mostly on the element of 
freedom and its implications. His emphasis is distinctively placed on the theme of taking 
control of one’s own life and actions, of making decisions for oneself. Thus, he quotes 
repeatedly Lonergan’s phrase from Method in Theology, that “it is up to each of us to 
decide for himself what he is to make of himself.”398 He also cites Lonergan when he 
says that the moral subject is 
at once practical and existential: practical inasmuch as he is concerned with concrete course 
of action; existential inasmuch as control includes self-control, and the possibility of self-
control involves responsibility for what he makes of himself.399 
 
This citation is perhaps the clearest clue to Conn’s meaning of existential. 
With regard to Gibbs’ insistence on the critical/reflective element as constitutive of 
the existential, Conn takes Gibbs’ cue but develops it in a different direction that 
eventually conflicts with Gibbs’ interpretation. Conn also considers the critical/reflective 
element essential to the description of Kohlberg’s postconventional level (stages 5 and 6). 
But while Gibbs, as was just said, understands this critical/reflective element in terms of 
the articulation, on the part of the subject, of a relatively explicit metaethics, Conn rejects 
that interpretation, and develops an alternative way of understanding this critical element, 
                                                 
398 Lonergan, Method, 240.  
399 Conn, Christian Conversion, 113 (emphasis mine). The quotation is from Bernard Lonergan, “Faith and 




in reference to the notion of intellectual or cognitive conversion (which is a process 
different from moral conversion). This approach yields the distinction between critical 
and uncritical conversion. Understanding what Conn means by this distinction, requires 
looking at his notion of cognitive conversion. The key element in Conn’s understanding 
of cognitive conversion is the person’s discovery of him/herself as a knower; that is, as 
someone who can know, understand, judge things through the use of his/her own 
capacities: cognitive conversion is the discovery that one can think for him/herself. This 
discovery (which Conn holds is not as common as one might expect) is ground-breaking, 
life-changing, and, Conn believes, justifiably merits to be called a conversion.400 
With this distinction in mind, Conn speaks of critical moral conversion as that in 
which the person, having now “appropriated” their status as a knower (via cognitive 
conversion), takes the helm of his/her moral life, discovers that “in the moral life one 
must be one’s own tailor, regardless of the brilliance of one’s favorite designer.”401 
This, claims Conn, is something that takes place specifically at the Kohlbergian 
postconventional level of moral thinking, in which the person’s moral life is no longer 
characterized by exclusively adopting the “conventional” answers of one’s 
intersubjective (i.e. direct personal) groups or the larger society. Only stages 5 and 6, 
Conn holds, fit the profile for a critical moral conversion, and that is what is distinctive in  
                                                 
400 Ibid., 121-123., which includes some examples of what Conn means by this cognitive conversion. Conn 
examines in this fashion, for example, the intellectual conversion of Thérèse of Lisieux in Conn and Wolski 
Conn, “Conversion as Self-Transcendence Exemplified in the Life of St. Thérèse of Lisieux.” See also 
Chapter 3, above. 




them, not their failure to conform to Gibbs’ Piagetian criteria.402 
As Kohlberg points out, it is only later, in the context of adult moral experiences of 
irreversible decision and responsibility for others, that an affectively and cognitively more 
developed postconventional subject can discover itself precisely as postconventional. Then 
a truly critical moral conversion is involved, for in this genuinely adult context the 
existential discovery that it is up to each of us to decide for ourselves what we are to make 
of ourselves presupposes at least an implicit cognitive conversion. Critical moral 
conversion involves, in other words, a subject’s tacit but nonetheless real recognition and 
choice of self as criterion of the real and the truly good in her or his own self-transcending 
judgments and choices.403 
 
Thus Conn draws on Gibbs’ understanding of postconventional moral thinking as 
reflective, to offer his own description of this level of moral development in terms of the 
critical/uncritical distinction. 
But Conn also concedes the possibility of an uncritical moral conversion. Moral 
conversion in general is understood by Conn in the Lonerganian terms of a shift in the 
criterion of one’s decisions and choices from the criterion of satisfaction to the criterion 
of value.404 Such a shift, says Conn, is already taking place at stages 3 and 4,405 usually 
beginning during adolescence. At these levels, Conn says, the shift is effected 
uncritically; but it is still possible to identify in this shift an existential element because, 
for Conn, what is central to this element is the “self-chosen” aspect. Says Conn: 
                                                 
402 Given that, in Conn’s valuation, there is something radically incomplete in an uncritical moral 
conversion (that is, Conn holds that moral perfection requires of the person that he/she undergo a cognitive 
conversion and become a critical thinker in his/her moral life), there is in Conn a normative reason for 
aiming at the later stages of moral thinking. (Ibid., 116, 128, 156.) 
403 Ibid., 116. 
404 Lonergan, Method, 240. See Chapter 3, Section 2. Conn still defines moral conversion by referring to 
the Lonerganian central criterion of “a shift from satisfaction to values”; but this he considers the “object-
pole” of moral conversion, which is in turn “rooted at the subject-pole in the existential moment when we 
discover for ourselves ‘that it is up to each of us to decide for himself what he is to make of himself.’” 
(Conn, Christian Conversion, 116.) 




one’s moral reasoning is not what one merely understands conceptually, but what one 
actually uses in making life decisions. A person’s conscience is structured by conventional 
moral reasoning only if that person is committed to conventional values, only if, that is, he 
or she has been morally converted. . . 
 
. . . For even an uncritical moral conversion is a deliberate choice of value as criterion for 
decision, and thus not simply spontaneous and unconscious, as Gibbs insists natural stage 
transition must be, but existential.406 
 
 By contrast, what characterizes stages 5 and 6 as “postconventional” is the fact, says 
Conn, that they are effected from a critical shift in the criterion for one’s decisions and 
choices – and not the lack of an existential element at one level or the other. 
Thus, where Gibbs understood the “existential” in terms of a conscious, reflective/ 
critical disposition, Conn understands the term (still in opposition to a natural/ 
spontaneous dimension of development) in terms of self-choosing or self-making. Thus 
the critical is not identified with the existential, as it is in Gibbs, and thus neither is the 
postconventional level of development (stages 5 and 6) identified in exclusive terms with 
the existential. 
Conn, however, does not make a clear distinction in his terminology between 
Kohlbergian developmental stages and moral conversion. How does Conn articulate the 
distinction between normal moral development and moral conversion? 
 
The coexistence of the natural and the existential in Conn 
The whole point of this discussion of Gibbs and Conn is to enrich the description of 
moral conversion and to clarify and support a distinction between normal moral 




shifts and existential changes (“existential” understood as a critical appropriation/ 
conceptualization of one’s moral views) aims at distinguishing neatly between  
developmental changes (which would, in his view, take place in the first four 
Kohlbergian stages) and “something” else taking place at the postconventional 
“orientations” – something that Gibbs does not name but distinguishes from (strictly 
speaking) staged developmental changes. Conn considers that the distinction holds some 
promise, but rejects Gibbs’ narrow understanding of existential-as-critical/reflective, and 
– more importantly – rejects Gibbs’ sharp categorizing of postconventional orientations 
as existential, and of the previous stages as natural/spontaneous. But how does Conn 
apply the natural/existential distinction to the Kohlbergian stages? And more relevant to 
our topic, how does he distinguish between Kohlbergian moral development and moral 
conversion? 
Rather than allocating each to different stages or orientations, Conn is aiming at a 
model in which the existential dimension (which in Conn corresponds explicitly to 
conversion) and the natural/spontaneous dimension (which corresponds to development) 
actually coexist in one transforming process. 
The point, however, is not to present a choice of either development or conversion, but to 
initiate a move to an integrated interpretation of the personal subject’s becoming which 
includes both development and conversion. In fact, while the developmental psychologists 
work within a model of development as a natural process of spontaneously unfolding 
stages, even their own theories, as we have noted, hint that something more is involved.407 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
406 Ibid., 129. 
407 Ibid., 107. The “something more” at which Conn is hinting is an existential, self-making, conversion 




Conn’s analysis reaches completion when, after having criticized Gibbs’ separation 
of the “natural” stages and the existential postconventional orientations, he asks the 
question of whether the natural and existential dimensions should be considered as 
mutually exclusive (within Gibbs’ account).  Conn answers in the negative: 
We avoid the apparent contradiction here if we understand that the one transforming 
process has two dimensions: one unconscious and spontaneous, one conscious and 
deliberate. As unconscious and spontaneous the process is the natural restructuring of 
moral consciousness called stage transition. As conscious and deliberate it is the 
existential choice of value called moral conversion. 
 
Gibbs is correct in distinguishing the existential dimension of moral development from the 
natural. It is not necessary, however, to relate them in an exclusive, “either/or” fashion: 
conventional stages are natural; postconventional  orientations are existential. These two 
dimensions, rather, are better understood as simultaneously characterizing both 
conventional and postconventional moral consciousness. After all. . .  there is no reason to 
think that the transformation of moral reasoning, which focuses on value, should simply 
occur in an unconscious and spontaneous way. All our experience of moral transformation, 
in fact, suggests conscious struggle as well as unconscious gift. 
 
Indeed, the fact that transition to a new moral stage occurs in the context of the previous 
stage’s functional inadequacy, or breakdown, is strong theoretical reason to expect the 
unconscious restructuring process to occur in conjunction with the conscious choice of 
value in moral conversion.408 
 
Conn’s strategy, then, is to speak of a “transforming process” that is a characteristic of 
every stage-change; this process is partly driven by natural/spontaneous changes that do 
not depend on the agent’s awareness and willing, but are rather the effect of a 
constructive response to environmental and social situations; and is partly driven by the 
agent’s cognitive grasp of the inadequacy of the current moral structures or habits, and a 
willful, existential determination to modify them.409 
                                                 
408 Ibid., 129-130 (emphasis mine). 
409 This strategy is by the way analogous to William James’ assessment, that in every conversion there are 
elements of the “volitional type” (i.e. the existential dimension) and the “self-surrender” type (i.e. 




Unfortunately, Conn develops this intriguing idea in only very brief terms; though 
from the few examples that Conn provides of its application to the Kohlbergian model,410 
it appears that it would have considerable explanatory potential if it were applied to a 
detailed analysis of the dynamism/integration of normal moral development and 
existential changes, both in Kohlberg’s model and in other developmental stage-
structures.411 What will be retained here for present purposes is simply the suggestion that 
certain forms of moral conversion may be required at certain points to advance normal 
moral development to the next stage; and that conversely, certain forms of moral 
conversion may require, as a condition for their possibility, a certain level of moral 
development. This suggestion will be considered in more detail in section 5 of the present 
chapter. 
Conclusion 
Gibbs provides a clear-cut way of distinguishing between developmental and 
existential changes: (1) consider “development” those changes corresponding to the 
preconventional and conventional stages, interpreted as unconscious, “natural/ 
spontaneous” processes, and (2) consider “existential” changes those corresponding to 
the postconventional stages. This way of distinguishing them, if granted, could in turn be 
                                                 
410 Development to conventional moral reasoning, for example, “involves a conscious desire and deliberate 
option for the good as distinct from the good-for-me.” (Conn, Christian Conversion, 156.) As to 
postconventional moral reasoning, says Conn, “more than a development from concrete, particular rules to 
abstract, universal principles, [it] involves a radical revolution in the very locus of moral authority. Initiated 
by a relativizing of conventional morality, the fullness of this revolution is based on the personal subject’s 
critical discovery and appropriation of his or her drive for self-transcendence.” (Ibid.) 
411 Ibid., 156-157. Conn’s framework seems particularly useful to examine some theories of moral 
development that theorize the need for certain “crises” to be engaged and resolved successfully, in order to 




used to distinguish between development and conversion, by simply identifying 
conversion with an existential type of transition. But Conn’s arguments provide very 
strong reasons to reject Gibbs’ approach both to Kohlberg and to the distinction between 
what is “existential” and what is not. Conn’s assessment - that in all stage transitions 
development and conversion are deeply interrelated as different moments of what could 
be called in more general terms a “transforming process” – seems to correspond better 
with both experimental observations and everyday experience. 
Furthermore, expanding on Gibbs’ original distinction between the natural/ 
spontaneous and the existential, Conn presents an interesting, and potentially 
explanatorily rich account of the relation between development and conversion. Conn’s 
accomplishment however is limited by the fact that he does not develop his notion of the 
“existential” in sufficient detail to know what would count as an instance of it in a 
conversion narrative. His project would have clearly benefited from a more explicit 
specification of the notion, as well as by a more elaborate account of how conversion 
relates to Kohlbergian stage-transitions. More importantly, in terms of establishing a 
conceptual distinction between conversion and normal moral development, Conn’s 
approach is not satisfactory either. This is partly for the same reason, i.e. the criterion of 
his distinction - “development” corresponding to the natural/spontaneous and 
“conversion” corresponding to the existential - is formulated in vague, undifferentiated 





Further, even if the criterion were granted to be clear enough, Conn’s contention 
that development recurrently requires an existential stance in order to proceed further 
would still have to be considered speculative at this point, until more research were done 
concerning the presence of existential factors in critical instances within the Kohlbergian 
stage-sequence (or other moral developmental sequences). In any case, Conn’s criterion 
is too vague; it does not sufficiently encompass the themes mentioned earlier (in Chapter 
5) that are usually referred to with the term “existential.” Thus it cannot, in spite of 
appearances, provide conceptual support for a careful discussion of the moral 
development/moral conversion distinction, nor for the development of empirical 
observations required to establish this distinction. 
In order to resolve these difficulties and proceed further in our investigation, a more 
developed explanation of the meaning of “existential” needs to be presented. In addition, 
it is necessary to establish – if not through formal empirical research, at least by looking 
at representative narratives – that “existential,” defined in such terms, properly 
characterizes conversion as it is generally understood. This step will retroactively ground 
the general definition of “conversion” that was presented at the beginning of Chapter 5, 
and upon which the three-fold description of moral conversion was built. 
Before this is done, however, in order to introduce some clarity into the somewhat 
murky business of distinguishing development from conversion, a new distinction will be 





4. “Incremental” and “sharp-turn” conversion: A distinction by analogy 
It becomes necessary at this point to introduce this new distinction both to clarify 
the Conn-Gibbs discussion, and also because it will be necessary to keep this distinction 
in mind in order to understand properly what will be explained in section 5 – that 
conversion can be better understood if considered through existentialist heuristic 
structures. 
The most important thing to keep in mind about the distinction to be presented here 
is that the terms of the distinction are meant to be related by analogy. This type of 
distinction was heavily used in medieval philosophy to address not only logical but also 
metaphysical and theological questions. The distinction itself goes back to Aristotle. 
Aristotle distinguished, in his treatises on logic, between “univocal” and “equivocal” 
terms – the latter being terms meaning altogether different things, as when “nail” is 
predicated of a sharpened piece of metal and of the hard layer covering a human finger, 
and the former being terms that retain the same meaning in every case, as when “car” is 
predicated of a Saturn or an Escort. The notion of “analogy” is introduced to solve the 
difficulty posited by terms that mean partially, but not exactly the same, as when 
“healthy” is predicated of a living being, a medicine, or the weather. “Healthy” has its 
full, proper meaning when predicated of a living being, and not of the weather or an 
aspirin; the two latter meanings, however, are not unrelated to the former, and in fact 
derive their meaning from the former. This type of analogy (that medieval philosophers 
called “analogy by attribution”) established a “hierarchy” in terms of meaning: one use of 




uses would be derivative, posterior “secondary” analogues. This and related distinctions 
were extensively used to resolve such metaphysical difficulties as how being is 
predicated, or how good can be predicated of both God and finite beings.412 
This somewhat lengthy introduction is needed to avoid misunderstanding the terms 
of the distinction between “incremental” and “sharp-turn” conversions that is about to be 
presented. The distinction differentiates between changes that occur incrementally, in a 
definite direction, and that become significant when one compares the beginning and 
end-points of the process, and changes that occur in such a way that they produce a 
certain amount of surprise, defying or thwarting one’s expectation or predictions or sense 
of regularity: changes that make us wonder whether we really knew the person 
beforehand. 
It must be clarified from the outset that this distinction is not equivalent to that of 
“gradual” and “sudden” conversion, which, though found in many authors – it was used, 
for example, by William James413 - is not of much help for the present purposes. The 
problem with the gradual/sudden distinction is twofold. First, the fact that a conversion 
process took many years or a few minutes is typically not of tremendous philosophical 
importance. Second – as James himself argues – a current towards change may have been 
subconsciously at play for a long while, but may become evident only suddenly, and so 
be ignored but for the last minutes in the narrative; if this is the case, then for the 
                                                 
412 The distinction is originally found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1003a33-35): “There are many senses in 
which being can be said, but they are related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not 
equivocal. Everything which is healthy is related to health. . . and everything which is medical to 
medicine...” To what extent the medieval treatment was grounded in Aristotle’s distinction, or went into 
further original ways, is of course a matter of historical analysis. 




distinction to be useful much more information would be required about subconscious 
processes at work than what is usually provided in the narratives. 
What characterizes a sharp-turn conversion is the significant change of direction 
manifested in the change, a new direction that defies, so to speak, a person’s moral 
inertia. By contrast, what characterizes incremental conversion can be illustrated with the 
metaphor of pushing into a higher and then an even higher orbit, while maintaining 
essentially the same direction. 
The story of Gandhi (case #8)414 can be used to illustrate an incremental type of 
conversion. Gandhi’s autobiography describes a persistent struggle for moral perfection. 
This struggle is fraught with internal and external obstacles, with youthful naivete and 
even some degree of self-deception; but the direction, the attitude,415 Gandhi’s moral 
orientation, remains consistently pointing towards a higher degree of moral perfection.416 
Thus reading Gandhi’s biography one is perhaps surprised by the degree of moral 
perfection he eventually reached, but not, as in other stories, by the impression that 
Gandhi made a very sharp turn at any point in his life. His experience of being forced out 
of the train is a waking call for him, but it calls him to strive higher in the same direction 
he was already striving towards – he had, for example, already gotten himself in some 
trouble for refusing to bow under discriminating practices.417 
                                                 
414 Gandhi’s story has been discussed already in Chapter 5, Section 2.B. 
415 It may be useful to recall here the spatial meaning of the world “attitude,” which adds to the illustration; 
attitude means the position of a body, particularly – in aviation terms – the orientation of the craft’s nose 
towards a lower or a higher plane. In this sense, “attitude” and “orientation” are close to being synonyms. 
416 See for example his description of his days as a student in London, in which he details the “strict watch” 
he kept over his way of living. (Gandhi, An Autobiography, 48.) 
417 See for example the incident caused by his resistance to the rule of removing his turban in court upon 




By contrast, the story of Jackie Katounas (case #24)418 illustrates a very surprising 
turn. Katounas, it may be recalled, had gone into a maximum security unit for the first 
time at 12, and went into prison at 16, spending eventually about 12 years in prison over 
a 25 year period (the article does not go over the details, but suggests that these 
convictions were due to stealing goods). She was also a heroin addict. According to her 
story, she had never given a thought to the victims until she received some stolen goods 
from a person that she knew; and somehow, this event triggered her conversion: she 
stopped “offending” for good, and became a facilitator in the New Zealand Restorative 
Justice program – dramatically turning her life around. If one looks a little below the 
surface and asks the question, “but was Jackie really a ‘bad’ person?” her case seems to 
be rather that of a person with a good heart (it did not take her too much to put herself in 
someone else’s shoes and feel remorse) but set in a self-destructive path. Thus the 
turnaround may not be a complete one – she might have had already a generous 
orientation that she was unable to actualize; and it is possible to speculate that maybe an 
undercurrent of remorse and desire to change might have already been at play. Even if we 
allowed credit to these speculations, though, the case qualifies as an instance of sharp-
turn conversion because the moral direction she gives to her life goes outwardly (and 
probably inwardly too) in a different, opposed direction to the previous: a direction of 
generosity rather than one of selfishness, a fulfilling and constructive project rather than a 
self-destructive one. 
In offering this distinction, however, I do not intend to convey the idea that actual  
                                                 




instances of conversion can be simply put into two categories, clearly delineated and 
mutually exclusive. The distinction (again, by analogy) establishes two extremes in what 
may be conceived as a spectrum of possibilities; narratives of conversion may contain 
elements in need of an incremental push, and elements that must be suppressed or 
countered by adopting a different moral orientation. 
For the purposes of producing a clearer characterization of moral conversion, and of 
distinguishing between normal development and conversion, “sharp-turn” conversions 
will be considered in what follows as the central referent for conversion, and our focus 
will be set on narratives that illustrate that kind of conversion. Incremental conversion, 
like development, moves in a definite direction, building on a previous base to achieve 
successive stages of increasing perfection; for this reason, distinguishing normal moral 
development from incremental conversion becomes at times very difficult. Sharp-turn 
conversion, instead, seems to deviate more clearly from the predictability and 
expectations pertaining to normal moral development; thus, a focus on sharp-turn 
conversion as the primary analog allows for an exposition of the characteristics of 
conversion in which these are presented in a sharper contrast with those of development. 
Once these characteristics are defined, it becomes less of a problem to identify how some 
of these characteristics – blurred as they may be in the actual stories – may help 
distinguish even incremental conversion from normal moral development. 
This focus on sharp-turn conversion as the primary analog does not mean that 
“incremental” conversions are per se less “worthy” of being called conversions. The 




sharpen our descriptive focus, so as to identify central characteristics of moral conversion 
in sharper detail than if we looked at narratives of incremental conversion. That is, a 
conceptual filtering is applied, but this is done for methodological reasons, and not for 
preconceived preferences for one description over the other, or to prematurely close the 
question being investigated. Furthermore, even if certain characteristics that will be 
considered here can be distinguished more clearly in sharp-turn conversions, this should 
be not taken to mean a priori that such characteristics are necessarily more significant in 
sharp-turn than in incremental conversions: that is something to be considered once these 
characteristics have been identified. So if it were determined, for example, that sharp-turn 
conversions strongly suggest the presence of free will in the agent (as will be discussed in 
the following chapter), this should not be taken to mean a priori that sharp-turn 
conversions demonstrate a “freer” will than cases of incremental conversion. 
This said, the notion of “sharp-turn” conversion as the primary analog of conversion 
will now take a front seat in our considerations. As will be seen, this methodological 
move is of special importance when characterizing conversion as existential. 
 
5. Moral conversion as “existential” 
What is “existentialism”? 
Though the problem of “existence” has a very long philosophical history, the term 
“existential” made its appearance in twentieth-century philosophy, with a more narrow – 
and one may say, dramatic - focus. Partly a reaction against a Hegelian type of 




general, metaphysical question of existence, but on the dramatic, concrete situation of the 
human being as existent. 
The term “existentialism” does not denominate a philosophical school or tradition, 
but rather a cultural movement with expressions in philosophy, literature and art. Authors 
considered under this denomination (such as Heidegger or Camus) have sometimes 
fiercely opposed being characterized as such. The concept, however, is helpful in that it 
does identify a cluster of distinctive philosophical themes, “a relatively distinct current of 
twentieth- and now twenty-first century philosophical inquiry.”419 Partly because the term 
was never considered to be the possession of a single school, partly because existentialist 
authors reflected on a number of issues that incorporated pressing concerns of their 
culture and times, and partly because of the extended reach of literary works through 
which these reflections were often expressed, the term acquired widespread use in 
Western culture, and has never entirely crystallized into a technical notion. The downside 
of this is that, while a certain ambiguity follows the use of the term, those who use it at 
times overlook this ambiguity, assuming perhaps that the meaning of the term is 
distinctly known by their audience. Gibbs and Conn, in the texts discussed above, 
exemplify this tendency. But on the other hand, perhaps an important reason for the 
popularity of the term is precisely that it collects a number of important themes in a 
dynamic, open-ended way that other philosophical terms dealing with the same issues do 
not. This is in fact the reason why the term has been chosen to characterize conversion in 




designates, is also of a very open-ended, cross-currents nature; and thus no other term we 
have at our disposition seems to convey its problematic as adequately as the term 
“existential” does. 
But in order for it to be of any use, the meaning of the term in the context of this 
work must be specified to some extent. The term resists a proper definition (e.g. by genus 
and difference); but it is possible to clarify its meaning by considering the themes that the 
term brings together, and the aspects regularly emphasized by existentialist thinkers. Not 
all of these themes, it must be noted, apply with equal significance to a characterization 
of conversion: specifying the term thus involves a certain “tailoring” of the concept to the 
needs of this work. The intention is to arrive at an adjectival notion that appropriately 
characterizes conversion.420 
A preliminary discussion was offered in Chapter 5, Section 1.A. There it was 
proposed that the term, as it is commonly used, draws our attention, first, to the 
importance of the change, (as in the phrase “he made an existential decision”); i.e. it is a 
change that affects a person’s life in very significant and fundamental ways. Second, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
419 Steven Crowell, "Existentialism," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2006 Edition), 
ed. Edward N. Zalta (URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/existentialism/>). 
420 This approach may be accused of yielding somewhat of a circular definition: “conversion” is 
characterized as “an existential change,” while the meaning of “existential” is specified by mentioning 
those characteristics that the author attributes to conversion. Regarding this difficulty, three things can be 
said. First, that it is part of any theoretical development that wants to rise above the notions of common 
sense to circumscribe at some point a specific context of meaning with its related terminology: little solid 
advances can be made otherwise, if one is subject to the unexpected variations of meaning of everyday 
language. (See Lonergan, Method, 81-85.) This is what is being done here with the notions of “moral 
conversion” and “existentialism.” Second, that what is intended is not to arbitrarily designate the meaning 
of “conversion,” but to articulate the notion in such a way that it includes what has been gathered regarding 
the historical development of the term, its everyday use, and its use in the scholarly literature. These 
sources are constant referents. Third, that in order to get beyond a mere conceptual distinction (and show 
that the notion of conversion as shaped here corresponds to something actual) it will be necessary to refer 




term points to something insofar as it is real and concrete, as opposed to something being 
“merely academic,” detachedly theoretical, etc. (as in an event “having existential 
consequences”). Third, the term “existential” has the connotation of something being 
personal; that is, the term seems to apply appropriately to persons and to persons only. 
Fourth, that existential involves the contingency of the concrete and of a consequent 
degree of unpredictability or unexpectedness – the fact that things happen that are not 
planned, plans fail, accidents occur, and this cannot be prevented by any amount of 
rational planning. And fifth, the term “existential” has the connotation of an emphasis on 
freedom, but also on freedom as a harsh blessing. While this was sufficient to clarify the 
meaning of “existential” for preliminary purposes, this presentation excluded some more 
technical connotations of the term that are very useful for a deeper philosophical 
understanding of moral conversion. It is necessary, for this reason, to go now into a more 
technical account of the notion. 
Steven Crowell, in his article on “Existentialism” for the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, provides a useful summary of the themes that characterize existentialism as a 
philosophical movement. Regarding its epistemological tenets, Crowell identifies as a 
characteristic of existentialism 
its claim that thinking about human existence requires new categories not found in the 
conceptual repertoire of ancient or modern thought. . . neither scientific nor moral inquiry 
can fully capture what it is that makes me myself, my "ownmost" self.421 
 
This insufficiency, it is claimed, does not entail a denial of the validity of scientific 
categories, but on the need (that Crowell traces to Heidegger) that the question of human 
                                                 




existence be raised concretely, not as some academic exercise, but as “a burning concern 
arising from life itself, the question of what it means for me to be.”422 
According to Heidegger, the categories bequeathed by the philosophical tradition for 
understanding a being who can question his or her being are insufficient: traditional 
concepts of a substance decked out with reason, or of a subject blessed with self-
consciousness, misconstrue our fundamental character as “being-in-the-world.”423 
 
This epistemological theme is developed further in the existentialist notion of 
facticity. Facticity includes all those properties that third-person investigation can 
establish about a person – about me; but although the validity of this investigation is not 
denied, what is claimed is that such an investigation reveals little about my existence, 
“the kind of being I am.” In contrast to this facticity, existentialist philosophers present a 
notion often articulated as “transcendence,” which refers in this context to “the stance I 
take toward my facticity. . . that attitude toward myself characteristic of my practical 
engagement in the world, the agent's perspective.”424 This aspect of my “being-in-the-
world” cannot be accessed by scientific inquiry, nor by the traditional categories of 
philosophy. 
Two further elements of existentialist reflection should be mentioned regarding this 
stance or attitude. The first is that this stance or attitude (towards one’s facticity, towards 
one’s concrete being in the world, etc.) has been interpreted by some existentialist 
thinkers as a “fundamental project” or basic choice of oneself, which in turn gives 
distinctive shape to an individual’s life. This choice of self is not always transparent to 







the person; but it is considered nevertheless fundamental in shaping a person’s identity or 
being-in-the-world.425 
The second point regarding this stance or attitude towards one’s concrete being in 
the world is that there is the possibility of not taking any such stance at all – and more 
than a mere possibility, this seems to many existentialist thinkers to be the common case. 
We have seen this possibility come out, for example, in Lonergan’s description of the 
“drifters,” those people the problem with whom is that “they do nothing very 
deliberately.”426 The opposite of this possibility is formulated by many existentialist 
thinkers as “authenticity,” a normative ideal that could be fairly characterized as the 
central moral theme in existentialism. 
Doing the right thing from a fixed and stable character — which virtue ethics considers a 
condition of the good — is not beyond the reach of existential evaluation: such character 
may simply be a product of my tendency to “do what one does,” including feeling “the 
right way” about things and betaking myself in appropriate ways as one is expected to do. 
But such character might also be a reflection of my choice of myself, a commitment I make 
to be a person of this sort. In both cases I have succeeded in being good; only in the latter 
case, however, have I succeeded in being myself. . . In contrast, the inauthentic life would 
be one without such integrity, one in which I allow my life-story to be dictated by the 
world. Be that as it may, it is clear that one can commit oneself to a life of chameleon-like 
variety, as does Don Juan in Kierkegaard's version of the legend.427 
 
The idea of “engaged agency,” the idea of the “integrity of a life-narrative,” the idea 
of “being autonomous,” of “choosing resolutely” and committing oneself to a certain 
course of action are variations on this theme of authenticity.428 The theme, also frequently 
                                                 
425 The notion of choice is of course philosophically problematic; it will be discussed in detail in the next 
Chapter. In the present context, however, the language of “choice” is used with the specific purpose of 
laying out this important existentialist idea, the idea in other words “that in the first-person perspective of 
agency I cannot conceive myself as determined by anything that is available to me only in third-person 
terms.” Ibid. 
426 Conn, Christian Conversion, 115. 





found in existentialism, of a tension or opposition between the individual and the public, 
the individual and the crowd is also related to the idea of authenticity:  
“The crowd is untruth.” The crowd is, roughly, public opinion in the widest sense — the 
ideas that a given age takes for granted; the ordinary and accepted way of doing things; the 
complacent attitude that comes from the conformity necessary for social life — and what 
condemns it to “untruth” in Kierkegaard's eyes is the way that it insinuates itself into an 
individual's own sense of who she is, relieving her of the burden of being herself: if 
everyone is a Christian there is no need for me to "become" one.429 
 
It was said above that the choice that grounds a “fundamental project” for the self is 
not always transparent. It should be added that there is also the possibility of self-
deception. For this reason, the move towards the existentialist ideal of authenticity must 
commonly be prefaced by first becoming clear about one's own being as an inquirer.430 
(The parallel between this idea and the Lonerganian idea that moral conversion requires 
intellectual or cognitive conversion can easily be seen, and indeed, intellectual 
conversion is one of the key elements in Lonergan’s own notion of “authenticity.”) 
This notion of authenticity is of particular relevance in the context – another 
pervading theme of existentialism – of a perceived “collapse of objective values,” which 
renders the person bereft of an objective moral anchor. In this context, from an 
existentialist perspective, the only options left to the person are a) an uncritical 
acquiescence in values that would be found devoid of ground under careful examination; 
b) some sort of morally meaningless existence or c) the existentialist self-affirmation that 
characterizes the authentic person as the only source of his/her meaning, and so a wholly 
autonomous commitment to value. 






In this context, the question about the nature of freedom naturally arises. The 
existentialist approach to the question about freedom is not framed in terms of the 
classical arguments against determinism; rather, the focus is on such experiences, key for 
existentialist authors, of anxiety and alienation, which, it is claimed, are not merely 
psychological events, but reveal fundamental aspects of the human self. The experience 
of “alienation” (expressed in the Heideggerian article unheimlich, translated sometimes 
as the “uncanny”) points to “the strangeness of a world in which I precisely do not feel 
‘at home.’”431 The experience of “anxiety” (Angst, angoisse)  
pulls me altogether out of the circuit of those projects thanks to which things are there for 
me in meaningful ways; I can no longer “gear into” the world. . . .In thus robbing me of the 
possibility of practical self-identification, anxiety teaches me that I do not coincide with 
anything that I factically am. . . 
 
So long as I am gearing into the world practically, in a seamless and absorbed way, things 
present themselves as meaningfully co-ordinated with the projects in which I am engaged... 
Anxiety undermines the taken-for-granted sense of things. They become absurd. Things do 
not disappear, but all that remains of them is the blank recognition that they are. . . While 
such an experience is no more genuine than my practical, engaged experience of a world of 
meaning, it is no less genuine either.432 
 
In this manner, the experiences of alienation and anxiety reveal to the person that a 
person is not to be identified with his/her “facticity,” that one is not, in that sense, the 
same as the objects in the world. Such experiences therefore have the potential to become 
wake-up calls, directing or restoring the person towards the path of authenticity. But 
although these experiences are, in a sense, fundamental to the human condition, this does 
not mean that everyone will necessarily have them or respond to them. A well-adjusted 
bourgeois, for example, might live his entire life without experiencing any radical sense 






of alienation or anxiety – and as such, without becoming aware of a need or a call 
towards authenticity.433 
What has been said should suffice for a general view of the themes fundamental to 
existentialism, and the connection between these themes. It remains now to indicate why 
it is claimed that the phenomenon of conversion may be better described – and be better 
understood - by making reference to these existentialist themes. 
Conversion as “existential”   
The present claim is that the phenomenon of conversion (in general, and of moral 
conversion in particular) can be better described and better understood by making 
reference to some of the themes explored by existentialist thinkers. This claim may be 
expanded a bit by adding that even the “undifferentiated” understanding of the term 
“existential” – as it occurs in non-academic speech – can also contribute to a better 
description of the phenomenon of conversion. 
To be clear, the claim being made here is not that moral conversion is a theme 
pertaining exclusively to existentialism, but that the historical emergence of the 
existentialist movement has provided us with heuristic structures that are extremely 
useful to describe and understand what goes on in moral conversion. As will be seen, 
some of the meanings that are thus gathered illuminate most clearly the primary analog, 
sharp-turn conversions, while some apply almost indistinctly across all analogues. 
                                                 
433 See for example Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, tr. Lloyd Alexander (New York: MJF Books, 1964), 83-85; 




1. “Existential” as “important” 
It was advanced in Chapter 5 that the term “existential” can draw attention, first, to 
the importance of a change, as when one talks of “an existential decision,” or of an event 
having “existential consequences.” One of the connotations of expressions such as these 
is that a particular change, decision or event affects a person’s life fundamentally. This is 
not a connotation found immediately in the philosophical use of the term “existential,” 
but it is present in the everyday use of the word. This connotation of “importance” is also 
characteristic of the notion of conversion across all of its analogues. The concept does not 
refer simply to any sort of change in a person’s views or habits, unless the people using it 
are being humorous, ironic, figurative, etc.; and even in these uses the humor or the irony 
is based on the understanding that, normally, the term “conversion” is reserved for very 
important, potentially or actually life-changing events. 
What is considered a life-changing event or circumstance is of course a relative 
matter. Some changes may affect some people “existentially” in this sense, but not other 
people in the same way. A change, for example, from a life focused on consumerist 
acquisition to one focused on helping others might be an “existential” change for most 
people. A change in a person’s judgment concerning the moral status of abortion may 
only affect “academically” the students who are considering the issue in a college course, 
but may affect existentially a doctor or a nurse working in an abortionist clinic, or a pro-
life or pro-choice activist. For the latter persons, the issue is at the center of their moral 
lives, or at least at the center of an important aspect of their moral lives. A change of this 




conversion. Thus  the term “existential” also implies that something has consequences 
that are real and concrete, as opposed to “merely academic,” detachedly theoretical, etc. 
2. Facticity 
Returning to the academic meaning of the term, an important point to call attention 
to is the existentialist observation regarding the limits of regular scientific categories 
when it comes to understanding the individual person – what has been considered under 
the notion of “facticity.” What arises from applying this notion to the prime analog of 
moral conversion is that a study of conversion, unlike a study of normal moral 
development, involves elements that seem to be beyond the reach of quantifying 
empirical method. 
This point has been already suggested. While considering the methodological 
reasons for the use of narrative evidence in Chapter 5, it was proposed that quantitative 
empirical research on conversion, even if it happened to exist, would be of little use for 
this study, because what is intended here is to get insight into the “internal” processes – 
cognitive and emotional – that occur in conversion. The data from quantitative empirical 
research, it was argued, would yield very little information, if any, about these aspects; 
thus the preference for detailed narratives, frequently autobiographical, that elaborate on 
the internal struggles, the streams of internal argumentation, the conflicting emotions, and 
other aspects that might be regarded as operative in the process of conversion. The point 
for looking at the existentialist notion of “facticity” is that it points to the reasons why 
quantitative empirical research is of so little use when describing conversion. If the 




about a human person qua individual, much therefore that is beyond the reach of 
empirical, quantifying, “3rd person” research, and important elements of conversion 
belong to this category.434 
The reason – expressed informally because a careful epistemological argument for 
this point is beyond the scope of this dissertation – is that an understanding of the 
intelligibility in the phenomenon of conversion involves understanding “existential” 
elements such as a (deeply) personal history of facts, attitudes, emotions and behavioral 
habits learned, imitated, admired, absorbed, resisted, questioned, examined, colored by a 
certain attitude, sometimes within, sometimes outside the developmental norm, that 
devolve (or not) into some sort of crisis, and get resolved into peaceful acceptance, a 
fearful step forward, an unstable truce, a hopeful resolution, or any of an enormous 
number of potential personal outcomes. Understanding the aspects of moral development 
that are natural/spontaneous means understanding regularities and, if possible, the general 
reasons behind such regularities; thus the quantifying empirical method is relevant to its 
study even if many of the elements mentioned above are also at play in relation to 
natural/spontaneous developmental processes. But understanding conversion means 
focusing on a personal history in terms of aspects such as the intellectual and moral, the 
affective, biological, relational, and dramatic; and even beyond a personal history, it 
means understanding a present attitude towards such elements, and even the empirically 
                                                 
434 There have been, of course, quantitative attempts to study conversion – Starbuck’s study of religious 
conversion, discussed in Chapter 2, is a classic example. But what Starbuck describes in his study of 
religious conversion fits better under the rubric of “natural/spontaneous development”: he describes in his 
study a recurrent phenomenon, and establishes its statistical frequency with respect to a clearly 
circumscribed age group. In other words, not every phenomenon that is called “conversion” in the literature 




intractable element of choice. 435 Whatever natural/spontaneous, quantifiable elements are 
involved in moral conversion, the most important aspects of the process of conversion are 
not amenable to that kind of inquiry. 
Another way in which conversion seems to be beyond the reach of quantifying 
empirical method concerns (by contrast) the way in which natural/spontaneous moral 
development is understood to be stable enough to admit of dependable predictions. The 
reason is that what we mean by normal moral development are recurrent patterns that 
can be found in a group, a population, or even across civilizations, patterns that can be 
identified through empirical quantitative studies; the presence of these patterns grounds 
the scientists’ expectations of being able to formulate predictions regarding moral 
development.436 Beyond scientific predictions, of course, it is also possible for people 
with enough experience of human behavior and conduct to identify similar patterns 
(albeit in methodologically undifferentiated ways). If, for example, the selfish behavior of 
a small child becomes a cause of concern for her young parents, an older adult may 
comfort them by telling them that “you were the same when you were that age,” by 
which it is implied that the child is repeating normal patterns and, just as her parents did,  
                                                 
435 A further, more synthetic theory may be ventured here, though this is not the place to defend it, and is 
presented merely as “food for thought” at this point: the phenomenon of conversion is beyond the reach of 
a quantifying empirical analysis because its intelligibility is of a narrative kind, and as such beyond the 
grasp of a method that essentially attempts to divide its object into discrete, atomic units. 
436 Of course, researchers on the psychology of moral development work under the assumption that such 
patterns of normal moral development exist (at least within the context of extended human communities, if 
not universally), and that they can be empirically/quantitatively mapped to some extent; and (unless they 
are absolute empiricists) that some explanation can be found, some theory developed, that explains the 
regularity of a pattern. One needs to grant these assumptions in order to concede the significance in 
perceivable patterns of development; but perhaps this is not too much to ask for, given that the opposite 




will eventually outgrow those imperfections – or, if preferred, reach a more perfect stage 
of development in that aspect. In fact, this kind of nontechnical prediction, like 
methodologically sophisticated predictions, may be issued even without knowing the 
child in particular, because the child is repeating general, well-known patterns. It is when 
a person deviates from such perceived patterns that he/she may become a cause of 
concern even for those familiar with the normal patterns of moral development, because 
in those cases it there is great uncertainty regarding what will become of that person. For 
this reason, moral conversion often generates some degree of uneasiness among those 
close to the convert, even if some of the immediate fruits of the conversion appear to be 
good: the person is operating in ways very different from the known patterns. 
Conn’s interpretation of Kohlberg (though itself highly debatable) illustrates some 
of the consequences of the irruption of the existential (here as the “concrete 
unpredictable”) in the realm of facticity. Conn, it was said, considers the process of moral 
development as a process in which both natural/spontaneous and existentially-driven 
changes take place; but if the process as a whole can be mapped, as Kohlberg does, into a 
quantifiable pattern, Conn seems to imply that the existential parts of the process account 
for the significant irregularities of the process as a whole. Kohlberg’s stage-sequence, it 
may be noted, not only establishes very wide age-ranges for reaching the higher stages of 
moral reasoning, but also establishes that some individuals do not reach some of these at 
all. Conn explains this fact by positing the need of existential moves, that by definition 
are not natural/spontaneous, and as such are not guaranteed by any set of “developmental 




explanation for the low rate of occurrences of the postconventional stages of moral 
reasoning: the higher the stage, the more conversions the person would have had to go 
through, which causes a cumulatively diminishing probability for each of the further 
stages until they become just too improbable to appear in any significant number, 
especially when the cultural conditions required for the higher stages are absent. Of 
course, Conn’s description of moral development, if true, would posit a significant 
difficulty for empirical studies of moral development such as Kohlberg’s: it would imply 
that the process of natural/spontaneous moral development is interspersed with 
“existential black holes” that resist here and there the analysis from facticity; “pockets” 
of a kind of intelligibility that quantitative empirical analysis cannot quite grasp. 
Whether Conn is on target or not, his model also helps to understand an important 
difference between sharp-turn and incremental conversion. Incremental conversion is 
compatible with the natural/spontaneous process of moral development: its presence does 
not frustrate this process, or contradict its orientation (and, if Conn is right, it may even 
be required in order for the natural/spontaneous process to continue its dynamism into a 
higher stage). Sharp-turn conversions, instead, seem to be for the most part unrelated to 
the dynamism of natural/spontaneous development, and they may at times frustrate it or 
contradict its orientation.437 
                                                 
437 More precisely: Natural/spontaneous moral development is predictable regarding (1) its direction; (2) its 
rhythm or schedule; and (3) its success or results. Kohlbergian research, for example, has established to a 
significant degree that development is unidirectional (Gibbs, "Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development," 
48-49; Rest, "Background: Theory and Research," 16-18.), and has established a certain rhythm or schedule 
for the achievement of certain stages. In third place, natural/spontaneous moral development is essentially 
predictable in terms of results or success. There is, for example, a basic expectation that a society or a 
community in which the relevant moral and pedagogical structures are solidly established, and does not 




This break in regularity and predictability of natural/spontaneous recurring patterns, 
involved by the presence of conversion, raises important questions regarding the 
adequacy of pan-deterministic interpretations of natural regularities; questions directly 
connected with the discussion about the possibility of freedom. These questions will be 
considered in detail in Chapter 9. 
3. Transcendence 
The flipside of the existentialist observation on facticity is the notion of 
“transcendence” – which, because facticity has been discussed in some detail, will need 
to be considered only briefly. The existentialist use of the term “transcendence” adopts 
almost entirely different meanings from other philosophers’ use of it. In existentialist 
thought, the notion simply stands for that attitude or stance a person takes towards the 
person’s factual circumstances (the person’s facticity), and which as such, it is claimed, 
makes the person’s existence and conditions transcend that facticity.438 A third-person 
investigation may be able to describe my factual circumstances – age, physical shape, 
social class, financial facts, etc. – but my attitude, the way in which I live or choose to 
live those circumstances is beyond the reach of such an investigation, and makes me  
                                                                                                                                                 
standards, in a number sufficient to maintain the community in decent shape and pass on the moral 
standards to the next generation. The expectation is not that a sufficient number of people will experience 
some quasi-epiphanic experience of an awakening to moral values, but that in the regular course of events 
such people are produced. 
The first point, direction, is the main point of distinction between incremental and sharp-turn conversion. 
Sharp-turn conversion is by definition unpredictable with regards to its direction, while incremental 
conversion by definition continues in a certain direction. If some forms of incremental conversion can be 
demonstrated to form part of an overarching developmental process, involving both natural/spontaneous 
and existential moments, then such forms of incremental conversion would also be to a certain degree 
predictable in terms of a schedule. In terms of success or results, however, it is probably adequate to regard 
both types as similarly rejecting a predictability based on recurring patterns. 




more than that facticity. 
Reflecting on this existentialist theme throws additional light on how conversion is 
usefully described as “existential.” As has just been discussed, conversion does not 
properly fit in analyses that focus on what the existentialists would call facticity. This 
entails then that the gravitational center of the notion of conversion is on the side of 
“transcendence.” This means that conversion can be understood as one of those 
“attitudinal” elements that make a person’s life be more than their mere facticity. Recall 
the examples of the second class of conversion, conversion regarding attitude, to see how 
this is the case. As indicated in Chapter 5, there is no report of the external circumstances 
of Antonio Pickett’s life (case # 20) varying significantly during his stay in prison; but at 
a certain point a change in his attitude took place, which made his life completely 
different, not only in terms of goals and objectives, but in his overall perception of the 
goodness of life. As Pickett’s partner in crime and in conversion Evans Robinson puts it, 
“the air smells different. The sun seems brighter. Things aren't so bleak all the time.”439  
Moral conversion then can be characterized as “existential” in that it involves a 
person in assuming an attitude or stance, which informs their facticity and transcends it. 
This is sufficiently clear in conversions regarding attitude, and also in conversions 
regarding behavioral coherence (which, as was noted, involves itself an attitudinal change 
as well). It is less clear perhaps in conversions regarding content; but here it may be 
argued that, even if there is no significant change in a person’s attitude, the person’s 
moral attitude or moral stance (even if stable while other things are changing) still plays a 
                                                 




significant part in moral conversion. When one is challenged with facing the possibility 
that one’s moral convictions were mistaken in some way or other – and therefore need 
restructuring - part of the challenge consists in maintaining (or restructuring) one’s moral 
attitude in regard to the newly adopted content. 
4. Authenticity 
The theme of authenticity is closely connected to that of transcendence. 
Existentialist thinkers note the difference between “owning” one’s life project, values,  
moral convictions, etc. as opposed to “drifting” – living a life perhaps highly moral, but 
lacking reflection and a positive embracing of such a project or set of values. This latter 
“drifting” attitude has been critically characterized in a variety of ways – as living in “bad 
faith,” being one with the unreflective crowd, living “bourgeois values,” taking morality 
for granted, being a “serious man,” living only a life of facticity, and so forth. But the 
central element and common theme in these characterizations is the combination of lack 
of reflection and lack of awareness about one’s lack of reflection. By contrast, what is 
here being called “authenticity” involves a critical positioning of oneself regarding such 
values – a self-conscious attempt to reflect critically, to examine the grounding of values, 
or to acknowledge their lack of grounding if such is what one’s critical reflection reveals,  
and then the taking of a position regarding them. It is a move not dissimilar to what 
Lonergan would call “critical self-appropriation.”440 
                                                 
440 Strictly speaking, the taking of a position might be labeled an “act of transcendence”; but note that one 
can take a position, adopt a stance, without critical reflection to ground it; but critical reflection, 
authenticity, without taking a position remains incomplete, “bad faith,” inauthentic. As has been 
mentioned, the key themes of existentialism are deeply interlocked in meaning and scope of application, 




To characterize moral conversion as existential in this particular sense a connection 
needs to be found between conversion and this particular theme. But the connection is in 
this case somewhat debatable. For it depends on elements of conversion that are 
considered essential by an important portion of the literature on conversion, but not 
universally. In the Lonerganian literature, for example, moral conversion in its most 
complete form always involves a move of the agent towards authenticity, that is (for 
Lonergan) a significant degree of critical self-appropriation. Without going at this point 
into the details of Lonergan’s concept of self-appropriation, suffice it to say that this 
involves reflection on what it is for oneself to be a knower and a chooser. It is called 
“critical” in this context to communicate the connotation – common in philosophical texts 
– of identifying and dispelling a number of myths about knowledge and objectivity in 
knowing and choosing. It is precisely in this sense that Conn distinguished between a 
critical and an uncritical moral conversion. For Conn, the former involves a previous 
intellectual or cognitive conversion by which the agent becomes aware of his/her 
subjective part in accepting values and in choosing. But a moral conversion that is not 
preceded by a cognitive conversion of this kind would be, for Conn, an “uncritical,” 
imperfect form of moral conversion.441 
Even though the idea that conversion involves a critical (in this sense) element is 
not universally found in the literature on conversion, it does not seem however 
unreasonable to consider that whenever some profound revision of one’s moral structures 
takes place – of one’s values, their grounding, one’s attitude towards morality, one’s life 
                                                 




project, the things held as meaningful, or what is the real possibility of achieving a 
certain degree of moral coherence – some degree of awareness of alternatives, at least of 
what one is leaving and what one is adopting, and of how they compare to each other 
must accompany such a revision. It may be reasonable then to posit a continuum of 
reflectiveness in conversions, from the “some degree of awareness” just described up to 
full Lonerganian “critical self-appropriation.” This means that the existentialist notion of 
authenticity may need to be understood with varying degrees of analogy when applied to 
conversion. Nevertheless it still seems more accurate to refer to authenticity, in relation to 
conversion, as one of the concomitant meanings entailed in the expression “conversion as 
existential,” than to allow conversion to be described in terms of the unconscious 
“theories-in-action” and self-regulating processes that Gibbs, for example, proposes as 
characteristic of the realm of the natural/spontaneous.442 And it may further be argued 
that, even if the theme of authenticity as critical reflection cannot be found in as many 
narratives of conversion as would justify including it universally, still this analogical 
understanding of authenticity as including “simply” reflection (i.e. not necessarily dealing 
with a critical discovery of oneself as knower), is an appropriate descriptor of moral 
conversion. Then the much stronger claim could perhaps be made that every conversion, 
understood as the sharp-turn, prime analog, includes a measure of reflection. This claim, 
however, cannot be defended here: it will be discussed in detail in Chapter 10. 
                                                 
442 Note that an emphasis on this theme may be also conceptually beneficial when it comes to 
distinguishing conversion from (profoundly harmful) processes that are externally similar, such as 
ideological indoctrination, “brain washing,” or behavioral changes caused by mental disease that are 
rationalized by the patient. (Interestingly, differentiating between these and conversion in the concrete 
cases could possibly be among the aspects that may at times escape the reach of investigations that only 




5. Anxiety and alienation 
A quick survey of other existentialist themes would throw into further relief how 
fitting is the characterization of conversion as existential. The themes of anxiety and 
alienation can be related to the reported feelings of uneasiness and weariness that in a 
number of narratives precede the moment of conversion, as were described in the texts by 
Griffin and James considered in Chapter 4. Beyond mere weariness, however, a more 
emphatically “metaphysical” reading of these experiences – as found in Heidegger, for 
example – interprets them as experiences that fundamentally undermine our taking-for-
granted the world and its familiar, operative certainties. This reading resonates strongly 
with narratives in which moral conversion is preceded by a sense of being lost in a 
familiar world, or followed by some form of estrangement from friends and relatives due  
to the new convictions or attitude. Think for example of the experience of Wayne Bauer 
(case #2), who, coming from a working middle-class, “American patriotism” background 
joined the Marine Corps in the 60’s, became an objector against the Vietnam war after 
some friends convinced him that his best argument “held no weight.” The way in which 
Bauer describes his feelings at the time clearly speaks both of alienation and anxiety: 
And what happened was, all of a sudden, my view of who I was and my environment was 
shattered. It was like looking in the mirror and having the whole thing shattered on you and 
seeing all your values, all your beliefs, everything you thought was real just kind of 
crumble. And it left me without any values and it also left me in a position where I had this 
terrible feeling of loneliness that there was no one I could go to for help. All the people I 
had trusted, I feel, essentially, they had lied to me.443 
 





Not only has his familiar world been shattered morally; Bauer will physically 
estrange himself from that world and go underground for some years, until he is 
eventually discharged from the Corps. 
 
6. The contingency of the concrete 
Another important connotation of the term “existential” is its reference to the 
contingency of the concrete. The observation here goes beyond the matter, already 
discussed, of the limitations of quantifying empirical method applied to moral conversion 
as its research subject, and its consequent limitations in terms of prediction capacity. 
Existentialist authors go beyond this observation to characterize phenomenologically the 
way in which this unpredictability is personally experienced, as a powerfully dramatic 
experience. 
In contrast with natural/spontaneous development, conversion seems to be 
unpredictable in terms of direction, rhythm or schedule, and also in terms of results or 
success.444 It is especially on the latter respect –unpredictability regarding results or 
success – that existentialist reflection narrows its dramatic focus. Existentialists 
characteristically emphasize the anxiety that the consequent awareness of a fundamental 
lack of control produces in the person, as an actual lack of control or as the ever present 
possibility of losing control in those matters that depend on our free choice. Sartre’s 
Roquentin in Nausea criticizes the illusory safety in which most people – particularly the 
bourgeois – seem to live, trusting in the regularity of events, a regularity that he perceives 
                                                 




to be ungrounded. The general perception of this ungroundedness is a cause for anxiety 
for him, and according to existentialist thinkers, to reflective people in general: things 
happen that are not planned, plans fail, accidents occur, and this cannot be prevented by 
any amount of rational planning. This anxiety is accentuated in processes that are 
dependent on subjective willingness, because this dependence entails that even one’s best 
desires may succumb to one’s own unwillingness to change, or to one’s lack of stability 
in purpose, when either of these are demanded. 
This type of anxiety seems to be particularly characteristic of narratives of 
conversion regarding behavioral coherence, in which the struggle to conquer old habits 
becomes the focal point of the person’s efforts, and not only the struggle to conquer them 
but even to just maintain one’s ground. The Christian tradition on spirituality is also very 
forceful on this matter: not only do we find insistence on the difficulties involved in 
doing what is good, but Christian treatises on spirituality are full of war images of 
fortresses and castles and with insistent calls to be vigilant, and to avoid being 
overconfident in one’s own strengths. 
This inherently unpredictable, almost accidental character of conversion often 
seems to make conversion something that can never be counted on.445 Natural/  
                                                 
445 The episode told in Augustine’s Confessions (III, 12) in which Augustine’s mother Monica asks a 
certain unnamed bishop to help her convince Augustine out of his Manichean beliefs has interesting 
resonances in this respect. The bishop’s first words of reassurance to Monica are developmental: he too was 
a Manichean when he did not know better, but eventually grew out of the heresy on his own. When this 
fails to comfort Augustine’s mother, the bishop tells her, with some impatience, “Go your way! As sure as 
you live, it is impossible that a child of such tears should perish.” Monica is not comforted by the 
developmental approach; the only other reassurance that the bishop can then offer to Monica is theological: 
it is grounded on Monica’s faith in God’s mercy and the hope that God will have pity on her, and not on 




spontaneous development cannot be entirely taken for granted, given that accidents may 
occur; but it can be at least “counted on,” if everything goes normally; it is, so to speak, 
on the high end of probability. Such seems not to be the case with conversion, which, as 
an existential event, cannot be placed at either end of the probability scale, and rather 
seems to belong outside the realm of statistics and predictability altogether. People 
“hope” for conversion when they perceive that it is needed; they rarely “expect” it; what 
they can expect however is the natural/spontaneous aspect of normal moral development. 
On the other hand, if this unpredictable, almost accidental character of conversion 
makes conversion something that cannot be counted on, it also makes conversion 
something that usually arrives unexpected. And the conversion stories are numerous 
enough to justify saying that it does sometimes arise. If the often pessimistic existentialist 
literature frequently emphasizes humanity’s causes for anxiety and the perceived 
precariousness of the human good and human virtue, narratives of moral conversion carry 
the message that the world is still a place full of surprises – good surprises: a place where 
love and forgiveness show up unexpected, where the personal path to self-destruction is 
not only sometimes averted but becomes the soil for transforming wisdom, where good 
intentions may overcome age-old hatreds and where goodness may rise against all 
apparent odds. The world of moral conversion is, granted, a world often overlooked, 
dismissed sometimes as an anomaly, not worth considering. But the narratives presented 
as examples in this work are real-life stories. As such they give us reasons for hope, 





The question presented at the beginning of this chapter, how to distinguish “moral 
development” from “moral conversion,” has now been responded to, through some 
terminological and conceptual clarifications and the introduction of the distinction 
between incremental and sharp-turn conversion. At the terminological level, it was 
necessary to narrow down the expression ”moral development.” “Moral development” is 
a very wide expression that is often used indistinctly to include all forms of moral 
transformation as long as they are considered generally positive (since “development” 
commonly implies a positive judgment). The narrower expression “normal moral 
development” was originally judged useful to frame the contrast with moral conversion. 
It soon, however, became somewhat insufficient, because it raised immediate questions 
about “what is normal”; and more importantly, because the expression itself is too vague 
to distinguish between development and some forms of what I have now called 
incremental conversion, that may be intertwined with regular developmental processes. 
This process of terminological clarification eventually settled on the phrase “natural/ 
spontaneous moral development,” which was intended to be equivalent to the phrase 
“normal moral development,” and which was then contrasted with the notion of “moral 
conversion.” 
Instrumental in this terminological development was the consideration of a 
difficulty proposed by Walter Conn; namely, his suggestion that conversion might be 
considered an integral part of normal moral development. This suggestion raised some 




have seemed in that case to merge too closely for the distinction to be of any use. But this 
difficulty was resolved by introducing the distinction between incremental conversion, 
which may in some cases be so integrated into a process of normal moral development, 
and sharp-turn conversion, which cannot be so integrated, and on which, as the primary 
analogue of the notion of moral conversion, the analysis was consequently focused. 
The key criterion to distinguish between normal (or “natural/spontaneous”) moral 
development and moral conversion was identified as the distinction between 
natural/spontaneous processes and (corresponding to conversion) “existential” processes. 
The idea of developing the distinction in this manner was inspired by Conn’s treatment of 
the distinction between moral development and conversion; but given Conn’s lack of 
sufficient clarity on this issue, it became then necessary to develop the meaning of the 
notion of the “existential” in more specific terms. This need was addressed through a 
focused application of the central existentialist themes, terminology, and heuristic 
structures to the notion of moral conversion. This helped to identify many important 
characteristics of moral conversion, most of them in contrast to the sphere of the natural/ 
spontaneous. In order to carry these observations beyond a mere conceptual elaboration, 
and show that this characterization fits real stories, a few of the narrative examples from 
Chapter 5 were revisited. 
Among the characteristics of moral conversion thus explored, this chapter has 
examined the issue of moral conversion being significantly beyond the reach of the 
quantifying empirical method, and also beyond the possibility of reliable predictions both 




was indicated that what seems of most relevance for understanding the phenomenon of 
moral conversion is not what is externally observable, but what is “internal,” those very 
personal factors that are better reached in part via introspection, and socially through data 
presented in narrative form. The questions these observations raise for epistemology are 
numerous, but will not be pursued in this work. 
The problematic regarding the potential unpredictability of moral conversion (and 
conversion in general), added to another existentialist theme not explored in the present 
chapter, namely that of human freedom, direct now our attention to the problem of 
freedom and determinism. This issue has received significant attention since the early 
origins of philosophical speculation. The following chapter will consider whether a study 









The discussion about moral conversion as an existential process, that is, as opposed 
to one following a natural/spontaneous process, brings to the foreground a matter that has 
been hovering in the background since the beginning pages of this work: the matter of 
freedom, or more precisely, of free choice as a factor in conversion. On a first approach, 
the fact of moral conversion (i.e., the fact that people undergo changes such as the ones 
described in Chapter 5) seems to controvert, or to constitute evidence against 
deterministic views – “determinism” understood here as the philosophical view that 
denies the existence of free choice.446 For example, the unexpectedness that moral 
conversion involves and the abandonment of long-held, regular patterns of behavior both 
seem to oppose the predictability implied by deterministic views. In addition, the process 
of moral conversion often involves experiences that are commonly associated with the 
                                                 
446 By invoking “the fact of moral conversion,” I do not mean to imply that the existence of conversion 
events is incontrovertible. On the contrary, one of the aims of the previous chapters (particularly of Chapter 
5) has been to establish that such events do in fact occur, and that they have the characteristics attributed to 




idea of choice, e.g. anguish, struggle, anxiety, resolve and others. Thus, both from the 
point of view of third-person observation (of patterns of behavior) and introspective 
experience, the fact of conversion may be invoked as evidence against the deterministic 
views. But is this argument valid? Does the claim that determinism is false follow from 
this fact? 
The topic of this chapter will be the specific extent to which a study of moral 
conversion contributes to this debate. The focal point of this contribution will vary 
slightly from other discussions of this issue. While discussions on free choice and 
determinism frequently focus on discrete instances of decision and action - “discrete” in 
the sense of concrete, specific acts that are argued to be either the result of a free choice 
or of deterministic processes - the focal point of this chapter will be on conversion as a 
process, not a discrete action, through which convictions, values, general attitudes and, 
eventually, whole patterns of behavior change. This alternative focal point may identify 
data that have not been as carefully considered and new insights or new arguments that 
may enrich the discussion. 
The free choice/determinism debate is centuries old and extremely complex. Its 
complexities include debates about the meaning of the key concepts discussed, about the 
epistemological issues involved, and about the metaphysical ramifications of the debate a 
priori or a posteriori, i.e., what metaphysical views make possible and/or what 
metaphysical views follow from either position on the free choice/determinism debate. 
This chapter’s contributions to this debate do not directly address any of these areas of 




conversion, once carefully described and differentiated from other aspects of human 
experience (the task of chapters 1-8), constitutes an important kind of datum that 
participants in this debate ought to attend to. 
The opening sections of this chapter situate it in relation to the larger determinism/ 
free choice debate. Then those aspects in narratives of moral conversion will be examined 
that indicate that the fact of moral conversion is an important datum for the free choice/ 
determinism debate. 
 
2. What the discussion is not about 
Surrounding, and deeply intertwined with the debate on free choice and 
determinism, are two discussions that frequently get confused with the discussion about 
free choice and determinism itself because of their close implications regarding this 
debate. Before examining moral conversion both in terms of observable and introspective 
evidence and their philosophical implications, it will be helpful to clarify the terms of the 
discussion by distinguishing it from these related, but not directly relevant issues. 
 
A. The discussion about the relative stability of moral convictions  
An issue that frequently gets confused with the discussion of free choice and 
determinism is that of the stability of moral convictions, and whether, once they are 
acquired (e.g., through the incorporation of the cultural values held by the community a 
person inhabits), such convictions or values are set for life. The view that claims that 




under any circumstances will be called here an “absolute value-crystallization” view. 
This is the view asserted informally in such expressions as “people don’t change,” or 
“you can’t teach an old dog new tricks.” In this view, should a person fail to acquire such 
moral structures by some “proper” age, he/she could not thereafter become a moral 
person. 
This view is often confused with determinism, and vice versa. This confusion, 
however – and the ensuing possibility of confusing this issue with the debate on freedom 
and determinism - seems to be based on an equivocation. If one grants the truth of 
absolute value-crystallization, it would seem to follow that the agent cannot “choose” to 
hold different moral views, i.e., one is “determined” by one’s breeding etc. to think 
morally in certain terms because it is impossible to change the views acquired at an 
earlier age. The equivocation here concerns what “determined” means. The fact, if it is 
one, that one cannot control or choose with respect to one trait or process does not entail 
that one cannot control or choose with respect to every trait or process, much less every 
act. Thus, even if one were to grant the truth of absolute value-crystallization, this would 
not exclude the possibility that one could act against one’s (unchangeable) moral 
convictions in specific, discrete instances. That is a separate question. In fact, the 
common experience of feelings of guilt and remorse after actions contrary to established 
moral conviction indicates that one’s moral convictions can remain as they were even as 
one has acted against them. Thus, one may conduct the debate about free choice and 




It is worth noting, however, that the truth of absolute value-crystallization would 
challenge the possibility of freedom on a specific context related to moral conversion. 
That is, if one were to conclude that moral conversion requires an exercise of freedom to 
take place, and absolute value-crystallization were true in its denial that such an exercise 
of freedom can take place, then the truth of absolute value-crystallization would entail the 
rejection of the possibility of moral conversion. So if the evidence of chapters 1-8 is 
accepted as confirming the existence of moral conversion as described, then absolute 
value-crystallization must be false. But as has been mentioned, neither this conclusion nor 
its contrary would tell us anything specifically about the wider free choice/determinism 
debate.447 Absolute value-crystallization seems in any case to be extremely difficult to 
defend, in view of the achievements of psychology of moral development and of the 
evidence for the existence of instances of moral conversion. 
While an absolute value-crystallization view is opposed to the possibility of moral 
conversion, however, a theory of relative crystallization of moral values, i.e., that moral 
structures normally become more stable, and progressively more difficult to modify in 
fundamental terms as the person becomes older (which seems to be confirmed by 
everyday experience and psychological observation) is not per se opposed to it. On the  
                                                 
447 An alternate version of absolute value-crystallization supports its claims by defining away competitors, 
that is, by stating the content of the “unmodifiable” moral structures in terms sufficiently general and vague 
to resist any factual comparison. One could take, for example, the story of a selfish person who eventually 
becomes generous or self-sacrificing (Dicken’s Scrooge is the paradigmatic figure), and say that this person 
was that way all along – that the selfish personality was a posture, that the person “had a good heart,” so 
there has been no real transformation. Or alternatively one could claim that this person’s values were not 
“crystallized” yet and counted as moral convictions only in the final pattern. One value of mentioning this 
possibility is that this pattern of definitional “argument” appears quite often in discussions of free choice 




contrary, the truth of relative value-crystallization would partly explain why sharp-turn 
conversions are regarded as extraordinary, surprising, unexpected. But whatever views 
one holds with regard to this issue, the issue itself must be separated from that of the free 
choice/determinism debate. 
B. Indoctrination and externalist views on moral learning 
The discussion of internalist and externalist views regarding the origin of moral 
convictions and moral judgments will be the focus of Chapter 10. It is in many aspects, 
however, entangled with the discussion about freedom and determinism; and for this 
reason it becomes necessary to disentangle them here. 
A simplified way of getting at the meaning of “externalism” is by referring to the 
idea of “indoctrination.” To “indoctrinate” means “to cause somebody to have a 
particular set of beliefs, especially by giving them no opportunity to consider other points 
of view.”448 “Indoctrination” is not a neutral term. It carries a negative implication, even 
an accusation: i.e., that the entity that indoctrinates is depriving the indoctrinated of 
something important, i.e., the opportunity to reflect on or debate the truth of the beliefs 
involved. Indoctrination can be carried out by brute force or by cunning or by a 
combination of the two, not by processes focused on inquiring, seeking the truth, or 
evaluating the contents of relevant beliefs. Thus indoctrination implies taking advantage 
of those whose critical capacity is not sufficiently developed to argue or question the 
beliefs involved, or overcoming the capacities of mature inquirers by force or cunning. It 
                                                 





carries the implication of a dehumanizing process, of a diminution of the indoctrinated’s 
effective freedom (assuming, as this notion ordinarily does, that there is such thing as 
freedom). In addition, as an outcome, those indoctrinated will be less prone to question 
potentially indefensible, irrational or unethical commands, and consequently more prone 
to act as desired by the indoctrinators rather than on their own judgments and choices. 
One of the characteristic elements of indoctrination is that it is a matter of 
indifference to the process whether the indoctrinated contents are true or not. The reason 
why these contents come to be believed or become convictions rather than others is that 
an effective process of indoctrination has taken place. Here is where the similarities with 
externalist explanations of morality can be found. According to externalist explanations 
of morality, the specifically normative content of moral norms and values is not what 
makes them more or less apt to become moral norms or principles. The fact that moral 
norms or principles are acquired, adopted or internalized by the moral agent is attributed 
to “external” factors, that is, factors entirely independent of the intelligible/cognitive 
content (i.e., what is there to understand) of such principles or norms. In its most radical 
forms (e.g. Skinner’s radical behaviorism, theories of psychological or behavioral 
contagion), “reinforcement” (conditioning) is postulated as working even without 
cognitive representations,449 so that even the possibility of cognitive appropriation of the 
contents of norms of action is rejected. In less radical forms (e.g. modeling theories, 
vicarious reinforcement),450 cognitive activities are involved: the person needs to be 
                                                 
449 Thomas E. Wren, Caring About Morality : Philosophical Perspectives in Moral Psychology 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), 42, 46. 




cognitively aware, for example, of the modeled behavior and/or the associated 
reinforcement (a reward or punishment). But even in the latter views, the content of the 
modeled behavior is still irrelevant; theoretically any behavior could be made into a 
pattern and judged as moral. The reinforcement process may not be guided by the 
malignant intentions usually associated with indoctrination, and this is where the analogy 
between the two falls short. But for externalist accounts of morality, it is not the 
“content” of the process that is relevant to the success of the process. 
As to the external factors to which the causation of moral convictions is attributed, 
externalist theories range in their considerations, from the crude stimuli associations of 
behaviorist theory, to the more sophisticated propositions of conflict resolution, 
approach/avoidance, and modeling theories. The former proposes a “conditioned 
reflexes” model, coupled with ideas of contiguity and association; the latter propose what 
are essentially psychological mechanisms of adaptation to the environment.451 
These theories, and the debate between moral internalism and moral externalism in 
general, will be considered in the next chapter. The point in mentioning this discussion 
here is to avoid confusion with the free choice and determinism debate. The connection 
between externalism and determinism is very close: a deterministic view may follow 
from the rejection of an internal venue of moral reflection or the like, if the latter is 
understood as essential for the possibility of free choice; and thus deterministic theories 
and externalist theories normally coincide. This coincidence, however, is not a logical 
necessity. One may logically conceive the possibility that all norms are externally 
                                                 




produced (externalism), and yet that a person may choose in particular instances not to 
abide by such norms (non-determinism). For some externalist theories this may not be 
true; for example, in the case of radical behaviorism, both the acquisition of moral norms 
and values and the determination of behavior are tied to the quasi-mechanistic model of 
stimuli-reaction. But this needs not be the case in all externalist theories of morality, and 
so a theory-by-theory examination is needed to determine which theories are both 
externalist and determinist, and which are not.452 For the purposes of Chapter 9, 
therefore, the question of whether we are talking about internalist or externalist theories 
of morality will remain open, because the focus here is on free choice vs. determinism. 
 
3. The notion of “free choice” 
The preceding considerations should help clarify what the discussion on free choice 
and determinism is not about, and thus help avoid becoming sidetracked by related 
discussions. It would be appropriate now to consider in more specific terms what the 
discussion is about. 
There is a group of connected concepts that stand in opposition to (and as such, 
constitute the target of) determinism. Central among these concepts are those of freedom, 
                                                 
452 A special situation seems to arise when the discussion of externalism/internalism is framed specifically 
in terms of “moral motivation,” as has become somewhat popular in recent philosophy, particularly within 
20th century Anglo-American treatments of the problem, and in approaches originated in or sharing ground 
with psychological research (see for example Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, "Moral Cognitivism and Motivation," 
The Philosophical Review 108, no. 2 [1999]; Wren, Caring About Morality, 15-16). The internalist view is 
often presented as entailing that motivation ought to follow from the grasp itself of the cognitive content of 
a moral principle or norm, or alternatively, that “moral cognitions are intrinsically motivating” (ibid., 15). 
But the distinction between the discussion of externalism/internalism and the discussion of free choice and 




will, decision and choice.453 A quick survey of the meaning of these concepts will help 
situate the discussion. 
The word “freedom” is the abstract noun derived from the adjective “free,” and the 
concept here may be more easily understood by analyzing the adjective. Traditionally, 
two levels of meaning have been attributed to this term. One meaning is essentially a 
negative meaning: something/someone is “free” if devoid of obstacles in a certain 
respect. An animal is “free” if it is not inside a cage or tied down; a person is “free” if 
he/she is not a prisoner, or a slave, or subject to other substantial limitations – physical, 
legal, etc. An object is in “free fall” if it is falling and there is nothing arresting its 
movement. A person is “free to choose” among different possibilities if there are no 
reasons to expect that, in electing one over the rest, the person will encounter particular 
obstacles. 
In the Western philosophical tradition, however, there has commonly been 
recognized another complementary meaning for the term, a positive one. This positive 
meaning of the term “freedom” makes reference to a human being’s mental and/or 
spiritual potencies. Specifically, “free” refers to a person’s capacity to choose, and is 
evidenced in acts of choosing. 
In its weak sense, the term “to choose” means “to deliberate,” the selection process, 
the mental (in a broad sense, “rational”) calculation that leads to selecting one among 
many possible options. In its strong sense, as it will be used in this dissertation, 
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“choosing“ means directing oneself to the selected possibility, action, object or state of 
affairs; an act of self-determination that crowns the process of deliberation.454-455 
By “free choice” then it is meant, first, that the chooser is not limited to one course 
of action, but has a certain openness to more than one course of action (negative sense). 
Secondly, it means that the course of action to be undertaken is determined by the 
chooser (positive sense). The determining originates, so to speak, from within the 
personal center of the chooser, and the chooser has control over what decision will be 
taken. 
This choosing that is free is understood by some to be grounded on, and to flow 
from, an aspect or element in the person’s constitution – a faculty, in classical 
terminology – that enjoys a degree of independence from physical, environmental, 
cultural, psychological or any other factors that might otherwise collectively fix the 
person’s decision on one way or another. This faculty is understood to be independent 
from these factors to the extent that they are ordinarily insufficient to determine the 
                                                 
454 Sometimes this positive aspect of freedom is emphasized by noting how a person may “choose” even 
when there are no alternative physical actions available. A person may choose among different possible 
attitudes, even if the physical options are restricted – a prisoner, for example, may or may not choose 
submit willingly to his or her fate. See for example Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, 157. A special case 
within this discussion – which exceeds the range of this work - occurs in Christian theology, when freedom 
is considered in the context of the doctrine of the beatific vision. 
455 The term “wanting” can also have two meanings, one weak and one strong, and it may help to clarify 
them here because, although not commonly used with a technical meaning in philosophy, it can sometimes 
become the source of equivocations. In its weak sense, it is as an equivalent of desiring, in the sense of 
experiencing an attraction or felt need for something, but an attraction that may otherwise remain idle or 
unacted upon. Its strong meaning, which is less commonly used, coincides essentially with the strong 
meaning of “choice”; it is the meaning at play for example in expressions such as “who wants the act wants 
the consequences of the act” – by which is meant that the person that chooses an act is freely making 
him/herself responsible for the consequences of the act. The strong senses of “wanting” and “choosing” are 
not exactly identical, however, in that wanting adds a linking of the choice to the appetitive aspect of 
human personality; and conversely, choice may entail a reference to the deliberation process, which is not 




possibility or course of action that the person will select. In a long tradition following 
Aristotle, the term “will” (the adjective “free” is implied when “will” is used) has been 
used to designate this faculty in terms of which the person is capable of free choice 
(which is understood, in turn, as an exercise of the will). The Aristotelian/Thomistic 
tradition has considered this faculty in quite some detail, postulating it to be an essential 
property of the human spiritual substantial form (or soul).456 Many other traditions, and 
even everyday language, make use of the concept (though not necessarily with exactly 
the meaning employed in the Aristotelian tradition), and the expression “free will” was 
formerly a frequent way of designating the focus of the free choice/determinism debate, 
whether an analysis of human action in terms of a specific “faculty” of will is involved in 
the argument or not. In the present chapter, a discussion of free will in terms of “faculty” 
will not be part of the argument, though the expression “free will” itself may be used at 
times. 
The term “decision” is very close in its meaning to that of “choice”; if there is any 
difference, it is that the term “decision” implies, when used, a (possibly relatively 
lengthy) deliberation process – thus one “arrives at” a decision, or “makes” a decision. 
Other than this, the terms “decision” and “choice” are often used interchangeably. 
To sum up, the terms used in this chapter should be understood as follows. Choice 
or choosing is an act by which the person determines one course of action or one 
potential direction among many that are open. It is understood (though this is precisely 
the point under discussion) to be a free act, that is, that the direction or course of action to 
                                                 




be taken is ultimately under the control, or the self-determination, of the person that 
chooses (or of the person’s will, as the faculty enabling free choice). The term “decision” 
is almost equivalent with “choice,” but will be used - to preserve the slight difference in 
meaning mentioned above – to indicate that the choice follows a deliberation process of 
some duration. Finally, to designate the debate itself, a number of expressions can be 
used (“free will and determinism”; “freedom and determinism”; “free choice and 
determinism”). To settle on a standard terminology, the latter, “free choice and 
determinism,” will be the one used throughout this chapter. 
It remains to examine briefly the meaning of “determinism” that is relevant to this 
dissertation. 
 
4. Naturalistic determinism and its challengers 
Theological and naturalistic determinism 
Now that the meaning of “free choice” has been examined, determinism, the polar 
opposite in the debate, can be defined (as it will be understood in the course of this work) 
as the philosophical view that denies the existence of free choice in general, and in human 
beings in particular. 
From the outset, two types of determinism can be distinguished: one that may be 
termed “theological”, and one that may be termed “naturalistic.” Theological forms of 
determinism claim that actions are predetermined by a divine intelligence or a divine will. 
(An alternative version sees human beings as unable to avoid predestined states of affairs 




“fatalism.”) In the present work I will not discuss theological types of determinism, 
which are not only multiform, but also more properly the subject of theological 
discussion. I will focus instead on the concept central to most philosophical discussions 
of this topic, naturalistic determinism. 
In general, naturalistic theories attempt to explain reality (including mental and 
moral elements) without making reference to theological or “supernatural” elements – or, 
as John Dewey puts it a bit more technically,  by working on the assumption that “there is 
no breach of continuity between operations of inquiry,” by which he means intellectual 
knowledge and related operations of the mind, and “biological operations and physical 
operations.”457 
In developing a naturalistic theory, the emphasis may alternatively be put either on 
the metaphysical or on the methodological. That is, a metaphysical naturalistic 
explanation is one that denies or rejects the existence of a theological or supernatural or 
spiritual realm of reality, in which case the view is often a version of materialism. But a 
methodological naturalism simply attempts to set that realm of possible reality aside 
when framing its questions or the terms of inquiry. Although quite often naturalistic 
determinism is backed by implicit materialistic assumptions, this is not necessarily the 
case. Therefore, unless specifically mentioned, the term “naturalism” will be used here in 
the sense of methodological naturalism, without any further implications regarding 
metaphysical assumptions. 
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Speaking specifically of methodological naturalistic determinism, what is operating 
at the core is the idea that the actions of structurally complex entities (specifically human 
beings) can be explained in their totality by the laws governing the activities of the 
simpler factors constitutive of those entities (i.e., can be “reduced” to these laws). From 
this point of view, social institutions and social processes, feelings, thoughts and 
philosophies, moral rules, and particularly the outcomes of individual persons’ decision-
making could theoretically be explained in terms of activities of the atomic, molecular or 
cellular level, and so by the application of the rules of physics, or chemistry, or biology, 
or other higher order candidates such as psychology or economics. “Free choices” would 
be then explained as solely the effect of factors that are absolutely beyond the agent’s 
control, factors that can cumulatively be said to determine the agent’s activities (the agent 
may be aware of all, some or none of them). The arguably nearly universal awareness of 
the mature human agent that he/she seems to be in control of his/her decisions is then 
explained (explained away, since it is an illusion) by additional theories. 
Care should be put in distinguishing this view from the view that was traditionally 
termed “mechanism.” A central philosophical tenet of mechanism is the theoretically 
absolute predictability of every event in the world. Originally, mechanism was based on a 
(now outdated) mechanical/physical model of causation; that is, predictability in terms of 
mechanical laws, laws governing the motion and collision of matter, extrapolated to 
apply to the whole of reality. In Laplace’s famous pronouncement, an intelligence that 




beings who compose it” would be able to predict any single event in the future.458 
Mechanical-physical mechanism no longer carries any weight within the sciences, its 
scientific principles having been abrogated by changes in the physical sciences, 
especially the “non-determinism” (that is, the non-predictability) of quantum physics. But 
the idea that every action is ultimately predictable has not altogether disappeared – it is 
found often at least at the level of scientifically uninformed common sense, and 
sometimes fostered by scientifically informed writers who choose to ignore the problems 
of mechanism for literary purposes. 
The problem of whether every event is ultimately predictable is a different 
philosophical problem from that of whether human actions are wholly caused by events 
independent of choice.459 In mechanism, however, both problems seem to come together, 
because the grounds for its thesis of absolute predictability are also grounds for a 
deterministic view: the reason why every action is ultimately predictable in mechanism is 
that there are no factors to be considered outside of mechanical/physical factors; 
therefore, there is no space in mechanism for factors such as the free will. The two 
problems, however, must be kept separate. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
examine whether all events are predictable and to what extent, and whether contemporary 
scientific models carry such implications or not. The problem of whether human actions 
are wholly caused by events independent of choice, on the other hand, is the focus of this 
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(Dover, 1953), 4. 
459 The two theses are often conflated in the everyday usage of the expression “scientific laws,” when they 




chapter; and insofar as determinism seems to entail predictability, the theme of 
predictability will be discussed further in Section 6. 
Challenges to determinism from within methodological naturalism 
It is important to note that from within the tenets of methodological naturalism 
itself, it is possible to conceive of a non-deterministic view of human action. One way to 
interpret the central tenet of naturalism is in terms of “continuity”; thus Dewey says, of 
the term “naturalistic,” 
As it is here employed it means, on one side, that there is no breach of continuity between 
operations of inquiry and biological operations and physical operations. “Continuity,” on 
the other side, means that rational operations grow out of organic activities, without being 
identical with that from which they emerge.460 
 
Depending on how this “continuity” is interpreted, determinism may or may not follow. 
Bernard Lonergan, for example, when formulating his view of “emergent probability,” 
characterizes each successive level of structural organization found in nature – physical 
processes, chemical processes, biochemical processes, biological development, etc. – as 
“continuous” with the previous, in the sense of not abrogating the laws that govern the 
behavior of what he calls the “lower conjugates,” i.e., the less complex levels of 
structural organization. But at the same time, the higher conjugates evidence their 
characteristics and activities (expressed in their own sets of laws), distinctive of their own 
level of structural organization, which progressively and in important respects 
“emancipate” the more complex structures from the deterministic limitations of the 
                                                 




lower, less complex levels of reality.461 Thus understood, the higher levels of 
organization enjoy a certain “freedom” from, are not wholly limited by, the laws of the 
lower-level structures. Birds, for example, though heavier than air, do not simply fall (nor 
do they simply ignore their weight); monks, though belonging to a typically 
heterogamous species, choose to be celibate (nor do they simply ignore the sexuality of 
their human constitution). Stating the same points positively, the more complex structures 
are endowed with their “level-specific” goals and meaning: birds attempt to perpetuate 
their structural organization by eating insects; monks spend a substantial amount of time 
– time that could be used for foraging or mating – in prayer or the illumination of sacred 
texts. 
Whether such a naturalistic “freeing,” if metaphysically or evolutionarily 
conceived, could go far enough to ground the possibility of human intellectual knowledge 
and free choice, is open to discussion (this seems to be, for example, part of Dewey’s 
project). But all that is intended here is to open to consideration the possibility of a 
methodologically naturalistic theory that is compatible with the idea of free choice. 
On the other hand, the “continuity” postulated by methodological naturalism may 
be held to entail an explanatory reduction of the “mechanisms” or dynamisms or laws of 
the higher structural levels to those of the simpler structural levels. It is in this manner 
that naturalistic determinism is grounded in many, perhaps most, accounts. 
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This way of understanding the continuity of levels of activity, however, is 
philosophically problematic in an important way. What causes the problem is that, to be 
consistent, this way of thinking demands that every aspect of reality be explained in terms 
of the simplest available structural patterns. Consider, for example, a biological 
reductionism that attempts to explain all human activity – and particularly, instances of 
choice and action – in terms exclusively of biological factors: survival instincts, 
reproductive instincts, a tendency to foster genetic diversity within the species, etc. The 
question that has to be posed to this approach is: Is there something peculiar to biological 
explanation that cannot be reduced to (that is, explained completely by) physical 
processes? If the proponent of the theory responds affirmatively, one could then ask: 
Why must only the biological level of explanation be accorded explanatory power that is 
not reducible? Why not acknowledge that, by the same rule, other levels of structural 
organization (e.g. the organization of complex ecosystems, or of highly intelligent beings 
in communities, or of nations into economic conglomerates) might merit a type or level 
of explanation specific to them? Why reduce their behavior to biological paradigms? 
Unless a proper answer to that question is found, the reductivist version of naturalism 
seems to demand the reduction of all naturalistic processes - including sociological, 
economic and psychological processes, which are quite often proposed to be reducible to 
biological models - to physical processes, and these to “sub-physical” processes, etc. 
This is, of course, only a partial refutation of biological (or other kinds of) 
reductionism. But insofar as various disciplines adopt deterministic interpretations based 




of human activity that are in some respects “free,” i.e. independent of the deterministic 
limitations of lower levels of organization. What is to be concluded is either that all 
naturalistic deterministic theories must be reduced to a “physical” determinism (or some 
“sub-physical” determinism, if the science of such a thing eventually came to being), or 
that they must explain how and why their level of consideration must not be reduced, yet 
further levels of organization can legitimately be reduced to it, or else that it must be 
granted that progressively more complex degrees of structural organization may have 
different structure-specific, “emergent” forms of activities with their own sets of laws, 
thus opening the door to a potential rejection of determinism within methodological 
naturalism. 
For this reason, examining the free choice/determinism issue from a 
methodologically naturalist perspective – i.e., that there is a continuity of inquiry  and 
explanation, and by implication, of activities and events themselves, from the simplest to 
the most complex – does not resolve the issue in favor of the determinist position. 
Challenges to determinism from outside naturalism 
Challenges to a naturalistic determinism can also be presented from the quarters of 
theories or views that reject the naturalistic standpoint, either as a metaphysical theory or 
as a methodological stipulation. A rejection of naturalism as a metaphysical theory of 
reality entails the view that natural processes and the material universe are not all that 
there is. The rejection of methodological naturalism, instead, is the rejection of the view 




conceded to be a valid or indeed the required method for specific sciences or realms of 
knowledge. Both rejections, in different ways, assert that the “continuity” postulated by 
naturalism must somehow be “broken” in order to gain a full understanding of the world. 
This view, logically, entails the possibility of rationally (i.e., philosophically) knowing 
something about realms of being other than those available to the naturalistic approach, 
though positions vary on what these are and how much we can know about them.462 
For a token example of how a naturalistic determinism may be challenged by 
postulating a mode of being that is or exists outside the canons of methodological 
naturalism, it is useful to look at Aquinas’ explanation of freedom, grounded on his 
understanding of Aristotle. Aquinas explains freedom (as “liberum arbitrium,” i.e., the 
possibility to choose among different particular goods) as a necessary consequence of the 
fact that practical reason is not determined to find, among finite goods, any one good as 
absolutely determining of the will – that is, a good so perfectly adequate to the 
constitution of the will, as intellectual appetite, that the human person will be irresistibly 
oriented towards it as their final good. The will for Aquinas is “intellectual appetite”; its 
orientation is towards unrestricted being. Thus finite goods (that is, everything but God), 
which appear (correctly) to human intelligence as limited and contingent, are not 
determining of the will; and in this non-determination the possibility of freedom is 
grounded.463 In turn, the inadequacy of finite goods to the intellectual appetite are 
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grounded on Aquinas’s understanding of these faculties (intellect and will) as spiritual, 
that is, as imbued of a certain degree of immateriality in their operation that can only be 
explained by reference to a subsistent or spiritual form (the human soul) as their 
metaphysical substratum.464 In short, for Aquinas human beings – unlike other animals – 
are free because their peculiar metaphysical constitution is not subjected to the physical 
determinism inherent in a purely naturalistic constitution (which would fix one’s 
appetites on specific limited ends). Note that, in grounding the character of free choice 
specifically as spiritual, Aquinas emphasizes that its freedom derives from our peculiar 
cognitive situation – our capacity for intellectual understanding of what is not contingent 
and material, and also therefore our capacity to reflectively grasp ends as such, and 
oneself as an agent. Other philosophical traditions emphasize first the specific condition 
of the human will as a rational appetite, and as such, as endowed  with a certain degree of 
indetermination/independence from that which it is drawn to, and with reflective 
capacities regarding the self as desirer/chooser, such that humans can “will the 
willingness” to do something, choose to choose or not to choose, etc.465 
The point in presenting these examples of a non-naturalistic theory is not to develop 
a criticism of naturalistic determinism based specifically on this theory; rather, the 
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presented by C. S. Lewis in C. S. Lewis, Miracles (New York: Touchstone, 1996). It was, incidentally, the 
difficulties of contemporary naturalistic explanations of intellectual knowledge that, Lewis claims, 
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465 If one wishes to pursue this approach to argue against determinism, care must be put in the order in 
which these arguments are presented. It is not unusual, for example, to find arguments for the soul’s 
spiritual constitution that are based on reflections on human freedom. But if the intention is eventually to 
argue for free will on the grounds that this is a consequence of the soul’s spiritual constitution, this 




intention is to survey the theoretical context within which the discussion of free choice 
and determinism takes place. What should be concluded from the preceding is simply that 
determinism, as a philosophical thesis, does face potential contenders both under 
naturalistic and non-naturalistic methodological paradigms, and that none of these can be 
discounted a priori. 
Once this point has been made, it is time to examine whether the present study of 
moral conversion can bring any new insights into the discussion, or whether it brings to 
the fore some form of evidence that has not been sufficiently attended to. A brief detour 
is required at this point to discuss the matter of the validity of this kind of evidence, in the 
context in particular of some challenges posed by empiricist views.. 
 
5. A comment on the evidence used in the discussion of free choice and 
determinism 
The evidence for the reality of freedom is likely to include such items as the 
reported introspective experiences of, for example, anxiety at the time of difficult 
choices, or the role in numerous human institutions of intention as relevant to social 
responses to people’s actions. But under the canons of the empirical method, 
introspective evidence of any kind is considered highly suspect. A first person account of 
an experience is suspect because of the high degree of interpretation that this account 
demands, and because the experience itself as a “fact” – as actually lived by the person as 
described – cannot be corroborated from a third person perspective in the manner, for 




controlled variables. Are we, then, at a dead end in terms of an investigation of freedom 
and determinism? Not if “corroborated by others” can be understood in a broader sense. 
An experience can arguably be corroborated not only through the replication of an 
experiment, or through the repetition of an empirical observation, but also by the fact that 
the person who listens to the account has had a similar experience, or an experience of a 
similar kind. The fact that the interpretation of such experiences and their implications 
may come under fire does not detract from the possibility of their becoming evidence for 
the support or refutation of theories. 
In order to discuss the problem of free choice and determinism without resolving its 
key questions in advance by how “evidence,” “corroboration” and “verifiability” are 
defined, it is methodologically necessary to consider evidence in a broader sense, namely 
as any kind of experience that may to a certain extent be corroborated by others. And the 
same is true of trying to determine whether the fact of moral conversion sheds any light 
on the free choice/determinism debate, as the kind of evidence for moral conversion 
offered in Chapter 5 should make clear. The problem of adequately interpreting the 
evidence still remains, as does the problem of gauging how much weight can be given to 
particular items of evidence. But when a person reports, for example, saying or doing 
things in anger, and later regretting them, that is a first person claim that is often 
considered very reliable because it is capable of being corroborated in this broader sense. 
(A formal psychological study in which research subjects are angered in order to see if 
they react with expressions of regret afterwards would  support its conclusions with what 




on first person interpretation.) For present purposes it is enough to say that, given the 
subject matter of this chapter, it would be shortsighted to restrict evidence and 
corroboration only to what can be obtained in such kind of studies. 
Data categories relevant to the discussion of free choice and determinism 
Surveying the discussion of free choice and determinism, it is possible to find that 
certain facts or phenomena are recurrently brought up, under the claim that their 
explanation necessitates the existence of free will in the human spirit, or of free choice in 
human actions. These facts or phenomena are used to ground significantly diverse types 
of argument for free choice, and correspondingly may be grouped in different key 
categories of “data.” These are also the facts/phenomena/data that those arguing in favor 
of naturalistic determinism need to either provide an alternative explanation for (one that 
is consistent with determinism), or else they need to argue that these purportedly common 
human experiences are profoundly misdescribed by those claiming to experience them, or 
are illusory and do not actually happen at all. 
Most notably, these include: 
1. People choosing an unexpected course of action with respect to their own previous, 
observable patterns of action, which seems to entail that a person’s actions are not 
predetermined. 
2. People choosing a course of action that (whether going against their previous 




feelings of one’s community, which seems to entail that a person’s actions are not 
absolutely determined by social/environmental factors. 
3. “Decisional anxiety,” reported feelings of tension and anxiety involved in choice. 
4. The possibility of some sort of direct introspective experience of one’s capacity to 
choose. In the present exposition, the discussion of this possibility will focused on 
two types of experience, those of (4.a) “volitional exertion” and (4.b) “resolve.” 
5. Feelings of regret, guilt or shame when or after one chooses a course of action 
deemed wrong, or with bad or evil consequences. Correspondingly, feelings of 
pride, honor and merit when one chooses a course of action deemed right, 
especially when this involved some hardship or sacrifice. 
6. Socially instituted forms of praise, blame, rewards, punishments, and other forms of 
social response that acknowledge or make sense only under the assumption that the 
agent is acting freely, including institutions in which the agent’s purpose or 
intention in acting are important determining factors of the social response. 
Although the philosophical literature of the free choice/determinism debate has 
attended to each of these categories to some degree, it has not focused carefully on the 
philosophical implications that follow when these categories are examined as they 
manifest themselves in the context of moral conversion. Typically, there is a significant 
amount of detail available in narratives of moral conversion about these categories, and in 
addition, because moral conversion is a process rather than just a discrete instance of 




For greater clarity, the presentation here will be divided in two parts: one dealing 
with third person (“objective”) evidence and discussing category 1 (including a brief 
note on category 2), and the second dealing with introspective evidence and discussing 
categories 3, 4.a, 4.b and 5. By “introspective evidence” is meant first person reports, 
whose contribution involves reflection by the corroborator on his/her own subjective 
experience. Categories 3, 4 and 5 can also involve corroboration by means of observed 
behavior, “body language,” etc.; but these alone, without the corroborator’s reflection on 
his/her own comparable experience, are typically considered insufficient as evidence. 
The sixth category of data, namely that of the presence of socially instituted forms 
of social response that acknowledge or make sense only under the assumption that the 
agent is acting freely, is frequently discussed in the free choice/determinism debate. But 
this category has not been found illuminating regarding moral conversion, and will 
therefore not be examined further in this study. 
 
6. Data category 1: Moral conversion and third person evidence for free 
choice. Unpredictability in a person’s patterns of action 
It was considered in the previous chapter how conversion, in its prime analogue, 
involves the unfolding of a course of action that is unpredictable or unexpected. This 
unpredictability goes beyond the potential anomalies of discrete acts that do not conform 
to the expected patterns; in moral conversion it often involves the replacement of the 




the correlate, in a study of conversion, to the first category of data that seems to oppose a 
deterministic model. 
The reason why a significant degree of unpredictability in human life seems to 
constitute a difficulty for determinism is that determinism would seem to entail a 
significant degree of predictability; instances of failure of this degree of predictability 
would arguably weaken the determinist position. 
But this argument against determinism must not be oversimplified. A determinist 
might reasonably allude to both the complexity and the hiddenness of the variables 
involved in causing the actions of any concrete human person. A person, the determinist 
could argue, is a tremendously complex system, and many, perhaps most of the relevant 
variables are hidden from easy analysis. So we cannot expect to predict his or her acts to 
any high degree, when our science barely allows us to achieve a decent weather 
prediction. One version of this response, at least, is not acceptable; namely, if the 
determinist is simply proposing a theory that cannot be challenged by evidence 
(essentially claiming ignorance in order to defend his/her conclusions). A deterministic 
position that denied the relevance of corroborating empirically a certain degree of 
predictability in human actions would be an empty, because unassailable, proposal. 
“Predictability,” however, does not need to be univocally understood, and one of 
the most contested issues in the free choice/determinism debate today concerns the 
degree of predictability that a meaningful determinist position entails. On the one hand, 
there is no science or method, at least in the present state of the human (i.e., social and 




individual human beings (sciences such as economics claim prediction capacities in the 
great numbers). On the other hand, the ability to achieve such predictions is an ever-
present part of daily practical life, indeed a common and necessary practical skill. We do 
this in daily life by observing patterns of action in people, and by inferring the existence 
of certain “habits,” or of a certain “character” that explains and grounds these 
regularities. For example, if someone who is constantly late arrives late to a meeting, we 
are not surprised; but if someone who is always punctual fails to arrive on time, we 
worry. Similarly, we put our trust in those who show signs of trustworthiness for different 
reasons – honesty, responsibility, etc. – and show these to be stable traits, and we try to 
be careful not to put our weight on those who with some regularity have failed our trust 
or that of others. We even have names for designating such habits and characters – 
untrustworthy, responsible, honest, lazy, etc. - and these help, for good or ill, to pin down 
our experience of how individual people we know have behaved, so as to predict how 
they will act in future occasions, and even reassure or warn others about the placing their 
trust on them. Thus practical knowledge, managerial knowledge, the skill of the politician 
or the leader to know whom to trust, the experience of parents, friends, teachers, mentors 
and spiritual directors, etc. – all attest to the possibility of grasping certain regularities, 
and a consequent predictability in matters of individual human action. 
But this measure of predictability in individual human action is insufficient to 
support the determinist’s position for several reasons. One is that the level of 
predictability that can be expected from even those most skilled in the observation of 




causal account of human action seems to entail. It is not an exaggeration to say that even 
honest people can be “expected” to lie sometimes, self-controlled people to lose their 
temper, and so forth – an “expectation” crystallized in the saying, “nobody is perfect.” 
The presence of these irregularities of predictability is a challenge for deterministic 
accounts that hold that every human action, and especially every human choice occurs 
with causal necessity as the effect of antecedent events. It does not pose such a challenge, 
however, in non-mechanistic accounts that allow for some statistical variation, as will be 
discussed below; it is the unpredictability posed specifically by moral conversion (and 
possibly other forms of conversion too) that actually challenges this scientifically savvier 
form of determinism. 
A second reason is that the kinds of predictions just discussed arguably depend on 
more than third-person evidence. They are most dependable when they are based on first-
person reflection on the predictor’s own experience, i.e., the kind of evidence that causal 
accounts of choice typically reject as too dependent on subjective or interpretative 
factors. 
But the third and most important reason why determinists can take no consolation in 
the kind of “humanistic” predictability of human action just described is that even this 
limited degree of predictability is simply overthrown by the fact of moral conversion. 
The study of conversion introduces a radically new category of unpredictability into 
the free choice-determinism debate. In the conversion process, and in sharp-turn 
conversion especially, what can be observed are not just discrete occurrences in which 




known, predictable pattern by a different one, typically, in fact, the establishment of an 
altogether new pattern. As has been argued, one of the marks of moral conversion, which 
can in fact be observed in the person, is the establishment of new patterns of action 
replacing either the previous ones or adding to the previous ones in such a way that the 
older patterns are transformed.466  
Note that the establishment of new patterns of action does not of itself entail 
unpredictability or an instance of moral conversion. For new patterns are also established 
in what has been characterized as natural/spontaneous moral development. But our 
capacity for predicting individual human action, discussed above, includes an ability to 
project, and to some extent anticipate, the “moral trajectory” of a person through our 
knowledge, incomplete as it may be, of factors such as motivation, commitment, the 
person’s courage and perseverance, etc. Such an ability to predict a person’s future action 
also takes into account typical human patterns of development, and, to the extent that this 
can be gauged, such factors as the strength of the drive to develop in that direction, the 
degree of commitment to that direction of development, the person’s demonstrated 
perseverance and so forth. This is equivalent, for example, to the ability of a perceptive 
teacher who can anticipate with some accuracy which students will develop a mastery in 
their discipline, which only moderate familiarity with it, and which will drop along the 
way. 
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But in the case of moral conversion, there is typically an unpredictability in the 
development of the new patterns of action, the new habits, convictions, etc. These go in a 
significantly different direction from the previous, especially as was considered when 
characterizing sharp-turn conversion as its prime analogue. In fact, the immediate reason 
why an instance of conversion calls out to our attention is that we find a discordance 
between the person’s present moral status – his/her attitude, convictions, projects, 
character – and what would have been so far expected by someone who knew this person 
reasonably well.  
It becomes then a matter of explaining this divergence. Attributing the changes to a 
blanket “statistical variation” – some amount of unpredictability is to be expected - does 
not work here, because we are in the presence of an unpredictability of a different order, 
the establishment of a wholly new pattern with its own schedule and regularities.467 
Alluding to the efficacy of hidden or unknown factors is also not valid as an explanation. 
The only valid strategy for determinism would be that of – through further research – 
somehow actually uncovering previously hidden or unknown causal factors and making 
the conversion necessary, i.e., determining this human action to occur – or alternatively, 
demonstrating the inherent reducibility of explanations and descriptions of moral 
conversion to the modes of explanation in which everything is predictable, as explained 
in the previous section. 
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A note on data category 2: When patterns of action diverge from socially 
established norms 
Another observation that is sometimes presented as a challenge to determinism, 
from a third-person point of view, is the fact that people’s patterns of action do not 
always reflect those that their society is structured to teach, foster and even enforce. This 
is the point adverted to in the data category number 2, above. This data category, 
considered generally (and not specifically with respect to moral conversion) is important 
for arguments against a type of determinism that considers human behavior as absolutely 
causally determined by cultural/societal teachings and practice. It is also important for the 
discussion of internalism and externalism, since it may be evidence that societal practices 
and teachings are not the only causal factor involved in the formation of moral 
convictions. The fact that these patterns of action are different from those generally 
espoused by the community the person belongs to adds the implication that the influence 
of the community is not the main (or the only) causal factor in that particular case. This 
discussion, as was said, concerns more directly the internalism/externalism debate, which 
is considered in the next chapter. In relation to the free choice/determinism debate, 
however, the second data category is only of tangential relevance. What is of most 
significance in instances of moral conversion (from a third-person perspective) in terms 




significantly different from the ones held previously, and thus unpredictable in the sense 
described.468 
 
7. Moral conversion and the introspective evidence for free choice 
In addition to data that can be gathered from third-person observations, such as the 
unpredictability with regard to patterns of acting that has just been discussed, arguments 
for the possibility and existence of free will also incorporate the presence of certain 
experiences – sufficiently common among human beings to attempt a generalization – 
that in some cases suggest, and in some cases appear to require the existence of free 
choice in order to be explained. A discussion of these categories of data requires, 
however, a brief detour to again consider the legitimacy of introspective data. 
The use of introspective data 
Some considerations have been made above (in section 5) regarding the need to 
understand “evidence” – that which can be used as data for an investigation, and which is 
essentially verifiable - in broader terms than as the standard empiricist model understands 
them. The use of narrative data in previous chapters is justified by this broader meaning 
of the term. But a few words should be said specifically regarding the use of introspective  
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revising and modifying their moral structures as a group, an event that can perhaps be called “social moral 
conversion.” An example of this is Jim Consedine’s report of New Zealand’s “Black Power” gang’s 
rediscovery of traditional Maori values, that led to a change, for example, of the gang authorities’ and gang 
members’ view on rape, which was banned by their 1978 national convention (Consedine, Restorative 
Justice: Healing the Effects of Crime, 83-84). Such instances prompt interesting questions regarding group 
agency (which overlap with the internalism/externalism debate), and may pose a challenge to 
sociohistorical determinists; but discussing these issues in sufficient detail would elaborating on issues that 




data in the arguments that follow. 
From an empiricist point of view, introspection is considered suspect because there 
is no way of empirically corroborating a reported experience, when corroboration is 
understood exclusively as “looking at” something, as empiricism does. This argument 
against introspection, however, could be turned against empiricism itself and its 
privileged objects. As Joseph Fitzpatrick notes, 
The knockdown argument against the empiricist model of knowing is that it is impossible 
to line up the proposed ideas on the one side, and the realities they are supposed to 
represent on the other side, and see how they compare.469 
 
As Wittgenstein points out, there is no reason to believe that what I associate with my 
sensations or images will be the same as what you associate with yours: the sensations or 
images I associate with the word ‘red,’ for example, are private to me and hence there is no 
way of knowing, in such a theory of meaning, that what I mean by ‘red’ is the same as what 
you mean by ‘red.’470 
 
The heart of the matter, Fitzpatrick points out, is that “introspection will be 
vulnerable to the same criticisms as the model of knowledge in which it stands.”471  
“Looking at” something cannot be unreflectively taken as the single criterion for 
verification. As a method, it is itself dependent on a more complex process; and that 
process, when applied critically, may reveal that standard empiricism is itself 
inappropriate for certain questions. Introspective accounts, cannot be corroborated by 
“looking at” or “looking into” someone’s mind, but they can be corroborated to a great 
extent by the fact that people share similar experiences or have had experiences similar 
enough to affirm common features. 
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Of course, a particular reader may not resonate with all of the experiences described 
here. This, however, can be considered as an equivalent to the reader believing that the 
material evidence reported in a study is dubious in some sense. In the latter case, the 
roads open to the reader are either to trust that the researcher is being truthful and 
accurate, to duplicate the relevant experiments him/herself, to withhold final judgment 
pending more data, or to simply reject the conclusions of the study without further 
investigation (a course of action that a careful investigator will probably avoid). In the 
case of introspective evidence, the alternatives available to the reader are the same. The 
only difference is that instead of duplicating relevant experiments, the reader may need to 
reflect more carefully on his/her own experiences, seek out others’ narratives 
(biographical, plausible fiction, etc.) or ask around if “something like this happened to 
anybody,” or perhaps just live a little more. To aid this process, philosophers, 
psychologists, writers of biography and autobiography, fiction and poetry, drama and 
screen plays, etc. all attempt to anticipate this difficulty by capturing in their descriptions 
of human life experiences that are sufficiently universal to elicit agreement in the reader/ 
audience. 
So, introspective data has the partial disadvantage of not being corroborable in an 
experiment with controlled variables, which precludes its usefulness for standard 
quantifying methodologies (although the growth of qualitative social/behavior research in 
the last half century challenges this generalization as well). But this disadvantage does 
not annul its usefulness as a source for information. On the contrary, introspective 




discussion of philosophical questions, like the free choice question, that reside in those 
sectors of reality. There are some risks involved, however. Much as researchers who base 
their investigations on standard empirical methodologies must be on their guard to 
consider the data honestly (and not subtly “fudge” the data to better suit their 
hypotheses), researchers who uses introspective evidence in their investigations must be 
on their guard against subtle ways of fudging the data. 
One such possibility that deserves particular mention is that introspective data rely 
on the memory of the reporter, and that memory may be retroactively modified in subtle 
ways by accepted ways of articulating experiences, by various psychic mechanisms or 
even by the reporter’s interest in a particular conclusion. It also grows fuzzier with time. 
But on the other hand, even when a reader is being cautious about such possibilities, 
when introspective accounts “resonate” with the reader, the reader can corroborate the 
evidence immediately. In the case of studies requiring replication, researchers have to 
work most of the time on pure trust in the competence and honesty of their fellows 
because replication of controlled-variables experiments is costly and time-consuming. In 
sum, there is no method of inquiry which does not depend at some point on accurate 
reporting of personal experiences to others, who corroborate such reports through 
comparing them with their own personal experiences. While these observations do not 
resolve the complex epistemological questions involved here, they are hopefully 
sufficient to motivate a careful look at what this dissertation’s findings about moral 




The question about direct experience of the “free-ness” of free choice 
Can introspective data provide something like a direct experience of the “free-ness” 
of free choice? The position supported in this work is that the independence of 
determining causes other than the act of choosing – what might be called the “free-ness” 
of free choice - cannot be directly experienced introspectively, but that certain categories 
of introspective experience strongly demand its possibility and existence in order to be 
properly accounted for. 
Aristotle and Aquinas provide an explanation for why the quality of “free-ness” is 
not directly knowable. The relevant Aristotelian principle is that we cannot directly know 
potency but only act, and potency only through act.472 We can only, in other words, have 
knowledge of what we are capable of doing by actually doing it. Applying this principle 
to the problem of freedom, it follows that we have no direct cognitive access to the 
unactualized “free-ness” of our choices, but only to the fact that we choose in one way or 
another. Whether we could actually have chosen a different way of acting is not 
perceived in any direct manner, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, because the only way 
to know that directly would have been to act in that way rather than the one we actually 
chose. 
The presence of certain types of experience, however, that accompany the act of 
choosing, has been used frequently to argue for the existence of free will/free choice. We 
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are aware, for example, that we take part in a decision-making process, balancing in our 
mind costs and benefits, duties and non-mandated options, desires, aversions, and even 
reflective desires to desire and so forth. If it seems that we cannot decide for one way or 
the other, we may experience frustration or “indecision.” If the potential consequences of 
the choice are important, we often experience a certain degree of anxiety. We may 
experience our own determination (the closest thing, perhaps, to experiencing freedom?) 
as weak and potentially shaky, or we may experience strong resolve. Even after having 
taken action, we can experience emotional states related to the choice – regret, remorse, 
pride, merit, elation. Such experiences do not seem to constitute water-tight proof 
because (again, not having a direct experience of freedom) they seem to require a certain 
degree of interpretation; but, on the other hand, the presence of these experiences 
accompanying every day actions seems to make it impossible even for advocates of 
determinism to live their lives in complete coherence with a rejection of freedom. The 
following sections will examine how these experiences take place in the specific context 
of a process of moral conversion, in order to show how they shed some additional light 
on the free choice/determinism discussion in support of this position. 
Data category 3: The evidence from the experience of decisional anxiety 
The present section will examine the way in which decisional anxiety (data 
category 3) is usually conceived in fictional accounts of conversion, and contrast it with 
non-fictional accounts. The results, as will be seen, are at best ambiguous: while some 




conversion, this is not very frequently the case. So this particular category of evidence is 
inconclusive. But its presentation is nevertheless necessary because it is occasionally 
mentioned as relevant evidence, and has certainly proven important to existentialist 
writers and to many authors of fiction. It will also bring to light some aspects of 
conversion that will be relevant to the internalist/externalist discussion in the next 
chapter. 
A favorite theme of existentialist philosophers is that of identifying some extreme 
experiences and interpreting their philosophical/existential significance. One of the 
particular favorites among these experiences is anxiety, and its more paroxystic form, 
anguish. (For present purposes, this shall be called “existential anxiety.”) In the 
existentialist conception of these experiences, it is characteristic of anguish and anxiety 
that they do not have a specific object (as “fear” is typically fear of something, e.g. fear 
of snakes). Instead, they seem to be directed at nothing in particular – or at existence 
itself. This anxiety, in more or less converging ways, is interpreted by some 
(characteristically, Kierkegaard) as consciousness of guilt or of sin; by some as a 
constituent of being in a world that is not familiar or hospitable, and by some 
(characteristically Sartre) as a confrontation with the fact of freedom, with the fact that 
we do not have a fixed nature and pre-made goals, but that it is our task (and 
responsibility) to create these, thus setting up a front against the abyss of nothingness.473 
Existential anxiety/anguish is thus presented as an experience directly related to freedom. 
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Its use as evidence of freedom, however, has been criticized not only because of its 
proponents’ tendency to put stress on extreme and exceptional experiences, but also 
because the variety of interpretations available suggests – as MacIntyre phrased it - that 
“the ratio of interpretation to experience may be too high.”474 
Downplaying a bit the existentialist interpretation, it is possible to recognize 
introspectively a more common form of anxiety that will be here called decisional 
anxiety. This is the rather familiar, often oppressive emotional state that people 
experience when they find themselves responsible for an important decision, particularly 
one in which the consequences appear to be rather obscure or uncertain. The experience 
can be described as being suspended in the middle of a decision-making process, of 
having to “make up one’s mind” but being yet unable to do so, of being conscious that it 
is up to oneself to decide for one way or the other, and desiring certainty (or at least more 
information) but not finding it, of wishing for more time to make the decision, while time 
seems to be running away too fast, of wishing the responsibility for the decision could 
simply go away. 
If the process of moral conversion involves in fact a crucial choice, one would 
reasonably expect it to be laden with some degree of decisional anxiety or related inner 
drama. And certainly such is the way in which moral conversion is frequently portrayed 
in fictional visions, particularly in films or TV shows. Practically a cliché, the moment in 
which the villain decides to amend his/her ways is more often than not made visual 
through close-ups of the character’s troubled, changing expression, rendered musically 
                                                 




tense by an orchestral crescendo, that devolves into highly elated tones when, at last, the 
“bad” character decides to change sides, overturning the negative outcome and, not 
infrequently sacrificing him/herself in the process. Such a sequence is designed to 
express externally the inner struggle of the redeemable antagonist – and to some extent, 
to visually portray a “free choice.” The conversion itself, of course, is usually not 
unexpected by the audience, since according to conventions (particularly Hollywood 
narrative conventions) hints of the subject’s redeemability are often provided earlier in 
the story.475 
Fictional narrative, however, has its own imperatives, particularly the requirement 
to maintain a certain degree of narrative tension and to intensify it towards the climax of 
a story. Moral conversion, marked by inner struggle, is one of the most widely used 
devices to this purpose – perhaps because this struggle can be even more captivating than 
external, purely physical struggle. However, while the real narratives of moral conversion 
considered do often contain a certain amount of drama and emotional struggle, the source 
of this inner drama does not seem to be decisional anxiety in particular. Rather it seems 
to be the case that, by the time real moral conversion is achieved, the proper decision has 
come to be quite clear to the agent, at least cognitively speaking; and the emotional 
struggle that ensues is caused more often than not by the need to come emotionally to 
terms with what is now seen as a relatively clear direction for decision. Though not 
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without some exceptions, this appears to be the common state of affairs in actual moral 
conversions.476 
Consider, for example, one of the few, well-known real-life narratives of moral 
conversion that in fact records high levels of anxiety: Augustine’s struggle, immortalized 
(not without some humor) in his Confessions. 
For this very thing did I sigh, bound as I was, not by another’s irons but by my own iron 
will. The enemy had control of my will, and out of it he fashioned a chain and fettered me 
with it. For in truth lust is made out of a perverse will, and when lust is served, it becomes 
habit, and when habit is not resisted, it becomes necessity. . . Thus did my two wills . . . 
contend with one another, and by their conflict they laid waste my soul.477 
 
But I . . . had said, “Give me chastity and continence, but not yet!” For I feared that you 
would hear me quickly, and that quickly you would heal me of that disease of lust, which I 
wished to have satisfied rather than extinguished.478 
 
At this point in the narrative, Augustine’s religious conversion is well advanced, but 
he finds himself held back in his progress by his inability to relinquish some habits that 
are incompatible with the new life that he desires to embrace wholeheartedly. As the 
critical point in this conversion gets nearer, this internal division becomes more acute, to 
the point that Augustine even speaks of “two wills.”479 
Augustine, however, seems to have a clear mind about what the right decision is;  
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the alternative paths have ceased to be regarded as morally equally valuable, or as equally 
fulfilling of his duty. This indicates that he is at the threshold of a conversion regarding 
behavioral coherence (and perhaps, to some extent, regarding his commitment to right/ 
wrong, this being a natural occurrence when behavioral coherence appears very difficult 
to achieve). It is the question, “will I be able to endure living such a different life from 
mine?” that delays the completeness of Augustine’s conversion, to the point that he 
begins questioning whether he will be ever able to take the step that is now seen as 
demanded of him.480 But if decisional anxiety is conceived as anxiety caused by the need 
to choose between similarly alluring – or similarly obscure – options,  this does not seem 
to be what causes Augustine’s anxious state. His anxiety is emotional and powerful, but it 
is not decisional. 
A perusal of a wider number of narratives of moral conversion confirms that 
decisional anxiety seems not to be the norm. In conversions regarding content, for 
example, it is very common to find that the convert regards the previous views he/she 
held with a sort of astonishment at their own blindness, or their inability to see the 
contradictions involved by such views. In a case cited by Bellah the subject, given the 
name of Brian Palmer (case #1 in the Appendix) looks back – after a divorce that came as 
a big surprise - at his previously held values, which are categorized by Bellah as a 
“utilitarian individualism.” He does it in these terms: 
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So I went back and reexamined where the thing broke down and found that I had 
contributed at least 50 percent and, depending on the vantage point, maybe 99 percent of 
the ultimate demise of the institution. Mostly it was asking myself the question of why am I 
behaving in such and such a way. Why am I doing this at work? Why was I doing this at 
home? The answer was that I was operating as if a certain value was of the utmost 
importance to me. Perhaps it was success. Perhaps it was fear of failure, but I was 
extremely success-oriented, to the point where everything would be sacrificed for the job, 
the career, the company. I said bullshit. That ain't the way it should be.481 
 
During this process of self-examination the subject settles for what Bellah categorizes as 
an “expressive individualism.” 
To be able to receive affection freely and give affection and to give of myself and know it 
is a totally reciprocal type of thing. There's just almost a psychologically buoyant feeling of 
being able to be so much more involved and sharing. Sharing experiences of goals, sharing 
of feelings, working together to solve problems, etc. My viewpoint of a true love, husband-
and-wife type of relationship is one that is founded on mutual respect, admiration affection, 
the ability to give and receive freely.482 
 
The subject describes implicitly his previous views as mistaken or shortsighted, and does 
not at any point seem to be torn by the need to choose between previous views and 
current ones. It is to him a matter of common sense – or of bettered sense.  
In another case cited by Bellah – which can also be categorized as conversion 
regarding content -, the subject, Wayne Bauer (case #2), recounts having left the Marine 
Corps in the 60’s: 
During this time, some friends of his who had gone to college in New York began to argue 
with him about the Vietnam War. “And after this went on, to make a long story short, for 
about three or four months, I realized that my best argument held no weight. And what 
happened was, all of a sudden, my view of who I was and my environment was shattered. It 
was like looking in the mirror and having the whole thing shattered on you and seeing all 
your values, all your beliefs, everything you thought was real just kind of crumble. And it 
left me without any values and it also left me in a position where I had this terrible feeling 
of loneliness that there was no one I could go to for help. All the people I had trusted, I feel, 
essentially, they had lied to me.483 
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After this he went AWOL, and resurfaced after a time to embrace a life as a 
political activist. There is mention in these accounts of a struggle to make moral sense of 
things, of the need to reevaluate moral categories, but commonly there is no mention of 
something like a terrible weight regarding a difficult choice between competing valuable 
alternatives. The questions frequently asked are “how” or “what,” but not “which one”, 
i.e., “whether” A or B. 
The same can be said of conversions regarding attitude towards right/wrong and the 
meaning of life. While these classes of conversion are frequently followed by a moral 
struggle to change one’s habits – a struggle that frequently develops into a conversion 
regarding coherence – the “awakening” to the need for embracing a moral life does not 
take the shape of an anxiety-charged, standing-on-the-edge-of-a-decision experience. The 
collection of cases presented by James Leuba, involving mostly the conversion of 
recurrent alcoholics (ergo, dealing in its majority with cases of conversion regarding 
attitude and/or coherence) is a good example. The subjects frequently express a state of 
near-despair at the sight of their lack of success in previous attempts; but when 
conversion occurs, it simply happens, and is met either with joy or a certain resignation, 
as in the case of “Subject E”: 
He met with the biblical phrase "He that has the Son has life eternal", and could not 
proceed further, all the while feeling there was another being in his bedroom. "It was 
unquestionably shown me, in one second of time, that I had never touched the Eternal, that 
is, God, and that if I died then, I must inevitably be lost. I was undone. I knew it as well as I 
now know I am saved. . . What could I do? I did not repent even; God never asked me to 
repent. All I felt was, "I am undone," and God cannot help it, although He loves me. No 
fault on the part of the Almighty.484 
 
                                                 




In fact, as Leuba’s collection attests, it is not uncommon in this type of conversion 
to find that the awakening experience takes the subject with a certain degree of surprise; 
and by the time the transformation has taken place, the subject can only look at the past 
attitude with the shame or embarrassment that a very unintelligent mistake provokes. 
 
On the other hand, there are some narratives of moral conversion that do describe 
instances of decisional anxiety. This seems to take place occasionally in cases of 
conversion regarding content and regarding commitment/attitude. An example of the 
latter can be found in the life of Thomas Merton, as analyzed by Conn. Merton’s adult 
life is at many times marked by struggle and anxiety, and the origin of the anxiety seems 
to be his difficulty to reconcile what seem to be contradictory life-callings – the ascetic/ 
mystic and the successful writer.485 Coherence is one of the elements at stake – at many 
times Merton considers his duty to forgo his activity as a writer, while at the same time 
enjoying his success – but what seems to be centrally at stake is Merton’s difficulty to 
reconcile two “meaning-giving” activities that seem to exclude each other. It seems then 
that in a conversion regarding commitment (in this example, commitment to a specific 
meaning-giving activity) there can be decisional anxiety, when two (or more) life options 
both strongly appeal to the person but present conflicting demands. 
It seems also possible to find instances of decisional anxiety related to the first type 
of conversion, conversion regarding content, when the resistance encountered arises from 
resistant mental habits or convictions that are backed by the authority or respectability of 




attached or believes that he/she owes some loyalty. In such cases, mental habits, authority 
and/or group pressure seem to counterbalance the perspective that arises from “seeing 
things in a clearer light,” and the person is forced to resolve the conflict by taking a stand, 
by making a choice between them, since mental clarity alone seems insufficient to define 
the issue. Walter Conn illustrates this struggle using a passage from Mark Twain’s The 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn.486 Huck, having helped Jim the slave escape, begins to 
feel the guilt from having “stolen” the slave from a poor woman, which makes him a 
“wicked boy,” and which he fears will be punished by everlasting fire. He tries to pray, 
but realizes that unless he writes a letter to the owner, letting her know of Jim’s 
whereabouts, this prayer would be a lie. So he resolves to write this letter and, after doing 
this, finds that he can pray again and feels clean of sin. But then he remembers how good 
Jim has been to him, his only friend now: 
I was a-trembling, because I’d got to decide, forever, betwixt two things, and I knowed it. I 
studied a minute, sort of holding my breath, and then says to myself: ‘All right, then, I’ll go 
to hell’—and tore it up. It was awful thoughts and awful words, but they was said. And I let 
them stay said; and never thought no more about reforming.487 
 
Conn reads this episode as “a transition from a moral consciousness defined by 
socially imposed rules and dominated by the fear of punishment attached to disobeying 
them, to a moral orientation defined by concern for value and liberated by a loving care 
that reaches out to others.”488 Huck is struggling against his superego, and fails to find 
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relief from his “superego guilt.”489 But his sensitivity to value, says Conn, does not let 
him take this route. 
Huck’s true moral dilemma presents itself to him in starkly clear, existential terms . . . And 
the “two things” he must decide between are not, he realizes, just two possible courses of 
action in this situation, one right and one wrong, but two radically different modes of moral 
existence. . . The full meaning of Lonergan’s understanding of moral conversion is at stake: 
the choice of value as criterion for decision and the choice of oneself as a free and 
responsible moral self. . . And, as with Huck, one chooses oneself as a free and responsible 
creator of value not abstractly, but in the concrete situation of a very specific action 
decision.490 
 
It seems possible, then, to identify some instances of decisional anxiety in moral 
conversion, though these cases appear to be exceptional within the moral conversion 
literature. In cases of conversion regarding content, decisional anxiety may be involved 
when the content of the (potentially) new moral orientation conflicts with the person’s 
existing religious convictions, or some other set of revered or respected truths, and when 
the person feels that the contradiction may only be resolved by making a choice for one 
or the other set of truths.491 And in conversions regarding commitment, decisional anxiety 
may be involved when the person needs to decide among paths that are relatively 
balanced in potential gains and losses, which results in locating the weight of the choice 
in the person’s willing. In conversions regarding behavioral coherence, a certain anxiety 
can take place when coherence looks to the person to be an unattainable ideal, because of 
attachment to previous habits or – the other side of the coin - an “insufficient motivation” 
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to counterweight such habits; but it does not seem that what is passing through the 
subject’s mind is “decisional anxiety.” 
Other than scenarios similar to these, however, decisional anxiety does not figure 
prominently in actual moral conversion (though it seems to be prominent in fictional 
accounts). The popular fictional image of the person at the threshold of conversion 
struggling to throw their weight one way or another, despite its popularity, is not 
representative. From the evidence available, a more common scenario is that of the 
person arriving to a somewhat solid conviction, i.e., of knowing that he/she was 
previously in the wrong, or is/was behaving incoherently with respect to moral 
convictions that are regarded by them as correct. It would seem therefore that, except for 
the few scenarios mentioned above, in actual moral conversion previous convictions and 
old mental habits do not weigh the process down once they are identified as inadequate, 
except possibly at the behavioral level. But clearly more study of decisional anxiety 
would be needed before this category would significantly impact the free choice/ 
determinism debate. 
Data category 4.a: The experience of volitional exertion 
The next type of experience that has been proposed as revealing the reality of free 
choice is the experience of volitional exertion (data category 4.a). This can be described 
as the experience of exerting oneself in order to solidify in one way or another a so far 




seems to waver. It is a more common experience in stories of moral conversion than the 
relatively rare experience of decisional anxiety 
Acts of volitional exertion stand out as potential evidence for  the “free-ness” of 
free choice because they involve a degree of mental energy and reflective attention much 
higher than regular acts of choice, in which most of the attention and energy are focused 
on the object of our actions. Often, however, the experience of volitional exertion is 
short-lived and quickly dilutes. I may have accomplished, for example, a relatively 
significant feat of volitional exertion to finish the current paragraph without getting up to 
get some coffee, dividing my attention between articulating my thoughts and pushing 
back the thoughts of coffee; but I will probably forget the experience itself as soon as I sit 
down to work on my next paragraph. Also, some people seem more able to sustain 
focused acts of choice in the face of continuing resistance than others - they are often said 
to have more “willpower.” As a consequence – a somewhat paradoxical consequence - 
people with more willpower are bound to experience volitional exertion with less 
frequency (because they, so to speak, channel their mental energy more efficiently), and 
thus perhaps will be less reflectively aware of their acts of choice. It is peculiar 
circumstances and a high degree of exertion that make the experience of volitional 
exertion memorable – if, for example, exhausted, I finished the last section of a race “by 
willpower alone,” a situation that will not only be per se memorable, but in which my 
whole attention would be focused on my exertion and how to prolong it. 




volitional exertion over an extended process of choice, or as the resolving factor in such 
an extended process of choice. In this sense, moral conversion may be a privileged 
context to experience volitional exertion. 
However, volitional exertion does not seem to appear significantly in the first 
category, conversion regarding content. As the narratives considered in Chapter 5 have 
shown, moral conversion regarding content is sometimes preceded by varying degrees of 
inner argumentation or “dialectic”; but once a “conclusion” is reached, the resistance of 
ingrained mental habits is typically not perceived as a strenuous obstacle, one that might 
require an exercise of volitional exertion. What the narratives indicate instead is either a 
certain degree of surprise for not having previously realized what is now realized, or a 
focus on the eye-opening character of the specific experience and what has been learned 
from it, with little or no mention of resistance and a need for effort (volitional exertion) in 
order to overcome past patterns.492 
Volitional exertion does not seem to be a typically relevant factor in conversion 
regarding attitude either, with the exception perhaps of cases in which the agent finds 
him/herself in a stalemate position, uncertain as to what course to take (and plagued, 
                                                 
492 This pattern is found, for example, in the cases cited by Consedine, Bowen and others in the context of 
“restorative justice” programs. There is mention of surprise and remorse, but the reality of one’s having 
harmed an actual human being – sometimes one’s own neighbor – irrupts almost unhindered by potential 
defenses or rationalization. The usual reaction during these encounters is an acknowledgement, on the part 
of the offender, of the wrongness of their previous actions - accompanied by varying degrees of remorse 
according to the gravity of the crime, together with a focus (perhaps prompted by the structure of the 
interview) on what needs to be done to repair the harm, and to get one’s life back on track. See Te Ara 
Whakatika, September 2001; Consedine, Restorative Justice: Healing the Effects of Crime; Consedine and 
Bowen, Restorative Justice: Contemporary Themes and Practice; "Face to Face," Te Ara Whakatika: 
Newsletter of the Court-Referred restorative justice project, July 2001. Also Kenneth Melchin, “Insight, 




perhaps, by decisional anxiety) and needs to exert his/her will in order to choose for a 
certain direction. 
But instances of volitional exertion are found with relative frequency in the third 
category, conversion regarding behavioral coherence, and this analysis will focus on 
such instances. The person attempting to achieve a higher degree of behavioral coherence 
– according either to newly incorporated moral convictions, or to a renewed attitude/ 
commitment regarding previously held values, or simply as realizing that he/she had 
drifted away from an acceptable degree of coherence – frequently experiences the 
resistance of old habits. When the desired coherence seems to evade the agent, however, 
what happens is that the person lives for a relatively prolonged period of time in the 
presence of his/her inability to make the desired choices and even longer in the presence 
of the resistance these choices eventually confront. In this context, attention to one’s 
willpower comes naturally as frustration accumulates, including explicit reflection on 
whether one is capable of changing by oneself or not. 493 That is, the not-choosing is 
interpreted as a lack of capacity by comparison with oneself choosing in other matters, 
and other persons choosing and choosing again against resistance, even in the same 
matter. And when the person finally begins to choose and choose again, this is similarly 
attended to closely and often interpreted as the (first) demonstration of one’s capacity for 
free choice in the matter. (Such are the kind of acts Aristotle and Aquinas had in mind 
when they said that from one’s - and others’ - acts one infers one’s capacities - and 
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indicates the need to acknowledge, as the very first step, that one is “powerless over alcohol; that our lives 




others’.) This “forced attention” makes moral conversion regarding behavioral coherence 
a privileged context for examining the experience of volitional exertion as potentially 
valuable (introspective, but corroborable) evidence for free choice. 
The struggle to reform resistant habits can be approached through either cunning or 
“brute” willpower. Anyone who has ever had to struggle against a persistent flaw or bad 
habit has probably first hand knowledge of both approaches. Both strategies involve 
volitional exertion, though in different degrees. 
The “cunning” approach involves setting up devices and external situations so that 
one is less often in the presence of temptations, less often faced with the possibility to 
transgress, and more often (or systematically) reminded of and prompted to engage in 
good habits. A smoker trying to quit may cut his cigarettes in half; an alcoholic may set 
up his daily routine so that he does not walk next to bars or is left alone at home; a 
student used to procrastination may set up a system of rewards as incentives for a 
morning well-spent, or may travel to a public study place where occasions to 
procrastinate may diminish. Engaging in such efforts of “cunning” is clearly experienced 
as an act of choosing in the face of one’s interior resistance to the desired patterns of 
action, although the strategies themselves involve a combination of exertion (because in 
most cases the external devices themselves cannot absolutely prevent the person from 
recurring in the undesired conduct) and the external devices themselves that are hoped to 
increase the efficiency of one’s exertion or the motivation to persevere. 
The alternative approach is through a “brute” or direct exertion of one’s will: the 




the student may simply force herself to avoid distractions and stay on task every time her 
mind wanders or she feels the inclination to spend her time doing something else. Those 
who take this approach are often said to be exercising their “will power.” This is often 
conceived as a (now fairly stable) capacity for focusing on a resolution and carrying 
through despite distractions, temptations and even threats. As it was noted at the 
beginning of Section 7, affirmation of a capacity depends on experience of the acts 
themselves, so willpower as a stable capacity  can only be recognized by observing the 
pattern of acts of choice in the face of persisting resistance. The exertion applied in those 
acts of choice that require it, however, is experienced quite directly. 
 In narratives of conversion regarding behavioral coherence, there is often at play a 
factor that may be characterized as heteronomous even by parties that defend free choice: 
this is the element of tension towards change, which is increased as the person becomes 
more disgusted with the bad habit or habits and with his/her apparent incapacity to 
modify them.494 These subjective feelings of disgust are rarely initiated by the person 
directly; they are experienced most often as a natural/spontaneous reaction to the 
situation lived. This element of tension is sometimes very strongly emphasized in the 
narratives, and for this reason, it can give grounds to considering it as the only relevant 
causal factor in moral conversion regarding behavioral coherence. But though it is true 
that in some accounts of moral conversion the active, causal role of the subject appears at 
                                                 
494 The expression “to touch bottom” indicates the extreme point of tension which usually initiates a 




times to be minimal,495 the mention of volitional exertion in the narratives – whether in 
the form of cunning strategies or brute willpower – reveals an active role on his/her part 
in choosing for an increased behavioral coherence.496        
Furthermore, it should be noted that the presence of volitional exertion does not 
entail success in the achievement of the desired degree of behavioral coherence. But even 
if success in reforming one’s patterns of action constituted, in statistical terms, some sort 
of anomaly in relation to instances of failure, the possibility remains that in those 
situations in which conversion regarding behavioral coherence does not occur, 
experiences of volitional exertion can be found that, though not sufficient to yield the 
desired result, are still relevant, and can be invoked as potential evidence for free choice. 
Data category 4.b: The experience of resolve 
Another experience that deserves consideration – in some cases related to volitional 
exertion as its culmination, but not necessarily related to it - is the experience of resolve.   
                                                 
495 An example of this is Robert Cooley’s (#19) decision to visit the FBI and offer his help in gathering 
evidence against his mob bosses. “Getting a corned beef sandwich,” he writes, “was my only purpose in 
life. When I turned the corner onto Dearborn Avenue, I happened to pass the Federal Building. It seemed to 
draw me like a magnet. Suddenly I thought, ‘Maybe I should see who's up in the Strike Force office.’” 
(Cooley and Levin, When Corruption Was King, 181.) At this point in his life Cooley can barely stand 
working for his corrupt employers; an enormous amount of pressure is building in his psyche. At the same 
time, however, he is unable to make the decision consciously to turn against them, aware of the terrible 
danger this implies; so his decision has to be hidden from himself at every step of the way. 
496 Passive or heteronomous elements are often emphasized in studies of religious conversion, as can be 
seen in William James’ and Emilie Griffin’s characterization of the experience of surrender, considered in 
Chapter 4. In their accounts, what seems to be the norm in religious conversion is that the person reaches a 
certain point in which he/she cannot proceed any further by their own volition, and only what has been 
characterized as surrender can bring them forward or allow them to conquer their hindrances. In the 
narratives of moral conversion considered here, however, “surrender” and similar processes of passive, 
dramatic transformation are not mentioned at all. This suggests a significant difference between religious 
and moral conversion; perhaps surrender becomes a necessity (psychologically or theologically) at the 




By “resolve” is here meant, not the act of choosing, but the emotional state that 
accompanies a person’s act of choosing. Resolve can be of different kinds, and 
experienced differently. Sometimes resolve is “weak,” or “shaky” (on again, off again), 
or experienced as mere exploratory steps to see what happens, or perhaps as weak as 
merely external pronouncements regarding what direction to follow but lacking internal 
conviction all along. In these latter experiences of “weak” resolve, the person can be 
described as still waiting for some form of external confirmation that their choice is the 
right one; the choice, in a sense, is left at the mercy of external factors. Alternatively, the 
course of action to follow may be determined in a mostly unreflective manner, without 
much awareness on the part of the agent of being a chooser. Many, perhaps most of our 
actions seem to take place in such manner. To call such actions instances of “resolve” 
would seem to be straining the term. 
For present purposes, resolve (or alternatively, “being resolute”) will be understood 
as the (strong) feeling of self-determination that accompanies the act of choosing, when 
this act is exercised with a significant degree of conscious awareness and firmness of 
mind with respect to the course of action chosen. Externally speaking, being resolute 
means that the person is at little risk of being easily swayed from his/her choice, by 
others or by external circumstances. The person is volitionally prepared, and feels capable 
(“motivated” is often the contemporary, but perhaps misleading term) of taking on heavy 
obstacles including danger, losses, social pressure, and long-term frustration in order to 
carry out his/her chosen action. Internally, the person experiences with great intensity the 




the person towards choosing, the person perceives these as his/her own reasons or 
motives, affirmed in his/her own choosing, and perceives him/herself as setting him/ 
herself firmly on that chosen path. Colloquial expressions that convey the spirit of this is 
“to put one’s foot down” and to “take a stand” in regard to acting in a certain way. In 
doing so, the person experiences him/herself as a chooser of that course, as a responsible 
being, responsible for that act, its results and so also responsible as one who determines 
him/herself and (to varying extent) the surrounding world as well.497 
The difference between the experiences of resolve and volitional exertion should be 
sufficiently clear. Though resolve may sometimes result from volitional exertion, it is not 
dependent on it and may often be achieved without such exertion. Volitional exertion, on 
the other hand, may sometimes result only in a weak form of resolve. That is, the two 
kinds of experience are only contingently related. 
Unlike the cases that showcase volitional exertion, which usually deal with people 
who have tried and failed a number of times and are now familiar with their goals, 
narratives that most vividly portray resolve seem to deal most frequently with people who 
have just undergone a conversion regarding attitude/commitment and are now trying to 
make sense of what the consequences of their conversion are in terms of action. In other 
words, the more common context for this experience to take place is at the interface 
between the second class and third class of conversion: their attitude/commitment 
                                                 
497 It is possible to speak of an implicit resolve when a person’s convictions and/or attitude have become 
firm or unyielding. The focus in this section, however, is on resolve as an experience, revealing of 
something. If the resolve is implicit, this means that the person is unaware of or at least not particularly 
conscious of the feelings themselves, and as a consequence, this meaning of “resolve” does not count as an 




conversion implies that the resolve to live differently should extend to the details of their 
lives, and that resolve now needs to determine a concrete shape for its undertakings. 
Thus, for example, Helen John (case #6), the anti-nuclear proliferation activist that 
left her family to live in an anti-nuclear demonstration camp, mentions in her account that 
“it had to be my own decision”498 – a phrase that expresses both a newfound awareness of 
herself as chooser, and also that whatever her decision would be, she would not be easily 
swayed. An attitudinal shift has taken place already;  she is now referring to a choice 
regarding action. Similarly, when Gandhi (case #8) resolves to fight racism - after the 
incident in which he was put out of the train by reason of his “colored” skin - his 
deliberation and resolve are directed at the course of action to be taken.499 He does not 
have any apparent “choice” with regard to the impact of the event as eye-opening; this 
just happens, while the resolve that the event led to was of his own choosing. (It is 
interesting to speculate however that, if he had chosen to continue living the way he was 
and not do anything about it, like most people did around him who were treated similarly, 
the experience might have sooner or later been forgotten, retroactively annulling its eye-
opening quality.) 
The context of a recent conversion regarding attitude/commitment adds a particular 
shine on the experience of resolve, that makes it come out with a clear, vivid contrast into 
the light, much like the shine that the new sun of the morning gives to things makes them 
look clear and vivid. This is the effect of the person seeing things anew, with renewed  
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possibilities for good. “The air smells different. The sun seems brighter. Things aren't so 
bleak all the time,” says Evans Robinson, the gangster turned CeaseFire activist (case 
#21).500 “I feel better about what happens in a single day in the classroom than I ever did 
during my years in law,” states Russ Fee, the lawyer turned school teacher (case #22).501 
These are statements that reflect the renewed meaning, renewed interest in life that 
the second class of moral conversion produces. Being resolute to live differently is not an 
experience in isolation from living daily life; the resolve imbues daily life with its 
“shine,” with the new meaning the person’s choice creates. In this context, the person 
thus experiences a real possibility of re-creating their lives, beginning a new path to 
concretely replace the old ones that were tired and dreary. Resolve in this context is not 
the isolated resolve that has for its object discrete actions and decisions, the 
meaningfulness of which may not extend beyond these concrete goals, but a resolve that 
has for its background the opportunity and the hope of entering a new way of life. More 
lived experience may reveal, perhaps, that these opportunities are not nearly as limitless 
or as accessible as they are experienced by the person during early periods of resolve. But 
the focus here is on what the chooser experiences and introspectively affirms, and from 
this point of view, it may be appropriate to say that in this situation the person does not 
merely observes resolve, but lives in resolve. 
The experience of resolve is clearly connected with choice; it draws the agent’s 
attention directly to his/her role as chooser and self-determining. It is beyond the scope of  
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this dissertation to estimate the precise weight of the presence of such experiences as 
evidence of the free choice (in particular against the possible argument that choice is 
illusory), and so as the basis for arguments against determinism. But insofar as 
introspective evidence of resolve can be carefully corroborated, perhaps with the 
assistance of technical phenomenological descriptions of resolve, those defending 
determinist positions must offer serious reasons why this kind of evidence does not 
undermine their claims. Therefore, those interested in pursuing the determinism/free 
choice debate clearly should examine narrative accounts of moral conversion regarding 
attitude/commitment, in order to evaluate the relevance of the experience of resolve to 
their debate. 
Data category 5: Regret, guilt, shame; pride, honor, merit 
It remains to say a few brief words about the group of experiences from data 
category 5, also identified introspectively, that are not experiences of volition as such, but 
are feelings or emotions that are often attached to experiences of choosing in the 
narratives of moral conversion. These are the negative feelings such as regret, guilt or 
shame, and positive feelings such as pride, honor and merit. 
In the narratives studied for this project, while converts often report experiencing 
feelings belonging to the “negative” group, usually in reference to their previous behavior 
and their convictions at that time, those cases in which the convert reports experiencing 
pride, honor or merit are much rarer. A plausible explanation is that it is in the 




feel meritorious. But as was discussed in the first two classes of moral conversion, 
resistance is either not encountered, or not experienced as significant, or not experienced 
as conquered through one’s own energy, choices, or “willpower.” Thus, when no 
significant resistance is encountered, converts tend to regard their conversion as simply a 
matter of “seeing things in a better light” and choosing to follow that “light.” The clarity 
of this seeing involves in itself nothing to be particularly proud of – even though one’s 
own choice has set oneself on a path informed by it - and it may in fact prompt 
embarrassment, regret, guilt or even shame regarding one’s previous obtuseness.502 On 
the other hand, if significant resistance is encountered and overcome, as does happen in 
the third class of moral conversion regarding behavioral coherence, a common reaction 
seems to be one of relief and even religiously motivated gratitude for one’s unhoped-for 
deliverance. But in such cases, some justifiable sense of merit, honor, even pride is 
sometimes reported. 
The presence of feelings of these kinds, both negative and the occasional positive, 
figures frequently in the literature of the free choice/determinism debate, as evidence (or 
not) for the argument that human actions are free. Contrary arguments, of course, abound; 
their strategy frequently focuses on explaining such feelings as aberrant, that is, as 
constructions of the psyche that grew as the psychological counterparts of the demands of 
social institutions and biological needs, but the presence of which deceives people into  
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cognitive/moral capacity for understanding or sympathizing with their more restricted viewpoint. But these 




attributing reality to the idea that choosers originate their choices (in some meaningful, 
measurable way) and thus to the idea of free choice.503 The debate mostly continues in 
that vein, that is,  in terms of the adequacy or not of such introspective evidence, or of the 
value of emotions as evidence for a metaphysical claim. It should be noted, however, that 
such arguments do implicitly grant the connection between these attendant feelings and 
the claim of the reality of free choice. The likely reason for this connection is that these 
categories of emotion are difficult to make sense of within a human personality except as 
emotional evidence of a perception of oneself as morally responsible; and one common 
argument in favor of the reality of free choice is premised on the reality of moral 
responsibility. Therefore these emotions may be indirectly relevant to the free choice/ 
determinism debate even if their direct contribution is uncertain. 
One further observation should be made here. When expressing feelings of regret, 
guilt or shame – whether for past discrete actions or for past views and patterns of 
behavior - people do not focus exclusively on judgements of moral matters, such as “how 
could I do something so mean?” or “how can I be so selfish?”  It is common to hear 
instead people recriminating themselves with expressions such as, “how could I do 
something so stupid?” or “that was so thoughtless of me!” In the context of looking back 
after moral conversion has taken place, the presence of such cognitive elements often 
seems to be particularly strongly accentuated: that is, the person seems to regard previous 
moral stances, attitudes and/or behavioral patterns in general as highly flawed from a 
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cognitive point of view.504 Of course, these judgments are intricately tied to more strictly 
moral categories, e.g. the fact that someone feels guilty for having been thoughtless 
implies that it was a morally faulty kind of thoughtlessness. But such a pattern of 
increased cognitive concern supports a line of analysis not related directly to the free 
choice/determinism debate, but to another debate, about externalism vs. an internalist 
understanding of morality. It is to that debate that this study turns in Chapter 10. 
8. Conclusion 
This  chapter has considered the possible evidence that can be gathered from an 
examination of moral conversion in relation to the debate about free choice and 
determinism. The first part of the chapter reviewed the general terms of the debate, 
distinguishing it from some related but not directly relevant discussions, establishing the 
terminology to be used here, and noting that any evidence from an examination of moral 
conversion would depend on a broader understanding of the notions of “data,” 
“evidence” and “corroboration” than what is accepted in the standard empiricist tradition. 
The second part of the chapter categorized and grouped together various 
phenomena that are commonly invoked in arguments for the reality of free choice and 
showed how these categories manifest themselves in the context of moral conversion. 
The main distinction between these categories of phenomena is that between externally 
observable data and introspectively observed experiences. The former categories consist, 
                                                 
504 See, for example, the cases of  Brian Palmer (#1 in the Appendix), Wayne Bauer (#2), “Lenny” (#7), 
and Leuba’s “Subject E” (#12), whose remorse took “the shape of regret after my folly in wasting my life in 




for present purposes, in observations of the fact that moral conversion defies the 
predictability of regular patterns of personal or social behavior.  
With respect to introspective evidence, the analysis has focused on four categories 
of experiences that have been considered to be evidence of free choice: decisional 
anxiety, volitional exertion, resolve, and the group of positive and negative feelings that 
indicate personal moral approval or disapproval after the fact. Independently of the 
debate about introspective evidence, the results are still not unambiguous in their 
implications. None of these experiences figures prominently across the board in moral 
conversion, or with comparable significance in all three categories of moral conversion. 
Thus in the case of decisional anxiety, its lack of prominence among accounts of actual 
moral conversion (even though it is prominent in fictional accounts) suggests that in 
actual moral conversion previous convictions and old mental habits do not weigh the 
process down, except possibly at the behavioral level. But clearly more study of 
decisional anxiety would be needed before this category would significantly impact the 
free choice/determinism debate.  
An analysis of the role of the experiences of regret, guilt, shame, pride, honor and 
merit in the context of moral conversion does not yield particular ways in which their 
examination may enrich the debate on freedom and determinism. The absence of 
consistent patterns of either positive or negative feelings and above all the fact that these 
are emotions rather than actions makes questionable their weight as evidence in a 




to elements of converts’ introspective experience that have bearing on the debate, i.e., the 
experience of being morally responsible. 
Volitional exertion, on the other hand, is potentially evidence of the convert’s 
experience as a chooser and it is found in the specific context of conversion regarding 
behavioral coherence. In this specific context, frequently the person experiencing it will 
have typically struggled for a considerable time against resilient bad habits, and the 
exertion required – in the form of repeated acts of choosing new ways of concrete action 
– will be at the focus of the person's attention, constituting it a relatively important source 
of evidence of experiences of free choice. 
Finally, the experience of resolve appears with considerable frequency especially in 
accounts of moral conversion regarding significant changes in attitude or commitment 
especially in relation to the articulation of a behavioral program consistent with the 
convert’s chosen attitude or commitment. Nevertheless the argumentative weight of these 
considerations within the free choice/determinism debate, like those regarding volitional 
exertion and unpredictability, cannot be evaluated without consideration of many other 
matters. The point here is rather to suggest that there is much material in a study of moral 
conversion that deserves attention by those engaged in the freedom/determinism debate. 
But if we step back from this debate and allow a progressively more refined picture 
of the process of moral conversion to emerge from these considerations, it becomes 
increasingly clear that the image of moral conversion as that of a person struggling 
against him/herself in order to overcome resistant habits of the mind or conduct through 




operation of free choice entails simply directing oneself in one way or the other (to thus 
resolve conflicts and impasses) seems less and less descriptive of what happens in moral 
conversion, and a more organic integration between the role of reason and the role of the 
will seems worth investigating. Therefore the next chapter will examine the role of 




FEELINGS AND COGNITIVE OPERATIONS IN MORAL 
CONVERSION: AN INTERNALIST VIEW. 
 
1. Introduction: foundationalism and anti-foundationalism; internalism and 
externalism 
This chapter considers what can be the contribution of a study of moral conversion 
to the internalism/externalism debate. To make that contribution clear, it is important as a 
first step to differentiate this debate from another, connected but different debate, that 
between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism.
One of the central questions of ethical theory regards the grounds or foundations of 
moral convictions. This is the question about why the content of moral convictions (what 
can be called “moral norms” here for the sake of brevity) is or can be considered morally 
demanding or imperative, and whether there are reasons for considering the 
imperativeness of moral norms as grounded in something more than the purely subjective 
acknowledgement of the agent, or of a social acknowledgement of their imperativeness. 
In other words, whether there are objective grounds or foundations for moral norms. In 
more general terms this discussion is often referred to as the discussion regarding the 




A philosophical argument attempting to achieve a defense of the objective 
imperativeness of moral norms (i.e., answering for the positive with respect to the 
existence of objective foundations for morality) can be characterized as foundationalist, 
while the opposite view – the view that denies such objective foundations – is commonly 
called anti-foundationalist. Foundationalist arguments have been attempted in a variety 
of ways, some focusing on disclosing some form of logical necessity (as with Kant’s first 
formulation of the categorical imperative), some establishing the moral sphere as a 
necessary aspect of human nature – a consequence of human rationality, or freedom, or of 
a peculiar disposition towards happiness and the good -, some establishing value as an 
actual property of things, some explaining morality as having its source on a divine 
imperative, etc. Anti-foundationalist arguments have also attempted a variety of 
arguments to explain the presence of moral institutions in human society, and of moral 
convictions in individual human agents; some of these explanations characterize the  
existence of moral institutions as convenient (for evolutionary purposes, for progress and 
happiness, etc.) while some characterize it as something of an aberration; but coincide in 
denying the grounds for an objective imperativeness of moral norms. 
The discussion on externalist/internalist views of morality can be considered to be a 
part of this larger debate.505 As was explained in Chapter 9, according to externalism the 
specifically normative content of moral norms and values is not what makes them more  
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here. Their use here follows very closely Thomas Wren’s in Caring About Morality. The bearing of this 




or less apt to become moral norms or principles. The fact that moral norms or principles 
are acquired, adopted or internalized by the moral agent is attributed to “external” factors, 
entirely independent of the intelligible/cognitive content of such principles or norms. The 
motivation for following moral norms is seen as the result exclusively of a process that 
can be characterized, using a term from psychology, as “reinforcement,” i.e., the psyche 
attaches or associates certain feelings (feelings of aversion, imperativeness, fear, guilt, 
etc.) to certain actions or behaviors. Whatever the mechanism invoked (conditioning, 
modeling, etc.) these moral feelings are essentially defined by the process that produces 
them in the psyche, and moral phenomena are, according to externalism, sufficiently 
explained by a description of this process. As a consequence, the content of the behavior 
is not regarded as relevant to the success of the reinforcement process, or as playing any 
part in the constitution of the moral convictions themselves. What is more, theoretically 
any behavior could be made into a pattern and judged as moral. 
According to the internalist view instead, the content of the act (the intelligible 
content, the act as it is known) is at least one of the intrinsically relevant elements by 
which the morality of the act is judged. (The term “internalism” makes reference 
principally to the intelligibility “internal” to the action/behavior itself, that determines it, 
as opposed to its being determined by “external” factors; additionally, the term makes 
also reference, using a spatial image that involves some controversy, to the “internal” 
realm of the cognitive.) This content is cognitively appraised and - in ways that vary 
according to what is implicitly or explicitly considered by the agent as the determining 




agent gauges their morality. Further, the content of the acts (and their cognitive appraisal) 
is for internalism an essential factor in the grounding of the criteria of moral action 
themselves – the determining notions according to which we judge things to be right or 
wrong. And the content of the acts (and their cognitive appraisal) is for internalism also 
an essential factor in the constitution of the agent’s attitude/commitment to acting 
morally. 
It is important for methodological purposes to note that an internalist view does not 
exclude the possibility of particular events taking place as externalism describes them, so 
that if some human actions were proved to have taken place as externalism describes 
them, that of itself would not entail the refutation of internalism. On the other hand, the 
externalist claim is universal without allowing for exceptions: according to this position, 
no human action takes place as internalism claims (although, as will be seen in the 
following section, some externalist views, without betraying their externalist claim, allow 
for cognitive elements to be relevant in the shaping of human action to a higher degree 
than other externalist views). 
The terms “internalism” and “externalism” are frequently identified with 
foundationalism and anti-foundationalism respectively. This is not the position taken in 
this work. “Internalism” will be understood here in the restricted sense of the claim that a 
cognitive appraisal of various kinds takes place in the shaping of moral convictions, and 
of the agent’s attitude/commitment towards morality. This claim (which will be soon 
qualified further) can be regarded as an intermediate step towards foundationalism, but 




been demonstrated. If demonstrated, the internalist claim can go as far as to imply that 
there is a human need or a desire/drive for something like rational adequacy or 
reasonableness in one’s moral structures. But in order to ground a foundationalist view as 
such, further steps are needed (which would establish an object correlative to this drive). 
These additional steps are beyond the goals of this study. Thus it is necessary to 
distinguish clearly between this restricted notion of internalism, and foundationalism.  
On the other hand, externalism seems to involve an anti-foundationalist position 
(and is in fact situated at the far anti-foundationalist range of the spectrum). Externalism 
essentially rejects the possibility of cognitive operations having to do with morality, 
which entails the rejection of the possibility of morality being grounded in a certain 
intelligibility. 
The aim of this chapter is to propose that a study of moral conversion can provide 
new insights on the discussion of internalist and externalist views of morality, in the 
sense explained above. 
One of the central difficulties in the internalism/externalism discussion is that a 
person’s moral makeup (understood here as a composite of the content of a person’s 
moral convictions, the person’s attitude towards right/wrong and happiness/meaning/ 
eudaemonia, and the person’s habits of moral action) begins to take shape during a 
person’s early years, before reasoning, critical thinking or any differentiated form of 
moral reflection can take place. As a consequence, there is very little introspective data 
on the cognitive and emotional processes involved when moral convictions and attitudes/ 




involved, much less to verbally articulate it (a difficult task even for most well-educated 
adults). The reach of external observation, on the other hand, is limited to externally 
observable actions and patterns of action, as well as such information as is verbalized by 
the (young and inarticulate) subjects. But if an introspective examination of developing 
morality during early childhood is mostly beyond reach, there is something that is the 
“next best thing.” This next best thing is a study of first-person accounts of adult moral 
conversion. In these accounts we can gain a certain degree of introspective access to the 
processes through which new moral contents replace old ones, or a different attitude 
towards moral matters is gained. 
As has been said in the previous chapter, regarding introspective evidence, access in 
this setting is not transparent; a person’s introspective observations can be expected to be 
offered from a certain point of view, and their articulation conditioned by previously 
acquired terminology and theoretical frameworks. But while mediating interpretations 
might obscure to some degree the purity of the data thus gathered, this difficulty is 
counterbalanced by the powerful effects that the conversion event has on the life of the 
person who reports it and the corresponding vividness of the story and the desire to share 
it accurately, perhaps even as something for which existing categories seem to be 






2. Examples of externalist theories of morality 
To understand better the challenge of externalism, it will be useful to review a 
number of theories of morality that express varying ranges within the externalist position. 
In this review, I will follow closely Thomas Wren in his book Caring About Morality.506 
According to Wren, while philosophical metaethics has favored – though not universally 
- an internalist perspective, Anglo-American psychology has favored an externalist 
view.507 Though the latter’s various theories of “socialization” have dealt with morality in 
increasingly cognitive terms, they have not become any the less externalist in their 
underlying metaethical perspective. Wren develops this claim by conducting a survey of 
the most influential theories of socialization; his intention is to show that there has been a 
gradual shift, in the recent history of psychology, towards a wider acceptance of the 
relevance of cognitive factors in the study of moral behavior, though the underlying 
philosophical framework is still dominantly externalist. This is partly shown by the shift 
towards more cognitive models in psychological explanations of the psychogenesis of 
moral ideas. 
Skinner’s radical behavioralism 
Among the externalism theories that most completely exclude cognitive processes 
we find Skinner’s behavioralism or “peripheralism.” This theoretical framework is 
committed to externalism from the outset, to the extent that, in its most precise 
formulation, it does away not only with references to such introspective factors as 
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desires, feelings and the concept of self, but even to rewards and punishments – since the 
latter still make reference to the subject’s expectations.508 The intention is to frame all 
descriptions of behavior in terms of “observable response probabilities rather than 
feelings, images or even expectation, all of whose usual definitions suppose some 
capacity for mental representation.”509 
According to Wren, there has been no shortage of researchers willing to work 
within this framework, but this line of research is “seldom very relevant to the 
philosophically interesting features of moral experience.”510 Non-cognitively reinforced 
behaviors (e.g., Pavlov’s dog experiments) will very rarely have moral relevance, notes 
Wren; in fact, many central ethical theories would consider such behavior from the outset 
as not pertaining to the realm of morality at all. 
Wren argues that by the early 1990’s it had been sufficiently established within 
psychology “that specifically human conditioning usually, perhaps always, involves an 
awareness on the subject’s part of the reinforcing character of the reinforcement.”511 It 
had been established, in other words, as an empirical claim within psychology at that 
point, that people have at least  some degree of awareness or representation (in terms at 
least of intentionality, and perhaps of reward/punishment expectations) involved in the 
reinforcement of “socially interactive” behavior. Skinner himself admitted in 1963 the 
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impossibility of avoiding cognitive categories altogether.512 Thus, most other theories 
accepting the externalist position consider at least a minimal degree of cognitive activity 
as essential to the conditioning process, the minimum being that human subjects “cognize 
reinforcements as rewards or punishments.”513 Under the standard psychological 
conditioning paradigm, however, this minimum is still very far from conceding relevance 
to the cognitive content itself as a basis for moral motivation or for establishing the 
morality of an action; the “value” given to an instance of behavior is mechanistically 
linked to the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the stimuli associated with the behavior, 
and what are called moral convictions or motivations are redescribed to fit within that 
framework.514 
Theories of psychological contagion 
 An alternative attempt to explain morality in externalist terms which Wren labels 
the “behavioral contagion” or “psychological contagion” approach focuses on the 
observation that people respond to “vicarious arousal.” Such “arousal” is produced by 
exposing the subjects to the sight of other persons being aroused by stimuli that would 
not naturally produce such reactions. Subjects may become conditioned, for example, to 
experience painful arousal in the presence of certain audible tones, by being exposed to 
the sight of other persons (actors) being so aroused (grimacing, etc.).515 Using this 
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observed pattern of behavior as a starting point, researchers proposed that the genesis of 
moral behavior is the effect of conditioning of this sort: we become conditioned to 
helping others, for example, if we find that our help produces in them gestures of 
pleasure or well-being, which in turn arouse such emotions in us. 
 There is some minimal cognitional activity involved in the process so described: 
the subject has to see or otherwise experience the model, and has to correctly “read” the 
emotions modeled. But the feelings or emotions are linked to a certain behavior by a 
purely external or arbitrary link, so this is clearly an externalist account. It is indifferent 
whether a positive empathic reaction is linked to a helping conduct, for example, or to 
spontaneous aggression.516 
“Force-composition” models: Approach/avoidance theories, and Freud’s early 
theory of Cathexis 
Wren also considers a group of externalist theories in which the cognitive elements 
are more relevant than in the theories previously mentioned. These theories consider the 
variety of intrapsychic drives or desires as the equivalent of vectorial forces within the 
psyche, so that the course of action taken is the result of the composition (or in an 
alternative expression, the “algebraic summation”) of all the relevant forces (drives,  
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desires) at play at any given time.517 
The theories in this group vary regarding the terms in which this force-composite is 
described; but they all employ a fundamentally mechanistic model. The prevailing idea, 
says Wren, about mechanistic models of human processes, “is that the resolution of 
conflict is paramechanical rather than parapolitical.”518 That is, the conflict is not 
resolved by some motives having a “privileged status or authority (as in a political 
system) but only by their greater strength or power (as in a mechanical system).”519 
As exponents of this type of theory Wren mentions Freud’s early theory of cathexis, 
and the theories known as “approach-avoidance” theories. The latter  
depict the subject as caught in an inherently nonrational force-field of desires, 
simultaneously inclined toward and away from some global state – similar to a rat for 
whom getting food also involves getting a shock.520 
 
The subject is “pulled” by competing goods, or “pushed” to avoid competing evils. 
The forces involved – which usually receive the non-technical name of “desires,” and the 
technical general name of “conations”521 – are defined in terms of “tension-reduction” 
(“push”), or of “expectancies” (“pull”). But though the idea of “expectations” might 
suggest a slightly greater emphasis on the cognitive quality of the processes involved, the 
interpretation given to these terms by approach-avoidance theories is still deeply 
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committed to the mechanistic “law of Effect.” Formulated firstly by Thorndike,522 the 
“law of Effect” says that “when a subject learns, he or she always does so reactively, as 
part of a psychosocial process objectively determined by causal forces and explicable by 
universal laws.”523 Drives or conations, in other words, are not considered in hierarchical 
or “parapolitical” terms, but rather as a part of a system of forces operating according to a 
mechanistic model. 
Wren interprets Freud’s theory of cathexis – an early theory, later set aside in 
Freud’s further work – as another example of the force-composition model. The term 
cathexis refers to the notion of psychic (especially sexual) energy channeled to an object 
different from the original object (or, actually, its representation). It is a psychic 
mechanism to achieve internal equilibrium or homeostasis under the tension of 
conflicting demands (which are understood, ultimately, as a set of non-cognitive psychic 
energies, eventually the Id).524 Socialization (the element that takes the place, within this 
framework, of moral learning) is then understood as “the set of culturally induced 
processes by which the direction and distance of displacements are determined.”525 
In his assessment, Wren notes that it may be inappropriate to conceive Freud’s idea 
of human motivation as just a network of blind forces, “since the importance of his work 
consists largely in its recognition of unconscious purposiveness.”526 But in his meta-
scientific framework Freud continued to advocate 
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an ‘economic point of view’ that would do away with qualitative, teleological accounts of 
motivation in favor of quantitative ones that could be manipulated algebraically.527 
 
In other words, the forces at work are external to, independent of the subject’s cognition 
of anything as morally imperative. 
Modeling/vicarious reinforcement theories 
Modeling theories (a set of theories whose best-known representative is Albert 
Bandura) add to the externalist repertoire by explaining the process of internalization of 
moral norms as brought about by the observation of a model’s behavior. The process 
clearly requires complex cognitive activities because the subject must observe the 
model’s behavior and process this information adequately enough that the general pattern 
of the model’s behavior is retained for imitation, though not its irrelevant details. The 
subject must also possess the cognitive capacities to apply the internalized norms to their 
concrete behavior, i.e., to “reproduce” the behavior. Furthermore, insofar as the 
consequences of the model’s behavior are considered by these theories to be a 
“reinforcing” element of the model’s effects, the subject must be able to perceive the 
consequences of the model’s actions as desirable or reinforcing and associate them with 
the modeled norm.528 Theories in this group also put emphasis on certain “inner states or 
feeling tones” that the model experiences, and which serve as a source of vicarious 
reinforcement for the subject: the model must express these feelings “in order to inform 
the subject that an apparently unrewarding act really has positive consequences for the 
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agent and vice versa.”529 There is also the idea that the model, as model (i.e., as 
apprehended as worth imitating or its opposite) becomes a force in the internalization of 
moral norms. 
Modeling is a very powerful means of transmitting values, saving the subject from 
tedious trial and error procedures; but it is a derivative mechanism for internalizing moral 
norms, still dependent on conditioning as the original reinforcement/internalization 
mechanism.530 Thus, modeling theorists, says Wren, despite their open acknowledgement 
of the importance of cognitional processes in the internalization of moral norms, still 
remain externalist regarding the appropriateness or rightness of the moral norms 
themselves. The learned patterns of behavior respond to the model’s own reinforcement 
schedule, and through it to social standards of appropriate behavior. But there is nothing 
in the patterns that become norms themselves that makes them particularly worth learning 
– in the moral sense – or that, in Wren’s terminology, make them “motivating in 
themselves.”531 That is, the subject is not imitating the model because “it seems right”; 
rather, the action “seems right” because it has been successfully modeled.532 Thus, 
despite a more sophisticated depiction of the learning process, the deep-level concept of 
moral learning on which these theories rest remains unmoved: “what brings people into 
morality in the first place is the likelihood of rewards or punishments.”533 
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Self-controlled delay in gratification 
The body of psychological research focused on the study of “self-controlled delay 
in gratification” is considered by Wren as involving far more cognitive activity than the 
previous examples, but because of its reliance on the mechanistic “law of Effect” it is still 
basically an externalist position.534 
The phrase “self-control” may remind us of Aristotle’s treatment of “moral 
weakness” (or “weakness of will”)535 and the virtues that remedy it; but the focus of this 
research is much narrower. What it focuses on is the capacity of the subject to postpone 
or inhibit the satisfaction of proximate inclinations for the sake of greater gains or 
rewards in the mid- or long-term. Moral norms are understood in terms of gratification 
delay, and thus all that is needed to explain the psychogenesis of morality is to describe 
the mechanisms by which the subject develops the ability to delay gratification.536 To this 
effect, the theory borrows from the theories previously described: the process of 
developing the ability to delay gratification is explained in terms of traditional 
conditioning, imitation, and especially modeling.537 The resources that the subject 
employs to inhibit proximate inclinations are themselves highly cognitive in nature, 
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involving the mental presentation of incentives, and including such internal resources as 
self-praise and self-blame. But the motivational effects of these learnings operate entirely 
mechanistically. Thus this research may help illuminate certain aspects of morality, 
specifically questions regarding the gap between motivation and action when as 
“motivation” is understood solely as the expectation of a reward; but it risks limiting the 
understanding of morality to a structure to enhance self-gratification. 
Kohlberg, and an internalist psychology of morality 
While Kohlberg’s theories have been discussed elsewhere,538 it will be useful to 
contrast the externalist psychological explanations of morality with his own, as a 
psychological theory that Wren identifies as internalist. Wren quotes Kohlberg, writing 
about Stage 1: 
Punishment is seen as important in that it is identified with a bad action rather than because 
the actor is attempting pragmatically to avoid negative consequences to him- or herself.539 
 
The focus here is quite different from that of the previous theories: punishment and 
rewards are no longer the determinant of attitude or action, but are the consequences of 
actions because of the intrinsic moral qualities of actions. Kohlberg views the ground of 
moralness at the other stages similarly.540 In addition, the Kohlbergian tenet of 
developmental hierarchy - namely, that stage-progression takes place in one direction 
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only: once a person reaches a certain stage of development in their moral reasoning, they 
do not “go back” to earlier stages – is closely tied to an internalist point of view. 
As the developmental hierarchy has been explained by James Rest, one of the 
elements that researchers have tried to evaluate is the comprehension or understanding 
that subjects at a certain stage of development have of the concepts that play a part in 
other stages. In one study, for example, subjects were asked to paraphrase arguments for 
a case resolution, as they are typically formulated by people at various stages during 
stage-assessment studies. The experiment’s aim was to evaluate comprehension, and 
measure “an inventory of concepts that the subject understands, whether or not the 
subject actually uses these concepts.”541 What the research showed was that 
comprehension for the stages is cumulative: subjects at Stage 4, for instance, had high 
levels of comprehension for Stages 3, 2, and 1. Comprehension also tends to be high for 
moral categories typical of the subject’s own stage, and poor with regard to higher stages 
than that at which the subject currently is (as assessed by the usual Kohlbergian 
procedure).542 What Rest concluded from these studies is that, as people outgrow old 
ways of thinking, they still understand them but do not prefer them, while, on the other 
hand, subjects at lower stages do not prefer the higher ones, but do not understand them 
either. “In summary,” says Rest, “who says higher stages are better? Subjects do 
themselves.”543 As subjects get to understand the reasoning structure of the stage 
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hierarchically following the one they currently are in, they end up preferring it. This 
suggests that understanding the conceptual structure of each stage is an essential factor of 
moral development, and more generally of moral life, which situates Kohlbergian theory 
clearly on the internalist side of the debate. 
Wren’s survey of psychological theories in terms of their philosophical 
commitments about the ground of the experience of moralness nicely illustrates what the 
debate between internalism and externalism is about. It is time now to consider how a 
study of moral conversion contributes to the discussion. 
3. Cognitive operations, and the notion of internalism 
Two potential misunderstandings 
By now the reader should have a feel at least for what constitutes an internalist 
position. But it is necessary to address two possible ways in which this position may be 
misunderstood. One is understanding internalism as merely the position that certain 
cognitive processes take place during the moral decision-making process. The point of 
internalism is much narrower. The point is not whether images, representations, verbal 
labels, conceptual thinking, association and other cognitive activities take place or not 
during the process (this psychological point seems to be sufficiently supported at present 
by the decline of radical behavioralism and the gradual incorporation of cognitive 
elements in subsequent psychological frameworks over the last half-century or so.) 




judgments can be meaningful in their own terms, efficacious determinants of moral 
action, and crucial as explanatory elements in moral psychology.”544 
The second way in which the internalist position may be misunderstood is by 
understanding “cognitive processes” in the narrow sense of “processes employing or 
following a logical sequence of thought.” If internalism were understood as proposing 
that the moral decision-making process is always the result of clearly formed concepts 
and well-constructed, emotionally detached, impersonal reasoning, then defending 
internalism would be extremely hard, since the process of moral decision-making rarely 
seems to be so tidy and detached. But if a broader meaning of the term “cognitive” (and 
related notions) is to be used, it needs to be explained. 
The difficulty here is illustrated in the discrepancy between Wren’s and Conn’s 
evaluations of Kohlberg’s position. Wren expresses concern that Kohlberg’s model may 
be “unduly cognitive,” since there is in it a tendency to regard reason-giving as an end in 
itself, what Wren calls a “justification game” that lacks an integration with “the richer 
atmosphere of desires, needs, affectivity, and other persons.”545 Conn on the other hand 
arrives at an opposite evaluation of Kohlberg as properly blending the cognitive and the 
affective: 
Logic, of course, is applied to complex moral problems, but the essence of specifically 
moral reasoning, leading to judgments of moral value, is evaluation, which is rooted not in 
the purely logical analysis of concepts, but in the affective-cognitive apprehension of 
concrete human values. Even the most advanced formal logical operations, therefore, do 
not by themselves enable a person to make mature moral judgments. 
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Given this analysis of Kohlberg’s understanding of moral reasoning as a fundamentally 
affective-cognitive unity, criticisms of Kohlberg’s approach to moral development as 
rationalistic must be judged as inaccurate.546 
 
Whether either evaluation is an accurate assessment of Kohlberg’s thought is not a 
point to be discussed here. But the discrepancy between the two evaluations illustrates the 
difficulties that arise for internalism if the cognitive process, is understood in the narrow 
sense of a cold, logical procedure. Quite often, internalist views are rejected precisely on 
the basis of an understanding of this view that renders it vulnerable to charges of 
rationalism and intellectualism, and are dismissed on the basis that people seldom, if 
ever, acquire moral views or make moral decisions by such a detached and focused 
exercise of logical reasoning. But knowing, i.e., the cognitive process, needs not be 
understood in this narrow manner. Explaining what is the meaning of “knowing” for 
internalism – and the specific operations involved in knowing - is the next step in this 
discussion. 
Experience, understanding, judgment 
The task of explaining the notion of “knowing” as it is understood in internalist 
views can be simplified by following the presentation of the matter by Bernard Lonergan, 
who spent considerable effort examining it in his opus magnum Insight.547 Lonergan’s 
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development of this notion will be described briefly here with the purpose of clarifying 
the notion of internalism, but also because, coupled with the Lonerganian treatment of 
intentional feelings, it plays a significant role in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
Lonergan identifies and describes many cognitive operations operating at different 
levels, namely the levels of experience, understanding and judgment. All these operations 
are driven in a unified movement by the desire to know.548 “Knowing,” though most 
frequently identified with the operation of understanding, is better understood as a 
complex act that develops towards perfection in the dynamic integration of operations at 
all these three levels. 
The first level of cognitive operations will be here called “experience”; it is labeled 
“empirical consciousness” in Lonergan’s somewhat idiosyncratic terminology.549 It 
consists essentially in the gathering of data. This group of operations considers the basic 
ways of gathering data, mainly sense-perception. But the notion is analogical, and 
“gathering data” can be understood also in other senses. Reading, for example, may be 
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548 In postulating an “unrestricted desire to know” as a fundamental, original human drive, Lonergan aligns 
himself with the classical position stated originally by Aristotle, that “all men by nature desire to know.” 
(Metaphysics, I, 1). This position is opposed to a pragmatist view that rejects such drive as original, and 
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549 As Lonergan works with the difficult task of producing a description of the structure of knowing, he 
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considered within this level, and introspection, which does not involve the senses, though 
it may involve memory and imagination. 
By consciousness is meant an awareness immanent in cognitional acts. But such acts differ 
in kind, and so the awareness differs in kind with the acts. There is an empirical 
consciousness characteristic of sensing, perceiving, imagining. As the content of these acts 
is merely presented or represented, so the awareness immanent in the acts is the mere 
givenness of the acts.550 
 
 Lonergan notes that gathering data is usually a spontaneous event (we hear a noise 
or see events happening in front of us), but it can also be a voluntary activity, through the 
focusing of our attention with the intention of answering specific questions. 
Lonergan’s second level of operations will here be called “understanding”; 
Lonergan’s term is “intelligent consciousness.”551 
But there is an intelligent consciousness characteristic of inquiry, insight, and formulation. 
On this level cognitional process not merely strives for and reaches the intelligible, but in 
doing so it exhibits its intelligence; it operates intelligently.552 
 
The activity of understanding is very basic, i.e., is not a subcategory of any other form of 
human activity. Consequently, attempts to describe the activity of understanding by using 
alternative expressions (“grasp,” for example, is a common image) often ends in the 
unhelpful repetition of these alternative expressions. For this reason, Lonergan and 
Lonerganians usually explain what understanding is by pointing at553 acts with which the 
reader should be familiar and identifying them as acts of understanding (for example, 
Archimedes’ insight in the bath, reaching the resolution of a detective story, the 
formulation of a hypothesis) and particularly to acts of understanding of the reader  
                                                 
550 Lonergan, Insight, 346. (Underlining mine.) 
551 The term “insight” is also mainly attributed to this level of operation. 
552 Lonergan, Insight, 346. (Underlining mine.) 





Understanding does not happen simply, however, despite the impression that 
expressions such as “grasping” or “insight” may give. The move from the first, data 
gathering level of cognitive operations to the level of understanding is driven by 
questions (which Lonergan calls “operators”); for example, “what is this?” “why does 
this happen?” etc. In an important sense, the questions for understanding precede the 
achievement of understanding, but the question (not necessarily formalized and phrased 
as such) and the development of (possible) responses to the question are the operations 
that, conjoined, make up the activity of understanding.554 Even in the sometimes sudden 
act of “putting it together,” there is always an active endeavor of our intelligence to make 
sense of the data, an endeavor (questioning) that, according to Lonergan, precedes the 
achievement of insight or the fulfillment of understanding. 
The third level of cognitive operations will here be called “judgment”; Lonergan’s 
expression is “rational consciousness.” Intelligence, driven by the desire to know, is not 
satisfied by understanding merely, but wants to know truth. It does not rest in what seem 
to be sufficiently explanatory insights, in an answer or answers; it poses further 
questions, for example “Is this so?” “Is this explanation in agreement with the data?” “Is 
it necessary to gather more data?” “Are there any questions unsolved, or unasked?” The 
questions and answers of understanding must be tested in activities of judgment. It is 
                                                 
554 Lonergan, like Coreth and other post-Kantian Scholastics, sees questioning as already shaping what, in 
less technical accounts, might be called “the answer,” so that no clear line can be drawn between 
questioning and answering. The concern to erase this dichotomy is one reason why understanding is first 
explained ostensively, counting on the reader’s experience to validate the inseparable connection of 




when all inconsistencies with the data have been resolved and no further questions 
remain or are raised, that intelligence can “rest” in (relative) certainty.555 
In addition, in Insight Lonergan identifies a fourth level of cognitive operations, the 
level of responsibility or “responsible consciousness.” At this level, questions for action/ 
decision are accessed by a correspondent set of “questions for responsibility” (“Is it 
good? Is it worthwhile?”). This fourth level articulates Lonergan’s early attempts to 
integrate the sphere of morality into his cognitive structure. As will be discussed later in 
the chapter, this attempt is not quite successful, but it is useful to mention it here for 
completeness. 
Such is the general structure of cognitive operations as developed by Lonergan, and 
it is helpful to have it in mind as an example of a cognitive theory that can be applied to 
an internalist view. The structure will be developed in more detail below, when it 
becomes applied to the process of moral conversion. The open form in which the 
different operations are characterized (a characterization that plays out an analogical 
conception of knowing) makes this theory particularly useful for a work that attempts to 
be inclusive of a variety of theories of knowledge. For Lonergan’s efforts are focused not 
in establishing a water-tight classification of cognitive operations, or in developing a 
thoroughly detailed systematic presentation of these operations, but in guiding the reader 
towards “self-appropriation,” that is, towards identifying these operations and their 
dynamism in one’s own experience as a knower.  
                                                 
555 Thus the “is” of judgment – it is the case – is not merely an equivalence sign. It is an affirmation of the 
reality of what (or of some of what) the activity of understanding has produced (or it is a denial of the 




This openness – which can be expressed technically by saying Lonergan offers an 
analogical conception of knowing – also leaves room for the “intrusion,” so to speak, of 
feelings and desire into the sphere of knowledge, in ways that are not isolated or 
compartmentalized but continuous and fluid. In acknowledging this “analogically fluid” 
relation between the emotional and the cognitive – a useful image might be that of the 
shore of the sea: where does the sea begin and the land end? - one is provided with a 
conception of knowing that permits an integration of the cognitive and the emotional/ 
affective spheres. Such an integration, it will be argued, is essential for the formulation of 
an internalist theory that does not encounter insurmountable difficulties at the time of 
articulating the move from the cognitive to the realm of action/decision. This point will 
be considered in the following section. 
 
4. The integration of the affective and the cognitive in internalist moral 
theories: Examples from the Aristotelian tradition 
So far, knowing has been discussed without making reference to the role of the 
affective aspects - from now on also termed “feelings” or “emotions” - that according to 
the narratives are often involved in the process of moral conversion.556 Yet it is clear 
                                                 
556 Terminological note: in the sections that follow, the terms “emotions/emotional,” “feelings,” and (the) 
“affective” will be used more or less interchangeably. The term “affective” is perhaps the most adequate in 
this context, as the term that complements the sphere of the cognitive. But terms such as “emotions” and 
“feelings” are more commonly used and refer to the same phenomena, though possibly regarded from a 
psychological point of view. Added to this, however, the terms “emotions” and “feelings” evoke, 
legitimately or not, the idea of “anchorless” phenomena, of highly accidental psychic events that occur 
without much rhyme or reason. Nevertheless some Lonerganians have begun to make use of them, perhaps 
precisely because of their connections with psychology, or perhaps because in doing so they intend to shake 
some mental cobwebs, to introduce a fresh view on the philosophical importance of this sphere. In 




from many of the narratives already considered that emotions not only play a part in the 
process, but are often connected to cognitive operations in complex causal relationships. 
Consider the example of Helen John (case #6). Her vision of a devastated Builth 
landscape, an image that generates a sort of “experiential” understanding of the dangers 
of nuclear war, is accompanied with an intense emotional response – it forces her to stop 
the car, and cry and feel sick for nearly three quarters of an hour.557 The emotional 
response must be understood as intimately connected to the cognitive event, her 
imaginative vision: the former – the emotional response - would not make complete sense 
if its connection with the cognitive event – the vision – were left out of the narrative. 
Sandra’s case (case #5) also indicates a connection of the affective with the cognitive: the 
process of her moral conversion is prompted by an affective reaction unequivocally 
connected to the sight of meat, cooked so that “it's burnt [on the outside] and you cut it 
open and it just sort of bleeds.”558 
It is necessary then to consider at least briefly the possible role of the affective 
sphere in an internalist account of morality, and this must be done both in general terms 
(in this section), and regarding their specific role in moral conversion (in the following 
section). 
The separation of the cognitive and the affective in many (especially historical) 
philosophical discussions of morality (sometimes made explicit, sometimes the result of a  
                                                                                                                                                 
source in the sections that follow, it seems necessary to include this option for the terminology used in this 
chapter. 
557 Haste, "Moral Responsibility and Moral Commitment," 337-341. 




narrow focus on one of these components) has generated some difficulties that need to be 
addressed in order to make an internalist account of morality feasible. On one hand, 
externalist accounts often equate the realm of morality to feelings/emotions exclusively, 
rejecting any connection with the cognitive. On the other hand, a contrary difficulty is 
frequently encountered in some internalist approaches that attempt to explain the 
experience of moral obligation as the result of a purely cognitive process. The solution to 
these complementary difficulties, I submit, lies in the possibility of an account integrating 
both knowledge and the affective as essential elements of moral decision-making and 
(consequent) action. 
Despite the problem having been relatively overlooked in the course of the history 
of philosophy - and partly because the seeds of the solution are already in Aristotle -, 
there is not a univocal solution to be found within internalist accounts, but rather a variety 
of approaches to the problem, explanatorily successful in varying degrees, mutually 
compatible to varying extents. In the present section I, will consider how the integration 
between the affective and the cognitive has been attempted within the Aristotelian 
tradition – in Aristotle himself, Aquinas, and, through the analysis of Brian Cronin, in the 
Lonerganian approach to the problem. As in previous instances, the focus here is not on 
demonstrating that one single approach is superior, but rather to offer “working 
examples” – prototypes, so to speak, that show or strongly suggest that a solution to this 
dichotomizing of the cognitive and affective is possible. More than this would exceed the 




Some internalist theories do not integrate in their considerations the affective sphere 
at all: while knowledge of right/wrong is reached through intellectual activity, whether 
feelings (when considered) are connected with good or bad actions depends ultimately on 
purely accidental circumstances. Kant may be cited as an example of this view: our 
knowledge of right/wrong depends ultimately on a judgment of practical reason, and 
feelings are systematically excluded from his consideration, though their capacity to sway 
or foster our moral views or resolve to one side or another is acknowledged.559 Some 
contemporary analyses - from the Anglo-American analytic tradition in particular - 
attempt to ground the motivation for moral obligation in the logical or semantic structure 
of moral judgments, and so may also be cited as examples of an internalist view of 
morality in which feelings have no significant relation with the moralness of an act.560 
 Alternatively, there are internalist theories that do consider feelings and emotions 
as intrinsically related to moral experience, and attempt to integrate this role with that of 
cognitive operations. In this case, the role assigned to the affective sphere is double: on 
one hand, it provides the drive to act morally.561 This drive, it is claimed, cannot come 
from pure knowledge, but must have a different origin (or “be” original in its own right). 
                                                 
559 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:440-4:442. 
560 For an in-depth criticism of this approach, see Svavarsdóttir, "Moral Cognitivism and Motivation." My 
opinion on the matter is that centering the approach on the notion of “motivation” has turned into somewhat 
of a dead end – the strategy tends to muddle the issues more than it helps clarify them. 
561 The term “drive,” in some contexts, indicates a blind psychological force – blind in the sense that it 
seeks its objects without concerns for other needs or for potentially harmful consequences for the 
individual. This is not the meaning given to the term in this dissertation. “Drive” as it is used points to the 
same entity as the term “desire” does, i.e., an intentional, felt need for something, that orients the person 
towards action. The reason why “drive” is preferred (despite the fact that both Lonergan and Cronin often 
favor “desire”) is that “drive” has a stronger connotation as a principle of action, or as motivating energy 




The second role assigned to feelings is that of being “revealing,” somehow, of the moral 
quality of actions or situations, of value and the good. 
In Aristotle 
This line of thought is present unequivocally in Aristotle, and is consequently found 
in Aristotelian-derived ethical theories all the way to present day. However, perhaps 
because the nature of the affective sphere is much more elusive than that of cognitive 
activities, the former has not been paid nearly as much attention as the latter. Only in very 
recent Aristotelian literature have feelings begun to be the subject of an analysis as 
detailed and focused as that which cognitive processes received a long time ago. 
Aristotle clearly identifies an original drive – the characteristically human desire for 
happiness – which, though notionally broader, does not seem to be a separate drive from 
the characteristically human desire to know (which in Aristotle is its ideal culmination). 
His ethics is grounded on this drive. A “value-revealing” character of feelings is also 
present in Aristotle: feelings express a natural orientation to the human good, both in 
terms of our desire to act virtuously and the pleasure or satisfaction that comes from 
doing good deeds. This orientation, however, does not provide an ultimate, reliable moral 
criterion: in particular, one’s natural tendencies require an adequate education to be 
developed properly. Without this education – or if one lets oneself cultivate bad habits - 
one may learn to like what is bad or dislike what is good. In absolute terms, this 
possibility is considered an exception against the background of the norm provided by 




exception, because – among other reasons – the right course of action is one among many 
possible wrong courses of action. “Hitting” on the right course of action is compared by 
Aristotle to hitting the bull’s eye: it requires training and prudent evaluation.562 In this 
manner, feelings and knowledge are seamlessly integrated in Aristotle’s understanding of 
virtue, which is the fundamental category in terms of which the moralness (or not) of 
every action and every person is determined.563 
In Aquinas 
Aquinas’ development follows Aristotle’s general lines, but with a few additions. 
He grounds the human drive for happiness on a created nature that is thought, willed and 
given being by God.564 He adds the principle of synderesis, the first natural law precept 
of practical reason according to which 
Whatever practical reason naturally apprehends as human good belongs to the precepts of 
natural law as something to be done or avoided. . . so it is that all those things to which man 
has a natural inclination, reason naturally apprehends as good and to be pursued in action 
and their contraries as evil and to be avoided.565 
 
A principle, in other words, that articulates the human orientation towards the good 
(though without establishing in specific terms what is right/wrong); what in more 
contemporary language is often called “conscience.”566 
                                                 
562 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, 6; 1105b, 30. 
563 Aristotle’s ethics is of course not without criticism – most commonly, for its arguable inability to 
provide clear, straightforward guidelines for action, or a “really ultimate” criterion for right/wrong. The 
point here, however, is to show a well-known example of an ethical theory that integrates –quite 
successfully in my opinion – feelings and reason. 
564 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.93 a.1; I-II (preface); I-II, q.1, a.1, a.8. 
565 Ibid., I-II, q.94, a.2. See also Clifford G. Kossel, "Thomistic Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth 
Century," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2002), 387. 




Aquinas like Aristotle acknowledges a positive role for feelings, but feelings for 
Aquinas are definitely subordinated to the judgment of reason. The notion (as revealed by 
Christian theology) of a “fallen nature” introduces an additional difficulty in terms of our 
probabilities of actually recognizing and doing what is right, in part because of a 
tendency to fail to regulate feelings through reason.567 
Lastly, Aquinas engages in an extremely detailed, psychologically acute 
categorization of virtues and their respective vices. Aquinas, however (and there is no 
room here, unfortunately, to deal with the historical subtleties of the case), did seem to 
stress the rational aspects of moral action, and to lose to some extent the matter-of-fact 
recognition that Aristotle gave to the role of feelings in morality. As a consequence, he 
left the door open to the possibility (or at least, he did not arrest a tendency) to leave 
feelings out of the picture. This is not to say that the role of feelings was completely lost 
in Thomist philosophy; it was there for those who cared to discuss it; but for many 
centuries this potentially integrative view of the cognitive and the affective was negated 
or ignored. Fortunately, it is possible to find more concerted efforts to illuminate this 
integration in recent Aquinas scholarship. 
In Lonergan 
Lonergan himself, notes Brian Cronin, did not attribute a central role to feelings 
until relatively late in his career. In Insight (1957) he still employed the term in the 
narrow, pejorative way in which it was understood in Catholic ascetical theology at the 
                                                 




time: feelings are “particularly dangerous and in need of control.”568 Lonergan’s ethics 
was at that point an emphatically reason-based ethics, appealing to speculative reason 
alone for the source of moral obligation.569 The set of conscious operations at the core of 
moral action/decision (articulated in the expressions “judgments of value” and “level of 
responsibility”) are understood by Lonergan, says Cronin, as emerging in direct logical 
continuity from the previous intellectual operations of experience, understanding and 
judgment.570 
This perspective, however, changes significantly with Lonergan’s Method in 
Theology (1971), in which he develops some elements inchoate in Insight and integrates 
some ideas from new influences, prominently from Max Scheler and Dietrich von 
Hildebrand.571 Here Lonergan develops a distinction between intentional and non 
intentional feelings, and distinguishes among the latter between those that respond to the 
agreeable/disagreeable or satisfying/dissatisfying, and those that respond to values.572 He 
introduces the somewhat ambiguous expression “intentional response to values” – which 
will give his commentators some headaches – and, through a more explicit focus on the 
function of feelings as drives, attributes to feelings a complementary, integrated role in 
the development of moral judgments. These elements, however, are not fully expounded 
                                                 
568 Brian Cronin, Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective, Guide to Philosophy Series (Langata- Nairobi: 
Consolata Institute of Philosophy, 2006), 231. “Accordingly, it will not be amiss to assert emphatically that 
the identification of being and the good bypasses human feelings and sentiments to take its stand 
exclusively upon intelligible order and rational value.” (Lonergan, Insight, 629.) 
569 Cronin, Value Ethics, 231. 
570 Ibid., 230. “Judgment is an act of rational consciousness, but decision is an act of rational self-
consciousness. . . the rationality of decision emerges in the demand of the rationally conscious subject for 
consistency between his knowing and his deciding and doing.” (Lonergan, Insight, 636.) 
571 Cronin, Value Ethics, 233-239. 




in his work, and it was up to later Lonergan scholars to identify clearly their significance, 
“tame” the terminology and assemble the pieces into a consistent, full-fledged theory. 
Cronin’s recent book, Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective (2006) is a significant 
achievement in that sense. From this work, a number of elements can be mentioned that 
are of relevance to this dissertation. 
First, Cronin elaborates on Lonergan’s distinction between intentional feelings that 
respond to the agreeable/disagreeable (“intentional response to the agreeable/ 
disagreeable”), and those that respond to value (“intentional response to value”).573 The 
former he calls sensitive feelings; they respond to vital needs of different kinds, and are 
shared by other animals. The latter he calls a spiritual feeling: it is characteristic of 
human beings, and is similar in constitution to the “unrestricted desire to know,” the 
desire which in Lonergan’s account sets in motion the dynamism of cognitive operations. 
In fact, Cronin frequently uses this similarity to the desire to know, with which 
Lonerganians are quite familiar, to elucidate the nature of the intentional response to 
value.574 The point is that the desire to know is not a desire oriented specifically to vital 
needs, nor does it declare itself satisfied when needs of such kind are met. It is a desire, 
instead, to know generally, and it declares itself satisfied only when it has understood and 
when the conditions for a (relatively) certain judgment have been met. Because of the 
                                                 
573 The term “intentional” is used here with the meaning familiar in the phenomenological tradition, i.e., the 
orientation/relation to an object of cognitive and affective acts or states. Some feelings, Lonergan 
distinguishes, are non-intentional: hunger, thirst, pain, irritability have a cause, and when the cause is 
removed the feeling commonly disappears. Other feelings, instead, “point at” something, even make their 
object present psychologically: we are curious about something, and not “just” curious; we are afraid of 
something, approving of something and so forth. The latter cases are called intentional feelings: the 
orientation to their object is essential to their constitution as feelings. (Ibid., 259-260.) 




object it intends to – truth, intelligibility, being insofar as it can be known and understood 
- it enjoys an independence in its functioning from vital needs. But according to Cronin, 
the drive to value is of a similar nature: it intends to value, the good, the “worthwhile,” 
and not to the satisfaction of particular vital needs. 
Paralleling Lonergan’s methodology about knowing, “value” is not given a 
definition, except (in what Lonergan calls a “second order definition”) as the object of the 
drive to value. Just as we get to know about knowledge and its object ostensively by 
reflecting on instances of the activity of knowing itself, it is in the personal experience 
and reflective awareness of seeking value that this drive, and the nature of its object, are 
identified (this form of inquiry Lonergan terms a process of “self-appropriation”). 
Third, it [the intentional response to value] can be thematized, named, explained, 
distinguished from all other desires. This is the foundation of ethics, the source of value, 
the beginning of the normativity proper to the person as free and responsible. It is not the 
work of ethics to prove moral obligation by a deductive syllogism, but to identify it in its 
operations, to distinguish it from other impulses and obligations. . . Just as the logician 
cannot prove the principle of contradiction, because in doing so he has to presume that it is 
operating; so the moral philosopher cannot prove moral obligation, because in doing so he 
must presume that it already exists.575 
 
Lonerganian methodology determines that the presence of this drive and the 
objectivity of its object must be established, through self-appropriation, by each person, 
allowing them, through reflective exercises, to become aware both of the presence and 
nature of this drive at the starting point (as drive) and at its ending (as indicated by the 
“resting” of the desire, and accompanying feelings, when it achieves its object). 
With the theme of the affective sphere having been introduced in this way, the 




then explicitly discussed by Cronin.576 While operations at the level of experience (the 
first level of cognitive activity) may be simply spontaneous, Lonergan’s activities of 
understanding and judgment could not exist without the desire to know that actually 
drives these processes forward. Additionally, joyous feelings, unique to each level of 
conscious operation, accompany and enhance (rewarding it) the awareness of the 
achievement of the proper object of each of these operations. (Cronin notes that the 
greatest joy of this sort is produced by achieving value, i.e., doing good deeds).577 
But while the connection between feelings and knowledge in the Lonerganian 
account is clear in these considerations, a confusion about them must be carefully 
avoided. Feelings imply a certain form of awareness, they “reveal” something (in a non-
thematic way), and this might seem to suggests the possibility of including them among 
the operations of cognition. To avoid this confusion, Cronin distinguishes between  
intentional responses to value (the affective sphere, “feelings”) and knowledge of value. 
An “intentional response to value” is a response to value, an attractedness, a being-
drawn-towards and just that: it does not know value or values. Cronin expresses this point 
thus: 
Feelings point in a certain direction, they guide a process, they are sensitive to values in a 
situation, they recognize value, but they never know values. It is only when the affective 
and cognitive aspects fuse together in a deliberative insight that we can know value in the 
resultant judgment of value. The intentional response to value initiates the process by 
suggesting, or being sensitive to the value issue. It drives the process forward by the felt 
moral obligation to assemble information, deliberate about possible alternatives and 
consequences, judge truly the value of various courses of action, decide wisely and 
implement willingly. The reward is feelings of a happy conscience.578 
                                                                                                                                                 
575 Ibid., 274. 
576 Ibid., 311-312. 
577 Ibid., 308-310. 





This distinction between the respective contributions of the affective and the cognitive 
will be made clearer later in this chapter when we consider it in relation to the process of 
moral conversion. 
 
The aim of this cursory look at the way in which Aristotelian ethical theories 
integrate the affective and the cognitive within an internalist view of morality, 
culminating in Brian Cronin’s development of these themes in Lonergan, has been to 
show that a theory that integrates feelings and knowing into an internalist theory is at 
least feasible. With this as background, it is now time to ask what is the role of emotions/ 
feelings in moral conversion, and how they relate to the cognitive aspects of moral 
conversion. As will be seen, only a joined affective/cognitive internalist view does justice 
to what the conversion narratives studied earlier tell us. 
 
5. A joined affective/cognitive internalist view   
This section will examine the claim that an analysis of narratives of moral 
conversion points to an account of the relation of affective and cognitive components of 
the decision-making process along the general lines of the view just expounded and to an 
internalist view of morality. The combination of these two descriptive theses will be 
called here a joined affective/cognitive internalist view. (The word “view” is meant to 
distinguish the general tenets being stressed here from more detailed accounts, i.e., 




Lonergan on these themes would be a “theory” in this sense.) The main tenets of a joined 
affective/cognitive internalist view are as follows: 
(1) Feelings and knowing, the affective and the cognitive, have both an integral part 
in the formation of moral convictions, moral evaluation, value judgments, moral action/ 
decision, attitude/commitment to morality and other related notions. (The specific notions 
to be used will depend on the specifics of the theory being considered). 
(2) The role of feelings is twofold. First, feelings act as the driving force “behind” 
the cognitive operations that result in understanding, judgments, evaluations, etc. This 
role of feelings should not be understood in the sense that feelings operate exclusively at 
the “beginning” of the process, i.e., merely “jump-starting” the cognitive process. Rather, 
this view sees feelings as the drive to know present during the whole process of 
understanding and judgment. (What comes chronologically at the beginning, in fact, is a 
question that does not have a simple answer, since it may be the data gathered 
spontaneously at the level of experience that provokes in certain instances the feeling-
response and not the other way around.) The point is not about which comes 
chronologically first; the point is that feelings act as drives throughout the whole 
dynamism of cognitive operations. 
The second role of feelings is to “confirm” or “crown” the conscious operations that 
lead to the formation of a value judgment, evaluation, decision or action, either positively 
(through feelings of joy, satisfaction, complacency, happiness, pride on one’s good 
actions) or negatively (feelings of unhappiness, uneasiness, guilt, anxiety, shame, self-




achievements of cognitive operations if they “don’t know” what their object is. The 
specific answer to this question depends on the specific theory of knowing and valuing 
under analysis. But roughly, two explanatory paths can be proposed, themselves not 
incompatible: (a) feelings may express a capacity to “respond” to the achievement of 
value itself (or its opposite) in a non-conceptual or non-thematized way; or alternatively, 
(b) feelings are the natural response to the relevant operations having been adequately 
carried out or not (e.g. a rushed decision does not “feel right,” even if it is a “good” 
decision in terms of what is decided). On either account, besides the role of feelings as 
the drive or engine for the cognitive work, including deliberation and decision-making, 
feelings also support or affirm the value of the result (i.e., positively or negatively). 
(3) While feelings play the two roles just described, still it is by cognitive activities 
that we are aware, in a conceptual or thematized way, of values in general, of particular 
values in particular situations, of moral obligations, rules, moral convenience, of the 
moral import of the connection of a possible course of action to its consequences, and of 
other elements of moral life. Further, since we are looking at this matter from an 
internalist point of view, this “thematizing” of the affective orientation must not be 
understood as a mere “filling up” with thematic content of what is actually fixed and 
determined from the beginning by the feelings themselves. The latter view would 
ultimately not be different from externalism because the emotions would be “dictating” 
what is right/wrong out of their own accidental, perhaps unfathomable dynamism, while 





In a true internalist view, instead, feelings provide an original orientation to moral 
value, and perhaps some specific way of feeling with regard to a specific issue or 
situation (which may be corroborated or criticized later by cognitive operations). But the 
ground of moral truth, the “seal” so to speak of moral truth, the basis of assent to a norm 
or a criterion as morally adequate and, as such, worthwhile, valuable or even imperative, 
is given by and in the dynamism of the cognitive operations. Similarly the joy (or sorrow) 
given by feeling, if it takes place, adds a felt confirmation to the (relative) certainty of the 
conclusion of the cognitive process. But the certainty itself, the affirmation that this is the 
case, that this ought to be done, is provided exclusively in the awareness that one’s 
decision, evaluation, moral judgment are “solid” in cognitive terms. This is a delicate 
point, but it needs to be understood properly in order to understand the meaning of a 
joined affective/cognitive internalist approach to knowing and moral decision-making. 
These are the general tenets of a joined affective/cognitive internalist view. The aim 
of this chapter has been to describe the account of knowing and morality that most 
accords with the narratives of moral conversion. Establishing the objectivity of the moral 
values that emerge from the process (i.e., their universality and/or imperativeness) is a 
matter for further discussion, but outside the scope of this dissertation.579 
The remainder of this chapter, then, will be devoted to examining the patterns 
identified in the narratives of moral conversion in order to compare them to the joined 
                                                 
579 The idea of authenticity in Lonergan involves the correct development and exercise of one’s cognitive 
operations at every level of conscious operation. It is an ever-developing state, that must be maintained 
through diligent vigilance and the establishment of the intellectual and affective virtues indicated in the 
“transcendental precepts” (normative ideals for each level of consciousness). It is the achievement of a 
relative authenticity that grants access (relativized, as it were, by our human limitations) to objective truth 




affective/cognitive internalist view just explained. As will be seen, the fit between them 
is significant and this supports the claim being defended in this chapter that narratives of 
moral conversion offer important evidence in support of internalist theories of morality. 
  
6. Affective elements in narratives of moral conversion 
The claim that affective elements operate as drives580 in narratives of moral 
conversion is corroborated in many of the narratives already considered, where the 
processes of conversion began with the agent’s attention to a particular feeling or 
emotion. Such is the case of Sandra’s affective response to burnt meat (case #5), which in 
turn prompts a process of reflection regarding the origin of such feelings of disgust, and 
leads, via a process of understanding this disgust, to a value judgment against eating meat 
in certain circumstances.581 Such is also the case of Gandhi’s shock at being expelled 
from the train.582 But feelings are not only found in the narratives in the form of shocking 
events; often it is a more “quiet” disquiet that is operating in the back of the agent’s mind, 
so to speak. Such is the example of Russ Fee’s becoming aware of his vocational 
misadjustment (case #22). Many of the cases  described in Leuba’s collection are similar, 
subject “L,” for example (case #14), who states that “I had no desire for anything good, 
only at times there would come a longing in my heart for something better.”583 
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The feelings mentioned in the narratives of moral conversion are of many different 
kinds, which indicates that there are many affective starting points to a process of moral 
reflection that may end up in moral conversion. Some of them may be distinctively moral 
in content, i.e., their object is directly connected with the themes of  right/wrong or 
happiness/meaning/eudaemonia (as was discussed in Chapter 5). Russ Fee’s persistent, 
nagging malaise is an affective response to a life situation that is perceived on the whole 
as unfulfilling, devoid of meaning-giving substance. In the victim-offender mediation 
case of Elizabeth and Charles (case #23), Charles’s frustrated attempt to speak with his 
victim, which initiated Elizabeth’s attempts to set up a mediation meeting, does not seem 
motivated by selfish motives but by a felt need to establish a healing type of 
communication, i.e., to tell the other party about his regret. A felt need to apologize, 
when sincere, fits well with what Cronin characterizes as the drive to value; there is no 
vital need/sensitive satisfaction to be gained from it; but the agent’s feelings will give 
him little peace until the healing communication has been established, the offense 
acknowledged and (hopefully) forgiven, the wounds closed. 
In other situations, the feelings involved at the beginning of the process may have 
only a distant relation to what would normally be considered moral content. Sandra’s felt 
shock in seeing the burnt-bleeding meat is not a feeling that one would normally think of 
as having moral relevance; and, as Helen Haste remarks in her analysis of this case, other 




particular dispositions (Haste’s explanation uses the theme of “schemas” or “scripts”)584 
that the experience develops into an opportunity for moral change; at a certain point the 
initial affective response ceases to be a main driving force, arguably because in 
understanding it, Sandra sees larger values at stake, and it is then partially, perhaps 
completely replaced by the desire to act in such a way that neither her initial aesthetic 
sensibility nor her moral values are offended by her food choices. 
It should be repeated here that in the Lonerganian framework, there is affective 
energy at work in our cognitive operations too, driving them forward, in the form of 
curiosity, wonder, the desire to understand adequately, the rejection of inconsistent 
explanations, the desire to assuage doubt and resolve uncertainty, and to frame our 
actions in a consistent intelligibility. In this sense, affect, feeling “pushes” conversion 
forward even in cases in which it was principally following one’s desire to know, rather 
than the drive to value, that a person ended up modifying his/her value structures and way 
of living. The case of Wayne Bauer (case #2), the marine gone AWOL after discussing 
the Vietnam war with his friends, seems to fit this profile, since his initial conversations 
can easily be interpreted as verbal sparring rather than an actual engagement in seeking 
value (though the limited evidence we have about this case does not allow us to offer this 
as more than an hypothesis). In fact it might be possible– though more evidence would be 
needed – to correlate classes of moral conversion with the specific nature of the feelings 
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involved in driving the process forward. Conversions regarding content, for example, 
may more frequently find their beginning in detached inquiry, while a powerful drive to 
value (a sustained question, for example, regarding the meaning of life) might be 
correlated with conversions regarding attitude. The narratives employed in this 
dissertation, however, are insufficient to offer this possibility at this point as more than a 
plausible hypothesis. 
 
With regard to feelings “confirming” moral conversion, their presence is even 
clearer in the narratives considered here than that of feelings in their role as initiators of 
the process. Negative feelings associated with intellectual, rather than with moral flaws, 
may be found in many of the conversions regarding content; for example, embarrassment 
or regret for having been thoughtless, close-minded or simply dumb enough to ignore and 
not see the flaws and the oversights in one’s own thinking. Brian Palmer, for example 
(case #1) describes his process of reflection (after his wife divorced him) in these terms: 
Being a compulsive problem solver, I analyzed the failure. I don't like failure. I'm very 
competitive. I like to win. So I went back and reexamined where the thing broke down and 
found that I had contributed at least 50 percent and, depending on the vantage point, maybe 
99 percent of the ultimate demise of the institution [of his marriage]. Mostly it was asking 
myself the question of why am I behaving in such and such a way. Why am I doing this at 
work? Why was I doing this at home?585 
 
In this description there is a clear undertone of self-criticism, of criticism towards his 
own inability to see rather substantial deficiencies in his previous outlook. 
Another type of feeling that appears frequently in the narratives is thankfulness. In 
the narratives studied here, it is most often associated with conversions regarding 
                                                 




attitude/commitment, and conversions regarding behavioral coherence when the latter 
had seemed unattainable for a prolonged period of time. It appears characteristically, for 
example, in cases of reformed alcoholics. Thus in Dr. Bob’s narrative (#30), “it is a most 
wonderful blessing to be relieved of the curse with which I was afflicted,”586  and in the 
words of Subject “M” (#18), “our home changed from hell to heaven.”587 Dave B., one of 
the founders of Alcoholics Anonymous, entitles his own story/witness “Gratitude in 
Action.”588 The feeling  of gratitude is also present in several cases of reformed criminals 
(cases #20, 21, 24, 26). 
The frequent presence of thankfulness is philosophically interesting for at least two 
reasons. First, this feeling is an expression of joy – of articulated joy, so to speak. As 
such, it indicates (and the relevant narratives are consistent in this respect) that the newer 
attitude, even if externally seeming to be morally more demanding, is appreciated as an 
enormous good rather than a burden. This phenomenon is of consequence in the 
philosophical discussion regarding foundationalism, indicating or suggesting that there is 
something in human nature that responds positively – even joyfully - to moral 
commitment, and that this is so even when such a joyful response was not originally 
within the expectations of the convert-to-be, i.e., if it happened that the cultural setting 
painted moral commitment as a gloomy or rewardless task. 
                                                 
586 Te Ara Whakatika: Newsletter of the Court-Referred Restorative Justice Project, (Issue 4, September 
2001), 180. 
587 Leuba, "A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena," 383. 




Second, thankfulness seems to need to be directed at something or someone; it is, in 
other words, “intentional” in the sense used above. Thus people who have undergone 
moral conversion frequently express feelings of thankfulness towards the people that had 
some role in their conversion. Perhaps in part because of a felt imbalance between the 
relatively small contributions of those people, and the enormity of the value acquired in 
conversion, moral conversion is also frequently accompanied by or followed by a sense 
of gratitude towards an unseen contributor, and so by some form of religious conversion 
– for example a recovery of the faith received during childhood, as in the cases of Jackie 
Katounas (case #24), and Antonio Pickett (case #20). 
A related phenomenon, perhaps demanded by the structure of thankfulness, is the 
feeling not only of having received a gift, but of one’s own poverty and incapacity to 
generate by oneself what was given. Not one of the narratives of moral conversion 
examined includes boasting or expressions of pride for one’s moral accomplishments; 
furthermore, often this feeling is complemented with a feeling of a power “beyond” that 
is operating in oneself, and in many of the narratives this is identified as the power of the 
divine (see for example, the Alcoholics Anonymous “Big Book”).589 
A difference appears here between moral conversion regarding content, and 
regarding both attitude and behavioral coherence. In conversions regarding content, 
thankfulness (particularly thankfulness directed to a divine power) is less common; the 
change in moral views is regarded, perhaps, as a “natural” occurrence (in the sense of 
following one’s natural capacities, and not requiring supernatural help). No “boasting” is 
                                                 




found in this class of conversion either, but some negative feelings can be found that are 
associated with having been in the wrong for quite a long time without even suspecting it. 
The presence of these positive and negative feelings confirms one of the proposed 
tenets of a joined affective/cognitive internalist view; namely that the positive/negative 
response of our feelings act as an immanent confirmation that the objects of desire 
(understanding and truth in relation to the desire to know, and value, in relation to the 
drive to value) have been, in this respect, achieved (or not). Such feelings do not entail 
the truth/falsity or rightness/wrongness of what is achieved in the act of moral 
conversion. Those conclusions would depend on judgments that would in turn depend on 
one’s understanding and further judgments about very complex matters, including the 
evidential value of (partial) fulfillment of important desires and the centrality of these 
desires in the constitution of a human person. But nevertheless it is a very significant 
pattern that such feelings are experienced as immanent confirmations that the operations 
of these desires have achieved their completion. 
Some philosophers have held that our feelings are operative in recognizing moral 
value even when our cognitive faculties do not (yet) detect them. Scheler, for example, 
proposed that we perceive values directly through our feelings.590 This position is at odds 
with the one that, following Lonergan and the Aristotelian/Aquinas tradition, is proposed 
here in which, while feelings are an essential component in human moral life, feelings are 
not considered the last word in moral judgments. The last word, so to speak, belongs to  
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reason; or better (since “reason” is nowadays often read only narrowly) to the cognitive 
dynamism of experience, understanding, judgment, all motivated by desire, that 
culminates in a moral judgment. This takes us to the next point; to examine the role of 
cognitive operations in a joined affective/cognitive internalist view. 
 
7. The role of cognitive operations in a joined affective/cognitive internalist 
view 
At the beginning of this work, the claim was made that an analysis of moral 
conversion, supported by the empirical data found in moral conversion narratives, could 
bring support to internalist views of morality. The claim was made at that point in rather 
general terms, since not much could be said at that point regarding the specific role of 
cognitive operations in the formation of moral convictions and moral structures. The 
claim has now been narrowed down by focusing on what has been called a joined 
affective/cognitive internalist view. According to the way in which this view has been 
defined, the affective sphere (what has been called, following Cronin’s usage, “feelings”) 
drives the cognitive operations forward, both with regard to purely cognitive endeavors, 
and to cognitive endeavors that result in the selection and actualization of a course of 
action. It is within this setting that the role of cognitive operations can be now examined, 
neither as simply operating towards the attainment of understanding and judgments of 
truth, nor as only operating towards evaluation and/or decision making regarding a 
specific action, but also towards a form of evaluation that goes deeper and revises one’s 




regard to moral matters, and which may result in the actualization of a whole process of 
transformation at the person’s moral core, i.e., moral conversion. 
To examine the role of cognitive operations in moral conversion, three topics need 
specific attention: (a) the connection between desires as drives and cognitive operations 
in the context of a process of moral conversion (the presence of feelings has already been 
examined in Section 6); (b) the role of cognitive operations in the process of moral 
conversion; and (c) the connection between the affective and cognitive operations, and 
the actual change effected in moral conversion. In all of this, Lonergan’s analysis of our 
cognitive operations will be employed to illuminate crucial points. 
The connection between desires and cognitive operations 
The previous section showed feelings, i.e., affective elements, playing important 
roles in the process of moral conversion, their role as drives or desires being of especial 
importance. The next step is to establish the connection between these desires and 
cognitive operations. In the Lonerganian approach, the way to establish this, as has been 
mentioned, is through what Lonerganians call an exercise of self-appropriation: this 
entails recalling, for example, any instance in which you have strained your mind to solve 
a puzzle, or even just asked a question out of curiosity, or (to include examples that 
involve judgments of value) honestly wondered or passionately argued about the morality 
of a past or projected action. Adverting to these inquiries is the first step in self-
appropriation; the next is the inference that these inquiries move forward because of 




our desire to actualize value(s), to be moral. Whether imagined or reflected on in the 
actual doing, such inquiries would be incomprehensible if not driven, “energized” by 
such desires. Thus the connection between cognitive operations and desires as drives is 
established. 
This connection is also made explicit in the narratives that have been offered here, 
though the feeling-driven questioning in these narratives almost always involves the 
sphere of value to a certain extent, that is, rarely is about truth only. Brian Palmer (case 
#1) asks to himself why his marriage broke down, and “mostly. . . why am I behaving in 
such and such a way.”591 Sandra (case #5) is “looking for a schema to justify her 
revulsion [to burnt meat].”592 Gandhi ponders whether to continue on his trip without 
minding the insults or whether to dedicate his life to root out the disease of racism. 
Leuba’s “Subject G” (case #15) is driven to “look within” after a lady shows him 
kindness despite his wretched situation.593 Almost every story considered here makes 
explicit reference, in one way or another, to such feelings being present and acting as 
drives at the beginning of a process of moral conversion. Every one of these narratives 
makes sense only in the context of such desires, whether they are explicitly named or not. 
It is therefore reasonable to propose that such desires, especially for truth and for value, 
are fundamental to the process of moral conversion. 
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The cognitive process during moral conversion. An application of Lonergan’s 
cognitional structure 
The next issue to be addressed is, what component operations does this cognitive 
process – that we gather into a unity under the description of “moral conversion” - 
involve? Although this task might be accomplished with alternative theories of cognition, 
Lonergan’s theory is particularly useful for this purpose, especially because it articulates 
cognitive operations in a way that helps differentiate and integrate the component 
operations from the gathering of data to the formulation of judgments of value. Of course, 
Lonergan has described the process only in general terms, so some interpretation will be 
needed to describe the cognitive operations as they take place during a process of moral 
conversion. (A summary of Lonergan’s cognitional structure has been advanced in 
Section 3 of this chapter.) 
It should be kept in mind that in actual instances of moral conversion a person may 
“fly by” some of these operations; for example, the data may be in the person’s 
awareness without a sense of diverting attention to it or struggling against resistance to 
“see” it. Or the person may understand what needs to be understood without questions to 
thematize the inquiry explicitly. Or the judgment about the truth of what is known may be 
effortless, “obvious,” as we often say. Thus explicit questions to be addressed may only 
arise at the level of judgments about values, action, responsibility. For example, Gandhi 
is shocked by the experience of being put off the train – the experience (not entirely new 
for him) of suffering racism on his own flesh. But he does not, in his own account, spend 




whether his ideas about racism were accurate or not. Rather, the experience stirs up in 
him – directly, as it were, as if the intervening operations had not taken place - the 
question, “what should I do now?” i.e., a question regarding action/decision.594 In the 
following considerations, then, an effort will be made to find in the narratives examples 
corresponding to each of the levels of cognitive operations identified by Lonergan, but 
not all of them will be found to be explicit in every narrative.595 
Note that among Lonergan scholars, the “standard” explanations of cognitional 
structure interpret the first three levels as focused on and driven by the desire to know 
solely, introducing the affective orientation to action/decision, value, morality only at the 
fourth level. The structure presented here differs from this standard treatment of 
Lonergan in that it presupposes that the moral orientation of the questioning process can 
be present from the beginning of the process, and so energize the first three operations as 
well, and not only the fourth. This interpretation of Lonergan is grounded on Cronin’s 
understanding of the function of feeling, though it is explicitly divergent from his view of 
the drive to value as (merely) a specification of the desire to know, i.e., as merely an 
unfolding of this desire at the fourth level of cognitive operations.596 The interpretation of 
Lonergan offered here is that the drive to value is not reducible to the desire to know, and 
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therefore that the drive to value may itself drive the questioning process forward along 
with the desire for truth, coloring it to its own specifications, i.e., looking into the data 
with a view to resources that may solve a question about action, trying to understand the 
scope of the consequences of a decision, wondering if one has thought of all possible 
alternatives and so forth; and indeed, in the case of moral conversion, a question about 
how one ought to live, and about what is of value and what are the proper standards of 
right action. 
The cognitive process during moral conversion: From experience to questions for 
understanding 
As was mentioned in Section 3, the level of experience describes the gathering of 
data that is examined and judged about in subsequent operations. While there is a 
meaning of “data” that refers specifically to the raw stimuli received through the senses, 
this is very rarely the sense that Lonergan gives to the word. For Lonergan, as for many 
other thinkers, almost all the sensorial stimuli that an adult person receives through the 
senses are interpreted, understood in terms of concepts and related frameworks as soon as 
(and even before) attention is directed to them, and only through a reflective (or more 
properly, reflexive) exercise are they actually able to be interpreted as sensory stimuli. So 
Lonergan uses the word “data” in a broad sense, as referring to interpreted, meaningful 
sensorial information (“there is a wagon over there”), to information gathered by others, 





It was also mentioned there that while the person is conscious there is a constant, 
spontaneous gathering of data; but that the gathering can also be focused intentionally by 
concentrating our attention of identifying the data that is relevant for a specific question 
or set of questions (i.e., when experience is directed by understanding). Thus, if the 
driving question is one of discrete action/decision, the data sought or adverted too will be 
that which is relevant to the action/decision, for example what parties are involved, what 
resources are at stake, what resources are available to make a solution possible, what is 
the relation among the parties (tense, hostile, patient, etc.), what feelings I perceive that 
may be revealing of aspects relevant to the situation, and so forth. 
In considering the way in which experience, i.e., data gathering, plays out in 
instances of moral conversion, spontaneous data are reported relevant to the process in 
the majority of cases. This characteristic is connected to the fact, already examined, that 
moral conversion (especially in its main analog) is a surprising, unexpected event. That 
is, the aspect of newness has its origin, according to the narratives, already at the level of 
experience; thus, the narratives mention experiences that “got them to think,” to reflect, 
or in some cases to move with urgency from the experience to an understanding of it and 
to a judgment of value. 
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Can we categorize the experiences found at the beginning of a process of moral 
conversion? From the narratives considered here, the following categorization is possible: 
(a) Vital demands or practically demanding situations are often the source of 
questions for understanding and a sense of urgency to come to judgment about value and 
action. Ordinary life is filled with such experiences: What is the nature of this illness that 
is affecting me? Why are the crops dying? What is the meaning of that alarm? Why do I 
smell smoke? Similarly, they may prompt serious reflection regarding the need to change. 
Many moral conversions begin thus. The case of Antonio Pickett (case # 20) is a good 
example of a conversion prompted by a vital situation that is perceived as intolerable. We 
find in this narrative that, despite “being enamored of the thrill and payoff of petty 
crime,” his life came to a point in which he needed to be constantly “looking over his 
shoulder, watching for police, worrying the next person he saw might try to kill him.”598 
This situation became unsustainable - it demanded understanding and judgment; and so 
while awaiting placement in a state prison he let his gang know he was stepping down. 
Although there is not an explicit question formulated in his narrative, i.e., it seems to 
move straight from the demanding experience to its resolution in judgment, there is 
nevertheless the suggestion of a period of reflection preceding this resolution when he 
says, “I knew this was my last chance to turn my life around.”599 
(b) The presentation of new data prompts, because of the human desire to know, the 
need to make sense of such data in terms of understanding and judgment of truth/falsity;  
                                                 





and because of the desire for value, the need to make sense of the new data also in terms 
of our orientation to value. “New data” should be understood here quite broadly: the 
expression may refer to empirical observations that the person has never made before, or 
to an event that brings “experiential knowledge” of what was perhaps known only 
passively, or perhaps only “in theory,” or there could be a third-party report of some 
reality of which the person was not aware, or the data may be in the form of a new feeling 
that provokes reflection regarding its meaning. 
Many of the instances of moral conversion examined here exemplify the experience 
of new data. Gandhi’s experience in the train (case #8) fits into the subcategory of a 
familiar matter now experienced “experientially,” as opposed to passively or abstractly or 
theoretically. So do the various narratives about restorative justice (cases #23, 24, 25 and 
26), where the experience of meeting their victims face to face causes in the offenders an 
“experiential awareness” of the nature of their actions, particularly of the harm they have 
inflicted in concrete, real persons with their actions. In many of these narratives we do 
not find explicit questions for understanding about the experience, because the meaning 
of the experience is grasped directly and effectively and the next questions are about what 
to do and how to live from then on. Jackie Katounas, for example, (case #24), in all her 
years of stealing “never gave consideration or a thought to the victims”; but her receiving 
stolen goods belonging to someone she knew became a turning point in her life: she felt 




for action, i.e., she stopped offending altogether, and “began thinking of other people 
than myself.”600 
Also  belonging under this heading are the numerous cases cited by Leuba (#15, 16 
and 17) in which the unexpected kindness of various strangers prompts a new kind of 
question and new insights in various alcoholics. “Subject H” (#16) mentions how he “did 
not understand why a well-dressed stranger should care for him and be willing to walk 
with a raggedly-clad fellow like himself”601; and in the case of “Subject G” the kindness 
of a lady “made him look within” to understand himself differently and judge and choose 
accordingly.602 
(c) The new data may be symbolic, in which case it typically requires a great deal of 
interpretive mediation. “Sandra’s” emotional/aesthetic reaction to burnt meat (case #5) is 
of this kind. Her immediate revulsion to the way her host family cooked their meat did 
not initially have “anything to do with conscience.” But it prompted a reflection that 
eventually resulted in her formulating a vegetarian position, the arguments for which 
were in fact not directly related to her emotional reaction to burnt meat.603 The 
presentation of the “new data” may even be imaginative, as with Helen John’s (case #6) 
vision of a Builth devastated by nuclear warfare. One may speculate about the 
subconscious processes that may have provoked these images; but the contrast between 
the beautiful scenery she was driving through and the imagined devastation prompted her 
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strong emotional reaction, and a “quasi-experiential” awareness of the consequences of 
nuclear warfare that was powerful enough to prompt serious questioning, then 
understanding, judgment and action. 
(d) Sometimes it is not just the data alone that raises questions, but the perception of 
a lack of “fit” or correspondence between the data and the framework that has been 
offered to explain it; or more complexly the lack of “fit” can be between various sets of 
data (e.g. conflicting accounts from various witnesses). “Being puzzled” is an expression 
that describes such a perception of incoherence; the reader can probably confirm from 
personal experience just how rare it is to simply shrug off a puzzling set of data instead of 
attempting at least a tentative explanation. A similar pattern is found in many narratives 
of moral conversion. Within this category one may consider cases of a highly 
argumentative nature, where the revision of moral structures is prompted by articulate 
discussions on moral issues. An example is found in the story of Wayne Bauer (case #2), 
who having enrolled in the Marine Corps in the 60’s, took part in many arguments about 
the Vietnam war with friends over the course of several months, until he eventually 
“realized that [his] best arguments held no weight.” Bauer’s narrative is very explicit 
about his awareness of incoherence between data and understanding: he compares the 
experience with “having his environment shattered,” feeling that he had been lied to and 
was therefore left without any values.604 
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(e) Finally, new feelings themselves may be the new data. This is the case for 
example when the feelings do not act simply as background drive, or as a somewhat 
predictable emotional resonance to what is already in awareness. Instead, a person’s 
feelings on some matter can become particularly puzzling or insistent, to the point in 
which there is a demand to pay attention to the feelings themselves and to question their 
meaning. The case of Russ Fee (#22), the long-time lawyer who left his successful 
practice in order to become a primary school teacher, exemplifies this possibility. Fee 
reports feelings of disillusionment with what he had accomplished, in spite of his success 
at it – i.e., feelings unexpected in that environment. He experienced himself having 
become “too brittle, too competitive, too self-absorbed.” Fee then reports a slow process 
of seeking out “what has values that are important to [one] and trying it out,” a process in 
which he was supported by his wife and adult children.605 His narrative suggests a 
gradually increasing awareness of his unexpected disillusionment with his hitherto well-
established career choice. Eventually he did understand the meaning of these feelings and 
made the value judgments and choices they prompted to. 
Brian Palmer’s case (#1) exemplifies an instance in which the emotional dissonance 
is nearly as significant as the situation that caused it. Having been suddenly faced with 
the fact that his well-provided-for wife was divorcing him, Palmer mentions this event as 
“one of the two or three biggest surprises in my life.”606 This unexpected experience, and 
the felt awareness that it could not be explained on the basis of previously accepted  
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meanings, led Palmer to reassess his life in fundamental ways, exploring the limits of the 
kind of success he had been pursuing; but part of his soul-seeking appears to have been 
prompted by the surprise itself, the fact that such a thing could have been brewing and he 
was completely unaware of it because it did not fit with how he had been understanding 
his life.607 
 
Thus an examination of moral conversion narratives indicates that an enormous 
variety of experiences can be found at the beginning of a process of moral conversion. 
Nevertheless it seems a common feature among them that they throw the person into 
some sort of felt imbalance – not by the experience’s own characteristics alone, but also 
because of the person’s disposition (often shaped by accepted categories of meaning and 
expectations) to be moved or thrown off by the specific experience. This affective 
imbalance can occur at various levels, but what is relevant to the present point is that an 
imbalance is also produced at the cognitive level as well. This is demonstrated by the fact 
that, in the narratives, the report of relevant experiences is almost always followed by an 
account of the questioning that follows the experience: for most of these persons, 
formulating questions seems to be a spontaneous way of articulating and addressing the 
felt imbalance. That is, the next set of cognitive operations involved in moral conversion 
(though, as was mentioned, this level may sometimes be left out of the narrative, i.e., left 
implicit) is that of understanding. The following section will consider the role of 
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place almost entirely at a subconscious level, or is kept at that level (albeit with some degree of awareness) 




understanding (in Lonergan’s sense, as throughout this analysis) in the process of moral 
conversion. 
The cognitive process during moral conversion: The level of understanding 
From the various affective scenarios described above, questions emerge for the 
person experiencing them. These questions are part of and generate in turn a process that, 
in Lonergan’s reading, is understanding. This is not a univocal, instantaneous or quasi-
magical grasp of the full nature of the object of questioning, but rather the operation of a 
variety of strategies that bring the intellect closer to full understanding. Such strategies 
include the gathering of more data to fill in gaps; an intensified focus on the data with the 
aim of identifying patterns relevant to an answer; a careful attempt to adequately 
define/describe the object, which may result in further illuminating relevant aspects of the 
data; reformulations of the question, until a question that properly frames the inquiry is 
achieved; and finally (if the process is successful) the formulation of theories or 
explanations, in which, in Lonergan’s account, this operation reaches its object.608 The 
actual event of understanding (“insight” is one of Lonergan’s preferred terms to designate 
it) might be described as the internal formulation of a definition or hypothesis. But as has 
been noted, these activities defy formal definition; for Lonergan they are not species of  
                                                 
608 Note that while many attempts to understand end up with the formulation of theories or explanations 
that seem to resolve the question, Lonergan stresses that there is a normative need (driven by the desire for 
knowledge) to move to the next level, the “level of judgment,” i.e., to ask the question “is it true?” “Is it 
so?” In other words, the questioning process should not end with an apparently adequate explanation, but 
must move forward towards a comprehensive revision of possible objections or alternatives, until a 
judgment can be issued in which (ideally) the conditions for the truth of the judgment are satisfied. 





other kinds of activities but (some of) the basic building blocks in the description of 
human activity. Instead, the descriptive and corroborative strategy for explaining what 
understanding means is ostensive, i.e., to point to examples of understanding, especially 
examples in the interlocutor’s own experience, so that he/she can self-appropriate them. 
Despite Lonergan’s formulation of understanding as a human activity, it is 
considered by Lonergan to be an event ultimately beyond our control, in the sense that its 
achievement does not come normally as a direct, “if-then” effect of our willing its 
achievement. The more the intellectual effort, the keener the description, the more 
polished and trained our intellect has become, the higher the probabilities of insight 
arising. But, by the same token, understanding is not guaranteed; on the contrary, 
Lonergan explains the (relative) fullness of understanding as dependent on a probabilistic 
model which he calls “emergent probability”: our active efforts, skills and accumulated 
knowledge provide the substratum that makes the emergence of an insight not only 
possible but more (or less) probable. We can modify to some extent the basic probability 
(by attention, i.e., staying on a problem more time, devoting more of our cognitive 
resources to it, etc.) but this does not guarantee positive results.609 
What is it that is understood in moral conversion? The variety of possible questions 
for understanding is tremendously diverse. Before considerations of possible response/ 
action to a given experience or set of data,, questions for understanding may attempt to 
identify the essence or definition of concrete objects, or of feelings, or of abstract 
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discussed in the previous chapter, cannot be guaranteed either, but seems to be also an event partially 




principles, or the dynamism of a group of objects, patterns of behavior, mathematical 
relations, concrete causal relationships, and the list could go on. One needs only to look 
at the variety of sciences and disciplines, becoming ever more specialized and 
subspecialized, to begin to grasp the potential diversity of questions for understanding. A 
similar open-endedness about possible questions for understanding arises in the context 
of an orientation towards practical action/decision, although the framework presented in 
Chapter 5, regarding what constitutes a “moral matter” (or a “matter of moral concern”) 
provides a useful set of categories for addressing the problem. It was proposed there that, 
in the modern/contemporary focus of the question, matters of moral concern are those 
dealing with the question about right/wrong, or what ought/ought not to be done; and in 
the classical understanding of the question, matters of moral concern are those dealing 
with the general problem of human happiness, the “good life,” the meaning of life and so 
forth. 
Using this framework, what is understood during the process of moral conversion 
(or questioned, revised, proposed as a theory, etc.) may be additionally categorized either 
as a conflictive or a reinforcing element. In the former case, one’s criteria for determining 
right/wrong, or for answering the question of happiness and the meaning of life, may 
come under questioning. The person may identify, in the conflicts generated by the 
application of one’s criteria to data, either in general or in relation to particular issues 
(e.g., harmful consequences to particulars or groups, paradoxes or other signs of internal  
inconsistency), or conflicts generated when applying the criteria to a wider context (e.g., 




generated by alternative viewpoints (putting oneself in someone else’s shoes, attending to 
another thinker’s proposal on the matter) and so on. In the normal dynamism of the 
“desire to know,” conflicts of this kind typically prompt a revision in terms of content 
(e.g., in Brian Palmer’s reexamination of his life goals, case #1). If conflicts, however, 
are perceived as extensive enough to make one doubt that the problem can ever be 
resolved – if the failure to understand, in other words, devolves into a more general 
conviction that the realm of morality cannot ever be understood – this may undermine a 
person’s overall conviction or commitment to their existing values and to moral life in 
general, as currently accepted by them, and thus prompt an attitudinal change: 
disappointment, skepticism, etc. We find an example of this in the case of Wayne Bauer 
(case #2): 
And after this [his discussions with friends that had gone to college] went on, to make a 
long story short, for about three or four months, I realized that my best argument held no 
weight. And what happened was, all of a sudden, my view of who I was and my 
environment was shattered. It was like looking in the mirror and having the whole thing 
shattered on you and seeing all your values, all your beliefs, everything you thought was 
real just kind of crumble. And it left me without any values and it also left me in a position 
where I had this terrible feeling of loneliness that there was no one I could go to for help. 
All the people I had trusted, I feel, essentially, they had lied to me.610 
 
Alternatively, the matters understood may not be of the kind that make the person 
doubt or revise moral/value criteria, but rather of the kind that reveal in deep detail the 
intelligibility or reasonability of such criteria, i.e., that reinforce a person’s conviction of 
the truth or adequacy of criteria already possessed and operative. This may include new 
arguments supporting their foundation, conflicts and problems solved by the application  
                                                 




of these criteria, harmful consequences to particulars or groups produced by not acting 
morally, the resolution of internal doubts when being presented with a more suitable 
interpretation of the meaning of the criteria, encounters with people who transmit 
happiness or satisfaction while embodying these criteria, and so on. Normally such 
discoveries would not prompt a revision in terms of content, given that the content is 
being ratified by the new understanding; the process of new understanding may be better 
associated with a renewed or intensified commitment to moral life. If the renewal 
involves a significant change, it may be considered an instance of moral conversion 
regarding attitude/commitment. 
Note however that these descriptions of conflictive or reinforcing understanding 
contain an implicit reference to operations that are better located in the third level of 
cognitive operations, the level of judgment of truth and falsity. The perception that 
intelligibility is lacking is closely linked to the operation of judging that one’s 
understanding on the matter is or may be flawed, and false. This move may be blocked 
occasionally by bias, i.e., by (in Lonerganian terms) a refusal to ask the further questions, 
but usually not before at least the shadow of a doubt (the product of judgment) makes an 
appearance. Similarly, reinforcing understanding moves to a reinforcing judgment of the 
truth of the relevant criteria. Convictions that were open to doubts become stronger, one’s 
certainty becomes fuller and so on.611 
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coherent meaning and affirming (or denying) that something exists in reality as understood. Further, to 
repeat an important point, Lonergan describes both of these operations as fallible, but also corrigible in 




The frequently experienced swiftness of the move from evidence to understanding 
to judgment, in many cases makes it seem spontaneous, that is, it is often not experienced 
as needing to follow the demands of a rigorous methodology. When this takes place, it is 
possible to confirm in one’s own experience the unitary dynamism or integrity of our 
cognitive operations. This is why Lonergan describes the process as an immanent, 
dynamic unity of cognitional activity, driven all the way through by the desire to know, 
and (in the present interpretation) by the complementary drive to value. That is, the 
cognitive process is unitary from beginning to end, and not some kind of logically 
complex concatenation of elements.612 
The cognitive process during moral conversion: The level of judgment 
The third level of cognitive operations (“rational consciousness,” in perhaps 
Lonergan’s most idiosyncratic terminological choice) is the level of judgment. The desire 
to know is not satisfied with having reached an understanding of the matter that, for all 
the illuminating it may be, has not yet been determined to be true. The desire to know is a 
desire to know truth, to be certain (which, in Lonergan, means the certainty relative to the 
range of questions being presently asked, what he calls the “virtually unconditioned”); 
and this not merely for pragmatic reasons but because the affective component of the 
knowledge process does not allow one to rest in something less than a relative 
                                                 
612 Lonergan, Insight, 300. In this connection, it is interesting to consider that, in many accounts, arguments 
for internalism seem to be formulated almost exclusively as pertaining to (in Lonergan’s terms) the level of 
understanding, implying that it is just “understanding properly” that generates conviction, the feeling of 
moral obligation, etc. This has to be viewed as a very limited approach. In fact, the famous “naturalistic 
fallacy” argument of G.E. Moore could be said to be focused on this narrow approach which attempts to 





certainty.613 The operations of judgment thus consist mostly on revising and weighing: 
revising whether the compound evidence-theory is conclusive, i.e., whether some gaps or 
flaws in the theory or explanation have been overlooked; weighing whether the evidence 
available is sufficient and corroborative enough; and pronouncing judgment regarding 
truth, falsity, probability or inconclusiveness. Again, the move from the previous level is, 
in Lonergan’s account, effected by a specific type of questioning, the questioning for 
judgment (“but is it so?”). Similarly, in the context of an orientation towards discrete 
action/decision, there is a distinctive questioning on the part of judgment, such as: “Is the 
need real?” “Are the possibilities of success well evaluated?” “Are the parties involved 
telling all they know, showing their true feelings?” “Are there any aspects of the situation 
that I have not thought of?” Beyond matters of fact relevant to action, moreover, the 
questioning may be about whether the criteria to morally judge the situation are 
appropriate: “Is the problem raised by the difficulty to apply present rules and norms, or 
is there a problem with the rules themselves?” Obviously such questions are relevant in 
situations in which moral conversion is a possibility, coming in many forms, depending 
on the type of moral conversion and the circumstances. 
While the normal effect of questions for understanding is to drive the cognitive 
dynamism steadily onwards – towards further understanding, and towards judgment - the 
effect of the third level questions of judgment is quite frequently an arresting of the flow, 
requiring the person to go slower in order to avoid the mistakes that occur when one  
                                                 
613 Even if a certain tenet cannot attain more than the category of “doubtful” with the present resources, the 




rushes into asserting the reality of a theory. And this caution obviously is reasonable in 
regard to moral conversion as well. Thus such questions may be raised as: “Is this 
dissatisfaction an effect of my present way of life, or does it have medical causes?” “Is 
one really capable of change?” “Will I be able to go through it?” “Are there any other 
aspects that I have not thought of?” 
Thus, in the process of a conversion regarding content the person may feel divided 
by the struggle of cognitive operations that seem to be working in opposing directions. 
This felt division is not necessarily caused by a defect of understanding; it may be rather 
a natural result of the operation of judgment, that moves cautiously in asking if what is 
understood from the available evidence is convincing enough. 
In instances of conversion regarding attitude, the role of judgment operations is of 
particular importance. Consider, for example, the many narratives in which the 
determining factor seems to be, not a new understanding of things (in the sense of a new 
theory or explanation), but rather an encounter with, to put it one way, the existential 
actuality of the concrete, or, as was mentioned when considering the level of experience, 
the newness of the data consists in its being “experiential.” Such cases, it was said, are 
common in the context of restorative justice and victim/offender mediation; the offender 
often experiences a sort of existential awakening when confronted with a “real” person as 
their victim and faced with the fact that their actions have caused actual, real harm to this 
person. 
A way of explaining this awakening, borrowed from John Henry Newman, is by 




distinction that will be translated here into “experiential” and “notional” knowledge.614 
On the one hand, up to this point the offender may have “known” that certain actions are 
deemed as immoral (or illegal) by many. In the worst-case scenario, the notion itself may 
be deemed, Thrasymachus-like, as a “noble simplicity” believed mostly by fools, but not 
binding for those clever enough to see through it.615 But it also seems possible that a 
person would maintain only a “notional” belief in the truth of these standards of conduct, 
separating them from impacting one’s life through rationalization, denial, inattention, 
mindless habit, so there is no “bridging” between them and what is actually relevant to 
the person’s life. Yet, as a number of moral conversion narratives attest, experiences can 
“strike home,” can have the capacity to bridge that gap, making the notion relevant to the 
person’s life. This is what may be called “experiential knowledge.”  
Jackie Katounas (case #24) provides an example. Despite her recurrent history of 
stealing, her story does not suggest a resistance to the notion that “stealing is wrong,” but 
rather a disconnection with the existential relevance of this truth. A further example is 
provided in Gandhi’s story; as has been mentioned, Gandhi was aware of the immorality 
of racism and discrimination, but this awareness seems to have been kept at the “notional 
level” until he suffered this specific (for it was not the first) experience of abuse and 
discrimination in his own person. Finally, Helen John’s roadside “vision” of the  
                                                 
614 Says Newman, in his Grammar of Assent: “It is in human nature to be more affected by the concrete 
than by the abstract. . . Real apprehension, then, may be pronounced stronger than notional, because things, 
which are its objects, are confessedly more impressive and affective than notions, which are the objects of 
notional. Experiences and their images strike and occupy the mind, as abstractions and their combinations 
do not.” (John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent [London: Longmans, Green, and 
Co., 1903], 37.) 




devastated countryside seems to have produced an analogous result, effecting a move 
from an abstract, irrelevant understanding that nuclear war is something bad to an 
emotionally charged understanding that seemed to leave her with no option but to address 
it and to take action. In all these cases there is, at the level of judgment, an affirmation of 
the reality of the moral standards being violated or threatened; an affirmation that is 
connected in the cognitive process to the presence of the new, experiential data. This 
affirmation, in turn, prompts a renewed judgment of value, which in the cases mentioned 
is extensive enough in what it covers to involve a life-changing attitudinal change.616 
As a tentative conclusion, an examination of narratives of moral conversion shows 
that the process of moral conversion can be “mapped” onto the Lonerganian cognitional 
structure of experience, understanding and judgment in dynamic unity. Therefore, it 
makes sense to propose that the dynamic unity of cognitional operations in general is 
attributable to the process of moral conversion. Furthermore, the cause-consequence 
language, so frequently used in the narratives (explicitly or in the form of imagery about 
the process), indicates a subjective perception of this dynamic unity of the cognitive 
operations on the part of those experiencing them. Experience prompts understanding 
                                                 
616 Can these attitudinal changes be explained instead in terms of a differentiation in the way one 
understands something? To be certain, it is possible to find some theoretical grounding for this 
interpretation. Aquinas’ distinction between knowing per perfectum usum rationis – a theoretical, 
methodologically sophisticated knowing – and knowing per connaturalitatem – through a deep 
“familiarity” with the subject - may be applied to illuminate this distinction between the “notional” and the 
“experiential.” (Summa Theologiae II-II, q.45 a.2.) The Aristotelian doctrine that we know the universal in 
the images presented to the intellect can be used to argue that what produces the “renewed understanding” 
is the presentation - broadly speaking - of a more effective image through contact with the real, concrete 
persons that were harmed. Attributing the differentiation to the level of judgment, however, seems to be 
conceptually cleaner. One does not need then to be stressing or italicizing the word “understanding” in 
different ways to make oneself understood: the distinction between notional and experiential is explained in 
simpler terms by arguing that the “awakening experience” adds to the judgment of truth evidence of a kind 




prompts judgment; judgment depends on understanding and understanding depends on 
experience, in recurrent self-correcting cycles. This is the way in which the process of 
conversion is reported, and it conforms to Lonergan’s careful model of cognitional 
operations in their dynamic unity. 
But to this point only passing reference has been made to judgments of value in 
relation to action and moral life, as a fourth step in the Lonerganian analysis. Clearly this 
step must be examined to complete our analysis of cognition in moral conversion: and 
that is the task we turn to now. 
The cognitive process during moral conversion: The level of judgments of value 
Lonergan’s treatment in Insight and in Method in Theology 
In positing a fourth level of cognitive operations, a level of decision/action 
(“responsible consciousness”) Lonergan establishes a continuity between cognitive 
operations undertaken independently of action, and the sphere of human action, value, 
moral life. Lonergan’s early attempts at establishing this continuity in the final chapters 
of Insight (1957) regarded moral decision and action as simply a next step in logical 
continuity with previous cognitive operations, without including the idea of an additional 
drive to value. That attempt, according to Cronin, was doomed to failure because it ran 
right up against the “naturalistic fallacy” obstacle.617 In fact, in Insight, Lonergan tried 
many formulations of this matter, without settling completely on one. “Rational 
consciousness,” another name for the operations of judgment, would become “moral self-
                                                 




consciousness” in the fourth level,618 and the “questions for truth” of the third level 
would become “questions for responsibility” at the fourth. The desire to know became 
specified at the fourth level as an “exigence for self-consistency in knowing and 
doing.”619 These are the seeds of ideas that will receive a fuller treatment some years later 
in Method in Theology, when he proposed, in addition to the desire to know, the drive to 
value and ways to integrate them in a unified account of human action. 
Even though partial and unsatisfactory, Lonergan’s treatment in Insight still throws 
light on the continuity theme. For the idea of a “rational exigence for self-consistency” in 
particular finds confirmation both in ordinary self-appropriating reflection on action and 
the moral life and in the moral conversion narratives. Everyone with some experience at 
examining their own actions will be familiar, for example, with the phenomenon of 
“rationalization,” e.g. of finding excuses for past deeds that are generally against one’s 
moral convictions. This phenomenon attests to the difficulty we experience in carrying 
out actions that are inconsistent or incoherent with our moral standards. Lonergan’s 
“exigence for self-consistency” is an articulation of this experience, and it highlights the 
immanent demand of a continuity between what is understood and judged as true, and the 
operations of judgments of value and decision/action. However, Lonergan’s account in 
Insight leaves this imperative for self-consistency without content. Value, convictions 
about the moral life are not yet integrated into Lonergan’s system. 
 Lonergan’s later view, however (here I follow Cronin’s reading) is that the  
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perception of moral values (as opposed to the perception of goods of satisfaction/ 
dissatisfaction, which have their basis in purely organic/biological dispositions) is 
grounded on a distinct spiritual drive, the drive to value. Like the desire to know, the 
drive to value is an immanent orientation of the person, in this case an orientation to 
value, and it is fulfilled in the achievement/realization of value. But Lonergan holds this 
orientation is not thematic, and needs to be mediated by cognitive operations to become 
thematized, and thus to allow us to achieve/realize values specifically.620 
 
The drive to value as limited to a specific level of consciousness, and as driving cognitive 
processes all the way through 
Some Lonergan commentators’ explications of the fourth level of consciousness 
seem to imply that the drive to value only begins to play a part at the fourth level itself; 
that is, they describe the flow of the first three levels of cognitive operations as driven by 
the desire to know, and the move to the fourth is described either as a specialization of 
the desire to know, or as if the drive to value made a sudden entrance, transmuting the 
process into a dynamism oriented towards a resolution in decision and action.621 As has 
been mentioned, this explication, though somewhat common, seems inadequate. It has 
already been shown in the previous subsections how the whole process can be conceived 
instead as sometimes oriented towards decision/action from its beginning steps – in 
which case understanding’s attention to the data focuses on the information needed to  
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make a good decision, and questions for understanding attempt to clarify both the 
practical situation and the criteria potentially involved in the decision. Similarly, 
questions for judgment attempt to certify that one’s understanding of the practical 
conditions is accurate. What is distinctive of the fourth level of cognitive operations on 
this interpretation is not the presence of a drive to value, for this, it is submitted, is also 
found and operative in other levels of cognitive operations. Rather, what distinguishes the 
operations of the fourth level of consciousness (and in so doing, makes the moral/value 
theme especially urgent at this level) is their specific orientation to the question about 
action: “What should I do?” 
It is probably not wrong, however (though it should be kept in mind that there is no 
“canonical” interpretation of Lonergan of this matter – not yet at least), to understand the 
fourth level of cognitional operation as permeated by the drive to value in a stronger 
sense than the other levels. That is, in a normal decision-making process the questions 
raised are not limited to calculations about practical or economic utility, that make 
abstraction of matters of moral value but for some occasional question about ethics. 
Rather, the normal decision-making process (i.e., the decision-making process of a 
person with a normal degree of moral awareness) is permeated with questions of moral 
value: “Is it worthwhile?” “Is it consistent with who I am?” “How is it going to make me 
feel afterwards?” “Will I be setting a proper example?” “Am I indulging myself too 
much?” Lonergan calls it, in fact, the level of responsible action/decision, implying that 





The process can be illustrated with the narratives of moral conversion. It was 
discussed how the drive to value, present in those feelings and emotions reported at the 
beginning of a process of moral conversion, becomes thematized through the dynamism 
of the first three cognitive operations. In the case of Russ Fee (#22), general feelings of 
anxiety and dissatisfaction become thematized as it becomes understood that these 
feelings are a reaction to an unhappy career, that is making him “too brittle… too brittle, 
too competitive, too self-absorbed. . . racing through life instead of strolling.”623 A 
process of discernment begins, which includes attention to the data, attempts to 
understand what causes these negative feelings, judgments regarding the accuracy of this 
interpretation, gathering of more data through the concrete experience of teaching, 
reflection on the feelings produced by this activity and so forth. At a certain point, 
however, it is clear to Fee that a decision has to be made as to whether to close his law 
practice and commit himself to the career of a teacher or not: understanding what is 
wrong and what can be done to solve it is not equivalent to determining it ought to be 
done and doing it. This kind of decision is beyond the operative effects attributed to third-
level operations (namely, judgments of truth or falsity); a further level of operations is 
needed (at least one) to decide on a course of action and to move to action.624 
                                                 
622 It may be useful to keep in mind that, in fact, the term “practical,” now used frequently to imply a 
“value-neutral” or “non-moral,” means-to-ends calculation, has been associated during most of its history 
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623 Anderson, "New Teacher Lays Down the Law… and Picks up the Books." 
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value/deliberation/moral judgments, decision/choice and moving to action might not be better considered as 
(two or three) distinct levels of operation. For the sake of simplicity, I will proceed using the standard 




Exactly how deliberation, choosing and moving to action take place and are related 
is not a matter to be discussed here. There are many differing accounts and some aspects 
of this question have already been discussed in Chapter 9. The question under 
consideration here is whether the proposal that there is a dynamic unity between the first 
three cognitive operations should be expanded to moral deliberation and choice, i.e., 
including elements of decision-making that make up this fourth level. When that has been 
done, the bearing of this analysis of moral conversion on the internalism/externalism 
debate can be examined properly. 
Self-appropriation and the dynamic unity of cognitive operations and action 
As with the individual cognitive operations, the primary forms of evidence that this 
dynamic is a reality are self-appropriation and corroboration by communicating with 
others about their self-appropriation about the same topic. By attending to, understanding, 
and judging about one’s own cognitive and affective operations, i.e., Lonergan’s notion 
of self-appropriation, there is, arguably, significant evidence of such a dynamic unity 
between the cognitive operations of the first three levels and fourth-level operations. 
Unless specific obstacles such as bias (i.e., a chosen or half-conscious refusal to ask the 
relevant questions) or psychological resistance block or somehow short-circuit the 
dynamism, there is no significant experienced discontinuity between experiencing data, 
                                                                                                                                                 
continue to call “decision-making” (and occasionally, “the sphere of decision/action”). For an alternative 
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Note on the Distinction between Judging and Choosing,” (class notes, Loyola University Chicago, 1985 to 
present) and also David T. Ozar and David J. Sokol, Dental Ethics at Chairside, 2nd. ed. (Washington 




understanding (or trying to) its meaning, judging it to be true/false, and considering it in 
relation to value and action (i.e., deliberation/choice). 
This basic continuity of activities has been found also in narratives of moral 
conversion. If a narrative lays out a specific content as being the subject-matter in a 
process of deliberation, such content can be seen to have been previously experienced 
and understood (at least to some degree) and then judged to be real, though this latter 
operation may be sometimes skipped in the narratives (i.e., left implicit). Of course, 
throughout the effort to identify evidence of this dynamic unity of operations, as has been 
noted often, we must be mindful that the operations do not always go perfectly. A 
person’s awareness is selective, and their understanding may be incomplete in many 
ways (such as, for example, in comparison with the understanding that may subsequently 
be gained retrospectively). And judgment, as has been stressed, is fallible, and so is 
deliberation. But note that such shortfalls do not invalidate the claim of dynamic unity as 
if they were direct counterexamples. Though the subtlety of the complete argument 
would take this section along an extended tangent, there is definitely an argument to be 
made that the fact that these kinds of events are judged to be shortfalls from cognition-at-
its-best is evidence of the dynamic unity of the four levels of operations (and of what 
counts as the proper object of each operation, to put this last point in Aquinian terms.) 
While the evidence of this dynamic unity is thus readily available, there are a few 
difficulties specific to this point that require particular treatment. The source of these 
difficulties is the theme of our orientation to action, which Lonergan, Cronin and the 




different nature from cognitive operations. Action is, or at least includes the external, the 
physical, and as such it is not self appropriated in the same way that cognitive operations 
are – or so it seems at first look anyway. That is, the flow between cognitive operations 
of experience-understanding-reflection-deliberation seems to encounter a gap of sorts 
when it begins to turn “outward,” to require bodily engagement (since self-awareness of 
the body is more likely to be localized, or at least spatial in a way that self-awareness of 
cognitive activities is not), i.e., to turn into action. There seems to be a gap here that 
Humean doubts might easily widen or render uncrossable. 
It is possible, however, to corroborate the unity between the operations of cognition 
and action by recalling our own experiences of deliberation (as the last of the cognitive 
operations) leading to action, i.e., by retrospective self-appropriation. In the process of 
deliberation, a decision to act was arrived at, and the decision was value-judged to be 
reasonable (that is, cognitively appropriate both in terms of factual knowledge and moral/ 
value criteria), and the action taken was what you decided to do. An example of this 
dynamic unity of the operations up to decision/action might run like this: I go to the 
supermarket and consider buying bread, according to criteria of taste, healthiness, price 
range, and ad hoc factors such as which members of my family will be there for dinner. 
Left, let us assume, between two options, I consider buying the one that I like the most or 
buying the one that the rest of my family prefers. The former option could be said 




value.625 I opt for the values of generosity and self-sacrifice, and choose the bread my 
family prefers. In this decision I experience myself as making sense of my decision in 
terms of values, potential consequences, consistency with how I regard myself in my 
various social roles, etc. The decision, we might say, “feels” sound; but this “feeling” is, 
upon examination, a self-reflective evaluation of the adequacy of the data (experiences), 
understanding, judgment about reality, and judgments about value and action 
(deliberation) that went into it and that, when I act accordingly, are the full description of 
what I am choosing to do. 
Now, in retrospect, with the whole process completed – and judged satisfactory as a 
decision-making/action process, i.e., “it feels sound,” as just noted -  I can confirm the 
reality (via understanding and judgment regarding the self-appropriated data of my own 
actions) of the dynamic unity between cognitive operations and action, I need only to 
look into the grocery bags and corroborate that the bread I actually picked up and paid for 
matches the outcome of the whole cognitive process. Thus a simple, pedestrian example, 
judged and evaluated (as a good decision) in self-appropriation can confirm the dynamic 
unity between cognitive operations. The one implicit requisite is that of selecting an 
instance in which all cognitive operations are judged adequately and are apparent to self-
awareness. In cases of one’s rushing through a decision and in cases of performing 
actions to which we are habituated, there would often not be enough self-aware data to 
examine closely. 
                                                 
625 The satisfaction/value distinction is simply incorporated here from Lonergan and Cronin for the 
purposes of this example. Obviously much careful scholarship on both categories and on their connection 




Now externalist authors may well claim that such straightforwardness in accepting 
introspective evidence is (or at least is likely to be) deceiving. Retrospective and 
observer-biased analyses of people’s narratives of their decision-making processes show 
them to be riddled with oversimplifications, rationalizations, and even confusion as to the 
sequence and interrelationship of operations leading to deliberation and decision. The 
process is better described, it is claimed, as one of preferences, understood as 
heteronomous directives never fully “available” to self-awareness, which by a balancing 
of their variably vectored energies direct our actions; and that this process is then later or 
instantly followed by a process of molding our thoughts to our actions. 
It must be granted that rationalization can run rampant in self-reports of human 
action; there are also many instances in which a person is confused as to what course of 
action to take (and perhaps anxiously aware of it), and in which a decision is reached via 
such measures as flipping a coin, following a “gut feeling,” or even doing the exact 
opposite of what one decided the moment after deciding. Such examples may be used to 
argue that decisions are not made in the way in which internalism describes them, i.e., in 
continuity with the dynamic unity of the cognitive process. 
The answer to this difficulty requires that we examine two methodological points 
that are key to understanding the internalism/externalism debate. One is the difference 
between some and all, possible and impossible. The other concerns the selection of 
examples offered as evidence. Concerning the first point, it was mentioned earlier that, 
while externalism claims to exclude every instance of internalist decision-making, the 




the same time acknowledging the actual, empirical difficulties of making fully reasonable 
decisions, and the fact that shortfalls frequently occur.626 So a limited number of 
instances in which the internalist explanation seems to fail does not determine the falsity 
of internalism. 
Concerning the second point regarding the examples offered as evidence, 
externalists need to account also for those instances of decision-making that have been 
internally comprehended with a peculiar, distinct clarity: moments in which we “clearly 
knew” how we judged what was to be done, as opposed to moments of obscurity, 
confusion, indecision or impulsive choices. Such moments of peculiar clarity are 
characterized not only by clarity of feelings (such as enthusiasm for certain values, or an 
intensely felt desire to act morally), but also by feelings characteristic of cognitive 
operations arriving at their object: by “eurekas,” the experience of “a-ha moments” and 
things falling correctly into place. While reflection on the former cases does raise 
questions about the dynamic unity of cognitive operations and action, reflection on the 
latter cases (in which self-appropriating them seems to be simply a matter of “looking” 
introspectively) do not raise such questions, but rather solidify the internalist view 
regarding the dynamic unity of cognitive operations and action; and these latter cases 
must also be taken into account in the debate. 
 
                                                 
626 See, however, the comment above (in this same section) about the implication of judging such as 
shortfalls. Externalists who consider them to be the standard thus are generalizing from them, to conclude 
that the decisions offered as evidence for internalism are being misdescribed. Note also, though this too 
would take this project far into questions of epistemology, that an externalist who interprets internalist 
examples as misdescribed, or “shortfalls” as typical, has either already accepted self-appropriation as a 
relevant form of evidence or is seriously misstating arguments that should properly be formulated only 




Corroboration of the dynamic unity of cognitive operations and action: The 
evidence of moral conversion 
If moral conversion takes place, and is described correctly as proposed in this study, 
it is important to ask if the narratives of moral conversion corroborate this claim about 
dynamic unity. Two of the categories of moral conversion do not result directly in 
“action” or “behavior,” but in changes regarding the content of the person’s convictions 
and their attitude to right/wrong and happiness/eudaemonia/ meaning. But as has been 
explained, such changes then in turn typically result in stable changes in habits of action/ 
behavior, and we would ordinarily withhold the descriptor “moral conversion” if, in some 
respect at least, they did not. 
Many of the now familiar narratives of moral conversion corroborate this claim. 
Russ Fee’s narrative (#22) outlines the process with great clarity, even detailing some of 
his experimentation before the decision was solidified. Gandhi (#8) describes the 
cognitive steps that produced first the seed and then the mature idea that became his 
guiding vocation. Wayne Bauer (#2) describes how the change of convictions, the 
realization that “[his] best argument held no weight,”627 moved him to action, i.e., to 
leave the Marines and live in the underground until he could sort things out. These 
particular narratives are especially useful because they detail the convert’s processes of 
deliberation. Others are more succinct and leave more of the process implicit in their 
narratives, but not in ways that support an externalist rather than an internalist  
                                                 




interpretation: Jackie Katounas (#24) seems to move quite rapidly from understanding to 
decision, but the dynamic unity can still be corroborated in her case in the coherence 
between what is understood and the moral implications in terms of convictions, attitude 
and action that are drawn from the event. 
Discontinuities and subconscious processes  
An objection could possibly be raised regarding some narratives of moral 
conversion in which the process as reported suggests a disproportion between the 
intelligibility of the specific motivating event (i.e., as opposed as how the event may be 
read symbolically) and the outcome, i.e., the significant change of life that supports the 
description of the process as a moral conversion; for example when the process takes 
place very suddenly, or when a strong outpouring of emotion is involved. In such cases, 
the cognitive dynamism articulated in the narrative might not seem to be meaningful 
enough to explain the degree of unexpected changes of direction, or the strength of the 
person’s resolution as evidenced by the subsequent stability of behavioral changes. These 
cases, in other words, may suggest an important undercurrent of subconscious processes 
that, prompted perhaps by some form of symbolic association, or having eventually 
surmounted the resistance that kept them “bottled up,” rise to the surface of 
consciousness and produce rapid, significant changes. And the question arises, therefore, 
whether such non-conscious heteronomous processes are the engine for the conversion, 





Many such cases can be found, for example, in the collection provided by Leuba, 
focusing mostly on alcoholism recovery (some of them admitting, as was mentioned, a 
theological reading too). Subject “E” (#12) was suddenly struck by a biblical phrase. 
Subject “M” (#18) experienced a sudden urge to kneel and pray.628 Helen John’s sudden 
imaginative vision (#6) also suggests a rather powerful undercurrent of anguished, 
tortuous feelings, erupting suddenly in her dread-filled vision of nuclear destruction. And 
Robert Cooley’s story (#19) also suggests a subconscious undercurrent, though of a 
different kind, in that his struggle seems to be closer to actual awareness. Cooley tells in 
his autobiography how the conflict between the values represented by his family, and in 
particular by his father (a honest policeman that had suffered for his unwillingness to 
compromise with the reigning corruption, and with the mob in particular), and the 
increasingly more criminal demands of his mob employers had been growing more 
intense in his conscience; but the risks involved in turning against his employers had been 
postponing any resolution. In Cooley’s account, he had no conscious intention of visiting 
the FBI when his feet, almost of their own accord, took him in that direction.629 
The fact that subconscious processes can have a substantial influence in our 
convictions and behavior can be raised as a difficulty for an internalist view. This 
constitutes a difficulty, however, only if one’s conception of subconscious processes is 
already loaded with an externalist interpretation, i.e., if the subconscious is conceived as  
                                                 
628 William James has outlined a psychological reading of these cases, using it to explain the relation 
between the moment of “surrender” that follows usually after a long, unfruitful struggle, and the sudden 
conversion that often takes place in such context. (James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 171-173.) 




a set of processes that fully direct the individual’s behavior independently of cognitive 
activities that are thought (in self-awareness) to shape one’s action. (Freud’s conception 
of the Id, for example, though not without its contradictions, fills such a description.)630 
But unless one is from the outset committed to an externalist view, there is no need to 
conceive of subconscious processes in such a narrow way. In fact, the wide divergence of 
the various attempts to define or describe the subconscious suggests that it is a mistake to 
attempt to consider it univocally; that is, in terms of its interrelations with the conscious 
sphere, subconscious processes seem to run at very different depths, some of them quite 
independent from conscious thought processes and so far removed from thematic 
awareness, while others (one can think of Sartre’s bad faith) take place at a depth just 
barely removed from thematic awareness by an almost deliberate refusal to look. More 
importantly, in many psychological accounts, the subconscious is represented as 
collaborating with, and in a sense being at the service of the needs of the conscious self, 
rather than the other way around. Thus, more concretely, while Helen John seems to be 
taken by surprise and practically overrun by a sudden emotional storm, Cooley – in the 
midst of a growing internal struggle –practically tricks himself into visiting the FBI 
offices. 
In short, the existence of subconscious processes, like the existence of shortfalls in 
cognitive operations, requires careful consideration by those supporting an internalist  
                                                 
630 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. Joan Riviere (Edinburgh: R. & R. Clark, Limited, 1927). The 
“Id,” in this description, is a sphere of the psyche characterized by drives and impulses that conflict 
vectorially, to which the conscious mind has no access. The function of the “Ego” is that of facilitating the 




account, but neither of them constitute a proof of externalism in our present state of 
evidence and understanding of this issue. But the presence of the subconscious does put 
an additional hermeneutic demand on the reader of narratives of decision-making (and on 
the process of self-appropriation as well), forcing him/her to do more than a literal, 
straightforward reading. This, however, is a methodological difficulty akin to that of any 
discipline that depends to some extent on evidence of the type that Lonergan calls self-
appropriation. 
8. Summary of Chapter 10: The argument for internalism 
The foregoing sections are not a full argument for internalism and certainly do not 
respond fully to externalist counterarguments. One reason is that the internalism/ 
externalism debate turns in part on epistemological questions related to the value of first-
person or introspective evidence (i.e., what Lonergan calls the evidence of self-
appropriation), and whether the criterion of third-person corroboration of first-person 
reports is fulfilled by using as evidence self-appropriation on that third-party’s part. 
These epistemological questions cannot be explored properly without discussion of 
a huge scholarly literature about them. But the foregoing sections of Chapter 10, in 
conjunction with previous chapters’ work, indicate that the reality of moral conversion, 
described as it has been above, offers significant evidence in support of the internalist 
understanding of human decision-making. The argument to this conclusion – as 
developed fundamentally in the present chapter - has three steps. 




describe (a) how the four cognitive operations are interconnected in this account, 
especially through the operation of the desire to know and the drive to value, in each of 
them individually, and (especially) as integrating their interaction; and (b) how these 
cognitive operations, themselves a dynamic unity, are also immanently connected in this 
account to action, i.e., that there is no gap in the relation between deliberation, decision-
making (i.e., choosing), and action.631 
The second step of the argument was to show, in the relevant sections of this 
chapter, that the narratives of moral conversion considered here conform to the pattern of 
dynamic unity (of the four cognitive operations themselves, and of the four operations as 
a unity in relation to action) thus described. That is, the reality of moral conversion 
constitutes important evidence that the dynamic unity claims derived from Lonergan’s 
account correspond to human experience. 
The third step of the argument, implicit throughout the foregoing, was to show that, 
if the affective and cognitive components of the process of decision-making are all 
intimately interconnected with one another, and if they as a dynamic unity are also 
intimately connected with the actions they lead to (and explain and justify), then human 
actions (at least those in which these operations are at their best, for frequent shortfalls 
and complicating psychological factors have been acknowledged as contingencies of the 
human decision-making process throughout) are the product of the person’s own  
                                                 
631 No attempt has been made here to deal with the complex question of intention, which is sometimes 
treated as an intermediary between choosing and acting and sometimes, as in Aristotle, described as an 
awareness accompanying the act of choice that what is being chosen is within one’s power. A careful 




cognitive and affective operations. This last claim is internalism (with the clarification 
that this particular form of internalism includes explicitly the consideration of affective 
operations, which is not always the case; therefore the designation of a joined affective/ 
cognitive internalist view). 
The fact of moral conversion offers significant evidence of the correctness of this 
internalist description of human decision-making, which more specifically entails: (a) 
that feelings and knowledge, the affective and the cognitive, have both an integral part in 
the formation of moral convictions, value judgments, and attitude/commitment to 
morality; (b) that the affective sphere acts as the driving force behind cognitive 
operations, and “confirm” their operation in the manifestation of related feelings; (c) that 
it is the cognitive activities that allow us to become aware, in a conceptual or thematized 
way, of values in general, moral obligations, rules, criteria for judgment and their 
application, and other elements of moral life; and (d) that cognitive operations yield 
(without being the single causal element at play) action immanently informed by the 
intelligibility grasped in those cognitive operations.  
9. Concluding remarks 
The phenomenon of moral conversion – the fact that people can significantly 
change their moral structures, convictions, attitude at any time in their life - has 
tremendous existential import for those involved; and it is also viewed by many who 
experienced it personally or at second hand, or who read about it, to be frequently an 




rarity in statistical terms; however, its exceptional character should not be interpreted as 
that of an accident or an anomaly, but rather as that of a difficult achievement, one that 
requires many things to go well for it to happen at all. In this character, its meaning is not 
restricted to its existential import for those directly involved in it. Many view the fact of 
moral conversion as a sign, as evidence that human life is not existentially bounded, not 
determined to take wholly predictable paths, not the result only of forces external to 
human cognition, valuing, and choice. 
As such, a study of the fact of moral conversion appears to have significant 
contributions to make to ongoing philosophical discussions, specifically the debates 
about free choice and determinism, and about internalism and externalism. Some of these 
possible contributions have been proposed here. 
Regarding the debate about free choice and determinism, after categorizing various 
phenomena that are commonly invoked in arguments for the reality of free choice, it was 
showed how these categories manifest themselves in the context of moral conversion. As 
an externally observable phenomenon, moral conversion defies the predictability of 
regular patterns of personal or social behavior, and as such presents difficulties for 
deterministic views of human action. But apart from what can be externally observed, 
moral conversion is also valuable to the debate as the source of introspective data that is 
of potential use as evidence of free choice. 
Thus, four categories of experiences were identified as potential (though not 
unambiguous) evidence of free choice: decisional anxiety, volitional exertion, resolve, 




disapproval after the fact. Two categories of experiences – decisional anxiety, and the 
category that groups such experiences as regret, guilt, shame, pride, honor and merit, i.e., 
positive and negative feelings that follow choice and action - were not found to be 
sufficiently relevant to the debate, because of the lack of a sufficiently consistent 
presence of these experiences in all three categories of moral conversion. It was 
suggested nevertheless that they may point indirectly to elements that have bearing on the 
debate, i.e., the experience of being morally responsible. On the other hand, the 
experiences of volitional exertion and resolve were deemed to be valuable as evidence of 
the convert’s experience as a chooser, the former being found more commonly in the 
specific context of conversion regarding behavioral coherence, the latter being found 
quite often in the context of the articulation of a behavioral program following moral 
conversion regarding attitude or commitment. The argumentative weight of these 
considerations, however, was deemed to be insufficient without examining the issue of 
free choice and determinism in much more detail than what is possible for the scope of 
this dissertation. The point, in short, has been to suggest that there is much material in a 
study of moral conversion that deserves attention by those engaged in the freedom/ 
determinism debate. 
The progressively more refined picture of the process of moral conversion that 
emerges from the discussion of these experiences strongly suggests that the popular 
image of moral conversion as that of a person engaging in a dramatic internal struggle, in 
order to overcome resistant habits of the mind or conduct through choice alone, is not 




activities in choice and action will be more adequate to the description of what happens 
in moral conversion. In this sense, the discussion of the role of moral conversion as 
potential evidence in the free choice/determinism debate is closely connected in its 
observations to some of the issues that are key in the internalism/externalism debate. 
The debate on internalism vs. externalism is concerned with the determining factors 
of discrete human moral action and the role of cognitive operations that appear to have 
influence on such action. Externalism, as discussed here, holds that cognitive operations 
have at most an instrumental or indirect or derivative role on determining a person’s 
moral convictions, attitude/commitment and actions. Internalism was defined as the 
position that claims that cognitive operations have a constitutive influence in the 
formation of a person’s moral structures and actions. It was argued that narratives of 
moral conversion provide important evidence of the presence of such cognitive 
operations in the revision and change of previous moral structures and in decisions about 
actions in accord with them. Employing the Lonerganian four levels of conscious 
operations and accepting Lonergan’s notion of evidence by self-appropriation, as well as 
the value of others’ corroborating self-appropriated evidence, narratives of moral 
conversion were shown to evidence (when at their best) the kind of dynamic unity of 
cognitive and affective operations and the kind of intimate relation of these operations to 
action that is consistent with internalism and inconsistent with externalism. 
Demonstrating the value of studying moral conversion, however, has required 
carefully differentiating it from other kinds of conversion and from other kinds of moral 




one reason why the importance of the evidence from the fact of moral conversion, for 
these and possibly other philosophical questions, has not been seriously explored by 
philosophers. Perhaps the preliminary work done here will enable other philosophers to 
pay more attention to this topic. 
Despite the length of this work, however, it is still difficult to consider these 
reflections more than a first look at the potential fruits of a philosophical investigation of 
moral conversion. The survey of actual narratives, limited here for the sake of clarity and 
brevity, could certainly be expanded, and could be more easily analyzed now that the 
necessary categories and other conceptual tools have been developed. A more in-depth 
examination of the philosophical discussions considered here, crucial to philosophical 
anthropology and metaethics, could be carried out, incorporating the empirical/existential 
data yielded by these narratives. Some applications outside disciplinary philosophy may 
also be suggested: further examination of moral conversion could be of use for areas such 
as moral education, convict rehabilitation, addiction recovery, moral/spiritual counseling 
and possibly even psychotherapy. To this must be added the potentially existential 
relevance that a philosophical study can have, the way in which the methodical 
philosophical examination of an important human matter can illuminate daily life. An 
examination of moral conversion certainly provides much to ponder for anyone whose 
life involves a struggle for moral excellence, and particularly for anyone that struggles 
daily with resilient imperfections, or persistent, burdensome vices. If nothing else, a study 
of moral conversion shows that there is gratitude and joy to be enjoyed in moral life, and 










APPENDIX: A COLLECTION OF NARRATIVES 






Case #1: Brian Palmer (Name changed) 
Source: Bellah, Robert N., Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. 
Tipton. Habits of the Heart : Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985) 3-8. 
Type of conversion: In Bellah's words, from a utilitarian individualism to an expressive 
individualism 
Explicit period of reflection: Yes 
Assessment of values: Yes 
The Story: A top-level manager in a large corporation, Palmer expresses to be proud of his rapid 
rise, but even prouder of the profound change he has made regarding his idea of success. 
Brian recalls a youth that included a fair amount of hell-raising, a lot of sex, and considerable 
devotion to making money. At twenty-four, he married. Shouldering the adult responsibilities of 
marriage and children became the guiding purpose of his life for the next few years. 
Whether or not Brian felt his life was satisfying, he was deeply committed to succeeding at 
his career and family responsibilities. He held two full-time jobs to support his family, 
accepting apparently without complaint the loss of a youth in which, he himself reports, 
‘the vast majority of my time ... was devoted to giving myself pleasure of one sort of 
another.’ (3) 
 
Brian put extremely long hours at work, averaging 60-65 hours a week. He did not question his 
commitment, which, he says, just “seemed like the thing to do at the time” (ibid.) But while he 
considered providing for his family important, he overlooked the importance of sharing his time 
with his wife and children. This, Palmer says, he compensated by saying, “I have this nice car, 
this nice house, joined the Country Club. Now you have a place you can go, sit on your butt, 
drink, go into the pool. I'll pay the bills and I'll do my thing at work." (4) 
Brian's wife did not share his outlook. She soon divorced him. Palmer found out later that she had 




The divorce, 'one of the two or three biggest surprises of my life,' led Brian to reassess his 
life in fundamental ways and to explore the limits of the kind of success he had been 
pursuing. 'I live by establishing plans. I had no plan for being single, and it gave me a lot of 
opportunity to think, and in the course of thinking, I read for the first time in many, many 
years. Got back into classical music for the first time since my college years. I went out and 
bought my first Bach album and a stereo to play it on. Mostly the thinking process of being 
alone and relating to my children.' (4) 
 
The children chose to stay with Brian, which also forced him to examine his sense of himself, and 
to shift his priorities in life. Being a single parent, Palmer reports, was a humbling experience 
itself. 
‘Being an compulsive problem solver, I analyzed the failure. I don't like failure. I'm very 
competitive. I like to win. So I went back and reexamined where the thing broke down and 
found that I had contributed at least 50 percent and, depending on the vantage point, maybe 
99 percent of the ultimate demise of the institution. Mostly it was asking myself the 
question of why am I behaving in such and such a way. Why am I doing this at work? Why 
was I doing this at home? The answer was that I was operating as if a certain value was of 
the utmost importance to me. Perhaps it was success. Perhaps it was fear of failure, but I 
was extremely success-oriented, to the point where everything would be sacrificed for the 
job, the career, the company. I said bullshit. That ain't the way it should be.’ (5, emphasis 
mine.) 
 
Brian eventually married a divorcee his age, with four children of hers. In this marriage, he 
reports, he discovered a new sense of himself and a different understanding of what he wanted 
out of life: 
He has a new sense of what love can be. ‘To be able to receive affection freely and give 
affection and to give of myself and know it is a totally reciprocal type of thing. There's just 
almost a psychologically buoyant feeling of being able to be so much more involved and 
sharing. Sharing experiences of goals, sharing of feelings, working together to solve 
problems, etc. My viewpoint of a true love, husband-and-wife type of relationship is one 
that is founded on mutual respect, admiration affection, the ability to give and receive 
freely.’ (Ibid.) 
 
The authors assess Palmer’s story in these terms:  
The revolution in Brian's thinking came from a reexamination of the true sources of joy and 
satisfaction in his life. . . His description of his reasons for changing his life and of his 
current happiness seems to come down mainly to a shift in his notions of what would make 





The authors’ assessment contains a certain amount of criticism; their focus is on uncovering how 
individualism has permeated moral language, and consequently how difficult it is to get away 
from individualistic formulations: 
His new goal - devotion to marriage and children - seems as arbitrary and unexamined as 
his earlier pursuit of material success. Both are justified as idiosyncratic preference rather 
than as representing a larger sense of the purpose of life. Brian sees himself as consistently 
pursuing a utilitarian calculus - devotion to his own self-interest - except that there has been 
an almost inexplicable change in his personal preferences. (6) 
 
But even when described under this critical light, Palmer’s story is still revealing of the moral 
conversion he has undergone. 
In describing the reasons for this change, he begins, ‘Well, I think I just reestablished my 
priorities.’ He sometimes seems to reject his past life as wrong; but at other times, he seems 
to say he simply got bored with it. ‘That exclusive pursuit of success now seems to me not 
a good way to live. That's not the most important thing to me. I have demonstrated to 
myself, to my own satisfaction, that I can achieve about what I want to achieve. So the 
challenge of a goal realization does not contain that mystique that it held for me at one 
time. I just have found that I get a lot of personal reward from being involved in the lives of 
my children.’ (Ibid.) 
 
 
Case #2: Bauer, Wayne (Rent-control activist)  
Type of conversion: A clear break with his family's working/middle-class traditions and with the 
“status quo.” This break forced him to live many years underground. He went from an 
unreflective acceptance of traditional/patriotic values to a period of confusion/emptiness, 
eventually putting his views back together into a community commitment through radical 
politics. 
Source: Bellah and others, Habits of the Heart, 17-20 
Explicit period of reflection: Yes 




The Story: Now a community organizer who works in California for the Campaign for Economic 
Democracy, Wayne, raised in working or middle class (the text is not clear on that detail) joined 
the Marine Corps in the 60's.  
‘I had come from a background of John Wayne, you know, American patriotism...’ After 
boot camp he was stationed at Camp Lejeune and would come up to New York City on 
leave. ‘1965 was when NYU marched and burned the draft cards and all of a sudden there 
was a political awareness and these people were letting their hair grow a little longer and 
putting earrings in their ear. And this was a real shock to me. I mean, I didn't understand 
this. I was in the Marine Corps.’ (17) 
 
During this time, some friends of his who had gone to college in New York began to argue 
with him about the Vietnam War. ‘And after this went on, to make a long story short, for 
about three or four months, I realized that my best argument held no weight. And what 
happened was, all of a sudden, my view of who I was and my environment was shattered. It 
was like looking in the mirror and having the whole thing shattered on you and seeing all 
your values, all your beliefs, everything you thought was real just kind of crumble. And it 
left me without any values and it also left me in a position where I had this terrible feeling 
of loneliness that there was no one I could go to for help. All the people I had trusted, I feel, 
essentially, they had lied to me.’ (17-18) 
 
Upon receiving orders to go to Vietnam, Wayne went AWOL, assumed an alias, spent eight 
years leading an underground life travelling around the country, eventually surrendered to 
the military in 1972, spent four months in a military stockade, but was spared a court-
martial and, finally, released by the Marine Corps with a general discharge. He returned to 
his parents, found them totally uncomprehending of his understanding of life, and moved 
from New Jersey to Venice, California. (18) 
 
Wayne's break with the conventions of family and community . . . did not end with a retreat 
into a preoccupation with profession and private life. ... It was through radical politics that 
Wayne glued the shattered mirror of his life back together again. After he made his break 
with his past, ‘morality became a question to me. It's sort of like I wanted to put everything 
back together again with more durable material, one that would stand the strain.’ Political 
activism became that durable material. (Ibid.) 
 
The way in which this happened was a bit by accident: Bauer got involved in a dispute of 
Hispanic tenants with their landlord, and eventually got involved in the Campaign for Economic 
Democracy. Eventually he got elected, in 1983, to the Santa Monica Rent Control Board. He also 
gradually reentered the Roman Catholic Church, “drawn by the example of a priest who 
attempted to apply the insights of the Latin American ‘theology of liberation’ to conditions in the 






Case #3: Allen, Marie (Cancer patient, name changed)  
Source: Byock, Ira. Dying Well: Peace and Possibilities at the End of Life (New York: 
Riverhead Books, 1997) 35-57. 
Type of Conversion: healing relationships; changes her evaluation of the worth of accumulating 
material things. 
Explicit Reflection: not apparent. 
Value Discussion: some, but mostly implicit. 
Story: Marie is described in Byock’s book as a middle-aged woman who has taken the many bad 
hands she was given in life with an acid sense of humor. She divorced her husband after finding 
out that her sister, Kathy, had had an affair with him; and remarried her ex-husband after fifteen 
years. Nut briefly after remarrying him, he died. Shortly after, she found that she had colon 
cancer in its terminal stages. 
Instead of being an occasion for despair, this was used as an opportunity to heal her relationship 
with her sister Kathy, who had been trying for some time to reconcile with her. Her sister and her 
sister’s husband Roger received her in her house and cared for her lovingly during the last year of 
Marie’s life. The wounds from their past were left behind remarkably quickly and with a great 
deal of pragmatism: once Kathy offered to take care of Marie, and the matter of whether she 
would be a nuisance (worried mostly about ‘smelling’) was arranged, the matter over Marie’s late 
husband was soon water under the bridge. Soon after moving with Kathy, Marie found out from 
her sister that her late husband had been two-timing both sisters, but paradoxically this discovery 
sealed their reconciliation in a bout of cathartic laughter. 
Marie’s estranged daughter Cindy at this point also began to get closer, though she had to 




Marie found the strength, with the help of the Hospice staff, to endure until the wedding took 
place. Marie died shortly after a year of being diagnosed, without pain, and under the care of her 
family. 
Marie, it should be noted, had a tendency to buy and accumulate things, such as a very big 
collection of shoes. Once she learned of her disease and decided to move to Kathy’s, she gave 
away most of her possessions without much of a second thought. This indicates a re-evaluation of 
the value of material things in her life. Other than this, her story does not suggest a significant 
change in her values, but the capacity to quickly let go of life-long resentments. 
 
Case #4: Gray, Dorian (fictional character)  
Source: Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (New York: Three Sirens Press, 1931). 
Type of conversion: Wilde’s novel presents in first place an interesting, well-known illustration 
of a “counter-conversion” (or alternatively, of moral decadence) from an unreflective kindness, to 
a philosophically-based individualistic (extremely selfish; perhaps ‘amoral’) aestheticism. In 
second place, it illustrates a failed attempt at conversion. 
Explicit reflection leading to conversion: There is explicit reflection in Gray’s beginning to 
move towards counter-conversion/decadence, originated by a book lent to Gray by an 
accomplished aestheticist. As to the failed attempt to convert, it is not specified what reasons led 
him to attempt a redeeming act, except being tired of his situation and perhaps fear that 
something bad might befall him. 
Value Discussion: Yes in the first movement, not in the second. 
The story: Dorian Gray begins the story as a youth of such innocence that it captures the 
imagination of an artist friend, to such a degree that the painting he produces captures Dorian’s 




rather than in his own visage. The movement towards counter-conversion/decadence begins when 
Lord Henry, a friend of the painter, gives the kind-hearted youth a book depicting his aestheticist, 
selfish philosophy, with the express intention of corrupting the youth. It is interesting to note 
Wilde’s emphasis on the power of words to provoke this change: 
The few words that Basil’s friend had said to him –words spoken by chance, no doubt, and 
with willful paradox in them- had touched some secret chord that had never been touched 
before, but that he felt was now vibrating and throbbing to curious pulses. . . Words! Mere 
words! How terrible they were! How clear, and vivid, and cruel! One could not escape from 
them. And yet what a subtle magic there was in them! They seemed to be able to give a 
plastic form to formless things, and to have a music of their own as sweet as that of viol or 
of lute. Mere words! Was there anything so real as words? (28) 
 
This encounter initiates Gray’s road to moral decadence. A long time afterwards, having 
performed many dreadful things – mostly unspecified but for murder and numerous seductions. 
Near the end of his life – and still looking youthful and innocent - Gray attempts allegedly to 
reform himself by trying to do one good deed, sparing the virginity of a country girl that had 
fallen for him; but his motives turn up to be less innocent than he thought. While he thinks he is 
on the road to redemption, his real motive seem to be the thrill of a new or forgotten experience; 
and indeed, the whole setup for his “good deed” has been fabricated: he had seduced the girl first 
in order to spare her. 
A new life! That was what he wanted. That was what he was waiting for. Surely he had 
begun it already. He had spared one innocent thing, at any rate. He would never again 
tempt innocence. He would be good.” 
“As he thought of Hetty Merton, he began to wonder if the portrait in the locked room had 
changed. Surely it was not still so horrible as it had been? Perhaps if his life became pure, 
he would be able to expel every sign of evil passion from the face. Perhaps the signs of evil 
had already gone away. He would go and look. . .  
He went in quietly. . . and dragged the purple hanging from the portrait. A cry of pain and 
indignation broke from him. He could see no change, save that in the eyes there was a look 
of cunning, and in the mouth the curved wrinkle of the hypocrite. The thing was still 
loathsome – more loathsome, if possible, than before . . .  Had it been merely vanity that 
had made him do his one good deed? Or the desire for a new sensation, as Lord Henry had 
hinted, with his mocking laugh? Or that passion to act a part that sometimes makes us do 
things finer than we are ourselves? Or, perhaps, all these? (244, emphasis mine.) 
 




Case #5: Sandra (conversion to a morally-based vegetarianism) 
Source: Haste, Helen. “Moral Responsibility and Moral Commitment: The Integration of Affect 
and Cognition.” In The Moral Domain: Essays in the Ongoing Discussion between Philosophy 
and the Social Sciences, ed. Thomas Wren, 315-359 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990); 335-336. 
Type of conversion: To vegetarianism, based on a moral concern but triggered by an ‘aesthetic’/ 
emotional reaction to the way meat was cooked in France. 
Explicit period of reflection: Yes; after being affected by that aesthetic/emotional reaction there 
is a period in which Sandra tries to make sense of it in moral terms. 
Assessment of values: Yes 
The Story: Haste reports the following interview to a youth identified in the text as “Sandra”: 
Sandra: "I'm a vegetarian. It started when I went to France. I lived in a butcher's for two 
weeks. It was then that I realized how you kill things and cook things and that it was a 
matter of conscience whether I should eat meat or not. I don't eat any at all now. That's the 
biggest conscience thing I've ever done." 
I: "What was the situation that made you change your mind?" 
S: "The fact that they cooked meat on the outside and it's burnt and you cut it open and it 
just sort of bleeds. That put me off for a start and that wasn't really anything to do with 
conscience, it was the actual idea of it." (Haste, 335) 
 
She began to make sense of her experience, to think. She reflected cognitively upon her 
affect; she looked for a schema to legitimate her revulsion. She began to see meat-eating as 
a moral issue and an issue on which she could exercise some personal responsibility. 
Sandra: "When I came back to England I still couldn't eat meat because I just couldn't think 
of actually eating an animal, especially in the way in which they are killed. If you're in a 
survival position then it's slightly different. But like farming is an industry where it just 
goes through and they're just killing all those animals, then I think that's wrong." 
I: "Why do you think it's wrong?" 
Sandra: "Because the animals themselves haven't really had a life. We're just breeding them 
to kill them. I just can't face eating something like that which has been killed in that way 
and hasn't had its own life." (Haste, 336) 
 
The author notes that in the interview Sandra invokes a variety of reasons or arguments for her 
decision, including considerations on the right of human beings to kill animals, the animals’ 






Case #6: Helen John (anti-nuclear proliferation activist) 
Source: Helen Haste, “Moral Responsibility and Moral Commitment: The Integration of Affect 
and Cognition.” p. 337-341. 
Type of conversion: First, from indifference to participation in political demonstrations (against 
nuclear missiles); this change seems to have been triggered by her imagining her land devastated 
by nuclear war. Second, from part-time participation/commitment, to full commitment, which 
included living on site, in effect abandoning her regular responsibilities to her husband and five 
children. 
Explicit period of reflection: Yes  
Assessment of values: Yes 
The Story:  
In her interview with Helen Haste, Helen John relates as a key moment her sudden realization of 
the pressing reality of the nuclear threat:  
I was one of those people who knew about nuclear weapons for years, and put it into the 
backs of their minds. . . because we were assured that we had enough nuclear weapons to 
stop any country attacking us. The deterrence theory lulled me into a false sense of security 
for years. And it was on that particular day driving into Builth that I realized that this was 
nonsense. . . (Haste, 338) 
 
I was driving on my way through beautiful scenery in Wales where I live and it suddenly 
occurred to me how this would all be altered in a nuclear war. And it just stopped me dead 
in my tracks. I couldn't keep on driving, I had to stop and I felt really physically very 
unwell. And I was crying. I sat for about three-quarters of an hour before I could continue 
the journey. I was scared sick, really scared. And then I felt terribly angry that any lunatic 
could put so much fear and pressure on people. (Ibid.) 
 
While her values in terms of the legitimacy of nuclear warfare remain the same, there is a change 
in her assessment regarding the actuality of the nuclear threat, and also a change in her perception 
of her own efficacy: 
Prior to that I had never seen the value of marching anywhere. It didn't seem to achieve 
anything. But I was sufficiently worried on this particular issue to go on the march, and 
make my own personal statement. And it was during the course of this march that I 
changed. (Ibid.: 339) 
 
When things do not change, but the nuclear tension instead escalates, the decision is made to stay 




of her duties to the wider community (and future generations) as compared to her duties to her 
family. There also seems to be a change in her perception of her own “independence,” that 
changes “her own definition of herself.” (Ibid.)  
“The moment it was suggested [to stay on] I knew that I wanted to take that initiative. . . 
And it was also really the very first totally independent decision I had made for myself in 
twenty years. Because I wasn't going to consult my husband or any other person. It had to 
be my own decision.” 
“I remember Douglas [her husband] saying to me very clearly, there must be other women 
who haven't got five children who can do what you're doing. But it's not true; there's only 
one me. Nobody can do exactly what I'm doing in the way I'm doing it.” (Ibid.) 
 
Note: This change is described in Haste’s text as a shift from “private” to “public responsibility,” 
even with regard to her duty as a mother. This seems to be an alternative way of dealing with a 
theme that Bellah, in Habits of the Heart, also struggles with, except that the latter deals with it 
using the categories of “individualism” and “social responsibility.” Note also that in Haste’s 
discussion of these cases there is the implicit assumption that “public” engagement indicates a 
higher level of moral commitment. (See also cases #7 and #8). 
 
 
Case #7: Lenny (From Republican to left-wing political convictions. Note the similarities with 
case #2: Wayne Bauer)  
Source: Helen Haste, “Moral Responsibility and Moral Commitment: The Integration of Affect 
and Cognition”; 341-344. 
Type of conversion: By his own description, from “indoctrinated Republican,” to moderately 
liberal (“the Javits, Rockefeller type”), to “radical.” 
Explicit period of reflection: Yes  
Assessment of values: Yes 
The Story: Lenny grew up spending his summers “going to military conventions,” in his own 
words a “gung ho Goldwaterite.” (Haste, 342.) He went to college in the mid-60's, and began 
changing to a moderately liberal position. What made him change his views, he claims, is 
the fact that once I started taking some college courses in economics and you can actually 
see that some of his policies were just completely ridiculous, and as soon as you get away 
from this one set opinion that dominated our area, as soon as you get professors in the 





By the time he became a college senior he was describing himself as a “contemporary liberal 
American.” (The texts assumes that the reader knows what is involved in this value shift; but it 
would be interesting if this were made more explicit.) But then he went to London, at a very 
turbulent time: the London School of Economics was closed for 25 days, and Lenny took part in 
the sit-in. (The text describes this as a “triggering event,” for Lenny’s value shift, although this 
does not come out clearly in Lenny’s quoted words.) Lenny became “radicalized,” in diametrical 
opposition to his earlier identity as conservative:  
I started to do some work under Professor X in political sociology and all of a sudden I saw 
things not in terms of being harmonious, but I saw a lot of conflict going on in society and I 
started to think about it in that perspective. . . (Ibid.) 
 
Back in America, he decided to take some time and do some teaching; he was assigned to the 
inner city schools, and becaming further radicalized. (Ibid. 343.) 
Note: An interesting detail about this case is that it belongs to Kohlberg's longitudinal study – a 
kind of study that involves gathering information on a subject’s moral thinking over successive 
interviews during an extended period of time. As such it is also analyzed in terms of Lenny's 
“moral stages.” His modified views thus are mapped in terms such as “cognitive reconstruction,” 
the “need for new schemata” (not Kohlberg's, but Haste’s terminology), and levels of moral 
reasoning. At age 20, when describing himself as “moderately liberal,” he is said to had reached 
Stage 4(3) moral reasoning, beginning to recognize alternative perspectives. At age 24 he is 
categorized as level 4(5) moral reasoning, having experienced major life crises involving both 
affective and cognitive reconstruction (Ibid.: 342.) Further analysis might reveal whether this can 
be considered a borderline case between normal moral development and moral conversion, as 





Case #8: Mohandas K. Gandhi (a life-commitment to fight against racism through peaceful 
means) 
Source: Gandhi, M. K. An Autobiography; or the Story of My Experiments with Truth; translated 
by Mahadev Desai (Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House, 1927), 106-109. Also retold 
and analyzed in Helen Haste, (1990), p. 345-346. See also Howard, Robert, Mohandas K. 
Gandhi: A biography of moral development; doctoral dissertation (Harvard, 1986). 
Type of conversion: event-triggered, from a self-centered (though of high-standards, ascetic) 
“private” morality to a commitment to a social cause against racism. His moral valuation of 
racism probably was not affected, but he began to see a personal responsibility in this matter. His 
conversion involved the realization that he might be the only person available who could handle 
this problem. 
Explicit period of reflection: yes. 
Assessment of values: yes (though his values in this specific instance are not changed; it is his 
perception of the need to do something about the issue, after suffering racism himself.) 
The Story: it is a well-known incident: Gandhi was traveling through Natal (Africa) as a 
representative of his Indian law firm. He was traveling first-class on a train, when the conductor 
told him (because of skin color, and maybe because he wore a turban) that he had to travel on 
third-class. Gandhi refused, and was forced off the train at the next station, in a humiliating 
manner. He sat in the waiting room, dark and cold, and considered whether to continue on the trip 
ignoring the insults, or – what would be his choice – whether to dedicate himself to rooting out 
the disease of racism, suffering hardships in the process. 
The hardship he was subjected to in this instance was superficial (and it was not the first time he 
had experience some sort of discrimination), but the humiliation and shock were enough to make 




enough to explain Gandhi's decision as a whole (other people suffered similar humiliation without 
becoming activists), but that, on the other hand, without this triggering event, Gandhi may never 
had thought about racism in these terms. (There would be other changes and transitions in his 
moral and political career, apart from this, so this should not be read as the “only” moral 
conversion Gandhi went through.) 
 
 
Case #9: Judianne Densen-Gerber (psychiatrist) 
Source: Helen Haste, (1990) p. 353-354. 
Type of conversion: Not really a story of conversion – there is no significant changes reported in 
the contents of her convictions, her attitude or her patterns of behavior; but the story is of interest 
because it exemplifies how this woman, because of her commitment (as reported) to her sense of 
integrity, she is ready to take action and get involved in many causes that “come her way” - ready 
to assume "public responsibility" in Haste's analysis. 
Explicit period of reflection: yes 
Assessment of values: yes 
The Story: a psychiatrist who had become involved in fighting child prostitution and child abuse, 
Judianne decided to found what would be called Odyssey House to help her drug-addicted 
patients, who had been turned out by New York's Metropolitan Hospital. Judianne justifies her 
readiness to commit and take action in this way: 
Denial didn't seem a possible defense mechanism because I had been profoundly influenced 
by a scholarship I won in 1952 to study restoration and reconstruction after World War II. 
In Europe, I talked to the Germans about the Holocaust, the camps and the atrocities. One 
after another, they defended themselves by repeating, “We didn't know.” I suppose in my 
work the thing that happened is that I kept hearing of these denials. Once you knew a 
certain problem, you had the choice of not facing the reality and walking away, or squarely 
facing an issue no matter how difficult or unpleasant. (353) 
 





I have never looked for an issue. It literally hit me on the head. I never sought a cause. 
They've always knocked on my door. I started Odyssey House in 1966 because a group of 
my drug-addicted patients wanted to be drug-free. Previously I’d promised them that if they 
kept the faith I wouldn’t abandon them. So when New York’s Metropolitan Hospital turned 
them out, they appeared in my doorstep. I did not have an ethical choice. . . I had given my 
word, and therefore my own sense of integrity was involved. (354) 
 
Judianne’s story provides also an example of a “triggering event” situation: Judianne became 
actively involved in movements against child prostitution and abuse when her husband, a medical 
examiner, brought home the T-shirt of a twelve-year old child who had died of heroin overdose. 
(353) 
 
Case #10: Dr. J, "the mass murderer of Steinhof" 
Source: Viktor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning (New York: Washington Square Press, 1985) 
154-155. 
Type of conversion: very little information is provided, unfortunately. This man went from being 
in charge of the Nazi euthanasia program - fanatically devoted to it - to, once in prison, becoming 
in terms of a fellow prisoner “the best comrade you can imagine,” giving consolation to 
everybody. 
The story is narrated by Viktor Frankl as an example supporting his “Critique of Pan-
Determinism.” His conclusion: “How can we dare  to predict the behavior of man? (...) We may 
even try to predict the mechanisms or "dynamisms" of the human psyche as well. Man is more 
than psyche.” 
Explicit period of reflection: unknown 
Assessment of values: unknown 
The Story: As told by Frankl: 
Let me cite the case of Dr. J. He was the only man I ever encountered in my whole life 
whom I would dare to call a Mephistophelean being, a satanic figure. [Coming from a man 




taken lightly.] At that time he was generally called “the mass murdered or Steinhof” (the 
large mental hospital in Vienna). When the Nazis started their euthanasia program, he held 
all the strings in his hands and was so fanatic in the job assigned to him that he tried not to 
let one single psychotic individual escape the gas chamber. After the war, when I came 
back to Vienna, I asked what happened to Dr. J. “He had been imprisoned by the Russians 
in one of the isolation cells of Steinhof,” they told me. “The next day, however, the door of 
his cell stood open and Dr. J. was never seen again.” . . . (154-155) 
 
More recently, however, I was consulted by a former Austrian diplomat who had been 
imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain for many years, first in Siberia and then in the famous 
Lubianka prison in Moscow. While I was examining him neurologically, he suddenly asked 
me whether I happened to know Dr. J. After my affirmative reply he continued: “I made his 
acquaintance in Lubianka. There he died, at about the age of forty, from cancer of the 
urinary bladder. Before he died, however, he showed himself to be the best comrade you 
can imagine! He gave consolation to everybody. He lived up to the highest conceivable 
moral standard. He was the best friend I ever met during my long years in prison!” (Ibid.) 
                    
 
Case #11: Patrick K.  
Source: Conference held at the Corporate Values Breakfasts Series, Loyola University Chicago 
(2005)  
Type of conversion: From involvement in corruption to warning publicly about the dangers of 
such involvement. 
Explicit period of reflection: yes 
Assessment of values: yes 
The Story: Patrick K. was a fast-track operator that got gradually involved in a scheme to help 
corrupt elements of the government of his state earn easy money, earning a corresponding “cut.” 
As he reports it, he was never comfortable with his activities; rationalization – convincing himself 
that this was a common thing to do, even beneficial for the general good - was a very important 
factor in his gradual involvement. He spent lots of time and effort, for example, devising ways to 
convince his wife and parents (who had misgivings and suspicions about the ethical aspects of his 
activities) that what he was doing was in fact ethical. His wife and parents were never actually 




body reacted in tremendous stress, with ulcers and hair loss. In his own words, “the body knows 
when you are doing something wrong.” 
Eventually the scheme was discovered, getting national publicity. The rest of the people involved 
ended up in jail, but Patrick managed to escape with his family. He became an international 
fugitive, not able to stay for too long in one place. But eventually he decided that such a way of 
living was intolerable, and decided to turn himself in to the authorities. He reports significantly 
that even in the dreary conditions in which he was held before being transferred to the U.S., what 
he felt at the moment was the most overwhelming relief. 
After doing time in prison, he got out with the requirement to do community service. He decided 
to give talks on his experience, explaining in them the steps by which people like him deceive 
themselves and end up doing illegal things - arrogance, love of risk-taking, rationalization, etc. 
He is now dedicated full-time to giving such talks around the country. Curiously (ironically, 
perhaps), he received as a result a number of honorary titles from various educational institutions. 
His story illustrates the weight of conscience, though in his case it may have been a conscience 
focused on the fear being apprehended, rather than on doing unethical things. It also illustrates the 
common conviction that a clean conscience provides interior peace. As an instance of moral 
conversion, it needs perhaps to be taken with a certain degree of skepticism, given, first, that a 
great part of K.’s predicament seems to have been focused on not listening to his conscience and 
fears, ignoring his own subconscious responses to his bad decisions, and half-convincing himself 
that nothing was wrong (which indicates that perhaps there was not a significant change in 
content); and second, that the conditions for his change in behavior, i.e. a requirement to do 






Case #12: Subject 'E' [from Leuba's collection of cases] 
Source: Leuba, “A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena,” The American Journal of 
Psychology 7 no.3 (1896), 373-6. 
Type of conversion: from alcoholism, sudden; the conversion is mainly religiously-grounded; 
but I copy it because of the “motives for repentance,” which are of natural reason. 
Explicit period of reflection: none is reported - at least not directly leading to the moment of 
conversion, which took him by surprise. 
Assessment of values: yes. 
The Story: 'E' tells his story at age 42, having converted at 33. Though the subject's father was an 
Anglican clergyman, he started smoking and drinking early; and after graduating from Oxford, 
the money he made in journalism he would spend it in “continuous carousal.” The subject reports 
being “handsome, of tremendously powerful physique, and was a general favorite with the girls.” 
He would be drunk at times for a week, and then a terrible repentance would come, and would not 
touch a drop for a month. But he would always eventually go back to drinking and carousal. 
His motivations for repentance were not religious:  
In all this period, that is, up to thirty-three years of age, I never had a desire to reform on 
religious grounds, but all my pangs were due to some terrible remorse I used to feel after a 
heavy carousal, the remorse taking the shape of regret after my folly in wasting my life in 
such a way - a man of superior talents and education. I was not much alarmed about the 
future world; I did not believe it to exist, at any rate. This terrible remorse turned me gray 
in one night, and whenever it came upon me I was perceptibly grayer the next morning. 
(374, emphasis mine.) 
 
He would always, however, recover from these episodes. 
His conversion came one day in which a friend asked him for an opinion regarding a book, 
Professor Drummond's Natural Law in the Spiritual World. He met with the biblical phrase “He 
that has the Son has life eternal,” and could not proceed further, all the while feeling there was 




It was unquestionably shown me, in one second of time, that I had never touched the 
Eternal, that is, God, and that if I died then, I must inevitably be lost. I was undone. I knew 
it as well as I now know I am saved. . . What could I do? I did not repent even; God never 
asked me to repent. All I felt was, ‘I am undone,’ and God cannot help it, although He 
loves me. No fault on the part of the Almighty. (374-375) 
 
After this experience, he told all his family about it, but only his older sister seemed to understand 
it. He came home drunk once more (he had not promised to abstain from drink) but having met 
his sister on his way back, he prayed for the first time in twenty years, and had an experience of 
self-surrender, after which, he claims, “from that hour drink has had no terrors for me; I never 
touch it, never want it. (375) 
 
#13 - Subject 'L' [from Leuba's collection of cases]  
Source: Leuba, “A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena,” 381. 
This is another case reported by Leuba - an alcoholic, converted at 44, who became himself, at 
the age of 54, superintendent of a Rescue Mission. Like in Case #12, above, this case illustrates a 
conversion in which the person differentiates between religious elements and elements of natural 
reason. Thus, “I did not realize that I was a sinner, only that I was a drunkard.” (381); “I had no 
desire for anything good, only at times there would come a longing in my heart for something 
better.” (Ibid.) 
 
#14 - Subject 'I' [from Leuba's collection of cases 
Source: Leuba, “A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena,” 378-380. 
This is another case of conversion from alcoholism reported by Leuba. This also illustrates the a 
case in which, although religious elements are present, the person distinguishes between elements 
of natural reason and religious elements. Thus, the convert reports:  
I wanted to escape from the evil effects of my sins in my physical life, but I do not 
specially recollect any desire to seek deliverance from all my sinful nature.. Conversion had 
no special meaning to me. I entered the home hoping that I would escape from drink, 




Case #15: Subject 'G' [from Leuba's collection of cases] [Alcohol addict turned Mission 
director] 
Source: Leuba, "A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena", 376-7. 
Type of conversion: from alcoholism, with religious background. It is significant in this case the 
presence of a “trigger event,” a lady showing him sympathy. 
Explicit period of reflection: no 
Assessment of values: no 
The Story: Narrated at age forty, converted twenty months before, now working as 
Superintendent of a “mission” (for recovering alcoholics). The story is told to Leuba by the 
subject himself. 
The convert reports having lived until the age of twenty-one in a Christian home, and having 
taken his first glass of whisky at that age. He gradually became an alcoholic after that. His 
addiction caused him to lose his business establishment and two jobs. He reports having “signed 
enough abstinence pledges to cover the wall of a room.” (376) 
Disgusted and tired of life, he left Canada to go to W. Here he arrived intoxicated. He 
secured a position, but was soon dismissed for drunkenness, and then found himself once 
more without money, without friend and without home. Gladly would he have welcomed 
death. As he was in this wretched situation, a lady showed him sympathy and invited him 
to a mission. Her kindness made him look within. For years no one had ever cared about 
him; this unwonted kindly interest went to his heart. 
 
He went to the meeting, and there was invited to “give himself to the Lord Jesus Christ with the 
assurance that He would save him.” He received a bed, tried to read, but was too disturbed; he 
finally experienced peace after asking God to take him as he was.  
The anguish of the night had passed, and he found himself calm and peaceful. That very 
morning he told a companion that he was converted, that he had given his heart to God. 
Terrible were the temptations that day as he passed before the saloon doors; but he was 
kept. They recurred day after day for more than a week. The lady's continued sympathy was 





Three months after his conversion he opened a mission, which progressed rapidly, and is 
now doing very good work among drunkards and other outcasts. (377) 
 
 
Case #16 – Leuba’s Subject ‘H’ [From Leuba’s collection of cases] 
Source: Leuba, "A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena", 377. 
This story has similarities with Case #15, in the sense that it also illustrates a “triggering event,” a 
conversion process triggered by the kindness of, in this case, a young man. Leuba reports: 
. . .while he was seated in Central Park, N.Y., a young man entered into conversation with 
him, and invited him to go in his company to a religious meeting. The kindness of the 
stranger moved him deeply; he did not understand why a well-dressed stranger should care 
for him and be willing to walk with a raggedly clad fellow like himself. (377) 
 
Case #17 – John B. Gough, “the famous temperance orator” [From Leuba’s collection of 
cases] 
Source: Leuba, "A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena", 343-344. 
Another story of a conversion prompted by an unexpected act of kindness. Says Leuba, 
It is practically the conversion of an atheist: neither God nor Jesus Christ is mentioned. The 
sense of his degradation and worthlessness does not involve in his mind responsibility for 
his sin to other; he is absorbed in his own self. He battles against himself, poor slave and 
outlaw, to conquer, if possible, the place he has lost in society. When the stranger spoke to 
him on a public street in Worcester, kindness, sympathy, the proof that all bonds between 
him and mankind were not cut of, and that men still had confidence in his manhood, lighted 
up the redeeming flame of Faith. (343) 
 
Leuba quotes from Gough's Autobiography:  
It was the first touch of kindness which I had known for months; as simple and trifling as 
the circumstances may appear to many, it went right to my heart, and like the wing of the 





Case #18: Subject 'M' [from Leuba's collection of cases]  
Source: Leuba, “A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena,” 381-3. 
Type of conversion: from alcoholism, with very marked religious elements; the interesting 
aspect of this case is that the moral and spiritual battle, though clearly carried in a religious 
context, seem to arise without his seeking specifically a religious activity or response. 
Explicit period of reflection: no 
Assessment of values: no 
The Story: The only child of well-off, non-religious parents, the subject received a good 
education but was, he reports, too pampered. At age fifteen “a religious wave swept over the land. 
I rose for prayer at a meeting and soon began to lead a different life, but did not continue over one 
year.” (381) At eighteen he left his home and began drinking hard. He got married, but continued 
nevertheless with his bad habits:  
I sought for peace and satisfaction in almost every kind of worldly pleasure, but could not 
find it. . . Soon after my marriage I became an infidel, many of my relatives are such. As I 
saw myself drifting down, and friends who at one time would have gladly recognized and 
courted my company shunned me, I sometimes was almost at the point of asking God to 
forgive me and make me a better man. . . I signed pledges, made promises, and broke them 
as fast as I made them, until my health was impaired, my intellect affected. I became a 
wreck, separated from wife and children. Poverty stared me in the face almost always. 
(381-382) 
 
Eventually the subject was even joined by his wife and children in drinking! But one, the subject 
reports, he “behaved badly” to his wife and children (it is not further specified), and suggested her 
to take the children and go to visit someone. He spent a few days alone at home, without 
drinking. Three days later he was feeling very lonely; “the house was quiet. I had not been in bed 
twenty minutes before I became perfectly conscious of God on my right hand…” and began 
experiencing for a while a sort of spiritual battle between God, asking him to kneel and pray, and 
the devil, suggesting that “if you want to do right, go ahead, that is all right, but do it in a manly 




will not help you.” (382) The following day, while praying, the subject reports having had a 
vision, hearing words “that at that time I did not know were in the Bible.” (383) After this 
episode, the subject left his old life, never going back to his old ways and habits; eventually his 
wife converted too, about ten months afterwards, “and our home changed from hell to heaven.” 
(Ibid.) 
 
Case #19: Robert Cooley [attorney for the mob] 
Source: Robert Cooley with Hillel Levin, When Corruption was King: How I helped the Mob 
Rule Chicago, then Brought the whole Outfit down (New York: Carrol & Graf Publishers, 2004). 
Type of conversion: from involvement in corruption to putting his life continually on the line - 
eventually sacrificing his way of life for the purpose of ending corruption. 
Explicit period of reflection: implicit; the critical decision seems to have been taken by letting 
his subconscious take the reigns. 
Assessment of values: yes. 
The Story: Cooley was a very successful criminal attorney in the 70's and 80's in Chicago. His 
success was in part due to his ability to make friendships, and to the wide range of his social 
contacts, some from his background as ex-policeman, some from night life and gambling circles 
(a preeminent part of his life, moving at times enormous sums). His particular lifestyle, together 
with the fact that he was quite able to handle himself, made him look like a trustworthy character 
for some of the mob bosses, at a time in which they ran everything from Chicago to the west 
coast. 
What was deceiving about his character - a strange combination of 'dolce vita', bully and 
principled man - was that Cooley was at heart a man of principles, even if his moral habits were 
borderline with criminal activity. His principles crystallized in the image of his father, an honest 




While Cooley’s activity was overtly corrupt (particularly with regard to a number of cases that he 
“fixed,” bribing judges and others), under the surface Cooley was very unhappy with what he was 
doing, trying at every turn to minimize the damage. Eventually the pressure became too much, 
and he turned on his masters. He went to the FBI and for a few years worked with them, 
gathering evidence, taping his previous “friends,” and devising cases and opportunities to later 
incriminate them. 
While some people at the FBI and state attorneys kept making his work difficult and even more 
risky (in Cooley’s own view, though the co-author dispels some of that impression in the notes), 
Cooley kept pushing forward and devising ways to incriminate his previous associates. He then 
took part in the trials and brought many important mob bosses down. Apart from the specific 
people that were convicted, the whole affair brought attention to many holes in the judicial 
system that enabled corruption to endure – this then underwent profound reforms. Cooley was 
during the process criticized and slandered (the state lawyer's association, for example, conducted 
a hearing and disbarred him, even though he was not planning on practicing again; most media 
did not report accurately the impact of his investigation, and in many cases made up stories 
regarding his motivations for becoming an informant); and he had to live a low-profile life 
afterwards, hiding and changing his identity at least three times. 
Assessment: In Cooley's case it is possible to trace some deeply-set values regarding life and 
honesty, despite his unorthodox, “borderline” values regarding night-life and gambling activities. 
His falling into unethical patterns of behavior was gradual, and to some point common in lawyers 
living in those times. But it is interesting to see that his deeper values regarding honesty and life 
survived - more so, they remain active, as he put his life on the line a few times while he was 
working for the mob to save a client or a friend, or to support an honest judge. Thus, this cannot 




set values that were obstaculized, or pushed down by fear, rationalization and convenience, 
eventually pushed to the surface, 
This case is also a good illustration of the “subconscious pressure” factor: when Cooley decided 
to turn against his bosses, he was still masking his decision from himself, and it was practically 
his legs that took the initiative:  
Getting a corned beef sandwich was my only purpose in life. When I turned the corner onto 
Dearborn Avenue, I happened to pass the Federal Building. It seemed to draw me like a 
magnet. Suddenly I thought, “Maybe I should see who's up in the Strike Force office.” 
(181) 
 
Case  #20 and #21: Antonio Pickett (‘Lil’ Tony) and Evans Robinson (‘Chip’) [ex-gangsters] 
Source: Rex W. Huppke, “Four who watch over the city,” Chicago Tribune, December 10, 2004. 
Type of conversion: from a life of crime to working to get people out of gangs. 
Explicit period of reflection: yes in the case of Tony; not explicit in the case of Chip. 
Assessment of values: Yes 
The Story: “Chip and Tony grew up four blocks apart in a modest but deteriorating section of 
West Humboldt Park. They were raised in strict homes where grace was said at the dinner table 
and swearing was forbidden.” They, however, “quickly grew enamored of the thrill and payoff of 
petty crime.” Starting as barely teenagers, stealing bikes in Oak Park, they later joined a gang and 
stole cars. 
“It was living the life of a gangster,” Chip says, “and it was lovely at the time. Anything we 
wanted, we could get it.” 
They eventually they got into drug dealing and began rotating in and out of jail and prison. Until 
1996, when Tony found himself facing a 12-year sentence for possession of a stolen vehicle and 
delivery of a controlled substance. 
He was 32. He'd spent much of his life looking over his shoulder, watching for police, 




“I was tired, man. I knew this was my last chance to turn my life around.” 
Through it all, Tony's mother, Shirley Pickett, a loving but stern evangelical minister, had 
never stopped praying for him, and the faith she always preached finally took hold. 
“My mom, she was there, always,” Tony says. “She's the reason I'm here today.” 
He was still in the County Jail awaiting placement in a state prison when he let his gang's 
leadership know he was stepping down. 
Tony went on to prison. Chip, by his own admission, ran wild. He became a menace, 
robbing anyone he wanted, making enemies at every turn. 
In 1998, those enemies struck back. As Chip left the home of a gang associate on the West 
Side with his cousin, shots rang out. Chip survived the hail of bullets, but he says his cousin 
was gunned down and bled to death in his arms. Chip has never gotten over that moment, 
but the tragedy only slowed him down. 
In prison, Tony heard what his friend was doing on the streets. He prayed Chip could hang 
on until his sentence was up. With good behavior, Tony was released in 2001, but for the 
first time, the two friends didn't immediately come together. Tony couldn't risk getting 
pulled back in; he needed some time to get his feet on the ground. 
Tony's mom heard about an initiative called CeaseFire. She got the contact information, 
gave it to Tony, and before long he was hired. 
 
(CeaseFire workers make contact with high-risk individuals, help them find jobs and educational 
opportunities, and counsel them about the pitfalls of street life. The program has been credited in 
past years as a significant factor in the reduction in homicides in Chicago.) 
 
Chip became one of his first clients. Chip's own weariness over living in constant danger, 
the grief over the death of his cousin were never enough to get him to stop. But once he 
saw Tony heading in a new direction, he didn't want to be left behind. So he took a factory 
job Tony lined up. He steered clear of people and places that might lead him back into the 
game. 
In 2002, CeaseFire hired Chip. The slick-talking duo found themselves together and back 
out on the streets. . .  
Chip and Tony still have street clout from their criminal past--today's gangbangers look up 
to them as O.G.'s, original gangsters. “These guys are for real,” one of the teens says. 
“Anybody else don't know what they're talking about.” 
As Chip and Tony roll away, both confide that they love their jobs, that they still live for 
the adrenaline, roaming the streets, scheming now on ways to make things right. 
But they carry regret with them, always. They know they hurt people, lied to their families. 
They know they influenced others to live a life of crime. 
“We were part of these guys turning out to be what they are,” Tony says. “We have to take 
some responsibility.” They pay their penance every day now, still facing up to criminals 
who try to lure them back. But Chip and Tony swear they'll never stray. 
“The air smells different. The sun seems brighter. Things aren't so bleak all the time,” Chip 
says. “We're on a positive track.”  





The article reports evidence that their change is stable. 
Officer Sheila McFarland of the Harrison District says the once-notorious Chip and Tony 
have shown they've changed their ways. “They've done some things in the past that we 
wouldn't be proud of, but in the same sense they've turned over a new leaf,” she said. “I 
believe their experience out on the streets and interacting with gangs at one time has given 
them the ability to go out and communicate with current gang members. They're taking 
these people under their wings.” 
 
Assessment: while the article mentions a specific religious background (a strong evangelist 
family in both cases, and in particular the role of Tony’s very supportive mother), this is not a 
case of religious conversion; Tony’s words suggest there has been also a religious re-awakening, 
but the motives mentioned are essentially moral (in the sense of not-specifically-religious). 
There is regret for the things they have done – people they have actually hurt; the decayed 
situation of their neighborhood, for which they feel partly responsible; the violence they have 
seen, particularly Chip’s cousin dying in his hands, and their responsibility in younger gang 
members having learned from them. All these motivating factors are explicitly mentioned. There 
is also love for their new way of life, compounded because their job still has an “adrenaline rush” 
aspect, but also (probably more significant) because they see their part in keeping kids out of the 
street, in school and jobs, etc. 
It is not clear, however, that the factors mentioned have been the most important in determining 
their conversion. In Tony’s case, the most important motivating factor at the time of conversion 
seems to have been a sort of weariness – tired of ending up in jail, having to look over his 
shoulder all the time, etc. Another important factor is the model presence of his mother, “praying 
all the time,” and supportive, present. It might be speculated that through her influence, also, the 
religious faith “took hold” in Tony, giving him a moral structure to fill the emptiness of the 
previous structure. Her suggestion to look into CeaseFire also provided Tony with a meaningful 




As to Chip, it is possible to see that he had accumulated a number of traumatic experiences, but 
these spun him out of control, instead of setting him in the direction of conversion. It was the 
presence of the friend (again, also as role-model) that helped him find a positive direction. 
The testimony of the police officer is useful in this case to assess the stability of their conversion. 
 
Case #22: Russ Fee [Primary school teacher] 
Source: Hilary Anderson, “New Teacher Lays down the Law… and picks up the books,” The 
Catholic New World, January 22-February 4, 2006 – p. 23 
Type of conversion: “Career” conversion, from long-time lawyer to school teacher 
Explicit period of reflection: yes 
Assessment of values: implicit 
The Story: As provided in the article: 
Russ Fee, a former civil rights and employment attorney, voluntarily gave up 27 years of 
practicing law to work with young people. Today he’s a third-grade teacher at St. Bruno 
School. 
 
The decision to change careers was not a quick one, but Fee said he knew in his heart that 
the practice of law no longer was giving him a sense of accomplishment. “There were 
several reasons for my about-face,” Fee said. “I had become too brittle, too competitive, too 
self-absorbed. I was involved in the adversarial system and became disillusioned with what 
I had accomplished as a lawyer. I wasn’t achieving what I had intended. I was racing 
through life instead of strolling.” 
 
Fee began winding down his practice, unsure of which road to take next. Finally, as time 
became more available, Fee began work as a substitute teacher in Berwyn’s District 100. 
 
Fee substituted through every grade, and liked elementary the best. “Children that age are 
enthusiastic and energetic,” he says. “Being a substitute was a delight. It’s not what you think.” 
Though already qualified to teach in high school, he took the courses for certification at the 
elementary level. While doing an assignment that involved observing children in public places, 




teacher, they “recruited” him, asking him to apply at their school. He did, and was hired as full 
time. 
“My biggest challenge now,” says Fee, “is answering questions from parents and others who 
wonder how I could give up law to teach third grade.” He has even written a book of poems out 
of his experiences. 
He credits much of his career change to the support of his wife and his three adult children. 
 
“Changing careers can’t be a forced decision,” he said. “One must go at it slowly and seek 
out what has values that are important to them and try it out. Changing careers is not 
necessarily a panacea for what’s wrong in one’s life. It has to be a decision of the heart and 
mind.” 
 
“I feel better about what happens in a single day in the classroom than I ever did during my 
years in law,” Fee said. “The children are enthusiastic, unafraid even with all the problems 
that occur in their lives.” 
 
Assessment: This is one of the rarely reported cases of “progressive” conversion, not sudden or 
marked by a triggering event, but showing a careful discernment of options, consultation with 
other family members, etc. There is not enough information on Fee's previous motivations, that 
drove him to seek a career as lawyer (though the fact that he was a civil rights attorney suggests 
his motivations where 'altruistic' or community-oriented). So it is possible to interpret his change 
not so much a change in moral structures, but as the discovery of a more appropriate way of 
channeling his original ideals and motivations. 
 
Case #23: Elizabeth and Charles [not their real names] [A victim-offender mediation case] 
Source: Kenneth Melchin, "Insight, Conflict and Justice"; paper read at the Lonergan Workshop, 
Boston College (2005). The story was told by Wendy Keats of MOVE, Inc., an organization in 




Type of conversion: Elizabeth’s is mostly a  “psychological” type of conversion (of closure 
regarding a traumatic event); Charles’ is one of awareness of the harm done to victims, and a 
potential change in his attitude towards life and towards rehabilitation. 
Explicit period of reflection: yes in the case of Elizabeth, no in the case of Charles. 
Assessment of values: not explicit. 
The Story: Elizabeth, a worker in a convenience store, was robbed by a man who threatened her 
with death while holding the knife to her throat. The 21 year-old offender, Charles, was captured 
and went to prison, condemned to serve a five-year sentence. But Elizabeth was seriously 
traumatized by the experience: she wet herself for many months after the experience, she was 
teased without mercy by other people; fear and shame began evoking haunting memories of other 
traumatic events in her past. She had nightmares, and became terrified whenever she closed her 
eyes. She lived in terror that he would come back to harm her. Friends and family became 
impatient with her; her marriage broke down and her relationship with her children deteriorated. 
To make matters worse, she did not technically qualified to be considered a victim according to 
the courts; the storeowners were the official victims. Apart from her victim impact statement, she 
was excluded from the procedures altogether. 
After two years of counseling with little results, she realized she needed to give closure to this 
event in order to move forward. She attended Charles’ parole hearing. Though she wasn't allowed 
to communicate with the offender, at one point Charles turned and attempted to speak to her, 
though he was prevented by an officer. After this event, Elizabeth contacted the Parole Board and 
requested a meeting with Charles, and was referred to a victim-offender mediation program. She 
was asked for the reasons to meet with Charles, and told the mediator: “I have to find out whether 
he is coming back to get me or my family. I have to tell him how I feel. I have to look him in the 




Charles had a story of his own: he was raised in a family environment of violence, drugs and 
abuse. He began committing minor offenses as a juvenile. The robbery was his first major 
offense, and he had committed it while under the influence of alcohol and drugs: “to him, the 
event was the result of a very bad acid trip.” He was not aware of the impact of his actions on 
Elizabeth, and only learned of them when he was told she insisted on submitting a victim impact 
statement. He had spent two years in prison - a brutal experience; he lived in constant fear - and 
felt his sentence was a heavy price to pay. 
When the mediator told him of Elizabeth’s fear of him, he showed astonishment: 
“Doesn't she know I wouldna’ never hurt her? Don't they give them convenience store 
clerks some training that tells them to just hand over the money and nobody will get hurt?” 
“Doesn't she know that every robber says 'don't call the cops or I'll come back an' git ya'? 
That's just the way it's done. Gee, I'm really sorry about this... I had no idea.” 
 
Under the control of the mediator, both parties told their stories in turn. At one point they even 
began to chuckle together about a detail and this released a lot of the tension. They began 
speaking from the heart.  
Elizabeth learned that the real Charles was not the Charles of her nightmares and fears. She 
learned that he had no intention of returning to hurt her. She learned that his sorrow was 
genuine. She learned something of his own suffering. 
 
They even came to a decision on how they would speak to each other if they ever met on the 
street; they shook hands and wished each other well. Elizabeth told Charles that she forgave him 
and told the mediator, “It’s over. It's closed. It's done.” She asked that a letter be sent to the Parole 
Board requesting that she no longer be used as a reason for keeping Charles in jail. 
Elizabeth no longer has nightmares and her fear is gone. Charles’ case manager reports that he is 
getting along well and that he is maturing after the mediation experience. Staff members feel that 
he will respond better to treatment and that he is developing a better attitude towards life. 
Assessment: Melchin himself - in the second part of his paper - derives many conclusions from 




in Elizabeth, after meeting “the real Charles.” As she begins to understand Charles’ humanity, his 
own history of suffering and his genuine sorrow, Elizabeth can de-link this image from the 
images and feelings arising from her earlier traumas. As she begins to forge a relation with him 
that is free of fear, she is freed from the fear that arose the “aberrations in feelings and in the 
patterns of valuing.” These considerations, however, may be more directly applicable in a study 
on insight’s effect on psychological healing than on moral conversion. 
Of more consequence to my study is the effect of meeting Elizabeth face-to-face for Charles. The 
case study does not follow his progress too far, but reports a change in his attitude that is 
promising. Perhaps the most important change is that now he has an experience of what it is to be 
the victim of a criminal action - there was a certain naïveté in the way he imagined victims 
reacted, or it may have to do with the tougher skin he had to develop while living in an 
environment of violence; but his encounter with Elizabeth may have dispelled some of that 
naïveté. The change may not be so profound, in that it seems Charles had somewhat of a good 
heart to begin with; it seems that it was more through ignorance of the consequences of his 
actions (not to mention that he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol) that he committed 
the crime. But the change in behavior may be, on the other hand, very significant. 
 
Case # 24: Jackie Katounas ['Restorative Justice' mediator] 
Source: Te Ara Whakatika: Newsletter of the court-referred restorative justice project. 
September  2001, Issue 4.  
Type of conversion: abandoning a life of crime. Triggering event: discovering that she was 
harming someone else. (There is some “de-centering” in this case) 
Explicit period of reflection: yes 




The Story: A heroin addict, Jackie Katounas “clocked up” 138 convictions and spent 12 years in 
prison over a 25 year period.  She went into her first maximum security unit at 12 years, and was 
in Mt. Eden prison [in New Zealand] at 16.   
"In all that time I was never aware I was hurting anyone. I never gave consideration or a thought 
to the victims," says Jackie.    
Jackie's change came about when she received some stolen goods, and realized that she knew the 
owner of these goods personally. “It was the first time I ever felt shameful,” says Jackie. “I 
phoned the victim and went and explained my involvement.” 
She then sought the rest of the stolen goods and return them to the victim.   
“It was a raw form of restorative justice, but I never offended from that day on. It was a powerful 
turning point because I began thinking of other people than myself. For 25 years I had wreaked 
havoc on the community, and then restorative justice changed my life.” 
She abandoned her life of crime, but the move was difficult. “I had to learn to speak to people 
without speaking about crime and drugs. I had to learn how to build rapport with people who 
weren't criminals.” 
Some time later she heard a speech by restorative justice advocate Jim Consedine. It helped her 
put her experience in a framework, that of restorative justice. Jackie trained to be a facilitator [in 
the Restorative Justice program], and now her work offers a unique perspective to prisoners.   
Jackie works as a facilitator for the Hawkes Bay organization's restorative justice project. 
Working at Whakatikatika Prison [Restorative Justice] Project. In the first 13 months of her work 
there, Jackie has had 82 referrals from prisoners wanting to make amends with their victims. She 
also runs a new initiative for the group, a community-based initiative known as Hawkes Bay 
Restorative Justice Te Puna Wai Ora Inc. She also features in a training video being produced for 




Jackie has managed to facilitate 15 conferences. For others, she has asked victims if they would 
be willing to accept a letter from an offender. This has gone ahead in about nine cases. 
Sometimes when I talk to them about the harm of their offending it is the first time they 
have ever heard that. I know it sounds bizarre that they don't think about the harm they 
have caused people or the ripple effect. Some of them still try to justify what they did or 
dispute the facts, but some begin to see what their offending has done. I know they have no 
idea of the effect because I used to be just like that. 
I challenge them to make change in their life. They need to address the stuff in their past to 
have a bright future. I  can establish a real rapport with the prisoners. 
 
Prison officers have been very supportive and have embraced the concept. If a prison officer 
believes a prisoner is  showing some remorse, they often make a referral to Jackie. 
Assessment: This narrative provides strong evidence that it was the lack of a certain insight that 
kept Jackie committing crimes and offenses, namely, that there was another side to those 
offenses: the victim. Realizing that she was doing harm to someone else was the insight necessary 
for her to change her behavior. That she went from self-involved heroin addict to restorative 
justice facilitator may indicate that she was potentially a generous person – there is not enough 
information to gauge how much of a change this was. But going from 138 convictions in 25 years 
to none, certainly indicates a deep change, and this is further supported by the fact that she 
devoted her energies to other-regarding, healing activities. 
Note: A later article in the same publication, written in first person by Katounas herself shows her 
Christian faith being at work (though it is not clear whether this was a factor in her moral 
conversion, or whether it came about later). 
This intimate knowledge of what it is like to be an “inmate” reminded me of how far the 
Lord has brought me by his grace. . . When I witness these miracles happening is it any 
wonder I’m so passionate about my work? I feel privileged and honoured to be an 





Case #25: The Remorseful Burglar [Another Restorative Justice case] 
Source: “Face to Face,” Te Ara Whakatika: Newsletter of the Court-Referred Restorative Justice 
Project; July 2001, Issue 2, p.3. 
Type of conversion: Remorse after committing a crime - Repayment 
Explicit period of reflection: implicit. 
Assessment of values: Not mentioned. 
The Story: A burglar broke into a house and took, among other things, a cellphone and a camera, 
the latter not property of the house owners. The burglar was captured, pleaded guilty, and agreed 
to take part in a community-based restorative justice process as well as the official criminal 
justice system. Mary (not her real name) had a chance to face the offender, ask questions, tell him 
how deeply his actions had affected her family, hear how remorseful he was and have some input 
into helping him move on and make positive changes in his life. 
“We heard through his probation officer that he got a job two weeks later, and we’ve had 
the first repayments for the damage. It was good to see he really responded, and from what 
I could see learnt a lot.” 
 
After the offender was arrested, Mary was telephoned by a facilitator to see if she would consider 
a restorative justice meeting: 
“I knew the offender was young -- not a hardened criminal. There were so many questions. 
I hoped the conference would make a difference for him and us.” 
 
Mary’s youngest son, who had been badly affected by the break-in, didn’t want to attend, but 
“benefited greatly by us coming back to tell him what went on.” 
At the conference it was “obvious the offender would have rather sunk through a hole in the 
ground than have been there. He looked nervous and embarrassed. He gave us the odd glance, but 
kept his head down mostly.” The offender 
“kept on trying to look at me but his head was getting lower and lower as he began to 




was so sad to see a young guy getting involved in crime. I wanted him to pay us back for 
the damage done and return the camera and cellphone.” 
 
Mary then forgave him and said the “slate was clean, but I really hoped in the future the slate 
would tell a story of someone who had made a terrible mistake but had learnt from it and pushed 
on to do good things with his life.” When Mary said she forgave him, the young man -- with tear-
filled eyes -- apologized. 
Assessment: Simple remorse may be a form of conversion, when it implies that the “offender” 
realizes the wrongfulness of his/her previous acts. In this case, the burglar was faced with his 
victims, and realized that “a simple in and out job” is a euphemism; behind such a “job” there are 
people getting hurt, left in fear and anger and frustration. Again (as in Case #23, above) a lacking 
insight was brought to light by the simple procedure of making the criminal face the victims. 
 
Case #26: Alan and Corry - Aggravated Robbery [Another Restorative Justice case] 
Source: Consedine and Bowen, Restorative Justice: Contemporary Themes and Practice, 
(Lyttelton, New Zealand: Ploughshares Publications, 1999) 112-118. 
Type of conversion: remorse and straightening-out after an attempted robbery 
Explicit period of reflection: yes. 
Assessment of values: some is mentioned. 
The Story: Alan Marr, age 20 and Corry Barrett, age 18, went into a dairy armed with a replica 
pistol, and demanded money. Rosemary, owner of the dairy, reacted by telling them to “stuff off,” 
after which they left immediately. When later apprehended by the police, they each admitted 
being involved. A restorative justice process was suggested after the co-accused had indicated a 
desire to apologize to the victim. (The process, usually called a "Community Group Conference 
(CGC), is separated into three stages: one that allows the parties to address what in fact happened 




to look at possible outcomes for the offenders to be recommended to the court. Those outcomes 
usually involve alternatives to imprisonment, and indicate ways for the offenders to repair the 
damages caused to the victims.) 
In the first stage (addressing what actually happened), the offenders explained that they had been 
unemployed, broke, hungry and in need of money. (Alan had obtained employment after the 
incident). The youngest, Corry, explained that he was having trouble with his family, and not 
communicating with them. They also explained that they had chosen this shop because the 
girlfriend of one of them lived down the road. 
The victim explained how scary the situation had been; and how now she took notice of every 
one who was coming in, and that they had now installed some security devices. She and her 
husband were now in fear and thinking whether they should sell the shop, although after meeting 
the “boys” they were not afraid anymore. They also explained how hard they had to work every 
day to keep their dairy, which they had owned for 14 years, and how if someone were hungry and 
asked for help, they might give them bread, milk and butter. 
The offenders acknowledged that it had been a stupid thing to do; and Alan added it was good 
that they hadn't got away with it, since then they might have done it again. Corry added that he 
had been taking Prozac, after diagnosed with clinical depression, and that he felt his home was 
not his home. After the event, his family and him had been brought together. “Before, I wasn't 
spending much time at home, I couldn't talk to my parents. Since then I have learned to, I am 
living back at home; I have a different value system altogether.” (Emphasis mine) Alan said that 
he also found it easier to come to his mother and father with questions, to get advice and even ask 
them for money. 
The offenders’ families were present. Each acknowledged the private hell they had gone through 




In the third stage, the boys formally apologized, and offered to pay for the cost of the surveillance 
system, or work, but the shop owners turned those offers down, saying they had come to tell them 
that they could do better and be better boys. In closing the meeting, the shop owners no longer 
feared that the offenders would come and seek revenge, and that they hoped the boys would get a 
lesson out of this. The offenders were given a sentence of two years’ suspended imprisonment. 
Assessment: it appears from the case that “the boys” were not really criminals, and felt shame 
and guilt about their deeds perhaps even before they were apprehended, and certainly before 
meeting the victims. In this sense, it does not seem that the meeting itself produced a conversion. 
The episode as a whole, however, seems to have been beneficial in helping them “put it together,” 
rather than a “change in values.” Nevertheless, putting the offenders in the same room with their 
victims probably solidified their already positive attitudes and judgments. Said Corry, “We didn't 
know you. For us you had no personality. Now I have met you.” 
 
Note: I have selected only a few cases of victim-offender mediation within the 'restorative justice' 
context, those that provide sufficient details to sustain a reasonable belief that there was 
some sort of moral conversion. There are many more cases in the literature, that also 
suggest at least some minor form of moral conversion, but that are presented in terms too 
brief. See for example  Consedine and Bowen, Restorative Justice: Contemporary Themes 
and Practice, 96-123. 
 
Case #27: New Zealand's “Black Power” Gang [A case of “social” moral conversion?] 
Source: Consedine, Jim, Restorative Justice: Healing the Effects of Crime (Lyttelton, New 
Zealand: Ploughshares Publications, 1999) 83-84. 
Type of conversion: group moral conversion 
Explicit period of reflection: yes.  
Assessment of values: yes. 
The Story: Information on this case is sparse. It involves specifically a group's explicit change of 




There was a time when belonging to a gang almost certainly meant having to be involved 
with rape in order to be seen as “staunch.” Such was the case with Black Power, probably 
New Zealand's best-known gang. For years women were treated as objects to be enjoyed at 
gang members' behest, and no amount of imprisonment for rape and other charges of 
violence made any difference. Prison was seen as a place to recruit new members. The 
traditional retributive justice process could not stem the violence towards women. In effect 
it increased it.  
Then came a dramatic shift in attitude. At their 1978 national convention, Black Power, led 
by their president Rei Harris, banned rape. Rediscovery of traditional Maori justice and 
values had a significant part to play in this conversion. So too did the strength and integrity 
of the president and some chief supporters.  
But for some old habits die hard. There were subsequent cases that Black Power dealt with 
themselves. Bill Maung, former judge and legal adviser to Black Power, has talked about 
how the gang dealt with such violations of their moral code. 
 
The text goes on to describe the incident of a woman raped by three of their members; she 
preferred not to go to the police, and it was dealt with on a marae, a trial according to traditional 
Maori customs. The members were judged and condemned in front of their tribes and peers. 
Shame would be their principal punishment; they were also placed under close supervision and 
ordered to pay a weekly sum to the woman out of their meager incomes for six months. 
According to the text, none of them re-offended (one, however, committed suicide later, though 
no definite connection was made with his rape offense). The young woman forgave them. Later, 
explaining why, she said that for once in her life she had felt in control of a major situation, so 
she felt she could afford to be generous to them given the sorrow they had expressed. 
Assessment: group responsibility is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but this case provides a 
useful bit of evidence to begin considering the possibility of communities explicitly revising their 
moral contents and attitudes as communities. 
 
Case #28: Arun Gandhi and Jackie Besson 
Source: Arun Gandhi’s talk during the Peacemaking in an Age of Terror Conference, Loyola 
University Chicago (2007). 




Explicit period of reflection: yes 
Assessment of values: yes 
The Story: told by Arun Gandhi (Mahatma Gandhi’s grandson) as an example of the 
transforming effect of non-violence. Jackie Besson was a “confirmed racist” in South Africa, one 
of the architects of the apartheid, under which Arun suffered during his youth. It so happened 
that, when Arun was living later in India, a ship experiencing some difficulties came to shore 
from South Africa, an Arun was charged with providing hospitality to the passengers. The first 
person he met was, surprisingly, Besson himself. Arun repressed his impulse to insult him and 
“tell him go throw yourself into the ocean,” and greeted him politely (though not amicably). He 
made a conscious decision to be polite rather than berate him, and let Besson stay with them for a 
few days, during which he showed him the sights (good and bad). Their conversation recurrently 
turned on the apartheid, and they often had harsh arguments over and again, changing the subject 
when the discussion grew too heated. But in spite of this, Arun and his family continued in their 
polite kindness and eventually made some headway in lessening the harshness of the exchanges. 
According to Gandhi, their departure after those four days was very emotional; Besson, with tears 
in his eyes, expressed he had seen things in a new light and claimed he had renounced his racist 
views and would now fight for a change in the system in South Africa. Gandhi did not believe it 
at first, but found confirmation later, when Besson actually got involved in fighting against the 
apartheid in South Africa. 
 
Case #: 29 – Donald Gelpi [conversion from racism] 
Source: Donald L. Gelpi, The Conversion Experience (1988: Paulist Press, New Jersey) 28-31. 
Type of conversion: Conversion regarding content, about right/wrong 




Assessment of values: Yes 
The Story: As told by Gelpi, 
Of the five forms of conversion, I experienced personal moral conversion first of all. I was 
born in New Orleans, Lousiana, and grew up in the section of the United States known as 
the Deep South. In the 1860s the Deep South seceded from the union over the issue of 
slavery. Prejudice distorts every society, and ethnic prejudice and bigotry mar every 
culture. In the United States black people and Native Americans, for example, suffer from 
racial bigotry, and in the Deep South racial bigotry focuses especially on black people. 
Because I grew up in the Deep South, I grew up a racial bigot. I did grow up believing in 
their essential racial inferiority to myself and to other white people. 
No one challenged my racial bigotry in a systematic way until I went to high school. The 
Jesuits who taught me waged ceaseless war on my racism and on the racism of my white 
classmates. I resisted them for two years, but eventually I conceded that they had the right 
of it. I recognized the immorality of racism and renounced it in my own heart. 
I look back on that experience as a personal moral conversion. I regard it as an initial moral 
conversion because, for the first time in my life, I took personal responsibility for 
disagreeing with the conventional morality taught me by my society. By disagreeing, I took 
personal responsibility for my own conscience.” (29) 
 
Case #: 30 – “Doctor Bob” [one of the cofounders of Alcoholics Anonymous] 
Source: Alcoholics Anonymous : The Story of How Many Thousands of Men and Women Have 
Recovered from Alcoholism (Online Edition). 4th ed. (New York City: Alcoholics Anonymous 
World Services, 2001) 171. 
Type of conversion: from alcoholism. 
Explicit period of reflection: yes. 
Assessment of values: yes. 
The Story: The story of “Doctor Bob” is one of the classic testimonies compiled in the A. A. 
“Big Book”; the birth of the society is dated from “his first day of permanent sobriety,” in June 
1935. Doctor Bob got into drinking during his college years, drinking as much as his money 
permitted. By the time he took up medicine, he was drinking enough to have morning “jitters.” 
His addiction was already compromising his capacity to go to class; he would not dare assist to 
class if he had those jitters, and in the Sophomore year he almost quit school. He had to convince 




could not hold a pencil), then passed them, then got into drinking again, eventually pulled himself 
dry, graduated, and remained sober during a couple years of residency during which he was too 
busy to leave the hospital frequently. After this, however, once he got his own practice, he fell 
into drinking again; he even developed a phobia to running out of liquor (176). He needed to 
manage his addiction carefully; he needed to be sober enough in the morning to practice 
medicine, in order to have money for liquor in the evening. He also developed tremendous 
cunning for acquiring and keeping alcohol at home, even during the times of prohibition and 
living with a vigilant wife. 
In his narrative, Bob does not specifically censure his drinking in terms of right/wrong, whether 
from a religious or a social point of view. Rather, drinking is decried as a continuous obstacle to 
his fulfilling his aspirations, and achieving happiness, and as the cause of many miserable 
moments and of living under the constant threat of downfall and shame. A felt contrast with 
people who could live free from these binds is reported as one of the factors initiating a change 
(though not per se powerful enough to accomplish it). Says Doctor Bob 
About the time of the beer experiment [a catastrophic attempt to replace stronger drinks 
with beer] I was thrown in with a crowd of people who attracted me because of their 
seeming poise, health and happiness. They spoke with great freedom from embarrassment, 
which I could never do, and they seemed very much at ease on all occasions and appeared 
very healthy. More than these attributes, they seemed to be happy. I was self conscious and 
ill at ease most of the time, my health was at the breaking point, and I was thoroughly 
miserable. I sensed they had something I did not have, from which I might readily profit. I 
learned that it was something of a spiritual nature, which did not appeal to me very much, 
but I thought it could do no harm. I gave the matter much time and study for the next two 
and a half years, but I still got tight [i.e. drunk] every night nevertheless. I read everything I 
could find, and talked to everyone who I thought knew anything about it. (178) 
 
It was about this time that a woman recommended Bob’s wife that he talk to a friend of hers. This 
man – unnamed in the story – managed, after many hours of talking, to get Bob to remain sober 
for a few weeks. After this, however, in the course of going to a conference, Bob drunk severely 




then took care of Bob again, and the following morning Doctor Bob was able to cease drinking 
permanently. He was able then to regain both his health and self-respect, and the respect of his 
colleagues. Bob asks himself the question, what did this man do or say that was different from 
what others had done or said? In his opinion, a key factor seems to be the fact that this man had 
been an alcoholic too, and had had “most of all the drunkard’s experiences known to man, but 
had been cured by the very means I had been trying to employ, that is to say the spiritual 
approach.” (180) 
With the help of this person, Bob was able to recover from his addiction, and to use his medical 
skills in the help of others with similar problems. To the day of his death, in 1950, he had helped 
more than 5,000 alcoholics, men and women, giving them sometimes medical assistance without 
charging them. 
Note: The current edition of the Alcoholics Anonymous book features a section with forty-two 
selected stories of recovered alcoholics (these stories are periodically revised and 
rotated so as to maintain both a collection of “classic” narratives and more 
contemporary ones). Many of these have similarities to the story of Dr. Bob, above. 
Doctor Bob’s is however particularly useful and representative because of the degree of 
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